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Despite everything that has been thrown at the problem over the decades, opium 
and coca production and distribution reached the highest levels ever recorded in 
2018. What explains such extraordinary resilience to prohibition?  
This study conducts a comprehensive investigation. First, it historicises the 
emergence of opium and coca enterprise as a product of commodification and 
social construction. Next, it examines the two global mechanisms – the US and 
the UN systems – for tracking and monitoring the ubiquitous markets typically 
hidden in plain sight, and critically assesses official information and knowledge 
published since 1986.  
Having assembled bases for understanding, this study then narrows down by 
focusing on the key actors and posing the questions:  
How do criminal entrepreneurs shape, and are in turn shaped by, the resilience of 
the illicit production of the crops opium and coca, and what are the implications of 
their enterprise on the governance over the livelihoods of poor rural households they 
affect? 
To answer those questions, this study makes a comparative assessment of four 
country cases: Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia. The assessment 
analyses three ‘configurations’ — the combination of factors or variables that 
represents the diverse outcomes or consequences – that may provide the 
answers. These are: (a) resilience and survival in the borderlands where the illicit 
crops are grown; (b) the careers or life stories of selected criminal entrepreneurs; 
and (c) prices and price changes of the illicit crops.      
This study concludes that interdependency, first elaborated by Blok (1974) and 
defined as political, economic, or social forms of symbiosis, quid pro quos, 
collusion, or connivance — not fragility, coercion and criminal enterprise, or 
prices — best explains the resilience of opium and coca to prohibition. Analysing 
interdependency not only provides an alternative framing, it also opens up the 
options for tackling the policy dilemmas posed by illicit crop economies over the 






Ondanks de decennialange strijd om het probleem aan te pakken, heeft de productie 
en distributie van opium en coca in 2018 een historisch hoog niveau bereikt. Wat 
verklaart die buitengewone weerstand tegen een verbod op deze industrie?  
Dit proefschrift beschrijft een diepgaand onderzoek naar dit probleem. Allereerst 
wordt de opkomst van de commerciële opium- en coca-teelt in historisch perspectief 
geplaatst als een product van commodificatie en sociale constructie. Daarna volgt 
een onderzoek naar het Amerikaanse en het VN-systeem. Dit zijn de twee mondiale 
mechanismen om de alomtegenwoordige markten die vol in het zicht zijn verborgen 
op te sporen en te observeren. De officiële informatie en kennis die sinds 1986 is 
gepubliceerd wordt daarbij kritisch tegen het licht gehouden.  
Nadat de theoretische basis is gelegd wordt de focus van het onderzoek verlegd naar 
de hoofdrolspelers. De onderzoeksvragen zijn:  
Hoe geven criminele ondernemers vorm aan, en worden zij op hun beurt gevormd door, de 
veerkracht van de illegale productie van de gewassen opium en coca? En wat zijn de 
implicaties van hun activiteiten voor het voorzien in het levensonderhoud van arme 
plattelandshuishoudens waarop zij invloed hebben? 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden is een vergelijkend onderzoek gedaan in vier 
landen: Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia en Bolivia. Er zijn drie 'configuraties' 
onderzocht die een antwoord op de vragen kunnen bieden. Een configuratie is de 
combinatie van factoren of variabelen die de verschillende uitkomsten of gevolgen 
weergeeft. Het betreft a) veerkracht en overleving in de grensgebieden waar de 
illegale gewassen worden geteeld; b) de carrières of levensverhalen van 
geselecteerde criminele ondernemers; en c) prijzen en prijsveranderingen van de 
illegale gewassen.  
De conclusie van dit onderzoek is dat onderlinge afhankelijkheid – en niet 
kwetsbaarheid, dwang en criminele ondernemingen, of prijzen – de beste verklaring 
vormt voor weerstand tegen het verbod op opium en coca. Het begrip onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid is voor het eerst beschreven door Blok (1974) en wordt gedefinieerd 
als politieke, economische of sociale vormen van symbiose, voor wat hoort wat, 
samenspannen of oogluikend toestaan. Het onderzoeken van onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid biedt niet alleen een ander perspectief, maar ook mogelijkheden om 
de beleidsdilemma's aan te pakken die ontstaan door de gevolgen van illegale 
gewasseneconomieën voor de mogelijkheden om in het levensonderhoud te 






Tackling the Puzzles of Resilience to Prohibition 
To set the stage for this study, it is necessary to first briefly examine the scope 
and depth of illicit opium and coca’s resilience to prohibition, and the underlying 
messy politics, from both a ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ perspective.  
In the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the two biggest economies in the world 
today, the United States and China, separately staged what were perhaps the most 
aggressive wars on drugs in history. Drug ‘cartels’ were destroyed, hundreds 
arrested, drug kingpins killed or captured, and tens of thousands of hectares of 
illicit cropland eradicated. Yet despite the full force of the state and the coercive 
capacities deployed, neither offensive succeeded in doing any measurable long-
term damage: the enterprise in illicit crops not only continued, but even 
expanded thereafter. What might explain this failure?1  
The US offensive began when the Drugs Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) published, on 23 August 1989, a list of 12 Colombian drug lords, 
including Pablo Escobar, wanted for extradition in connection with charges filed 
in US courts. As the list made it to the news, a full-blown war ignited. The 
Medellin cartel responded by targeting the Colombian government, sending 
dozens of sicarios (assassins) to kill judges, prosecutors, uncooperative policemen 
and politicians. By early October 1989, Colombian police had linked 142 deadly 
bomb attacks to the Medellin mobsters. Up to 88 car bombs were reported to 
have exploded at banks, hotels and malls in major Colombian cities. As the war 
intensified, an Avianca commercial airliner, on which two government 
informants were thought to be passengers, was blown up in November, killing 
all 107 on board (New York Times, 23 August 1989; 30 August 1989; 4 October 
1989; 20 December 1994). 
 
1 More extensive discussions of the overall failure of prohibition are discussed in Buxton (2006); 
IDPC (2018); Rolles et al. (2016); TNI (2006, 2008).  
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As the US stepped up the pressure, governments of the region fell into line 
by extraditing more drug lords to face US prosecution. Among the ‘big fish’ 
handed over was Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, Bolivia’s former Minister of the 
Interior (Los Angeles Times, 12 December 1989). The DEA charged him as 
principally responsible for organising cocaine production in Bolivia, by 
protecting traffickers who paid him and arresting those who refused. 
Testimonies revealed how he sold cocaine seized from uncooperative traffickers 
— including that kept as evidence in government vaults — to traffickers who 
did cooperate (New York Times, 23 March 1991; Taylor, 29 April 1983). He was 
infamous for warning his foes to ‘walk around with their wills under their arms’2.  
But it was at the end of 1989 that US resolve was demonstrated most clearly. 
A few days before Christmas, over 27,000 American troops invaded Panama. 
Though there were other, perhaps more decisive, geo-political reasons for the 
invasion (i.e. to protect US interests in the Panama Canal which was being 
threatened by political instability), the US targeted Panama’s military ruler 
Manuel Noriega, and used his capture to justify its patently illegal invasion 
(Berman, 1990). Noriega was seized and unceremoniously taken to Miami, where 
he was charged and eventually convicted of drugs and money-laundering 
offences. He was jailed for 40 years. The US also moved against a number of 
Panamanian banks, including the First Inter-Americas Bank, thought to be 
owned by Colombian drug lords who used it to launder drug profits (Micolta, 
2012: 65–66).  
In 1990, the US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 
reported that Colombia had ‘by far the best ever year for its anti-drug effort’: 452 
cocaine labs destroyed; the feared drug lord Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha killed; 37 
tonnes of cocaine seized; 50 aircraft confiscated; 3,607 traffickers arrested; and 
over 2 million gallons of precursor chemicals destroyed. But it came at a cost of 
420 Colombian National Police killed, on top of a string of assassinations, 
including the murder of leading presidential candidate Luis Galan (INCSR 1990: 
125; INCSR 1991: 27).  
By 1995, all 12 Colombians on the US list were either dead, in prison or in 
hiding. The powerful Medellin and Cali cartels were destroyed (Los Angeles Times, 
12 August 1990; New York Times, 15 June 1990; 21 June 1991; 27 June 1995; 6 
August 1995). Yet the curious outcome is that the vast cross-border structures 
of the illicit drugs trade did not dissolve and crumble. Instead, they just 
 
2 The US ambassador to Bolivia feared for his life after Arce reportedly ordered his assassination 
in retaliation for Arce’s extradition (Los Angeles Times, 29 September 1990).  
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
xxvi 
restructured and perhaps even modernised. In its 1996 assessment, the INCSR 
admitted that despite the elimination of Colombia’s two powerful drug cartels, 
the destruction of over 16,000 hectares of coca that year via US-assisted spraying, 
and the seizure by Colombian police of 16 tonnes of cocaine worth over $300 
million, ‘Colombian coca cultivation increased by 32 percent, the largest relative 
increase to date in any coca-growing country’ (INCSR, 1997). Illicit coca’s 
resilience to prohibition was on full display. 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, China was carrying out its own 
anti-drugs campaign. The milestone often cited is 12 April 1986, when 
authorities in Yunnan, the south-western Chinese province that shares a border 
with Myanmar3, Laos and Vietnam, made their first major drugs bust on the 
Ruili–Muse border crossing since China became a People’s Republic in 1949. 
Two people, one a Thai national, were arrested and 22 kg of heroin (worth about 
$2.97 million today) seized. The traffickers were eventually convicted and 
executed (Chin and Zhang, 2015: 59).  
By the 1990s, a ‘people’s war’ against drugs was well under way. Its scope and 
depth are seen in an event documented by Zhou Yongming, on 26 June 1992, 
when a baying crowd of more than 40,000 people packed the municipal stadium 
of Kunming, Yunnan’s capital, to witness the public trial of 21 drug traffickers, 
who were sentenced to death and immediately executed. In addition, 4,000 kg of 
heroin and opium — a sizeable fortune — were set on fire in 60 huge electrical 
pots. Simultaneously, in Humen in Guangzhou, about 1,380 km southeast of 
Kunming, 160 kg of heroin, opium and marijuana were publicly burnt while 31 
Guangdong offenders were sentenced to death, similarly through a trial inside a 
stadium witnessed by thousands. Eighteen were immediately executed (Zhou, 
1999: 131, 1).4  
As anti-drugs operations intensified, key border towns in Yunnan used as 
trafficking bases were locked down. Pingyuan, for example, was put under an 
80-day siege from July to September 1992, involving over 100 military vehicles 
 
3 By convention, the country will be referred to as ‘Myanmar’ and its capital as ‘Yangon’. How-
ever, the US government continues to consistently use ‘Burma’ and ‘Rangoon’, and these will be 
used where US government documents are cited. Hence, I have used both sets of names inter-
changeably. 
4 Both date and location (Humen) are symbolic, as they mark the anniversary of the end of the 
First Opium War (1839–1842). China views the ‘drug problem’ not only as a kind of social devi-
ance, according to Zhou, but also as an explosive political issue: drugs were an imposition of im-
perialist powers, hence Chinese anti-drugs crusades were framed in nationalist discourse and 
the construction of a Chinese anti-imperialist identity (Zhou, 1999: 1–3).   
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and 2,000 policemen. Increased arrests and convictions drove Yunnan’s 
execution rates to soar, with 401 drug traffickers executed in 1991, increasing to 
464 in 1992 (ibid.: 161–167, 133–134)5.  
China also targeted major Myanmar drug traffickers. In the early 1990s, 
Myanmar’s military was consolidating control of the restive Shan and Kachin 
states, where separatist ethnic armies roamed but could neither win nor be 
defeated. As local ceasefire agreements were signed, the opium economy in the 
border regions started to expand, creating consequences in adjacent Yunnan. 
Among the major Myanmar drug traffickers captured by China were Yang 
Maoxian and Lee Guoting, both Kokang natives. The Yang family is believed to 
have controlled many of the opium refineries that emerged in Kokang after the 
1989 ceasefires. Yang Maoxian was the younger brother of Yang Maoliang, a 
leading figure and ranking commander of the Myanmar National Democratic 
Alliance Army (MNDAA), one of the Communist Party of Burma splinter 
groups. Both Yang and Lee were executed (Chin and Zhang, 2015: 3; Meehan, 
2015). 
If the US had the Andean countries (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) as the 
source of its cocaine supply problems, China had the Golden Triangle countries 
(Myanmar, Thailand and Laos) as the source of its heroin supply problems. The 
US response was to wage a war on drugs in collaboration with client 
governments, while also providing aid to fund alternative development and crop 
substitution programmes. China responded with its own set of interventions 
that, like those of the US, sought international cooperation, including providing 
aid for crop substitution (Kramer and Woods, 2012; Woods, 2011).  
Both countries knew that their expanding economies and huge markets were 
attracting substantial illicit drugs traffic. Both responded with forceful law 
enforcement to eliminate kingpins, close down smuggling routes, and eradicate 
production. Yet both failed. By the US’s own admission, Colombia’s production 
even increased. And on the China–Myanmar border, no long-term disruption of 
the illicit trade was seen. Chinese authorities themselves offered an explanation: 
each time they disrupt a major drugs-trafficking operation, arrest conspirators, 
or execute drug lords, traffickers simply resort to the ‘ants-moving-house’ 
method, i.e. moving drugs in small quantities but in huge numbers, like ants, to 
spread the risks of apprehension (Chin and Zhang, 2015: loc.74).  
 
5 China is regarded as having one of the highest execution rates in the world, see Cornell Law 
School (2014).  
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The key inference that may be drawn from the US and China’s failures to 
eliminate the illicit enterprise is that there are underlying, well-embedded labour 
and production networks that could not be brought down by state action alone. 
The elimination of major drug lords — such as Escobar, Arce, Noriega, Yang 
and Lee — does not destroy the commodity chain, and may only reconfigure or 
rearrange the underlying business structures of the illicit trade. Furthermore, 
such disruptions enable market entry by smaller-scale entrepreneurs, who then 
start a new cycle of revival and growth in the criminal enterprise. 
The ‘ants’ of the China–Myanmar drug trade and the smaller-scale drug 
traffickers of Colombia, therefore, are the labour force that bear the risks and, at 
the same time, make the illicit crop enterprise resilient to prohibition. They are 
the actors who, through informalisation via dispersal, decentralisation and 
specialisation — or the adaptive division of labour — constitute the criminal 
enterprise’s most effective response to law enforcement efforts. They are the 
criminals without borders. 
 Altogether, these ‘ants’ have built the illicit drugs trade to become what 
appears to be the world’s largest criminal enterprise. In a comprehensive review 
of global illicit financial flows published in 2011, the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) estimated the total proceeds of all crime to be between 2.3% 
and 5.5% of global GDP. The midpoint in this range is 3.6% which, when 
applied to the global GDP of 2019, is equivalent to $3.092 trillion — a figure 
that is much higher than the $1.823 trillion combined output of 48 economies 
of sub-Saharan and northern Africa. The ‘largest income for transnational 
organised crime’, states the UNODC, ‘comes from illicit drugs, which account 
for some 0.6% to 0.9% of global GDP’ (2011a: 7). 6  This translates into a 
turnover of about $515–713 billion for 2019 — equivalent to nearly five times 
the global aid budget for that year.7 In 1997, the UN estimated the illegal drugs 
business to account for 8% of all international trade, comparable to the annual 
global turnover in textiles (New York Times, 26 June 1997),  ‘a remarkable 
inversion in human fundamentals’ (McCoy, 1999: 302).   
 
6 The UNODC has not followed up on this 2011 publication. Subsequent publications have also 
been careful in putting out concrete figures, presumably to emphasise that these are estimates. 
7 The World Bank’s GDP Ranking Table for 2019 gives a global GDP of $86 trillion (rounded off); 
see https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-ranking, accessed 12 May 2020. The global 
aid budget in 2018 was reported by the OECD at $152.8.2 billion; see 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-stand-
ards/official-development-assistance.htm, accessed 12 May 2020. 
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It goes without saying that any economic activity of this magnitude is likely 
to leave almost no aspect of development untouched. Its size and breadth make 
it an important development and governance issue. Amongst other things, it will 
shape the creation of jobs; determine access to land and markets; sway trends in 
banking; drive cross-border financial flows; affect public services; influence 
political decision-making; and change processes on who gets to wield power. 
Indeed, it will inevitably shape ‘who owns what, who does what, who gets what, 
and what do they do with it’ (Bernstein, 2010: 22) in the overall economy.  
Just how well-embedded the labour and production networks of the illicit 
drugs trade are in local society, and why they are so resilient to state control, can 
be seen in the story of Khalida, a 10-year old Afghan girl who in 2008 was handed 
over by her father to a 45-year old drug trafficker as payment for his opium 
debts.   
‘It is my fate’, Khalida told journalist Sami Yousafzai, as they awaited the 
arrival of the trafficker to collect her. Her father, Sayed Shah, who had spent 
much of his life raising opium on stony hillsides of Laghman Province in eastern 
Afghanistan, had borrowed $2,000 from the drug trafficker, promising to repay 
the loan with 24 kg of opium at harvest time. Unfortunately, a government drugs 
eradication team appeared at the family’s 2.5-hectare plot of land and destroyed 
all the opium poppies. Fearing repercussions from the angry trafficker, Shah fled 
with his family to Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar Province, but the trafficker 
soon tracked them down. Scared and desperate, Shah brought his case to a tribal 
council, begging for leniency. Unfortunately for the father of ten, the elders ruled 
that he ‘would have to reimburse the trafficker by giving Khalida to him in 
marriage’. Khalida ended up becoming an ‘opium bride’ (Yousafzai, 2008).  
But there is more to Khalida’s case than just plain debt collection. As more 
accounts of opium brides emerged by 2012,8 it became apparent that the girls are 
taken not simply as debt settlement. Most drug smugglers choose to go through 
the Islamic nikah marriage ceremony as well, a culturally recognised symbol that 
legitimises the man’s status as husband or ‘owner’ of the girl. The ritual is not 
just a form of insurance against being legally charged for extortion or kidnapping 
a minor. Marriages are also a strategy that changes the status of the enterprising 
 
8 See for example Monischa Hoonsuwan’s (2012) report in The Atlantic and Fariba Nawa’s (2012) 
in Foreign Affairs. In 2011, Nawa had published the book Opium Nation: Child Brides, Drug Lords, 
and One Woman’s Journey Through Afghanistan. See also the Pulitzer Center’s series “Too 
Young To Wed: The Secret World of Child Brides”, https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/child-
brides-child-marriage-too-young-to-wed, accessed 19 December 2019.   
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creditor from outsider to insider in the girl’s village, thereby entitling him to some 
form of protection.9 As a ‘local son’, the trafficker may also use the wife’s house 
as a base for drugs trafficking, especially since in Afghanistan, ‘drugs tend to be 
stockpiled in the villages rather than in the district bazaar’ (Goodhand, 2009: 17).  
At first glance, then, Khalida’s story or the phenomenon of opium brides 
might seem a useful starting point for an investigation into the resilience and 
apparent invisibility, at least to outsiders, of illicit enterprise. In this story, the 
opium bride emerges as an instrument to be used by an enterprising trafficker 
for integrating his illicit business into a local social system, that at the same time 
may turn the girl’s village into an effective infrastructure within the global chain 
of an illicit commodity trade. However, a preliminary search of academic 
literature examining this phenomenon revealed very little; most of what is 
available comes from ‘grey literature’, and until 2012 even that was lacking.  
In their contribution to the 2011 publication, Children of the Drug War: 
Perspectives on the Impact of Drug Policies on Young People, Kabul-based researchers 
Atal Ahmadzai and Christopher Kuonqui described an ‘obscured reality’ in 
which ‘the international and local literatures remain nearly blank on the subject’ 
of child bartering. Pointing out that their fieldwork suggests a wider prevalence 
of opium brides than the scant coverage suggests, they cited some explanations 
for the lacuna. These included social and cultural sensitivities on child-bartering 
practices that may cause embarrassment to those speaking up; the strong de facto 
hold on society by drug lords who obstruct the flow of opium-related 
information; and the particular prevalence of opium brides in unsecured districts 
that are typically not accessible to journalists and researchers. Thus, although the 
phenomenon of opium brides is ‘a real crisis for the young sisters and daughters 
of opium farmers’ families, its full magnitude, social costs, and consequences on 
the lives of the bartered girls remain largely unknown (2011: 43–56).  
What is clear, though, is that the ‘ants’ in the illicit trade, in this case an 
enterprising Afghan drug trafficker, have irregular and unorthodox means at 
their disposal that enable the survival and resilience of their enterprise.     What 
is shocking in Khalida’s case is not just the cruelty of the arrangement, but also 
the way the elders of Laghman advised that she be used as ‘payment’ to settle 
 
9 The use of marriage to receive protection from local villages is also seen elsewhere. One 
prominent case is that of Malaysian Zulkifli bin Hir, a.k.a. Marwan, a wanted terrorist who 
married into families in Mindanao, southern Philippines, thus avoiding capture for years (Ressa, 
2015). Another is Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian Arab and known bandit in the Sahara, who 
married into a Berabiche Arab clan in Timbuktu, and into a nomadic Touareg clan further north 
in Mali (Anderson, 2015: 9).    
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the debt. Seen from an outsider’s perspective, this ‘self-perpetuating system’ 
grows and ‘becomes more ruthless and sophisticated than ever’, as it acquires 
more tools and assets and employs ‘a growing array of opportunists who trap, 
rape and rob from the point of departure to the end of the road’ (Cave and 
Robles, 2014).10 
What emerges therefore from the US and Chinese failures in enforcing 
prohibition, and from the complexity of cases like Khalida’s, is that there are 
macro and micro questions that comprise the puzzle of the illicit drug trade’s 
resilience to prohibition:  
• Why is it that despite an unprecedented UN consensus calling for illicit 
crop eradication since 1961, despite state-enforced eradication attempts 
repeated through history, and despite contemporary wars on drugs waged 
by no less than the two largest economies, the US and China, ‘the 
production of opium and manufacture of cocaine are now at the highest 
levels ever recorded’ (WDR, 2018a: 1; emphasis added)?  
• What is the role of rural indebtedness not only in the creation of opium 
brides, but in the expansion and embeddedness of illicit drugs capitalism? 
More importantly, could the emergence of household indebtedness in 
illicit drug crop enterprise be analysed in the ways framed by Gerber — 
i.e. as a factor of social differentiation; as fostering market discipline; as 
creating pressures that undermine traditional community bonds; and as a 
powerful mechanism of social selection? (Gerber, 2014: 729). 
Putting the macro and micro research questions together, the puzzle that 
emerges is: why have the illicit cultivation, processing and trade of opium and coca become so 
resistant to prohibition and state control?  
This study was conducted for two reasons. First, despite its sheer scale and 
complexity, what is generally known about illicit crops’ resilience to prohibition 
remains largely fragmented or piecemeal. This is borne out by the simple fact 
that despite all efforts towards its eradication, the illicit commerce continues to 
grow. Could it be, therefore, that the prevailing knowledge about these illicit 
crops and the participants in their commodity chains is riddled with simplifying 
 
10 This quote from New York Times journalists Damien Cave and Frances Robles was used in a 
special feature article on coyotes or human smugglers in the multi-billion-dollar illegal migration 
enterprises from Central America to the United States.  
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fictions that obscure or distort, rather than unpack or explain, the sum of the 
parts that make up this complex phenomenon?  
Second, it may be inferred from the UNODC estimates that criminal trades 
are also a creator, not simply an extractor of wealth as often regarded. Could it 
be, therefore, that for many poor communities, or the ‘ants’ of the illicit trade, 
who are marginalised and excluded from regular economies, illicit crop 
production has become an alternative livelihood and means of survival? If so, 
why is illicit crop production often studied mostly in terms of the crimes 
committed, and less in terms of the processes that allow it to reproduce itself, 
continue with impunity, generate the capital it requires, mobilise the labour 
supply it needs, or achieve certain forms of legitimacy? Given its resilience to 
prohibition, does the illicit or ‘shadow’ economy normalise to incorporate 
development as well, and should it therefore be analysed as such? 
Another puzzle is why many poor households, often assumed to be prey, 
appear to be engaging in business with criminals thought to be their predators. 
Are these households in fact complicit criminal partners? A common explanation 
is that they may have been coerced or have no choice. But it could also be 
pointed out that choices — whether rational or otherwise — are never made 
outside of a particular context, i.e. there is no single universal context in which 
the ‘rational choice’ of complicity is made. The onus, therefore, is on researchers 
to describe and explain the trade-offs and paradoxes that emerge in these 
contexts.  
This study is an investigation into these questions. It seeks to explain why 
prohibition has failed; what makes illicit crop economies resilient to law 
enforcement; how its actors arrange and rearrange themselves in these contexts; 
and what trade-offs and paradoxes need to be unpacked and explained. This 
study attempts to provide a contribution towards addressing the challenges to 
development and the governance of rural livelihoods posed by the illicit 
economies of opium and coca. 
Initial probes into cases like Khalida’s reveal the depth of the research 
challenges. An illicit enterprise, by its very nature, is deliberately hidden, often 
misrepresented, and not uncommonly denied. In addition, available information 
may be filtered by those with the power to control its flows and with an interest 
in shaping the version that comes out. And apart from the obvious risks of 
reaching unsecured districts to conduct research, there is an important question 
of ethics. Is it ethically acceptable to conduct research that may open poor 
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individuals, families and communities involved in illicit enterprise to possible 
prosecution by the authorities, or worse, backlash from powerful men of 
violence who may be offended should their enterprise receive unwanted 
attention? The names of Khalida and her father were retrieved from an open 
source — but by what right could researchers repeat it? There is also a question 
of whether the researcher has a responsibility to do something more than just 
publish, for example, by bringing official attention to individual cases, like 
Khalida’s, so that some form of justice may be served.11 There is, therefore, 
substantial difficulty not only in finding pieces of the jigsaw, but also in 
representing research subjects who may hold the key to the puzzle in a way that 
enables their own agency. 
Another key challenge is how an insider’s perspective could be known by 
outside researchers. Victim–villain relationships are not always simple or one-
way. Ahmadzai and Kuonqui have called for ways of penetrating ‘the 
melancholic social character expressed daily by ordinary people’ so that it may 
properly be captured, not continually ignored (2011: 51). Questions may also be 
raised as to how practices that may be illegal according to formal written law 
could be accepted and even legitimised by traditional institutions, like tribal 
councils and marriages, in ways that Thelen and Steinmo have elaborated, i.e. 
that social outcomes are ultimately shaped and mediated, constrained and 
refracted, though never solely, by institutions designed and chosen by people 
(1992: 1–3). 
 Given the challenges presented by these questions, various approaches and 
research plans were conceived, weighed and eliminated. Fieldwork was ruled out 
early on, not only because of the dangers, language difficulties and funding issues, 
but also because I was in full-time employment, unable to take a sabbatical, living 
in the UK, raising a family with three children in school, and already in mid-
career. Why, indeed, go through all the effort to unlock a puzzle so complex? 
Yet what sustained my interest and commitment to pursue this study was my 
exposure to the various issues and policy dilemmas through my employment as 
a policy and research adviser in an international NGO. This not only brought 
regular interaction with colleagues and partner organisations doing field-based 
humanitarian and programmatic work in various conflict-affected countries with 
sizeable illicit economies, but also afforded opportunities to participate in and 
 
11 As Fujii explains, this is not simply about procedural ethics, but about how researchers should 
consider and treat study participants as an ongoing responsibility, not a discrete task to check 
off a ‘to do’ list (2012: 717).   
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organise relevant conferences, such as the conference on the land–drugs nexus 
in New York in October 2014, a pre-conference presentation of papers in 
Glasgow in June 2017, and the Illicit Economies Colloquium in London in April 
2018. Thus, from 2014 to 2019, I carried out this research wearing two hats — 
that of an INGO staff member based in London, on one hand; and that of a 
part-time, non-resident PhD researcher of Erasmus University International 
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, on the other.  
Eventually, a comparative case study approach (to be detailed later) was 
considered and developed after auditing a series of lectures on research methods 
at SOAS, University of London.12 The core of this approach is a comparison of 
life stories of selected criminal entrepreneurs in Afghanistan, Myanmar, 
Colombia and Bolivia. This decision was inspired partly by the unnamed drug 
trafficker in Khalida’s story above, and partly by work that I had carried out on 
criminal entrepreneurs:13 rather than examine ‘victims’, why not focus on the 
‘villains’? A closer examination of that unnamed trafficker appeared to offer clear 
potential for unpacking the puzzle.  
The use of actors as the central unit of analysis also derives from a number 
of scholarly outputs. For example, in analysing a completely different set of 
actors, Baud and Rutten point out that the work of individuals is often lost in 
the literature on contentious politics, especially since many studies fail to take a 
closer look at the men and women whose ‘histories of interpersonal contacts and 
interactions may be crucial in shaping contentious ideas and their reception’ 
(2004: 2). In the acclaimed 1994 collection An Anarchy of Families: State and Family 
in the Philippines, McCoy, Sidel, and other authors show that men of violence and 
elite families have an influence on wider society and its politics that is often 
ignored by the treatment of politics and change through formal institutional 
structures. Hence, by developing actor-focused cases, these authors were able to 
explain not only the apparent reasons for the weakness of the post-colonial 
Philippine state, but also the sources of resilience of the elite families who shaped 
and were shaped by their interactions with that state (McCoy, 1994: 1–11). Since 
criminal entrepreneurs and state institutions are engaged in reciprocal 
relationships that constantly define and redefine them both, an examination of 
their histories of interaction and politico-economic roles, and the influence these 
 
12 This was made possible by the generosity of the seminar’s organiser, Dr Carlos Oya.  
13 See for example Gutierrez (2003) and Gutierrez (2013) in Lara and Schoofs (eds).   
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have had on wider society and its politics, potentially offers new insights into the 
questions being raised by this study.  
Actor-focused study is also linked to Historical Institutionalism, the approach 
to studying politics and social change elaborated by Thelen and Steinmo, cited 
earlier. Because political evolution is influenced by the intentions of its subjects, 
using criminal entrepreneurs as a unit of analysis can illuminate the ‘branching 
processes’, particularly the points of departure from established patterns that 
lead to outcomes such as remarkable resilience to policies of prohibition and 
state control (1992: 1–27). 
The objective of this research, however, is not to simply solve the puzzle. 
More importantly, this study is an attempt to make a contribution towards 
addressing the challenges to development and the governance of rural 
livelihoods posed by the illicit enterprise in opium and coca. As such, and in 
keeping with its original focus on the criminal entrepreneur as the unit of 
analysis, the central research question14 is:  
How do criminal entrepreneurs shape, and are in turn shaped 
by, the resilience of the illicit production of the crops opium and 
coca, and what are the implications of their enterprise on the 
governance over the livelihoods of poor rural households they 
affect? 
Hence, the title of this study: ‘Criminals Without Borders: Resilience and 
Interdependency in Opium and Coca Commodity Chains’. A brief explanation 
of the argument and outline of the study follows.  
The argument 
While drug traffickers may indeed be ‘ruthless and cruel capitalists who trap, 
rape, and rob’, as Cave and Robles assert, it can be assumed that they could not 
do so for long unless their activities are normalised, their relationships are 
expanded, and their enterprise becomes embedded in local society, with or 
without coercion. As such, although illicit enterprise is almost always framed as 
 
14 This is slightly changed from the question in the original 2015 research proposal, which read: 
How do criminal entrepreneurs exploit the economic and political institutions that enable or con-
strain the commerce in opium, coca, and their derivative products, and what are the implications 
of their enterprise on the livelihoods of poor rural households in opium poppy and coca-growing 
areas? 
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a ‘problem’, in reality, the relationships, and their impact and outcomes, are far 
more complex than often assumed. Drug cartels, for example, can build 
impressive levels of legitimacy among their audience even without being 
romanticised, like Jamaica’s Shower Posse gang, whose leader is known 
simultaneously as a philanthropist and a drug lord (Cederstrom and Fleming, 
2016). Pablo Escobar himself, despite his ruthlessness, also became known for 
his ‘other side’ in forming organisations that provided housing for the homeless, 
and private social security for residents of marginal barrios of Medellin 
(Thompson, 1996; Los Angeles Times, 21 February 1988).  
Reflecting back on Khalida’s case, it is evident that creditor-drug traffickers 
who take opium brides are not total outsiders even at the outset — they possess 
some form of legitimacy, otherwise tribal councils would not even listen to them. 
It would not be surprising if Khalida’s family’s woes were blamed more on the 
government and its opium eradication campaign, rather than on the criminal 
trafficker. Under desperate conditions of broken economies and competing 
institutions, of which the state is only one (Ballve, 2019), criminals who provide 
an important local lifeline as a source of agricultural credit, a provider of 
transport, or who pay for the repair of local water systems, become better 
regarded. There are plenty of examples: smugglers in the Sahara (Scheele, 2012); 
criminal networks set up like strategic business structures that emerge as licit in 
the eyes of those involved in their transactions (Abraham and van Schendel, 
2006); and the ‘global outlaws’ who move trillions of dollars of illegal products, 
from diamonds, arms and pharmaceuticals to food and oil, outside legal channels 
(Nordstrom, 2007: xvi). Assumptions that opium-based credit is particularly 
exploitative or is ‘a bargain with the devil’ have been challenged, because the 
question that should be asked, argues Adam Pain, is ‘what does the cultivation 
of opium poppy say about the need for and the role of rural credit in 
Afghanistan?’ (Pain, 2008).   
This shows that illicit enterprise is not a simple, straightforward issue as 
conventionally regarded; sometimes it may be seen as ‘alternative development’, 
or a solution to the problems with which poor and desperate people grapple. 
Despite their violence and coercion, drug traffickers hunted as criminal 
smugglers by the state can also be seen as saviours who prevent moribund rural 
economies from collapsing. They could be predators to some, while being 
protectors or patrons to others. What also becomes evident is that there are 
peculiar forms of governance arrangements that emerge where illicit economies 
thrive, that may best be examined using power analysis on different levels, 
spaces, and forms, as described by Gaventa (2006).   
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This study is different from most drug policy research in at least two ways. 
First, as described above, a central focus is on the key actors, the criminal 
entrepreneurs, who arrange and rearrange themselves in conflict and 
accommodation with other actors and, in the process, produce — whether by 
design or unintentionally — particular forms of socio-economic order where 
opium and coca are grown. Building on McCoy’s idea of a ‘covert netherworld’ 
— a shadowy realm beneath the surface of political life that forms a recurring 
social milieu at regional, national and international levels, and in which power, 
profit and political change are contested, negotiated and created (McCoy, 2016: 
848; 2019: 9–10) — this study aims to show that the criminal entrepreneurs who 
inhabit such realms are not only specialists in coercion but are also actors who 
regulate and manipulate (often coercively) access to land and resources, mobilise 
labour and shape its divisions, and promote certain forms of capital 
accumulation. Additionally, this study expands on the argument developed by 
Goodhand and Mansfield, that such criminal entrepreneurs are sources of both 
order and disorder, i.e. the particular types and patterns of rent appropriation 
they engage in may contribute to more inclusive or exclusive political settlements 
that impact upon processes of state-building and peace-building (2010: 1–5). The 
contention is that a better understanding of the roles of these criminal 
entrepreneurs as pioneers of capital, intermediaries in commodity chains, and 
arbitrageurs between state and borderlands may provide new ways of unpacking 
and explaining the puzzle.  
Goodhand’s discussion of shadow, combat and coping economies also 
informs this study’s differentiation of actors that inhabit these spaces. As law and 
order weakens, criminal actors begin to control a wide spectrum of shadow 
economic activities — smuggling arms and fuel; providing safe passage for 
consumer goods; kidnapping to raise cash; and so on. But there are belligerent 
actors too who engage in various forms of fund-raising for their armed struggle 
by imposing taxes on the passage of goods, directly engaging in profitable illicit 
activity for combat economic activities. Finally, there are the ordinary people 
caught in the conflict, who try to manage when everything is in flux and there is 
no security. They participate in economic activities, whether licit or illicit, in 
order to cope with the adverse conjuncture (Goodhand, 2004). This framework 
further provides a useful analytical tool that shows how criminals, belligerents 
and ordinary people caught in conflict may have agendas that, while completely 
different from each other, often overlap and may even merge temporarily.  
The second reason this study is different is that it situates the examination of 
opium and coca more as commodities within processes of agrarian change, rather 
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than solely as criminal or conflict goods shaping the outcomes of violence and 
politics where they are grown and traded. In other words, while opium and coca 
are just plant crops, the social, economic and political relationships, as well as 
the consequences that emerge from their production, trafficking and 
consumption, inevitably play a role in shaping capital accumulation and state 
formation, i.e. the political economy of ‘who owns what (property relations), 
who does what (social division of labour), who gets what (distribution of income) 
and what do they do with it (social relations of consumption)’ (Bernstein, 2010: 
22–23). 
This study’s principal contention is that conventional explanations of illicit 
crop enterprise — i.e. those framed along the concepts of law and order, or 
definitions of who or what is licit or illicit, legal or illegal; and those framed along 
assumptions of market forces, spontaneous order, or prices and profit — are 
insufficient to explain survival, resilience and change in rural agrarian economies 
where opium and coca are grown. As such, an alternative framing, rooted in 
political economy analysis and in the social forms of symbiosis, quid pro quos, 
modus vivendi, collusion, or connivance — or what has been referred to as 
interdependency — is needed.  
Interdependency, which may explain how criminal entrepreneurs survive and 
become resilient, was a notion first elaborated by Anton Blok in The Mafia of a 
Sicilian Village, 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (1974). Blok’s 
basic contention is anthropological, that ‘it must not be assumed that mafiosi have 
their own independent structure’ (ibid.: 15). In other words, these actors — 
whether called bandits, mafiosi, traffickers, or criminal entrepreneurs — are 
essentially embedded in society, the economy, and state institutions, and are 
therefore necessarily engaged or locked in interdependent relationships, whether 
as friend or foe, with other socio-economic and socio-political actors. They must 
therefore be analysed in the context of those interdependent relationships, and 
not considered as if they were autonomous or external to the rest of society.  
In an earlier article, Blok observed that, given the specific conditions of 
outlawry, bandits have to rely very heavily on other people. This is because ‘they 
require protection in order to operate as bandits and to survive at all. If they lack 
protection, they remain lone wolves to be quickly dispatched’. The protection 
can come not only from a narrow circle of kinsmen and affiliated friends, but 
also from powerful politicians including those who hold office. ‘Our task 
therefore’, Blok emphasises, ‘is to discover people on whom the bandit relies’ 
(1972: 497–498).  
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Michael Watts recently called for a revival of interest in Blok’s work, because 
The Mafia of a Sicilian Village offers a view at odds with much of the economics-
dominated work of the 1990s and 2000s. While these later literatures ‘see mafia 
exclusively as a perverse market response to modernization and 
commercialization in a context in which the state fails to protect property’, Blok 
takes a substantively different view, as Watts points out, by construing the mafia 
as brokers in violence that keep restive peasants in submission, but in ways that 
are starkly ‘different from its feudal predecessors who acted mainly as armed 
retainers for maintaining law and order of vested interests in the countryside’. 
The ‘mediating functions’ of feudal armed retainers ‘were minimal and strictly 
local phrased’, while those of the mafiosi ‘attain major strength and significance 
in connection with the impact of the State and the advent of the market’. Blok 
shows that it is the collusion, cohabitation and contiguity with the state and 
forms of public authority which are central to the mafia’s reproduction (Watts, 
2016: 76). 
Blok argued that criminal entrepreneurs are not just plain gangsters or 
racketeers for the simple reason that they make decisions that affect the public. 
From his fieldwork in western Sicily, Blok observed how mafiosi became the 
force for change that shaped the effective distribution of land, patterns of land 
use, and the consequent division of labour resulting from shifts into livestock 
raising. Without the mafiosi, capital would not have had agents with the power 
to principally reorganise peasant society into more commercial forms of 
agriculture. Because they had the power to mediate or settle conflicts, they 
enforced a particular form of property ownership. Hence, the realm of the 
criminal entrepreneur is the public, where he or she establishes 
interdependencies with other socio-economic and socio-political actors. It is this 
symbiosis or interdependency that distinguishes the criminal entrepreneur from 
the ordinary outlaw or bandit (Blok, 1974: 6, and 245–252; Tables II–XIV).  
Indeed, interdependency implies that while criminal entrepreneurs rely on 
others to survive, others also rely on them. To emphasise, the reliance is mutual, 
not one way. As sociologist Norbert Elias explained, ‘underlying all intended 
interactions of human beings is their unintended interdependence’ (Elias, 1994 
[1939]: 284–285; 300). At any given point of economic development, Elias 
elaborates, people are bound to and dependent on each other in quite specific 
ways, producing particular forms of social integration and tensions. In a barter 
economy where goods transfer from producer to final consumer without 
intermediaries, interdependence is straightforward. But as transfers gradually 
become more differentiated and subjected to the intervention of both social 
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actors and the range of methods that states use to regulate commerce (e.g. 
business licences, tax forms, or property registers) and to socially construct what 
is legal or illegal, more and more people become intermediaries and functionaries 
in commodity chains that grow in scope and complexity. The interdependence 
becomes increasingly complex. 
 
Organisation of the study  
To develop and sustain the argument, answer the central research question, and 
resolve the identified puzzle, this study is organised as follows.  
Chapter 1 introduces the study and lays down the tools for conducting the 
research: (a) the theoretical and conceptual models drawn from the relevant 
literature that provide the analytical frames for sorting through the debates, 
theories and policy positions; and (b) the details of the comparative methodology 
adopted, its analytical operations and logical sequence.   
Chapter 2 historicises the remarkable resilience to prohibition of the illicit 
drugs enterprise today by tracing the genealogy of the global enterprise in opium 
and coca through processes of commodification and the emergence of 
commodity chains that gave these plants a ‘social life’ as tools for colonisation, 
incubators of capitalism, and a means for capital accumulation. Inspired by 
Gramsci’s work on how the senso commune (common sense) is reproduced and 
embedded by the blocco storico (historic bloc), this chapter introduces the idea that 
resilience to prohibition emerges out of processes of commodification, and that 
unbundling the institutions and social relationships of commodification may 
allow the ‘common sense’ around illicit drugs enterprise to be reset to break new 
ground in its understanding.   
Chapter 3 sketches the consumer, intermediary and producer markets of 
illicit opium and coca. This chapter attempts to accomplish two goals. First, it 
critically assesses limits of the two global mechanisms to track and monitor illicit 
markets in opium and coca, simply by analysing whether the official estimates 
produced by the US government and the United Nations are internally consistent 
and valid. Second, it elaborates on the wealth of information that has been 
collected on illicit opium and coca markets but which, I would argue, has been 
devalued, often ignored, and frequently misinterpreted by proponents of 
prohibition.  
The subsequent three chapters provide the key findings that compare four 
illicit-crop-producing countries (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia) 
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across three configurations that represent the diverse outcomes and 
consequences of the puzzle: resilience, careers and prices. These constitute the 
main body of this study. Chapter 4 discusses resilience by elaborating on the 
limits of development and drug policy orthodoxy and examining four sub-
national cases that reveal and detail the paradox of illicit economies. By looking 
into the local contexts of the world’s leading opium and coca producers, this 
chapter deconstructs the most common assumptions on illicit enterprise and 
shows that illicit crops may also be sources of stability, even drivers of economic 
growth, and sources of livelihoods that enable marginalised communities and 
territories abandoned by the state to be reinserted into national and global 
markets. It also focuses on agency, examining how, within so-called ‘fragile’ and 
conflict-affected areas, displaced and dispossessed households are building 
resilience, adopting innovative and unorthodox strategies for coping and survival 
in changing and insecure environments. 
Chapter 5 is the core contribution of this study: a comparative examination 
of the life stories and careers of selected criminal entrepreneurs in the four 
countries that enables inferences to be drawn into how drug lords also act as 
rural elites promoting, whether intentionally or otherwise, specific forms of local 
economic and political order. This chapter contends that a better understanding 
of the roles of these criminal entrepreneurs as pioneers for capital, intermediaries 
in commodity chains, and arbitrageurs between state and borderlands may 
provide ways of unpacking key challenges to peace-building and post-war 
economic development in borderlands where illicit enterprise thrives, and thus 
offer a clearer picture of their impact on governance over the livelihoods of poor 
rural households drawn into illicit opium and coca production for coping and 
survival.      
Chapter 6 investigates the ‘mystery of prices’ by deconstructing price theory 
and elaborating on the limitations of its uses as applied to illicit opium and coca. 
In particular, this chapter shows that decisions taken by illicit crop producers are 
rarely based on the so-called signals of prices, which remain unpredictable, but 
rather on the predictability and risk-reducing attributes, ironically, of illicit crop 
production. This chapter tracks changes in the prices of opium and coca derived 
from official sources from 1986 to 2018.     
Finally, Chapter 7 provides the conclusions and the synthesis of this study’s 
findings that answer the central research question. An overview of how the study 
is organised is presented in the Overview Table below. 
 




 Overview table: summary of the study 
Chapter 1: Introduction, theoretical constructs and methodology 
Chapter 2: Historicising illicit drugs enterprise 
Chapter 3: Tracking and monitoring illicit drugs markets: consumers, intermediaries and 
producers in global commodity chains 
  
Chapter 4: Resilience 
Survival and resilience: 
the paradox of illicit 
economies  
 
Chapter 5: Careers 
Pioneers, intermediaries 
and arbitrageurs: criminal 
entrepreneurs as politico-
economic actors  
Chapter 6:  Prices 
Illicit markets and the 
‘mystery’ of prices  
Afghanistan Fragility and resilience 
in Helmand Province’s 
illicit croplands 
Lal Jan Ishaqzai and 
Bashir Noorzai — negoti-
ating protection 
Impact of price changes 
before and after the 2001 
Taliban opium ban 
Myanmar 
Illicit crops as sources 
of stability and insta-
bility in Shan State 
Lo Hsing Han and Tan 
Xiaolin on the China–My-
anmar border 
How prices of opium 
and heroin were affected 
by the 1989 ceasefire 
agreements  
Colombia Marginalisation, exclu-
sion and reintegration 
via illicit crops in Putu-
mayo 
Castaño brothers — fran-
chising criminal enterprise.  
Prices before and after 
the 1996 ‘cocalero upris-
ings’ in Putumayo   
Bolivia Social vs. market con-
trol of illicit crops — 
lessons from the 
Chapare 
Roberto Suarez Gomez 
and the upper-class drug 
lords 
Prices before and after 
the capture of state 
power by cocaleros in 
2005  
Chapter 7: Conclusion:  Implications on development and governance of the resilience and 





Theoretical Constructs and 
Methodology for Analysing 
Resilience and Interdependency 
in Illicit Crop Enterprise 
 
 
1.1 Locating illicit crop enterprise in agrarian change 
processes 
This study makes the case that because illicit drug crops are commodities 
produced mainly in marginalised borderlands (WDR 2019a: 62–74), it is 
necessary to locate and analyse the criminal entrepreneurs involved within their 
rural contexts — how they shape and are in turn shaped by conflict and 
contestation over the control of territory, the regulation and manipulation of 
access to land and resources, the reordering of the agrarian labour supply, and 
the outcomes of state formation.  
Such an emphasis is often lost, however. On the one hand, key publications 
that shape policy — such as the Systematic Country Diagnostics produced by 
the World Bank, or the World Drug Reports published by the UNODC — often 
ignore the politico-economic roles of criminal actors, especially in agrarian 
settings (Gutierrez, 2020), or the typically ‘invisible incubators’ that have become 
the economic foundation for the illicit crop trade (McCoy, 2019). The lack of a 
more deliberate and specific agrarian focus sustains assumptions that ‘war is 
development in reverse’ and that economic growth is the best solution for 
tackling and preventing both conflict and criminality (Collier et al., 2003); or that 
since the central actor in conflicts is the state, investing in state capacity and 
presence in borderland areas leads to conflict prevention (United Nations and 
World Bank, 2018). As other scholars have pointed out, ‘economic growth and 
development’ can themselves be violent, produce poverty, and be a source of 
criminality and conflict (Thomson, 2011: 322), while spaces often depicted as 
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‘ungovernable’ or ‘stateless’ are actually ‘wracked by extra-legal regimes of rule 
in which the state is simply one actor among others’ (Ballve, 2019: 211).    
On the other hand, broader scholarly literature rarely looks at the subject 
through an agrarian lens. Key works on organised crime, for example, are 
typically focused on violence and illegality, with little or no emphasis on agrarian 
spaces. Diego Gambetta’s classic work on the mafia analyses ‘an institution that 
exploits and thrives on the absence of trust by providing protection, largely in 
the form of enforcing contracts, settling disputes, and deterring competition’ 
(2011: 2; also, Gambetta, 1993)15. Vadim Volkov’s ‘violent entrepreneur’ who 
remade Russian capitalism is largely urban based, with Volkov explaining crime 
as ‘a result of the failure of different social institutions to ensure the proper social 
integration of individuals and groups’ (2002: 17). Federico Varese’s work 
elaborates on the migration of criminal enterprise in a globalising world (2012), 
while Benjamin Lessing’s well-argued study unpacks how drug cartel violence is 
used to constrain the state’s behaviour and influence policy outcomes (2015: 
1486).  
Within the sub-disciplines of development studies and critical agrarian 
studies, there is a paucity of literature on illicit crop enterprise and its main 
actors.16 This is not to say that there is a complete absence of such focus: a 
number of agrarian and area studies scholars have examined these issues from 
varying perspectives. Alternative development or crop substitution policies, for 
example, have been examined by Cohen (2009); Davalos et al. (2016); Dion and 
Russler (2008); Ibanez and Carlsson (2010); and Rincon-Ruiz et al. (2016). The 
roles of violence, militias and other armed actors in borderlands and narco-
frontiers have received excellent scrutiny from scholars including Ballve (2012, 
2019); De Danieli (2014); Meehan (2011); and Woods (2011).  
Placing criminal actors within contexts of rural transformation, therefore, 
would usefully complement the policy and broader literature, and may also 
provide ways of unpacking key challenges to peace-building and post-war 
 
15 In his review, McDonogh points out that the main weakness of Gambetta’s opus is that it fo-
cused exclusively on the industry of protection and does not engage further with the political 
and social context, or with ‘the already existing circumstances given and transmitted from the 
past’ (1996: 97).  
16 Web of Science searches of ‘opium’ and ‘coca’ in leading development journals (World Devel-
opment, Journal of Development Studies, and Oxford Development Studies) and in the Journal of 
Peasant Studies and Journal of Agrarian Change returned only a few articles. 
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economic development in conflict-affected borderlands where illicit economies 
thrive.  
Indeed, a growing number of studies have demonstrated the need to place 
illicit actors in their rural contexts. A key contribution from McSweeney et al. on 
drug-trafficking-related agrarian change asks, ‘why do narcos invest in rural 
land?’; it focuses attention on the structural context (‘Why now?’ and ‘Why 
there?’), the logics underlying traffickers’ interest in the rural sector, and the 
mechanics by which they acquire and legitimise landed property. The authors 
conclude that drug traffickers ‘hasten the transformation of landscapes of 
smallholder production into the “rentier-agribusiness” nexus of land speculation, 
cattle, and export monocrops’ (2017: 5–6, 16). In an earlier publication, one of 
the authors, Richani, used the label narcobourgeoisie to differentiate drug traffickers 
from other bourgeois factions, and listed four distinguishing factors: (a) the 
mode by which they extract surplus value from coca growers and the labour 
involved in coca’s processing; (b) their role in the commercialisation and 
marketing of the illicit crop; (c) their peculiar position between legality and 
illegality; and (d) the centrality of violence in organising their business, from the 
extraction of profits and the enforcement of contracts to state co-optation 
(2013).  
Another key contribution comes from Teo Ballve, who develops the 
analytical concept of ‘narco-frontiers’ to help ‘disentangle the confusing political 
economy of agrarian spaces affected by the violence of the drug wars’. Narco-
frontiers, he argues, are spatial ‘Others’ wracked by extra-legal regimes of rule, 
in which the state is simply one actor among others. The drug trade, Ballve 
concludes, is inducing violent agrarian change all over the world (Ballve, 2019: 
211).  
Locating research on illicit crop enterprise in critical agrarian studies has many 
benefits. It will be a useful contribution to the approaches and lacunae 
enumerated by Bernstein and Byres in their inaugural essay in the Journal of 
Agrarian Change (2001); and to the perspectives, frameworks and methodologies 
listed by Borras in the 2009 relaunch of the Journal of Peasant Studies (2009). 
Fairbairn et al. (2014: 653) listed four classic themes that represented ‘the 
variegated trajectories of agrarian change across space and time’ — illicit crop 
enterprise may be a useful addition to ‘new directions in agrarian political 
economy’. In the same way that McMichael presented food regime analysis, illicit 
crop enterprise analysis may also ‘explain the strategic role of agriculture … in 
the construction of the world capitalist economy’ (2009: 139). Scoones talks of 
key moments of historical debates about rural livelihoods that have identified the 
ambiguities, tensions and challenges of such approaches (2009: 171). Introducing 
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a political analysis of illicit trade in opium and coca may provide an important 
contribution to the livelihoods perspectives.   
This study attempts to develop an inter-disciplinary synthesis with a core 
focus on the criminal actors of illicit crop enterprise. Indeed, the paradoxes 
around the role of criminals and their ubiquity in agrarian conflicts suggest that 
their emergence and participation in the commodity chains of a globalised world 
‘without borders’ need to be rethought. Khalida’s story, narrated in the Preface, 
illustrates key issues. In the analysis of opium brides, larger issues of lack of 
access to land, water and credit tend to be ignored because men like Khalida’s 
father resorted to growing opium — which captures attention for its illegality, 
and not for its role as a coping mechanism for survival. The part played by the 
tribal council in suggesting that Khalida be given up as debt repayment will likely 
be viewed through the lens of moral failure of community leadership, with no 
thought for the peculiar relationships of power that emerge in such situations. 
Thus, there is little examination into the resilience strategies that evolve to tackle 
poverty, debt, conflict and the lack of protection. As such, this complex case 
shows the need to go beyond the typical one-dimensional victim–villain narrative 
and explore institutions and issues of local agency that explain an outcome such 
as opium brides.17 What also emerges is the need to avoid simplistic depictions 
of a situation that create stereotypes which, though not untrue, are incomplete, 
and makes one story become the only story (Adichie, 2016).  
In order to carry out this inter-disciplinary synthesis, key terms need to be 
clearly defined.  
1.1.1 Definition of key terms 
Four key concepts that are central to this study’s investigation are: (a) criminal 
entrepreneurs; (b) capital accumulation; (c) state formation and state-building; 
and d) criminal violence. Defining these key terms lays the ground for the 
discussion of further theoretical constructs in the next section of this chapter. 
1.1.1a Criminal entrepreneurs 
The key actors who are the focus of this study’s core examination are called 
‘criminal entrepreneurs’ for two reasons: they are engaged in activities that are 
illegal, hence, they are ‘criminals’; and the illegal activities they carry out form a 
 
17 The victim-villain narrative emerges in most journalistic reporting on conflict and criminality in 
Afghanistan. However, it must also be emphasised that journalism plays an essential role in 
bringing hidden events from the shadows out into the open. Hence, it may challenge official 
interpretations, but also sustain dominant social constructions.  
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complex project or undertaking, i.e. they are an enterprise. Simple criminal acts 
like robbery or extortion can be perpetrated by a lone, individual robber or bully, 
with the act completed within minutes. In contrast, setting up a drugs business 
is a much more complex undertaking: it requires capital, some of which may be 
lent as credit to a farmer who grows the crop; it may entail providing protection 
so the farmer’s assets are not forcibly taken by others; it needs transport to collect 
the semi-processed harvest and to take it elsewhere for further processing or for 
onward sale; and its success needs connections to other powerful people or to a 
social network that supplies information, logistics and even forms of insurance, 
among others. It will also require a capacity for violence that may or may not be 
used. Hence, it is an enterprise whether at the production, wholesale, or retail 
distribution stage, and the criminal who engages in it is necessarily an 
entrepreneur.18 
 Various authors have used the term ‘entrepreneur’ in one way or another. 
Blok called the mafia he studied in Sicily ‘violent peasant entrepreneurs’, who are 
not just plain gangsters or racketeers because ‘they make decisions that affect the 
public’ (1974: 6). Gallant applied the term ‘military entrepreneur’ to bandits, 
applying an older and more ambiguous reference to the use of weapons by a 
category of men who take up arms and wield violence or the threat of violence 
as their stock in trade (1999: 26–27). Criminal entrepreneurs also share many 
things in common with ‘local strongmen’, defined by Sidel as the ‘power brokers 
with monopolistic personal control over coercive and economic resources in 
their territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks’ (1999: 141). As such, criminal 
entrepreneurs may be thought of as a class of politico-economic actors who 
engage in what Naím calls ‘trade that breaks the rules — the laws, regulations, 
licenses, taxes, embargos, and all other procedures that nations employ to 
organise commerce, protect their citizens, raise revenues, and enforce moral 
codes’ (2007: 2).  
There have also been definitions that dismiss criminals a priori as political or 
economic actors. One textbook in criminology, for example, reduces criminals 
to a simplified narrative of ‘actors with no political goals’, further adding that ‘an 
 
18 A similar use of the term ‘criminal entrepreneur’ is applied to kidnappers in Gutierrez (2013). 
A kidnapping is an enterprise, and is different from, for example, raiding and pillaging which 
have no regard for the physical safety of the victims. A kidnapping can stretch on for months and 
years, with the victim kept unharmed, at least until the ransom is paid or not paid. There are 
also kidnappings with political aims, which represent an even more complex enterprise 
(Gutierrez, 2013: 125).  
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organised crime group is not motivated by social doctrine, political beliefs, or 
ideological concerns’. The criminals’ goals, the author argues, are money and 
power, and their ‘procurement is not limited by legal or moral concerns’ 
(Abadinsky, 2010: 3). But by its very nature, the procurement of money and 
power — especially when it is not bound by legal or moral limits — could not 
be apolitical. To step outside social boundaries and to undermine legal and moral 
limits could not be other than a deliberate political choice, even when explicitly 
declared otherwise. Criminals are therefore necessarily political and economic 
actors, not just disingenuous lawbreakers without a political goal as Abadinsky 
asserts. When they ignore, challenge, or violate rules, laws and moral limits, they 
are effectively making a political choice, producing intended and unintended 
outcomes that impact on state and society. They are economic actors too because 
they animate commodity chains — the cross-border networks of ‘labour and 
production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’ (Hopkins and 
Wallerstein, 1986: 158–159). The best way to capture their roles in the political 
economy is to describe them as multi-dimensional criminal entrepreneurs with 
multiple stories. 
Collectively, criminal entrepreneurs are engaged in what has become a 
strategic form of commerce that not only shapes particular forms of capital 
accumulation, but also structures the nature of state formation. 
1.1.1b Capital accumulation and criminal enterprise 
To understand more about criminal enterprise, it is necessary to go back to the 
basic propositions on how capital accumulates, this time applied to illicit markets, 
and on how such accumulation could be disruptive. 
Capital accumulation is a term that originates from Marx’s concept of ‘primitive 
accumulation’, understood as ‘the historical process of divorcing the producer 
from the means of production’. It is ‘primitive’ because it is embryonic, i.e. the 
beginning or point of departure for the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 
1976 [1867]: 873–875). Marx’s original insight is that primitive accumulation is 
based on force and is anything but idyllic — i.e. accumulation does not happen 
‘spontaneously’ and requires force to compel its observance.  
Beyond the ‘primitive’ stage are other stages or different ways in which capital 
accumulates. During the bandit periods of the 1700s that Gallant has studied, 
for example, capital principally accumulated in the form of landed estates, i.e. the 
latifundia, hacienda and plantations. As these estates grew to become an economic 
force, it eliminated small, subsistence-oriented peasant forms of agriculture, and 
replaced them with more commercialised agrarian regimes that ‘divorced the 
producer from the means of production’.  
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It was the intrusion of these estates and capitalist agriculture into the peasant 
economy that increased poverty and unrest which, Gallant observes, produced a 
mass of disgruntled and displaced young men who provided the fertile breeding 
ground for violence — ‘poor and rootless men set loose in the countryside’. It 
was from this manpower pool that men of violence from whatever side — 
whether bandits who were ‘outlaws’, or estate guards or soldiers who were 
‘inlaws’ — were drawn. They were bandits when they stole and preyed on the 
estate; estate guards when they agreed to work for a landowner or estate manager; 
or soldiers recruited for the enforcement arm of the central state (1999: 25–52). 
In other words, it can be argued that the reproduction of men of violence en 
masse is a social consequence of the disruptions created by capital accumulation 
and agrarian change.  
Karl Polanyi reinforces this contention. His starting point, like Adam Smith’s, 
is the division of labour — i.e. that the social process wherein individuals seek 
what they can do best and profit from is the chief cause of the wealth of nations. 
But to make such a division of labour possible, a mechanism of exchange — the 
market — is necessary. The problem is that while markets are indeed prolific 
creators of wealth, they also rip societies apart (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 171). This 
is because the market’s ‘freedom of contract’ which establishes the relations 
between the employer and the employed, Polanyi said, requires the liquidation 
of institutions that keep peasant society together. That is, peasant society’s ‘non-
contractual organisations of kinship, neighbourhood, profession and creed’ need 
to be destroyed because they claim the allegiance of the individual, and therefore 
restrain the individual’s ‘freedom’ to enter into those contracts (ibid.). In short, 
because the expansion of the wealth-creating market also means the destruction 
of the traditional bonds that keep peasant society together, a market in transition 
becomes the mechanism that first uproots, then displaces, and finally disperses 
the vast manpower pool of the peasant economy. While this process of 
uprooting, displacement and dispersal creates the labour supply needed by the 
market economy, these same mechanisms also (re)produce bandits and 
criminals.   
Polanyi provides a useful reminder of the value of those bonds that are 
broken up by capitalist accumulation and development. In ‘primitive’ societies,19 
he argues, the individual would not starve unless the whole community is in a 
 
19 Note that Polanyi does not use the term ‘primitive’ in any derogatory sense; rather, it means 
pre-capitalist. ‘The differences existing between civilised and “uncivilised” peoples have been 
vastly exaggerated, especially in the economic sphere’. For more on this point, see Polanyi (2001 
[1944]: 47). 
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like predicament. Bonds and institutions prevent individual starvation, and 
‘destitution is impossible because whosoever needs assistance receives it 
unquestioningly’ (ibid.: 171). There is less inequality, because peasant society’s 
‘non-contractual obligations’ provide the social safety nets that protect the 
individual. Thus, the supreme irony is that ‘primitive’ society ‘is more humane 
than a market economy, but also at the same time, less economic’ (ibid.: 172). 
When the market destroys the traditional bonds that keep peasant society 
together, the choice for those uprooted and dispersed will typically be between 
starvation or employment. Reducing the individual’s choice in this stark way, 
according to Polanyi, is essentially how the market creates the labour supply 
needed by a commercialising economy. But then it may be asked: could there be a 
third choice? What about those few who don’t want to starve, and at the same time 
do not want to enter into contractual obligations of employment either, or those 
who do not wish to be just another supplier of labour in a mass market? This 
study contends that there is a third choice to Polanyi’s conundrum: the 
individuals who engage in banditry or illicit enterprise create a way out of the 
choice between starvation or selling labour. The alternative is to use violence, 
initially as a tool for survival, but eventually as the stock in trade for illicit 
enterprise.    
Thus, a refinement to Polanyi’s points could be made: the ‘bonds and 
institutions that prevent individual starvation’ do not always totally disappear. 
There could conceivably be certain bonds and institutions of ‘kinship, 
neighbourhood, profession or creed’ that remain, and these could be exploited 
by the survivor and the criminal. By making good use of these bonds and other 
forms of dependency offered by circles of kinsmen, affiliated friends and other 
social actors, the criminal is able to gain protection. This appears to offer an 
explanation as to how bandits and criminals — who may later engage in illicit 
enterprise — could be socially reproduced and recruited. As Blok explained, the 
specific conditions of being an outlaw require a bandit or any such group ‘to rely 
very strongly on other people’. Those who survive, or eventually transform into 
established criminal entrepreneurs, are those who have made good use of the 
protection and other forms of dependency with circles of kinsmen, affiliated 
friends and other social actors.  
A contemporary example illustrating this point is provided by the case of 
Khalida in the Preface. Goodhand (2009) explores the strategies adopted by drug 
dealers to secure a stake in the border region of Sheghnan, where the smuggling 
of opium into Tajikistan is rampant.  Dealers, Goodhand found, may sell drugs 
to families who have an addict and/or are already impoverished, leading to 
progressive indebtedness. This usually leads to the distress sale of assets to pay 
 Chapter 1: Theoretical Constructs and Methodology  
9 
 
off the debts, but drug dealers may also ‘take advantage of this situation to marry 
the daughter of the family and use the wife’s house as a base for drugs 
trafficking’. Thus, the trafficker is both an agent of capital penetrating and 
disrupting local society, but is also an actor who uses the traditional institution 
of marriage as a strategy for ‘gaining a privileged position in the trafficking supply 
chain, thereby integrating the opium business into local social systems’ 
(Goodhand, 2009: 17). The phenomenon of ‘opium brides’ is much more 
complex than it first appears.  
Various forms of enterprise, of which many may be illicit, would naturally 
emerge as displaced and disgruntled young men seek to take what they can from 
both a changing peasant economy and an expanding and commercialising market 
economy, in order to survive. An enterprise could be said to have emerged when 
demand for, as well as the ability to supply, certain products and services become 
recurrent or regular. Thus, when the demand for the services of men of violence 
becomes recurrent, and can be met, an enterprise in violence emerges.  This is 
how illicit economies appear to emerge and enable further market penetration of 
peasant societies.  
1.1.1c State-building and state formation  
In his Foreword to Blok’s The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, Charles Tilly noted the 
parallels between government and mafia: both rely on control of concentrated 
and effective means of coercion; beneficiaries in both directly or indirectly tax 
the producers of wealth; and certain operators in both systems are allowed to 
scoop some of the proceeds of the flow of wealth toward the top (Blok, 1974: 
xix–xx). This led Tilly to argue that banditry, piracy, mafia, policing and state-
building all belong to the same continuum. Organised violence and coercive 
exploitation, therefore, are at the core of state-building (Tilly, 1985: 170–171). 
The key difference is that mafia, unlike government, has no accountability, no 
visibility, and offers no means of representation for those under its control.  
Oliver P. Richmond introduced a useful analogy: state-building aims to 
produce a benevolent neoliberal state (or the ‘Jekyll’ according to its backers); 
but there will always be indigenous forces of state formation (or the monstrous 
‘Hyde’) that should be blocked by state-building. Expanding on Tilly, Richmond 
points out that state formation processes are widely argued to form a predatory 
state, while state-building projects are about establishing legitimate monopoly on 
the means of violence, bureaucratic and financial management, rule of law, the 
provision of public services, and the moderation of tensions through a 
representative political system (2014: 1–2). Goodhand adds that state-building 
or state-making can be understood as ‘a conscious, planned and often externally-
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driven attempt to establish an apparatus of control’, while state formation is a 
historical process that is immanent or inherent, and largely the ‘unconscious 
outcome of conflicts, negotiations, compromises and trade-offs’ (Goodhand, 
2009: 7). The question that both address is the nature of the state that has 
emerged in territories and borderlands where international state-building, often 
driven by development aid and peace-building, meets local populations and the 
institutions produced by unplanned historical processes.  
Many questions have been raised as to why modern state-building, especially 
that supported by the international community, for example in countries like 
Afghanistan, Kosovo or Timor Leste, has not led to the establishment of 
effective states in the last 25 years as intended. Richmond asks what kind of 
hybrid states are actually forming (2014: 1) and suggests a move away from a 
reliance on internal violent or externalised institutions’ agency, reform and 
conditionality, and towards the concept of peace formation (2013: 378). Eriksen 
likewise criticises state-building based on the institutionalist model from a 
Weberian framework and argues that the creation of effective states requires the 
creation of state-centred societies, where both material and symbolic resources 
are concentrated in the state, something which is ‘very difficult to achieve for 
external actors’ (2017: 771).   
Strazzari and Kamphuis (2012) add an important contribution that is 
particularly relevant for this study: they show that informal and criminal 
economies transform over time and have an impact on state formation. Because 
protracted armed hostilities and the mutation of conflict under conditions of 
economic globalisation engender a realignment of ‘political interests and a 
readjustment of economic strategies’, we need to examine not only how shadow 
economies keep people fed and armed in times of violence, but also how this 
clandestine sector of transactions creates hybrid economic governance and 
shapes state-building (2012: 58). Strazzari and Kamphuis find that ‘economies 
beyond-the-law’ are not transitory, they are bound to stay, ‘in spite of (or because 
of) unprecedented efforts at checking them and aligning them with the 
statebuilding effort’. The definition of what is legal, they continue, ‘ultimately 
rests on the state’s power to criminalise’ (2012: 59-60). De Danieli’s case study 
on Tajikistan’s transition from civil war illustrates this point. After the 1997 peace 
agreement, state-building was incomplete, and the central government did not 
have the resources to impose and maintain order throughout the entire territory, 
where in certain pockets threats of secession still remained. Hence, compromises 
emerged with criminal groups that exercised effective control of certain parts of 
the country – they were ‘allowed’ to keep their lucrative criminal enterprises for 
as long as they acted as de facto subcontractors of local security. Later, further 
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deals emerged, such as promising votes, or intervening in localised conflicts of 
unruly groups (De Danieli, 2015). Thus, as Strazzari and Kamphuis assert, wars 
do not end ‘by leaving a tabula rasa for many types of top-down institutional 
transfers and engineering’ (2012: 60).  
Considering findings from case studies on Mozambique, Kosovo, Nepal and 
Afghanistan, one of the most important suggestions made by Strazzari and 
Kamphuis is to avoid what many contributions to state-building and peace-
building do, namely, to take the peace settlement as the analytical starting point. 
Instead, they emphasise the need not to gloss over the economic situation that 
accompanies the path to war, the way that informal and criminal economic 
activities become embedded, and how vested interests are consolidated during 
protracted armed conflict (2012: 60–61).  
This study is informed by the work of these scholars: it looks at the inter-
relationships between criminal economies and state-building on one hand, and 
at how criminal economies shape and structure state formation and capital 
accumulation on the other.   
1.1.1d Criminal violence 
Clarifications are necessary for the ways in which violence is defined and treated 
in this study. Given its rural focus, the starting point is Blok’s argument that the 
violent operations of mafiosi and the general level of socially permitted physical 
violence in western Sicily during its transition from smallholder to more 
commercialised agriculture can only be understood in relation to the distinct 
stage of development reached by Italian society at large. That stage of 
development, Blok suggests, is marked by rising social and political tensions 
between peasants, shepherds, estate owners, absentee landlords, the central state, 
and various other actors. As society changed, it was the mafiosi, a particular 
variety of middlemen, ‘who succeeded in maintaining a grip on the intrinsic 
tensions between these spheres’ (1974: xxviii). The mafioisi managed the 
tensions by means of physical force, which implies some degree of acceptance 
of the unlicensed use of private violence by the state to maintain some form of 
central control over its southern periphery (1974: 6).  
A further insight may be drawn from North, Wallis and Weingast, who argue 
that when states are in such stages of transition, it will be difficult for them to 
produce many of the common public goods and services associated with markets 
and economic growth. Hence, the state will use systematic rent-creation, 
otherwise known as corruption, not to simply line the pockets of the dominant 
coalition, but as the essential means of controlling violence (2009: 139–140) or 
keeping the middlemen in line. 
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These depictions of violence, its utility, and how it can be controlled can be 
contrasted with some more recent elaborations on criminal violence. Deborah J. 
Yashar, for example, examines why violence has emerged as a pandemic 
phenomenon in third wave Latin American democracies, where just 8% of the 
global population is found but which accounted for the highest percentage (36%) 
of the 437,000 homicides in the world in 2014 (2018: loc. 399). Yashar focuses 
on homicides, which can be counted (rather than the wider and more ambiguous 
mafia violence), to critically examine the wider literature on violence and to arrive 
at why, when, and where actors will kill. She provides three explanations. First, 
that the development of a transnational illicit economy and illicit criminal 
organisations set the stage for the high levels of violence. Second, that illicit trade 
and transit are likely to take hold where illicit actors find weak and/or complicit 
state institutions. And third, that the highest levels of violence are emerging 
particularly where illicit organisations encounter organisational competition 
from rival organisations, the state, or both (ibid., loc. 751).   
These conceptions of the state’s relationship to criminal violence — i.e. 
Blok’s ‘tool of control to manage social tensions’, and Yashar’s state complicity 
and ‘homicidal ecologies’ — are reference points for this study’s examination of 
criminal entrepreneurs.   
 
1.1.2 A research approach to analyse state formation and hybrid 
economies  
Given the topic and nature of the research challenges, as well as the ambition to 
show how criminal enterprise impacts on capital accumulation and state 
formation, this study proposes an inferential strategy based on comparisons of 
‘configurations’ applied to a number of cases. A ‘configuration’ is defined here 
in two ways. First, a configuration is ‘a specific combination of factors or 
variables that produces a given outcome of interest’ (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 
loc. 219-223). For example, the resilience of illicit crop cultivation in borderlands 
and remote rural areas is a specific combination of factors that makes the 
production of opium and coca in a subsistence agrarian economy possible. By 
comparing the contexts, actors and state–community inter-relationships in the 
four countries where resilient illicit crop cultivation has emerged, inferences may 
be drawn that could offer new ways of understanding the outcome, which is 
illicit enterprise.  
Second, configurations may be thought of in terms suggested by Blok, as 
‘changing patterns of interdependencies in which individuals and groups are 
involved, both as allies and as opponents’ (1974: 9). To illustrate, an alliance 
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between drug lords and local security-police forces is a configuration showing 
patterns of interdependencies. A drug lord just making a profit would simply be 
hunted down. But a drug lord making a profit while serving a useful political 
purpose (e.g. delivering cash, securing votes, or providing coercive services) 
could be treated as an ally. Such alliances are contingent on many issues that 
change over time. The point is that by comparing changing patterns of 
interdependencies between actors over time and across the four countries, a 
better understanding may emerge of the messy politics of how criminal actors 
arrange and rearrange themselves in conflict and accommodation with other 
actors.  
This ‘changing pattern of interdependencies’ is reflected in McCoy’s 
elaboration of how separate realms — overt and covert, licit and illicit, legal and 
illegal — converge in a particular and potent way that transforms the ‘social 
margins of crime and illicit commerce into potent sources of political change’ 
within wider realms (2019: 11). Another key example is Ballve’s discussion of the 
complex alliance between drug traffickers and agrarian elites in Colombia’s 
northwest Uraba region, wherein state formation ‘is produced through the 
convergence of narco-paramilitary strategies, counterinsurgency and 
government reforms aimed at restructuring through decentralisation’ (Ballve, 
2012: 603).  
This study’s working assumption is that by comparing configurations — the 
specific combination of factors as well as changing patterns of interdependencies 
— across a number of cases in the main opium poppy and coca-producing 
regions, a realistic and sensible way to describe, analyse and make inferences on 
the patterns, relationships and outcomes in the illicit commerce of opium and 
coca could be established. When this PhD research started, a longer set of 
configurations was considered. However, as the research progressed, and upon 
further examination and reflection, items in the long list were combined, 
removed or adjusted. Finally, the decision was made to focus on three 
configurations, namely:  
• Configuration 1: survival and resilience in illicit crop communities  
• Configuration 2: criminal careers of selected drug traffickers 
• Configuration 3: prices of illicit crops and its products. 
The configuration survival and resilience is about patterns of adaptation by 
local communities in which they exercise agency to minimise and spread risks, 
gain access to assets and protection, and create social and political order amidst 
conditions of instability, violence and change. These patterns, as will be shown 
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in detail in Chapter 4, are a refutation of drug policy assumptions — the set of 
dominant narratives that frame not only the UN’s but also other agencies’ 
understanding of illicit crop economies. These assumptions include regarding 
opium and coca as sources of instability and a social evil that breeds fragility and 
violence; or assuming that fragile states are most vulnerable to illicit crop 
production and its consequent harms. Yet by looking into the details of local 
contexts in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia these illicit crops are 
found to also be sources of stability, even drivers of economic growth. They 
enable marginalised areas abandoned by the state to be reinserted back into 
national and global markets. Within the so-called fragile states are resilient 
communities adopting innovative and unorthodox strategies for coping and 
survival in constantly changing and insecure environments. By analysing survival 
and resilience in specific areas in the four countries, this study will demonstrate 
the limitations of the dominant narratives and assumptions. By then comparing 
changing patterns of interdependencies, the study maps out an alternative 
approach for examining resilience and development in illicit-crop-producing 
territories.  
The configuration criminal careers comprises a combination of factors that 
explain why criminal entrepreneurs are not simply gangsters, racketeers, or 
malevolent criminals, but are also economic and political actors in the social 
contexts in which they operate (Blok, 1974). This configuration will review how 
criminal entrepreneurs are also pioneers who spread circuits of capital into the 
most deprived and dangerous territories (McSweeney et al., 2017); intermediaries 
who create employment and livelihoods as they link to wider economies and 
become gatekeepers and powerbrokers who decides on who wins or loses in the 
contestations and competition in local economies (Blok, 1974); and arbitrageurs 
who manage politics and order at the margins of state and market (Ahram and 
King, 2012). Chapter 5 will present a comparative analysis of how selected 
criminal entrepreneurs in Myanmar, Afghanistan, Colombia and Bolivia have 
been pioneers, intermediaries and arbitrageurs in their careers. It will also 
examine the interdependencies and relationships of accommodation and conflict 
that emerge between them and other social actors. To be examined are life stories 
of:  
• Lo Hsing Han, a militia leader who became a drug lord on the China–
Myanmar border and went on to become one of Myanmar’s most 
important licit business tycoon.  
• Lal Jan Ishaqzai and Bashir Noorzai, two Afghans who, like Lo, were 
big enough to be included in the US Designated Kingpins List, and 
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whose assets and companies are monitored by the US Treasury and the 
UNODC. 
• The Bolivian cattle baron and pilot Roberto Suarez Gomez, who 
became Bolivia’s ‘King of Cocaine’ in the 1980s and set up ‘La 
Corporacion,’ a cartel of Bolivian traffickers.  
• The Colombian paramilitary leaders Fidel, Carlos and Vicente 
Castaño Gil, the brothers who set up the paramilitary group Los 
Tangueros and subsequently the national network of paramilitary groups 
in Colombia in 1997. The brothers were among those who replaced the 
‘big men’ (Pablo Escobar, et al.) who were captured or killed in the US–
Colombia war on drugs in the early 1990s. 
The third configuration, prices, is included to respond to the frequent but 
inappropriate application of microeconomic theory (on demand and supply) for 
explaining dynamics in the illicit commerce of opium and coca. Chapter 6 will 
be devoted to this configuration. It will not only show comparisons across the 
four countries, but more importantly, will also demonstrate that, apart from 
prices, there are other mechanisms for coordination in local economies (like state 
interventions, social networks and criminal enterprise) that structure continuity 
and change (Gutierrez Sanin, 2019; Laserna, 1995; Pain and Sutton, 2007).  
Some similarities can be drawn between the three configurations in this study 
and the composite indexes discussed by Alison Ritter (2009). Ritter asserts that 
an index is ‘a single common metric that represents the diverse outcomes or 
consequences’ of a complex social problem. A key example she cites is 
‘ecological footprint’ — a single metric that attempts to encapsulate multiple 
indicators. Developing indexes, she argues, is a way to systematically enable the 
comparison of policy options and outcomes across countries or themes (2009: 
475). Similarly, the configurations ‘resilience’, ‘careers’ and ‘prices’ are metrics, 
the combination of different conditions that produce an outcome of interest. 
However, because these configurations are qualitative indicators, they are 
technically not quantitative measures in the way that indexes are. Still, the 
underlying utility is the same: these configurations, like indexes, are methods for 
analysis and comparisons.  
 To summarise, this PhD study offers new conceptual models that may bring 
into sharper focus the hitherto understudied linkages between illicit economic 
activities on the one hand, and developments in capital accumulation and state 
formation on the other. By going beyond the ‘single story’, it will attempt to 
improve the understanding of criminal entrepreneurs, particularly in terms of 
how they shape governance outcomes in agrarian economies on property 
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relations, social divisions of labour, distribution of income, and social relations 
of consumption, as illicit economies expand and contract.  
The next two sections of this chapter provide an elaboration of the 
conceptual and methodological tools that are used to shape the study’s analysis. 
1.2 Deconstruction, theoretical constructs, and review 
of literature 
This section critically engages, using the lens of political economy, a number of 
theoretical constructs that have been developed and deployed in understanding 
illicit crop enterprise and its actors. It starts with the World Drug Report 2018 
(WDR 2018), published in five booklets, which grounds its analysis and 
interpretation of the ‘world drug problem’ on the notion of markets. In his 
Preface to the five booklets, UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov issues 
a stark warning: 
We are facing a potential supply-driven expansion of drug markets, 
with production of opium and manufacture of cocaine at the highest 
levels ever recorded. Markets for cocaine and methamphetamine are 
extending beyond their usual regions and, while drug trafficking 
online using the darknet continues to represent only a fraction of drug 
trafficking as a whole, it continues to grow rapidly, despite successes 
in shutting down popular trading platforms. (WDR 2018a: 1) 
Fedotov’s references to ‘markets’ is a reflection of how understanding and 
policy-making on illicit drugs is shaped by the idea of the existence of ‘illicit 
markets’ and ‘drugs markets’. However, there is no explicit definition put 
forward by the UN of these ‘markets’; they are simply assumed to exist with no 
critical elaboration on how such spaces emerge, how transactions are conducted 
and organised in such spaces, who the other actors are (apart from the usual 
suspects), and how their roles evolve. Hence, it is necessary to probe into the 
assumptions of this dominant theoretical construct of ‘illicit drug markets’.  
WDR 2018 cites a study by the US Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) that estimated the size of the US drugs market in 2010 at around $109 
billion per year (WDR 2018b: 37). The European Union (EU) had also 
commissioned an earlier study on how the global market for illicit drugs had 
developed from 1998 to 2007, which has been widely used since publication. 
After observing cocaine and heroin prices in 18 countries, authors Peter Reuter 
and Franz Trautmann (2009) put forward the following propositions: 
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• The costs of production of the commodities in this market are trivial 
(roughly 1–2%), compared to profits earned from their smuggling and 
distribution.  
• The vast majority of the costs are accounted for by the distribution of 
the commodities domestically in the consumer countries.  
• Most of the profits from domestic distribution go to the lower retail lev-
els, even though the great individual fortunes are made at the higher (i.e. 
wholesale) levels of the trade20.  
 
Table 1.2: Reuter and Trautmann’s table on the prices of cocaine and heroin 
through the distribution system, ca. 2000 (per pure kg equivalent) 
Stage Cocaine Heroin 
Farm-gate $650 (leaf in Colombia) $550 (opium in Afghanistan) 
Export $1,000 (Colombia) $2,000-4,000 (Afghanistan) 
Import $15-20,000 (Miami) $35,000 
Wholesale (kg) $33,000 (Chicago) $50,000 (London) 
Wholesale (oz.) $52,000 (Chicago) $65,000 
Retail (100 mg 
pure) 
$120,000 (Chicago) $135,000 (London) 
Source: Reuter and Trautmann (2009: 23). As shown, prices multiply up to 200 times 
from farm to market  
  
Other experts, such as Ernesto U. Savona and Michele Riccardi (2015), 
similarly estimate the size of the illicit drug market, but note that ‘illegal markets 
are by definition characterised by a lack of data and high dark numbers’, and that 
various estimation methodologies in use ‘have not yet obtained general 
consensus’. Thus, the risk is that any quantification of illicit markets will produce 
only ‘guess-estimations or mythical numbers’. Nevertheless, they publish 
measurements of the scale of revenues from illicit markets, through a synthesis 
of existing estimates, and the production of new estimates from some selected 
markets. They estimate the annual revenues in the EU from the illicit market for 
heroin to be €7.99 billion euros, and for cocaine, €6.76 billion euros (ibid.: 36). 
They estimate the total annual revenues for the entire illicit drug market 
 
20 Further discussions on these points and the distribution of drugs are available in Inkster and 
Comolli (2012), pp. 17-19. 
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(including cannabis, amphetamines and other drugs) at around €28 billion euros 
for the whole EU.  
These quantifications and measurements are authoritative. Carefully 
calculated, they are perhaps the best measurements available, no matter how 
provisional and conditional, into the shape, reach and depth of illicit drug 
markets. Like the UNODC reports, they are essential for policy development 
and planning by governments, law enforcement and development agencies. 
However, if the goal is to ascertain how such spaces for illicit transactions are 
organised, how its actors are created, recruited and deployed, and how change 
happens in such illicit markets — these measurements are not sufficient. It would 
be unfortunate indeed if these quantifications were treated as endpoints, rather 
than as starting points for more comprehensive investigations into the 
phenomenon of illicit drug markets.    
The measurements alone will say little about how the areas or spaces in which 
illicit transactions are conducted, actually emerge, expand, shrink, transform, 
collapse, or re-emerge. While measurements will provide clues as to how illicit 
markets are organised, they will not by themselves provide the details of how 
property relations are contested and consequently change within these illicit 
markets; nor will they identify the causes or factors that influence the patterns of 
income distribution that emerge between the actors in this chain. Also, and most 
importantly, the measurements will be largely blind to the full range of actors 
involved and how their roles evolve within illicit markets. When analysing 
demand and supply, these quantitative reports invariably discuss the actors 
making the illicit transactions, but not necessarily the intermediaries, protectors, 
or other unlikely players who lie in the shadows yet play key roles in enabling 
these illicit markets to function — especially if these go-betweens are the power-
wielders in the governments to which these agencies report.21  
It is also important to highlight that measurements may be unwittingly 
contributing to the reductionist and very simplistic way by which success in drug 
policy and law enforcement is monitored and assessed. For many years since 
1999, when Illicit Crop Monitoring Surveys and World Drug Reports began to 
be regularly published, the success of drug prohibition has been measured largely 
in terms of hectares of illicit cropland eradicated; kilograms of opium, coca and 
other drugs seized; and number of arrests, prosecutions, or killings of suspected 
 
21 Because much of the information is sensitive, there are difficulties in publishing. For example, 
two case studies commissioned by this researcher for a Christian Aid report could have provoked 
a government shutdown of humanitarian programmes or jeopardised fragile peace negotiations 
with rebel alliances.  
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criminals. While this hectares–kilograms–arrests method of reporting is 
undeniably a measure of success, it shows only a very limited part of a wider 
social phenomenon that is taking place. For example, many successful 
eradication campaigns tend to produce what has been called the ‘balloon effect’ 
— i.e. squeezing one part of a balloon only produces swelling in another part — 
or the displacement of production and transit to other areas. As the Alternative 
World Drug Report (AWDR, 2nd edition) notes, what is framed as a ‘success’ 
could have serious implications for national and international security, and only 
push drug trafficking organisations to target other regions (Rolles et al., 2016: 
48). Thus, the problem is only displaced, perhaps even expanded, and certainly 
not resolved by the measurement-based ‘solutions’ in use.  
Furthermore, the capture, jailing and killing of the big men of the illicit 
commerce in drugs do not necessarily lead to the elimination of the market. An 
example mentioned in the Preface of this study shows how the elimination of 
kingpins and drug cartels by 1995 only forced Colombia’s illicit drug trade to 
restructure. As the AWDR argues, while the war on drugs ‘can potentially 
eliminate violent criminals like Pablo Escobar or Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, 
it also enables their rise to power and, in the longer term, can do little or nothing to 
eliminate the wider criminal market they are a part of’ (ibid.: 88, italics added).  
A further problem created by the hectares–kilograms–arrests method of 
reporting is that it removes subtle but important distinctions between the key 
actors that need to be highlighted. Bolivia, for example, was initially only a coca-
producing nation (where the coca plant is grown), and not a cocaine-trafficking 
one (which processes and smuggles cocaine). ‘Bolivia’s problems’, noted 
LaMond Tullis back in 1995, ‘are therefore not traffickers or refiners but 
(peasant) growers and the economic and social conditions that attract them to 
the drug trade’. Tullis led a UNRISD (UN Research Institute for Social 
Development) research programme from 1993 to 1995 that produced a six-
volume report that coined the widely used phrase unintended consequences. In his 
conclusion, Tullis said, ‘a realisation must develop that supply suppression will 
not solve consumption problems. The economics are against it, risk-taking 
operatives are too plentiful, and the corrupting influence of drug money is too 
pervasive’ (1995: 205).  
This dissertation is an attempt to expand coverage beyond the radical 
simplifications of quantification and measurement. It will look into the context 
in a more thorough and systematic way, using the three configurations of 
resilience, criminal careers and prices. The intention is not to diminish the value 
of quantification and measurement, but to build the narratives and analysis that 
could complement the knowledge produced via quantification and measurement. 
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It would be useful at this point to introduce a distinction between illicit and 
illegal.22 The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘illicit’ as ‘forbidden by law, rules, or 
custom’.23  ‘Illegal’ is defined as ‘contrary to or forbidden by law, especially 
criminal law’.24 In other words, this is a smaller subset of ‘illicit’ — anything 
illegal is that which is forbidden, but only by law. Though something illegal may 
be banned by law, it could be accepted or tolerated by norm and custom. Drug 
trafficking is the best example: it is illegal and banned by law; yet as the story of 
Khalida above shows, it is accepted or tolerated by the households who grow 
opium and by traditional tribal councils.  
Conversely, it is also possible that something legal and accepted by law could 
be rejected by norm or custom. Slavery and apartheid, for example, were legal 
institutions that became repudiated by norm or custom. Another example is the 
banking group HSBC. A US Senate investigation in 2012 exposed how HSBC 
financial services effectively laundered billions of dollars for a Mexican drug 
cartel.25 Despite the evidence obtained in the Senate investigation, HSBC argued 
it did not break any laws, pointing out that its clients were Mexican currency 
exchange firms, not drug lords. US prosecutors backed away from criminally 
charging HSBC; instead, an out-of-court settlement was agreed wherein the bank 
paid an unprecedented fine of $1.9 billion and issued a public apology. HSBC 
received protection too from the British government, which told relevant US 
authorities that a revocation of HSBC’s banking licence would not only lead to 
thousands of job losses, but more importantly, threaten another ‘global financial 
disaster’ right after the 2008 global financial meltdown.26 This case shows how 
the illicit commerce in drugs has become firmly embedded in the world’s licit 
banking and financial systems, blurring the lines between legal and illegal. In 
other words, while something illegal will always be illicit, not all that is illicit is 
illegal. Both terms are social constructs.  
Yashar offers an interesting perspective on these concepts. She points out 
that being illicit is not an inherent property of goods or behaviour; it is a political 
 
22 The distinction was introduced to me by Alex Cobham, a former colleague at Christian Aid. 
23 See: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/illicit.   
24 See: https://www.lexico.com/definition/illegal 
25 See for example, page 41 of the US Senate Report 
(https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20REPORT-
HSBC%20CASE%20HISTORY%20(9.6)2.pdf), and various media reports like 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18867054. Last accessed 31 March 2019 
26 See https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/11/hsbc-us-money-laundering-george-
osborne-report, accessed 31 March 2019.  
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construct that is the by-product of the state’s role in forging legal boundaries. 
Hence, formal institutions refer to what is regulated by the state and lawful; 
informal institutions refer to what is beyond state regulation but not necessarily 
illegal; and illicit institutions refer to what the state has defined as unlawful, 
regardless of whether the state plays an active role in regulating it. Yashar’s 
treatment thus covers the illicit and illegal, but then introduces a useful contrast 
with the informal (2018: loc. 2299–2334). 
Yashar also makes an important clarification that it is the construction of illicit 
categories that creates incentives for a subset of actors to engage in illicit activity. 
Ultimately, ‘prohibition creates incentives for individual and collective actors to 
take advantage of, and make profit from, these prohibitions (2018: loc. 2299).  
For the purposes of this research, this study will avoid using the term ‘illegal’, 
and use ‘illicit’ instead in describing the economic activities or actors it refers to, 
using the wider definition of illicit. It seems more applicable to use ‘illicit’, rather 
than ‘informal’, when describing the illegal opium-growing activities of Khalida’s 
father and the drug trafficker, because while illegal, these activities are after all 
accepted or tolerated by local social norms and custom. Similarly, ‘illicit’ also best 
describes HSBC’s practices, because while technically legal, they are ethically and 
socially wrong and lie outside the realm of the informal.  And ‘illicit’, as this 
dissertation demonstrates, is a status applied by convention, and is therefore a 
social and/or political construction.  
Because of these nuances in meaning, it is important to carefully elaborate on 
the various analytical frames which can be used to explain illicit economies and 
their actors. These analytical frames, which are discussed in the succeeding sub-
sections, provide possible alternatives to the market supply-and-demand model 
dominant in the UN. This is one aspect of this study’s attempt at introducing 
more useful ways of measuring progress in public policy objectives, particularly 
those relevant to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
1.2.1 The covert netherworld  
Alfred W. McCoy, who penned the path-breaking The Politics of Heroin (2003), 
asserted that the lack of a model or theory for an in-depth understanding of the 
ever-changing details of illicit economies is a gap that may explain why both 
drugs and development policies have adopted dubious assumptions and have 
proven unable to tackle the balance of harms and gains that illicit economies 
bring.  
In a recent article, McCoy (2019) puts forward a new conceptual model as a 
contribution to filling that gap. He suggests that there is an invisible incubator 
for forms of illicit trade (illicit drugs, arms trafficking, human smuggling, illegal 
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migration, etc.) that he calls the ‘covert netherworld’ — a shadowy realm and 
clandestine domain beneath the surface of political life. He argues that illicit 
economies persist because they are the economic foundation of that shadowy 
realm that ‘shapes, compromises, and corrupts conventional politics and political 
culture at the highest levels’. We need, argues McCoy, to examine the deeper 
meaning of the character of illicit commodities, the implications of their 
phenomenal proliferation and persistence, and the merging of seemingly separate 
realms — overt and covert, licit and illicit, legal and illegal — that will allow us 
‘a fuller, three-dimensional view of weak states, world powers, and the 
international politics that encompass both’ (2019: 9-10).   
McCoy takes particular notice of strategic roles, arguing that it is law that sets 
the parameters of the illicit market; that security services influence the volume 
and level of syndication within this market through collusion, corruption, 
incompetence or a combination of all three; that political leadership attacks but 
also abets such collusion; and that criminal entrepreneurs exploit both de facto 
legal immunities as well as market opportunities. He concludes — and illustrates 
through case studies of Afghanistan, Myanmar and the Philippines — that ‘there 
were recurring instances of affinity and alliance between state and criminal actors 
that inhabit this clandestine political space’ (2019: 10).  
It would be a significant improvement if the UN’s World Drug Reports were to 
consider this conceptual model. Rather than measure hectares, kilograms and 
arrests, policy formulation may be greatly improved by focusing on the 
compromises, collusion and corruption that McCoy has enumerated in his 
conceptual model. 
1.2.2 Intended and unintended interdependency 
A model which contrasts with interdependency, described earlier, is the rather 
narrow economic rationalist model, in which households’ decisions (for example, 
on whether or not to engage in opium poppy cultivation) is reduced to being 
simply a function of price. This economic rationalism has been challenged by a 
range of authors. In a 2007 contribution, for example, David Mansfield posits a 
more complex picture, arguing that the motivations and factors governing 
decisions on opium poppy cultivation differ by location and socio-economic 
group, because of the  ‘multi-functional role opium plays in rural livelihood 
strategies and how a household’s dependency on opium poppy cultivation varies 
according to its access to assets’, including local public goods such as governance 
and security, the availability of informal credit, access to water and infrastructure, 
or the availability of household labour and seasonal workers, and so on (2006: 
47).  
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The farm-gate price is therefore only one in a long list of factors that shape 
the decision on whether or not to grow opium. While fairly favourable prices 
bring opportunities, there are potential risks to mitigate. In certain villages, 
opium gum has in fact become a form of currency used to buy food and other 
needs or kept at home as a form of insurance that can be drawn on to pay for 
unanticipated household emergencies. The conditions elaborated by Mansfield 
and Fishstein clearly show that prices and markets could not explain everything 
(2015). Simplification and the isolation of a factor like prices can be useful, but 
not if such analysis obscures other and sometimes more decisive contextual 
factors.  
From the discussion of Blok’s interdependency (1974), McCoy’s covert 
netherworld (2019), and the rejection of economic rationalism (Mansfield 2006, 
2007; Mansfield and Fishstein, 2015), this study has taken steps to represent the 
interdependencies and its commodity chains in a simple model, shown in Figure 
1.1 below. As the Figure shows, interdependency is not just between individual 
economic and political actors, but also between different sets of producers and 
even between distant local economies that form a commodity chain. Commodity 
chains facilitate specialisations because a set of households, or perhaps even 
whole villages, principally dependent on opium or coca as a cash crop, can take 
this course only if their food and other needs can be supplied from elsewhere. A 
critical factor necessary for production — the supply of hired hands or seasonal 
migrant workers who can be called upon during the labour-intensive harvesting 
weeks of the planting cycle — need to come from somewhere because a 
household’s supply of labour, even if it includes women and children, may not 
be sufficient to do the harvesting (see Wolf’s discussion of the ‘true division of 
labour’; Wolf, 2010 [1982]: 310).  
Similarly, downstream links show that illicit cultivation in the village is 
dependent on whether harvests can be securely processed in the village itself or 
in nearby locations, i.e. if there is sufficient specialisation that enables the local 
economy to have access to the precursor chemicals and barefoot chemists who 
can run the makeshift ‘laboratories’ to process opium gum into heroin, or coca 
into bazuco. The emergence of these clandestine ‘processing centres’, in turn, is 
dependent on the availability of drug traffickers to mobilise the capital needed 
to pay for the cost of precursor chemicals, wages, accommodation, transport and 
bribes. These investments will pay, only if ‘safe’ smuggling routes through transit 
areas/countries are available, which in turn requires certain logistics such as the 
construction of hidden landing strips or coastal drop-off points, or the 
availability of individual ‘drug mules’ travelling as tourists through airports. All 
of this presumes that a retail distribution network resilient to police action is in 
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place in the consuming countries (see for example Topik, 2009). Thus, the 
conceptual model of interdependent commodity chains offers an alternative to 
the widespread use of the market and demand-supply model as an analytical tool 
to map the transition from plant crop to illicit class-A narcotic drugs between 
distant economies. 
The idea of interdependency also directly refutes assumptions that criminal 
entrepreneurs are outsiders and outlaws who lack legitimacy, and who operate 
exclusively outside the state or formal economy (Grajales, 2015; Gutierrez, 2003, 
2013). In this model, the criminal entrepreneurs are represented by human 
figures, who emerge in various roles across the chain as capitalists, protectors, 
intermediaries, owners of assets, distributors, or sub-contractors. There are 
plenty of examples of criminal entrepreneurs who get elected, genuinely, into 
political office (see for example SHAN, 2011); of intermediaries like lawyers, 
bankers, or accountants selling secrecy services (see ICIJ, 2020); or other 
professionals running firms that become ‘parking lots’ for drug money, e.g. real 
estate firms or construction companies capitalised by drug money and 
subsequently awarded multi-million dollar public works contracts (see for 
example Gutierrez, 2016). Corruption is a common explanation deployed to 
account for such phenomena (Cockcroft, 2012); but this dissertation argues that 
this explanation only tells half the story at best and remains insufficient for 
understanding why illicit enterprise becomes normalised. Intended and 
unintended interdependency, it is argued, could provide a more comprehensive 
explanation. 
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Figure 1.1: A simple model interdependency showing how a local economy specialising in opium or coca cultivation 
depends on upstream and downstream links with other local economies, facilitated by key actors to form chains. 
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1.2.3 The ‘invisible hand’ of prices or the visible hand of power? 
At the core of the dominant market model is the assumption of free exchange, 
that transactions between self-interested actors will be shaped exclusively or 
predominantly by the forces of demand, supply and the price mechanism, ‘as if 
guided by an invisible hand’.27  The applicability of this assumption to illicit 
markets is largely unchallenged. I will argue that another way is needed and that 
such a way is offered by the notion of interdependency: that the building blocks 
of a market, whether licit or illicit, do not come from free exchange, but primarily 
from the social and economic relationships that emerge among interdependent 
actors, typically guided by the visible hand of power. Given the opportunity, this 
visible hand would seek to capture and expand monopoly control. But at the 
same time, interdependence appears to diffuse such control, or otherwise 
prescribe limits on its expansion. These are the central theoretical arguments of 
this study.  
The role of the ‘visible hand’ of power — which can sometimes also be 
invisible — is often lost or de-emphasised in the UN World Drug Reports or in the 
US INCSRs. Fedotov’s preface to the WDR 2018, for example, is completely 
depoliticised: it raises the alarm, and claims ‘to promote balanced, 
comprehensive approaches’ (WDR 2018a: 1), yet there is little said about the 
actors in the illicit market, or even the banks that enable illicit transactions. 
Wallerstein has argued that in commodity chains, the interest of producers is not 
to lower costs like all others, but to maximise profit and market power. Thus, 
for as long as the actors in Figure 1.1 are able to maintain relative monopolies, it 
does not matter whether or not they are efficient or economically ‘competitive’, 
as price theory would have them be — they can be the most uncompetitive, most 
inefficient, and least productive, and yet still capture the most profits, if they can 
maintain their relative monopolies, or control political levers, which is dependent 
on state action of various kinds (Wallerstein, 2009: 84). 
Profit maximisation based on political power, not economic efficiency, is 
particularly evident in the illicit drugs trade. For drug traffickers, there is more 
value in paying bribes to the right officials than in, say, improving productivity 
 
27 The phrase ‘invisible hand’ is derived from Adam Smith’s thesis that markets are self-
correcting, self-regulating and self-sustaining in terms of what to produce, what to charge, and 
how to organise distribution. Prices of commodities, levels of rent, and the wages of labour in 
free markets, he argued, will tend to settle at levels that are most socially beneficial. Markets, 
Smith argued, are the only reliable mechanisms for achieving efficiencies in the production and 
distribution of goods in society. From Smith (1979 [1776]), Book 1: 456; and subsequently from 
Butler (2011).  
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in cultivation or lowering transport costs, as ‘normal’ agricultural producers do. 
A most useful strategy to prevail over rival drug traffickers is not to lower costs 
and prices to undercut the competition, but to buy information, to know when 
to lie low and avoid a forthcoming government crackdown that could destroy 
competitors and rival illicit growers, and then use the ensuing depletion of supply 
to raise prices and maximise profits. In other words, there is a new form of 
‘economics’ involved that moves away from prices and the ‘invisible hand’ and 
converges instead on political entrepreneurship and the ‘visible hand’, as seen in 
the case studies elaborated by McCoy (2019).  
However, there appear to be limits on the leverage and monopolies that 
political entrepreneurship can capture, as shown in the rise and decline of ‘drug 
cartels’. A cartel is, technically, a collusion of economic actors to manipulate 
prices to maximise profit, often by controlling the volume of commodities made 
available on the market. But as some scholars and experts point out, many drug 
traffickers could hardly exercise control over the volume of production of drug 
crops, even with the systematic use of violence 28 . Reuter and Trautmann 
reported that growers in both the Andes and Afghanistan are small producers, 
and are fragmented and disperse, hence there is no suggestion that they have any 
collective power in bargaining (2009a: 11). Similarly, Riccardi and colleagues 
emphasise that, for Europe at least, ‘illicit markets are very seldom under the 
monopoly of one single criminal organisation’ (Savona and Riccardi, 2015: 34). 
Rather, they are characterised by a plurality of actors, ranging from large traditional 
criminal organisations to small-scale actors and individuals. The role, nature, 
composition and level of cooperation among these actors constantly change, 
they continue, thus making it almost impossible to determine how much each of 
these actors may earn (ibid.). Like the invisible hand, therefore, the visible hand 
has its limits.  
It has also been pointed out by Collins (2009: 519) that the only time that 
actual cartels existed was in the 1890s to early 1900s, when cocaine was legal.29 
This was when German pharmaceutical companies dominated the market with 
their game-changing strategy of importing semi-processed cocaine sulphate 
(bazuco), rather than dry coca leaves.30 The evidence today points to increased 
 
28 See for example, Reuter (1983).  
29 Note that the scope of Collins’ work did not include the British East India Company, which as 
this study argues, may have been the first drug ‘cartel’ in history. See further discussions in 
Chapter 2. 
30 See discussion of Gootenberg’s account of the history of the commodification of cocaine in 
Chapter 2.  
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dispersion of the networks and commodity chains that make cocaine available to 
its consumers. In other words, even with political leverage, these commodity 
chains and networks could not be centrally controlled: they evolve through 
changing relationships of conflict, competition and accommodation.  
Yet it is still not far-fetched to say that today’s illicit commodity chains could 
drive a similar ‘great leap forward’ to that described by Wolf (see Chapter 2.5) — i.e. 
that revenues and income earned across the chain would escalate demand for 
materials (e.g. precursor chemicals), services (cross-border banking), and protection 
needed for moving the commodities across borders — that would lead to 
specialisations across regions. The specialisations are probably a reason why illicit 
opium and coca are grown and processed in only a handful of countries. These were 
already evident when US President Richard Nixon decried in 1971 that though his 
country had the largest number of heroin addicts in the world, ‘America does not 
grow opium, nor does it manufacture heroin’.31 But again, as Wolf reminds us, such 
specialisations are not the result of ‘free commodity exchange’: there are constraints 
governing the selection of these commodities, and political and military sanctions 
are necessary to enforce and sustain the asymmetrical benefits and displacements in 
these exchanges (Wolf, 2010 [1982]: 310–314). ‘Choice’ in this system of 
interrelationships — as seen in the case of the land-poor farmers of southern 
Afghanistan and the further cases elaborated in this study’s later chapters — is rarely 
‘free’.  
The coercive specialisations taking place therefore characterise the ‘system of 
cruel and unregulated capitalism with a proven ability to adapt’ (Cave and Robles, 
2014). This implies massive social reorganisation because, indeed, a local 
economy would not spontaneously specialise, i.e. abandon food production in 
favour of specialised opium poppy or coca cultivation, unless there was 
extraordinary force or pressure applied on it to do so. The so-called ‘spontaneous 
order’ that emerges from markets is not created by an ‘invisible hand’, but rather 
by the limits of monopoly power acquired by emergent criminal entrepreneurs.  
It is a paradox that through the ‘visible hand’, criminal entrepreneurs are able 
to buy legitimacy. In capital-starved, asset-deprived and collapsing local 
economies, it is these actors’ investments into illicit enterprise that could provide 
the lifeline of income and employment that enable survival. This leads to another 
assumption in the dominant model that needs to be refuted: the notion that 
criminals, because they are ‘criminals’, do not enjoy legitimacy. Holders of the 
visible hand can purchase the required legitimacy they need to carry on.   
 
31 See Nixon’s speech at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048, accessed 12 June 
2018. 
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It was Hobsbawm who originally situated the phenomenon of banditry within 
its socio-political context. In societies with class divisions and states, Hobsbawm 
points out, ‘banditry simultaneously challenges the economic, social, and political 
order by challenging those who lay claim to power, law, and the control of 
resources’ (Hobsbawm, 2000 [1969]: 7). Banditry as a specific phenomenon 
therefore cannot exist, he emphasises, outside socio-economic and political 
orders. Banditry as a mass phenomenon can appear ‘when non-class societies 
resist the rise or imposition of class societies, or when traditional rural class 
societies resist the advance of other rural, or urban, or foreign class societies, 
states or regimes’ (ibid.: 9).  
   Looking at a history of banditry over three centuries, historian Thomas 
Gallant explains key bases for the acceptance and legitimacy of criminals. Bandits 
and criminals, he argues, cannot be total outsiders for the simple reason that they 
are a by-product or social consequence of changing forms of capital 
accumulation, labour appropriation and modes of exchange in the formal 
economy. In other words, criminals are ‘part and parcel of civil society’: they are 
drawn from the same ranks of the rural economy being disrupted by agrarian 
change. In addition, Gallant also highlights that although bandits and pirates 
stole, and by definition expropriated goods and commodities illegally, they were 
not always operating illegally, i.e. men of violence switched careers from bandits 
at one point, to being estate guards or soldiers at another time, or even becoming 
politicians or state leaders over time, depending on their links to ruling elites. 
Simply put, the same men who are considered by some as illegitimate could be 
seen by others as legitimate. Besides, ‘when opening their household larders to 
outsiders’, Gallant suggests, ‘it made little difference to peasants and rural 
labourers whether the open-palmed claimant was the taxman or an extortionist 
brigand. Both made questionable claims on resources’ (1999: 27–28). 
 Gallant’s historical overview also shows that banditry or piracy, while often 
thought of as rooted only in the backwaters of society or in social systems 
constituted by a traditional peasantry, actually created conditions that enabled 
the diffusion of capital into rural economies. In other words, bandits could be 
agents of capitalism. According to Gallant, bandits played a role in monetising 
the rural economy. Since they stole and pillaged portable commodities of value 
— gold or bullion, spices, jewels, opium and the like, as well as livestock — these 
stolen goods needed to be converted into cash or other forms of wealth in order 
to be enjoyed. This meant that the communities in which bandits were immersed 
had to be engaged in some form of exchange with wider, larger economies. 
Because bandits had more symbiotic rather than parasitic relationships with the 
local communities they relied upon, the profits they gained from exchange with 
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broader economies became useful to those communities in which they were 
based. As Gallant concludes, ‘the market mechanism of exchange linked the 
brigand to the agriculturalist and led to the increased monetisation of the rural 
economy’ (1999: 37–38).   
Bandit activities further led certain rural areas to be connected directly to 
outside markets over time. As exchange relations consolidated and became more 
regular, certain rural areas became established suppliers of various illicit products 
and ill-gotten gains — stolen gold, drugs, arms, etc. — to outside markets. Some 
even specialised in providing associated criminal services, such as the slave-
raiders who captured humans for sale in what until the 1800s was the legal 
enterprise of slavery.32 Gallant shows, for example, how bandit enclaves inland 
and pirate lairs on coasts around the world grew into regional market centres and 
entrepôts in their own right. Pirates operating from the Caribbean even ‘became 
a major economic force supplying urban markets in North America’. Bandits or 
pirates were predator-merchants who performed important but curiously 
unacknowledged roles in the expansion of commerce and wider economies 
(Gallant, 1999: 38).  
A set of 2015 case studies from the UK development NGO, Christian Aid, 
reveals similar patterns persisting in some of today’s illicit economies.33 For 
example, Christina Anderson describes how the deserts of northern Mali today 
have camel-riding or 4x4-driving outlaws who, like their pirate forebears, ‘turned 
otherwise isolated settlements and mobile trading caravans in the desert into 
bazaars for smuggled goods — from sugar, fuel and staples to cigarettes, mobile 
phones or Viagra’. The bazaars are often bases too, says Anderson, ‘for hiding 
and forwarding illicit merchandise, like weapons, ammunition and narcotic drugs 
— mainly cocaine and cannabis resin’. She states that modern criminal 
entrepreneurs ‘are increasingly adept at converting stolen or smuggled goods into 
other forms of wealth that add real value to the local economy’ (Anderson, 2015: 
1). 
Filippo De Danieli’s study on Tajikistan provides clues into how particular 
economic contexts enable criminal entrepreneurs to develop and flourish, while 
refuting a common assumption that drug trafficking is always a hard security 
threat. Documenting how symbiotic relationships developed between the state 
 
32 Interesting stories about ‘outlaw nations’ and ‘republics of rogues’ that grew in pirate lairs in 
Madagascar, the south Atlantic and the Caribbean, are provided in Frank Sherry’s Raiders and 
Rebels: The Golden Age of Piracy (1986).  
33 See the synthesis report and summary of four case studies on Tajikistan, Mali, Afghanistan and 
Colombia in Gutierrez (2015). A fifth case study on Myanmar remains unpublished.  
 Chapter 1: Theoretical Constructs and Methodology  
31 
 
and criminal organisations after Tajikistan’s 1997 peace agreement, De Danieli 
argues that these relations go beyond collusion and sharing in illicit profits. As 
such, Tajikistan’s drug mafias have actively contributed to preserving the 
established order, either by eliminating potential threats to the regime, or by 
settling disputes in the country’s most remote and unruly regions (2015: 2-11). 
De Danieli provides accounts of how criminals transitioned to become 
political actors after the civil war. He cites the case of Sangak Safarov, a bartender 
with a long criminal history who became leader of the country’s biggest militia, 
the Popular Front of Tajikistan, which later became the ruling party; and of 
Gaffur ‘the Grey’ Mirzoev, another militia leader of a group called the 
‘Presidential Guard’, and allegedly the key player in the narcotics business, who 
helped quash at least two coup attempts (De Danieli, 2015).34 In other words, 
criminal entrepreneurs are not just one-dimensional ‘Robin Hoods’ who may 
have legitimacy to some and not to others.  
Further contemporary cases are elaborated in Out of the Shadows: Violent Conflict 
and the Real Economy of Mindanao, published by the peace-building NGO 
International Alert (Lara and Schoofs, 2013). This volume showcases the shadow 
economies of Mindanao: the illegal gun trade (Quitoriano); drugs (Cagoco-
Guiam); kidnapping (Gutierrez); informal land markets (Gulane); cross-border 
illicit trade (Villanueva); and the links between borrowing money and violence in 
Sulu (Kamlian).   
To summarise, criminal entrepreneurs are not just criminals. They are political 
and economic actors too, playing key roles in state-building and preserving the 
established order. They are suppliers of both order and disorder (De Danieli, 
2015; Goodhand, 2009), whose visible hands structure outcomes in the political 
economy.  
1.2.4 McMafia and the normalisation of crime  
In 2009, journalist Misha Glenny published the book that coined the term 
McMafia. Collin’s review of the book, however, dismissed it as superficial, 
sketchy, short on documentation and analysis, and builds up gossip into 
sensationalist claims (2009: 518). Despite the validity of the bad review, what 
could not be denied is that the term McMafia, by itself, already serves as a useful 
contribution. There are important parallels between the growth of organised 
 
34 These roles, however, did not last long. Safarov was killed in a gunfight with a fellow com-
mander in 1993. When Mirzoev’s growing strength became a threat, he was eliminated by the 
president whose administration he helped secure; he was arrested in 2004, his assets were 
seized, and the Presidential Guard was disbanded (De Danieli, 2015). 
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crime on one hand, and the ubiquitous expansion of multinational companies 
like the food chain McDonalds to practically every corner of the world, on the 
other. Criminals, organised and disorganised, Glenny explains, ‘were also good 
capitalists and entrepreneurs intent on obeying the laws of supply and demand. 
As such, they value economies of scale, just as multinational corporations did, 
and so sought out overseas partners and markets to develop industries that were 
every bit as cosmopolitan as Shell, Nike, or McDonalds’. The key pattern Glenny 
underscored is that McMafia, and not McDonalds, is the greatest ‘success’ story 
of globalisation (Glenny, 2009: p.5-7) – a phenomenon that has not been 
sufficiently acknowledged.  
It is also worth noting that it would have been nearly impossible for 
researchers to do the same level of reporting that Glenny accomplished in 
documenting, in English, 13 cases of criminal enterprises around the world. 
Glenny not only had access to the infrastructure, services, and connections of a 
state-backed global media conglomerate. As a BBC journalist, he was also better 
positioned to take risks. Research councils and universities would hesitate to 
fund and approve similar work by researchers because of the obvious risks, costs, 
and difficulties of ensuring it complies with research ethics.35  
To date, much has been written about globalisation of the licit type, but little 
on the illicit type. Yet the size alone of the illicit economy shows it is such an 
important economic force. What many policy and security analysts are now 
deliberating is not any more the size and reach but the extent to which the illicit 
is ‘silently hijacking’ significant portions of the global licit economy. Naím, for 
example, highlighted how illicit trade is inextricably linked to legitimate 
commerce, thus blurring boundaries between state and criminal organisations, 
and between legitimate and criminal business. He also points out a ‘great 
mutation’ of moving away ‘from fixed hierarchies and towards decentralized 
networks; away from controlling leaders and toward multiple, loosely linked, 
dispersed agents and cells’. It is a mutation, he said, ‘that governments in the 
1990s barely recognized, and could not, in any case, hope to emulate’ (2007: 7-
8). Simply put, organised crime and illicit economies are not anymore completely 
‘underground’ – they quite often normalise or become the standard.  
 
35 Journalism and academic research are fields that should be reinforcing, or at least comple-
menting, and not cancelling each other out.  
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1.2.5 Smugglers or saviours?36 
Blok’s advice to first ‘discover people on whom the bandit relies’ is prescient 
(1972: 498). It situates the criminal entrepreneur in his socio-economic and 
political context. Criminals, after all, inhabit more or less the same territory, rely 
on the same food supply, are connected to the same markets, and are subject to 
the same mechanisms of control and coercion as most people. The criminal relies 
not only on ordinary people who could be their relatives or friends; they also rely 
on local patrons, politicians, and in many cases, the police, based on quid pro 
quos and deals they have struck. Criminals are said not to prey within their own 
immediate community, because otherwise they will be thrown out or abandoned. 
Criminals are social actors who learn to navigate their way through the complex 
maze of relationships and dependencies in society.   
It must be emphasised, however, that others — ordinary villagers, agricultural 
traders, or local politicians — rely heavily on criminals as well. A poor peasant 
household, for example, that is constantly vulnerable because of the absence of 
state institutions, can get better and more effective protection from a powerful 
drug lord by colluding and cultivating opium poppy. There are plenty of stories 
of how poor households keep their harvests and meagre properties from petty 
theft because of their association with known entrepreneurs in violence.37 But it 
is not only protection that is provided. In cash-starved and infrastructure-
deprived local economies normally regarded as ‘dangerous’ — and as such 
avoided by normal firms because of the inherent risks — it could be the criminal 
who, despite the status of ‘outlaw’, is the most important source of cash, 
investment, or employment. Hence the question ‘smuggler or saviour?’.  
Other scholars have explored this question in detail, including Eric 
Hobsbawm (2000 [1969]: 5), who introduced the paradox of the social bandit, 
otherwise known as the ‘ancient politics of Robin Hood’. Criminals are officially 
‘outlaws’, yet as Hobsbawm explains, the Robin Hood who was an outlaw and 
criminal to state authorities was a saviour and hero to poor communities. 
Hobsbawm raises the question of whether banditry was a form of social protest. 
By imposing their will on victims through extortion, robbery and other forms of 
violence, Hobsbawm suggests, bandits ‘simultaneously challenge the economic, 
social and political order by challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, 
 
36 Adopted from the title of Judith Scheele’s 2012 book, Smugglers or Saints. 
37 See for example the cases of kidnappers and fugitive criminals in the southern Philippines 
whose mere presence in villages where they sought sanctuary provided protection to those vil-
lages (Gutierrez, 2013: 131–136). 
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
34 
law and control of resources’ (ibid.: 7). This makes banditry political as much 
criminal. 
Hobsbawm’s thesis, however, has been challenged by Blok, who points out 
that ‘there is much more to brigandage than just the fact that it may voice popular 
protest’. Bandits, Blok continues, ‘do not seem to be the appropriate agents to 
transform any organizational capacity among peasants into a politically effective 
force’, and in many cases, have in fact been tools for suppressing social protest. 
Rather than be actual champions of the poor and the weak, ‘bandits quite often 
terrorised those from whose very ranks they managed to rise. Rather than 
promoting the articulation of peasant interests, bandits tend to obstruct or to 
deviate concerted peasant action. Bandits have fulfilled pivotal roles in the 
demobilisation of peasants’. Furthermore, Blok continues, brigandage indirectly 
impedes large-scale peasant mobilisation because it provides channels to move 
up the social hierarchy to a select few, thus weakening class solidarity (Blok, 1972: 
496). 
The Blok–Hobsbawm exchange reminds us that there is no straightforward 
answer to the question of smuggler or saviour. The criminals of today could be 
hero or heel at the same time. Modern-day Robin Hoods can be an expression 
of social protest in the same way that they can be effective tools in the 
suppression of that social protest. This reverberates to this day in the debate 
around the impact of drug traffickers on poor peasant communities growing 
illicit crops. The dominant narrative states that criminal entrepreneurs are 
sources of violence and coercion and are therefore predators of the poor local 
communities they rely on. But this study argues that the same criminal 
entrepreneurs are a source of both order and disorder, of both stability and 
instability. The challenge is to avoid ignoring or negating any of the roles that 
they perform.  
Hence, further elaborations are necessary on the role of criminals. For this, 
we return to Gallant, who wanted to examine ‘the economic contexts that enable 
such entrepreneurs in violence to develop and flourish within different stages of 
economic development’ (1999: 27–28). His more basic question is how criminal 
entrepreneurs and their assorted allies are reproduced and recruited in society in 
the first place. Gallant suggests a straightforward answer: capitalist penetration 
of rural areas uproots young men from an increasingly moribund peasant 
economy, thus making recurrent the supply and demand for the services of men 
of violence. This pattern is explained in more detail in the next section.  
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1.2.6 The suppliers of order and disorder 
It was the sociologist Charles Tilly who added an essential component to the 
understanding of criminal enterprise: criminals long-considered to be sources of 
disorder could be suppliers of political order as well. Drawing on the analogy 
that state-making is like a protection racket, Tilly argued that states qualify as an 
example of organised crime (Tilly, 1985). Organised violence and coercive 
exploitation, he said, ‘played a large part in the creation of European states’, 
which means that ‘banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war-making all 
belong to the same continuum’ (ibid.: 170–171).   
Tilly introduces key definitions. ‘Someone who produces both the danger 
and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer’. On the other hand, ‘someone 
who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger’s appearance 
qualifies as a legitimate protector — especially if his price is no higher than his 
competitors’. Tilly then states that, ‘someone who supplies reliable, low-priced 
shielding both from local racketeers and from outside marauders makes the best 
offer of all’ (1985: 171). Tilly’s explanation of how criminals could be suppliers 
of political order dates back to 1974 when he wrote the Foreword for Blok’s The 
Mafia of a Sicilian Village, wherein he said:  
The system of producing mafia is cruel and curious. It parallels government 
in some respects and intertwines with government in other respects. Like 
governments, its operators rely on control of concentrated and effective 
means of coercion to keep the bulk of the population in line. Like 
governments, the beneficiaries of the system, directly or indirectly, tax the 
producers of wealth — the agricultural workers. Like many governments, 
the system permits each of the operators to scoop some of the proceeds 
from the flow toward the top. It depends on government to stand far 
enough away not to interfere with the flow of proceeds, but close enough 
to assure that neither rivals nor the people at the bottom will block the flow. 
Unlike most governments, however, the system has no accountability, no 
visibility, no means of representation for those under its control. So the 
mafia system is more curious and more cruel than government itself. The 
murders, thefts, and mutilations its operators use to maintain their control 
— to ‘make themselves respected’ — are only the most lurid manifestations 
of its evil. (Blok, 1974: xix–xx) 
 Tilly and Blok emphasise that the central characteristic of mafia ‘is the private 
use of unlicensed violence as a means of control in the public arena’, and that 
the actions of the mafiosi depend on a particular set of economic and political 
arrangements. Tilly underscores that the task is ‘to locate the connections 
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between the prevalence of private violence and structure of economic and 
political life’ (Blok, 1974: xv).      
 Tilly further reiterates that the circumstances that created mafia lie in the rural 
setting, where ‘the phenomenon originated and prospered, rather than with the 
cities in which it eventually multiplied’ (ibid.: xiii). He states that what Blok 
describes in Sicily ‘resembles … former peasant populations at the edge of 
capitalism throughout the world’, for instance in the hacienda estates of Latin 
America and Southeast Asia, where ‘rent capitalists’ ‘consolidated control over 
the land, harnessing cheap labour for world markets, and converting semi-
autonomous peasants into dependent proletarians’ (ibid.: xvi)38.  
Joel Migdal argues that ‘for peasants to produce what the market demanded 
they produce, there had to be an additional force insuring compliance with the 
market’s demands.’ That force, he said, was the state, backed by the coercion of 
armies and police, and the adoption of policies on land, taxation, and 
transportation that greatly enhanced the force of the market (Migdal, 1982: 73). 
But Gallant highlights a problem: the state apparatus did not always possess the 
means and military capability to compel peasants to do what it wanted. State 
institutions were also not always in situ, and in many countries were still mostly 
incomplete. Hence, the state could not always be that force to penetrate the 
peasant economy. It is in this regard, Gallant suggests, that criminals step in as 
potential suppliers of order. In order for the state to be able to deploy its array 
of techniques — tax rolls, land registries, standardised currencies, etc. — to undo 
the existing ways in which peasant societies were socially and economically 
organised, it had to co-opt, or at least arrive at some form of settlement with, 
criminal forces in society that it could not destroy (Gallant, 1999: 37–38).  
The role of criminals as suppliers of order can be seen better from a historical 
perspective that lays out how banditry and criminal enterprise have been more 
widespread than assumed. The literature on peasant unrest, Gallant observes, 
shows that actual peasant rebellions were rare. Banditry, however, was not. 
Hence, banditry as a historical phenomenon may have had a far greater impact 
in shaping capital accumulation, labour appropriation and mechanisms of 
exchange in many peasant economies than has been understood to date, as 
demonstrated most eloquently by Blok’s Mafia of a Sicilian Village. At the very 
least, Gallant argues, bandits provided the pretext for state intervention into the 
 
38 See also Schneider and Schneider (1976) who discuss cultural codes generated in the early ad-
aptations of Sicilians to such changes.  
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peasant economy. But at most, bandits were active strategic partners of rulers as 
well as rebels in changing the peasant economy.  
David Nugent adds important refinements. Nugent questions the view that 
state and society are distinct ‘entities’, each with its own clearly identifiable 
boundaries and interests. He also questions the assumption that state and society 
have interests that are in conflict with one another — that is, that the state can 
advance its interests only at the expense of society, and vice versa. This notion 
of a ‘zero sum game’, he explains, is so deeply ingrained in social science thinking 
that ‘virtually all the literature on the consolidation and breakdown of states is 
characterised by these assumptions’ (Nugent, 1999: 69).   
Based on his study of political competition between elite castas of northern 
Peru in the early 1900s, Nugent argues that far from giving expression to 
alternative political possibilities, illegal political networks – which in many ways 
are similar to criminal networks – may not only follow the same organisation, 
but may also demonstrate the same intentions as the formal state apparatus. 
Illegal political networks therefore, according to Nugent, may require the formal 
state apparatus as a condition of their very existence. Thus, rather than help 
define the limits of ‘stateness’, or the external boundaries of some discrete entity 
called the state, ‘illegal political networks may themselves be key mechanisms by 
means of which state organisation is brought into being and reproduced, and 
vice versa’ (ibid.: 69–70).  
Finally, it is also valuable to remember Goodhand’s discussion of coping, 
shadow and combat economies, elaborated in the Preface and in Chapter 4.2.3. 
The concepts of households and villages, traditional institutions and social 
norms, and political structures and contestation need to be seen in the context 
of the combat, shadow, and coping economies that emerge in such complex 
situations (Goodhand, 2004).  
1.2.7 Arbitrageurs and intermediaries in state-sponsored protection 
rackets 
A final body of literature to cite in this review is that which qualifies criminal 
entrepreneurs as arbitrageurs and intermediaries in state-sponsored protection 
rackets. First is Ahram and King’s definition of warlord, which provides the 
essential qualifier — that criminal entrepreneurs are also arbitrageurs. 
Referencing Fernand Braudel, they highlight that:  
…the success of warlords was, at its base, due to their unique position as 
frontiersmen. They were creatures of the borderlands, growing up in regions 
where states and empires were both needy and inexpert: where they had 
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
38 
difficulty extending their own power and where they required assistance in 
preventing the catastrophe of foreign invasion. Warlords were uniquely 
gifted boundary-crossers, conducting both violent and non-violent 
transactions across political, economic, and cultural dividing lines. Despite 
the popular image of warlords as sword-swinging barbarians ruling 
despotically from usurped thrones, the most successful ones turned out to 
have something that everyone else wanted: the ability to serve as middlemen 
across uncertain boundaries while, in the process, reaping some of the 
profits for themselves. (Ahram and King, 2012: 170)    
Ahram and King explain that racketeering is not always possible, because it is 
only in the rare condition of absolute state failure that there are no police, 
however corrupt, who can offer some protection to citizens engaged in everyday 
economic activities. State power therefore, even when remote, could impose 
limits on practising racketeers. Success in such situations, they point out, relies 
upon a distinctive form of brokerage — i.e. positioning to intermediate in return 
for political, financial, or other rewards, thereby gaining personal and political 
aggrandisement (ibid.: 174).   
Ahram and King arrived at their definition of warlords-as-arbitrageurs by first 
rejecting the deductive, Weberian distinction between different types of 
legitimacy which assumes that states alone enjoy a monopoly over the use of 
force. They cite Michael Mann who said that, ‘most historic states have not 
possessed a monopoly of organised military force and many have not even 
claimed it’. Hence, it is necessary to understand warlords as ‘armed agents who 
wield some degree of civil power and claim some kind of local sovereignty over 
a defined region, while paying allegiance to one or more stronger powers’. The 
subservience and loyalty to a superior authority, state Ahram and King, is what 
sets the warlord apart (ibid.: 172). 
The two authors summarise three explanations for the emergence of 
warlordism. First, warlords offer an anachronistic form of political authority 
occurring where modern state authority is weak; they therefore represent forms 
of social organisation that the state is meant to replace. Second, warlords offer 
an alternative social structure: they offer protection and other public goods ‘that 
are superior to those putatively offered by the state’. And third, warlords are not 
so much violent franchisees, but are essentially violent entrepreneurs who seek 
to control some local resource (drugs, timber, diamonds) to enrich themselves 
and their subordinates (ibid.: 173).    
More recently, a group of academics asked the question, ‘why do narcos 
invest in rural land?’ (McSweeney et al., 2017). Drawing on scholarly, journalistic 
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and policy sources, they outline ‘three key elements of the political economic 
context that create and enable land acquisition by drug traffickers’: the war on 
drugs; late 20th century neoliberalism; and pervasive inequalities in Latin 
America’s agrarian sector. As they found in their review, rather than being 
anathema to private investment in the rural sector, narco-entrepreneurs ‘create 
the very conditions for such investments — not everywhere, but importantly in 
the very landscapes most likely to have been closed off to capital investment 
prior to the drug traffickers’ involvement’ (ibid.: 16). McSweeney et al. conclude 
that, ‘drug traffickers use the vast wealth they capture from an illicit commodity 
chain to act as neoliberal pioneers, spreading circuits of capital into new 
territories: communal, reserved, and public lands’ (ibid.).   
McSweeney et al. introduce the notion that drug traffickers are a ‘narco-
bourgeoisie’, ‘due to their use of cocaine profits to establish and extend private 
property relations into erstwhile communal and protected lands that were 
previously unavailable for capital accumulation’. The idea of a narco-bourgeoisie 
effectively captures the relationship between drug control policy and capitalism 
(ibid.: 3).   
1.2.8 Conclusion: Recasting criminal enterprise 
To summarise, this sub-section has provided a set of theoretical constructs that 
are useful for the examination, interpretation and analysis of the politico-
economic roles of criminal entrepreneurs in shaping state formation and capital 
accumulation, which are undertaken in this study. This sub-section: 
• introduced intended and unintended interdependence, and indicated 
how it explains the survival and resilience of criminal enterprise;  
• made the argument that the building blocks of a market, whether licit or 
illicit, are not based on free exchange, but primarily on the social and 
economic relationships that emerge from interdependent actors, 
typically guided by the visible hand of power;  
• traced the emergence of actors who can either be smugglers or saviours 
of the capitalist penetration of rural areas that uproots young men from 
an increasingly moribund peasant economy, thus creating recurrent 
supply and demand for the services of men of violence; 
• argued that ultimately, the reproduction of criminals en masse is a social 
consequence of the disruptions created by capital accumulation and 
agrarian change;  
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• emphasised that the criminals that emerge — contrary to the common 
understanding that they can only be malevolent actors and sources of 
disorder — can also be providers of order;  
• showed how criminal enterprise reproduces itself around the world using 
the old combination of force and cunning, like corruption and state 
capture;  
• recast criminal enterprise as a force for change, whether good or bad, 
especially at the margins of state and market. Not only does criminal 
enterprise have remarkable resilience to state power, it also becomes 
normalised. The sub-section looked at the covert netherworld and how 
criminal enterprise has become the economic foundation for a shadowy 
realm; and finally,   
• looked at the role of criminal entrepreneurs as arbitrageurs and as a 
‘narco-bourgeoisie’. 
In sum, this sub-section has sought to recast the role of criminal 
entrepreneurs. Though they may be rightly regarded as malevolent politico-
economic actors creating disorder, they can also be agents of order. They can be 
gatekeepers to the ebbs and flows of capital and political opportunities in the 
borderlands, sustained as they are by interdependent relationships in which they 
arrange and rearrange themselves in conflict and accommodation with other 
actors.  
 
1.3 Historical and comparative research: Explanation of 
the methodology and analytical operations 
This study uses the methods of historical and comparative research to try to 
resolve the puzzle and find answers to its central research question. Historical 
and comparative research means examining the past in order to understand the 
present; it uses historical as well as contemporary cases to explain the origins and 
development of illicit crop enterprise and its commodity chains. This approach 
seems to be the most appropriate for challenging the generalisations of 
prohibition (Llobera, 2000: 72–74).  
Chapter 2 begins this research by presenting a genealogy of illicit crop 
enterprise and its social life. Chapter 3 uses two sets of primary sources — the 
official reports from the UN and US agencies that measure and describe illicit 
drugs enterprise today — to critically assess the conventional wisdom about illicit 
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crops and their commodity chains. Chapters 4 to 6 present the comparative 
analysis of what were referred to earlier as configurations — focusing on 
resilience, careers and prices — to dive deeper into the origins and development 
of illicit crop enterprise.  
1.3.1 Use of primary sources and indices 
A key contribution of this study is its critical examination of two sets of primary 
sources: the official reports about illicit drugs enterprise published annually by 
the US government since 1986, and by the UN since 1999. These reports are 
bulky documents: the annual US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR), for example, typically has over 400 pages; in recent years, each annual 
publication comes out in two volumes. The UNODC’s World Drug Report (WDR) 
is more variable in size but is also a dense document packed with charts and 
statistical tables.  
These INCSRs and the WDRs are administrative records — collections of 
mainly factual information recorded by the US government and the UN in order 
to track and monitor clandestine illicit drugs enterprise. These records are used 
for policy development and decision-making in both institutions. The INCSRs 
are used to guide decision-making on US official development aid (to be 
explained in more detail in Chapter 3); while the WDRs are the basis for drug 
policy development in the UN.  
The use of records as a source of data for research analysis has been declining 
because, increasingly, specially designed research studies are carried out to 
replace records-based data (Hakim, 1998: 36). This study does not use the 
INCSRs and WDRs as sources of data for constructing datasets for analysis; 
rather, it provides an analytical reading of their contents to track trends and 
patterns in the knowledge about illicit crop enterprise. This reading is not just 
based on counts or frequency and developing coding categories; more 
importantly it is also an attempt to interpret the underlying text and meaning of 
official statements and claims, such as how relationships of conflict and 
accommodation between various actors are represented in the reports (Slater, 
2000).  
1.3.2 Why comparative methods? 
The research procedure to be applied in Chapters 4 to 6 is anchored in step-wise, 
medium-N, comparative methods — a specific research approach which traces 
its genealogy from the works of David Levi-Faur (2003); Benoit Rihoux and 
Charles Ragin (2009); and Peter P. Mollinga and Daphne Gondhalekar (2012, 
2014). This methodological approach has been selected mainly because it is 
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through comparative research — especially when it goes beyond ‘loose’ or 
‘implicit’ comparisons-by-contrast — that the complexity of the hidden 
phenomena of illicit crop economies may be further unpacked, thus allowing for 
the emergence of new insights and inferences through which the governance 
challenges over the livelihoods of illicit crop-dependent communities may be 
better understood.  
In 1998 when the UN General Assembly endorsed an ambitious 10-year 
programme for a ‘drugs-free world’, drug control policy came to be monitored 
through a linear, largely context-free, stripped-down quantitative reporting. 
There is no question that this monitoring and tracking, as represented by the 
INCSRs and the WDRs, are necessary to measure and quantify a clandestine 
commerce. However, these reports tend to be instrumentalist, in the sense that 
theory dictates the evidence, and not the other way around. The emphasis on 
standardisation and compliance with the three international drug control treaties 
leads to over-generalisation and the single-narrative approach that arguably 
obscures more than it reveals about the ‘drug problem’. A label developed by 
Larry M. Bartels could be applied to this approach — i.e. quantitative imperialism, 
or a system of inference based largely on quantification which is too narrow or 
radically incomplete (Bartels, 2010: 83–84). A comparative approach may 
transcend the limits of quantitative imperialism.  
The trend in standardisation, top-down policy formulation and enforcement, 
and consequent over-generalisation has emerged despite efforts within the UN 
system itself for more specific and contextualised understandings of the ‘drug 
problem’. For example, before the UN General Assembly made its 1998 decision 
to pursue a ‘drugs-free world’ within 10 years, a six-volume series produced by 
UNRISD (UN Research Institute for Social Development) provided context-
focused, nuanced and in-depth treatment and analysis that could arguably have 
provided the needed ‘balance’ or counterpoint to the instrumentalist approach.39 
These publications, illuminating as they are, appear to have been overlooked in 
the policy-making, and may have been drowned out by essentially apocalyptic 
narratives of an impending ‘drugs catastrophe’. Fears about a drugs catastrophe, 
reflected in many of the 2,058 entries in Tullis’ (1991) annotated bibliography, 
may have predisposed policy-makers to do away with nuance and context, and 
rely almost exclusively on standardisation and top-down enforcement.  
 
39 The series includes Painter (1994); Renard (1996); Thoumi (1995); Tullis (1995). It is unfortu-
nate that, unlike most UN reports, this six-volume series is not available online.  
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Yet the promise of top-down enforcement has clearly not been achieved. In 
2008, when it became apparent that the ambitious 10-year programme for a 
drugs-free world had failed, the UNODC came up instead with a revisionist 
history that justifies continued instrumentalist analysis (TNI, 2006, 2008). This 
PhD study believes, like Mollinga and Gondhalekar, that ‘comparative research 
may be an avenue for supporting attempts at contextualising policy approaches 
and policy instruments in a way that avoids either extreme’ of linear, stripped-
down, quantitative reporting on one hand, and context-focused, richly-detailed 
investigation on the other (2014: 183).  
1.3.3 Explaining comparative methods   
To begin with, comparative methods appear particularly suited to a study of the 
commerce in illicit crops, rural livelihoods, and their consequent links to violence 
and disorder, because these techniques provide a means for testing causality in 
processes and relationships that are clandestine and understudied. As this thesis 
intends to show, the problem is not the ‘illicit crop’ itself — whether opium or 
coca — but rather the relationships, quid pro quos, or political settlements 
around it, about which knowledge and information still remain largely piecemeal 
and uneven. When information with a bearing on the analysis is incomplete or 
piecemeal, observations, deductions and comparisons can be made from which 
inferences can be drawn. As explained by Hospers, ‘in ordinary life we claim 
knowledge not only from observation but from inference. We see bear tracks in 
the mud, and we infer that a bear was there even though we didn’t see one’ 
(Hospers, 1990: 72). Systematic comparison, therefore, can be a useful strategy 
to address the limitations of knowledge on phenomena that are hidden, under-
researched, fragmentary, or incomplete. Furthermore, comparative methods 
offer a safer way of dealing with the risks inherent in a study of illicit actors where 
tracking, collecting and systematising evidence could put researcher and 
information sources in danger, directly or inadvertently. 
It could also be pointed out that ‘comparison is a key operation in any 
empirical scientific effort’ (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: loc. 178). It not only lies at 
the heart of human reasoning, but ‘any descriptive effort, any typology or 
classification involves comparison’ (ibid.: italics added). In other words, ‘we know 
that apples are not pears because we have compared the two’ (ibid.: loc. 183). 
Hence, simple, rudimentary comparisons — especially when ‘translated into a 
set of systematic comparative methods and techniques’ — are building blocks 
that cumulatively can become powerful explanations for various phenomena 
(ibid.: loc. 193).  
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Simple comparison is about looking for similarities and differences between 
units or cases. Cases are defined as ‘the political, social, institutional, or individual 
entities or phenomena about which information is collected and inferences are 
made’. In social science research, examples of cases are ‘nation-states, social 
movements, political parties, trade union members, and episodes of policy 
implementation’ (Brady and Collier, 2010: 315). A set could simply be a group of 
cases with a pre-defined, shared attribute. Choosing cases and sets, Rihoux and 
Ragin point out, should ‘by itself be a process guided by the underlying research 
question and the preliminary hypotheses one may have in this respect’ (2009: loc. 
803). This means that not only should the inclusion of each case ‘be justified on 
theoretical grounds’ (ibid.; see also Ragin, 1994); it also means ‘that the number 
of cases analysed cannot be fixed a priori’. In other words, ‘new cases may be 
added, or others dropped, in the ongoing process of research’ (Rihoux and 
Ragin, 2009: loc. 803).  
Systematic comparisons appear to be particularly applicable for the 
examination of illicit drugs cultivation and trafficking not only because the 
phenomena involved in such a study are far too complex to reduce to discrete, 
simple, stand-alone observations, but also ‘because real-life or laboratory-like 
experimentation for such cases is obviously neither empirically possible nor 
ethically acceptable’ (ibid.: loc. 202). Thus, as Rihoux and Ragin point out, the 
comparative method ‘can be considered a crude substitute for experimentation’, 
while also controlling for contextual conditions (ibid.: loc. 205).  
Ragin developed ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ or QCA in 1987. The 
term ‘QCA’, however, may have become a misnomer, because over the years, 
the approach has evolved into something that is certainly more than just about 
qualitative methods and techniques. It was once described as an ‘insurgent 
campaign’ in sociological methodology that defies the doctrines of the two major 
‘parties’ — quantitative and qualitative — and is ‘dedicated to a principled 
alternative’ that is ‘not a compromise between quantitative and qualitative but 
rather transcends many of their respective limitations’ (Vaisey, 2009: 308).  
QCA is now called ‘Configurational Comparative Methods’ or CCM by 
Rihoux and Ragin (2009). This approach, they explain, is where the researcher 
engages in a dialogue between cases and relevant theories. It enables medium-
range theorising in social research, defined as an approach aimed at integrating 
theory and empirical research (ibid.: loc. 461). Hence, CCM allows for the 
empirical testing of theories, as opposed to grand theorising, and is useful too, 
for combining structure- and actor-related aspects of phenomena being 
investigated (ibid.).     
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CCM, like other techniques, has formal tools and its own language. The term 
‘condition’ is similar to the term ‘variable’ (whether independent or dependent) 
used in statistical analysis, while a ‘configuration’ is a defined as ‘a specific 
combination of factors or conditions that produce a given outcome of interest’ 
(ibid.: loc. 219). CCM views causality ‘as context- and conjuncture-specific’, and 
therefore ‘rejects any permanent form of causality’ (ibid.: loc. 505). Hence, CCM 
urges the researcher ‘not to specify a single causal model that best fits the data, 
as one actually does with statistical techniques, but instead to determine the 
number and character of the different causal models that exist among 
comparable cases’ (ibid.: loc. 506).40 Thus, CCM moves away ‘quite radically 
from simplistic, probabilistic causal reasoning’. In this sense, CCM allows for 
what it calls ‘multiple conjunctural causation’ across cases — i.e. ‘that different 
constellations of factors may lead to the same result’ (ibid.: loc.487).  
CCM utilises the strengths of the case-oriented approach, for example in 
arriving at whether a condition (variable) is necessary, sufficient, or both, in 
producing or causing a particular outcome. A condition is necessary ‘for an 
outcome if it is always present when the outcome occurs’. In other words, the 
outcome cannot occur in the absence of the condition. On the other hand, a 
condition is sufficient ‘if the outcome always occurs when the condition is 
present’. This means that the outcome could also result from other conditions 
(ibid.: loc. 225). 
A key piece of advice emphasised by Rihoux and Ragin is that a strategy of 
systematic comparisons could be most applicable when the relevant and 
interesting objects for examination are ‘naturally’ limited in number (ibid.: loc. 
215). For example, nation-states or regions, or political crises, are too few for 
statistical generalisations to be developed with certainty from dataset 
observations.41 But trends and tendencies, along with causal processes, could be 
established by making comparisons. It can be pointed out that, in terms of 
research methods, two of the most important studies in political science are 
 
40 This is the reason why, in this PhD study, different causal explanations will emerge when com-
paring the three configurations across the selected cases.  
41 A ‘dataset observation’ is defined as all the scores in a given row of a rectangular dataset, or 
all the numbers or the collection of scores for one given case on the dependent variable and all 
the independent variables. A data point in a two- or multi-dimensional scatterplot is a dataset 
observation (Glossary entry in Brady and Collier, 2010: 324). 
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comparative: Barrington Moore’s classic The Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy (1966) and Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (1979).42 
Levi-Faur’s refinements on the comparative approach resonate particularly 
strongly with this PhD study, especially his strategy for dealing with key 
dilemmas. A first dilemma concerns the limitations or doubts about the scientific 
status of the case-oriented approach. A single case may indeed allow for intensive 
examination, but as many have pointed out, it cannot constitute the grounds for 
valid generalisation, or for disproving an established generalisation. Because 
science is a generalising activity, intimate knowledge of one’s case — which is 
the greatest advantage of the case-oriented approach — becomes perceived as 
yielding only marginal benefit to scientific progress. Levi-Faur argues that this 
view is mistaken, because it assumes ‘that social reality is driven only by a few 
“shakers and movers” that are responsible for most visible outcomes in the 
political and social world’. Such assumptions result in an ontology of ‘simple’ 
theories for a ‘simple’ world. Levi-Faur suggests that social reality should be 
perceived as a product of conjunctural causality, through which accuracy, 
richness of detail, and intimate knowledge of one’s case ‘might be elevated to the 
same importance as the search for generalisation’ (Levi-Faur, 2006b: 5–6). In 
other words, a case study, even if it is ‘just a case study’, can be as much a game-
changer as generalisation.  
Hence, rather than giving up on either generalisation or particularisation, 
Levi-Faur proposes that it might be useful instead ‘to balance these conflicting 
goals’. Generalisations, he argues, tend to fade when we look at a particular case, 
yet ‘case analysis without an attempt at generalisation is a mere anecdote’. He 
suggests that the needed balance could be achieved by increasing the number of 
cases in the quest for generalisations (ibid.: 7).  
This leads to another problem: what is the appropriate number of cases to 
achieve such a balance? If large-N studies are to be reserved for the statistical 
method, Levi-Faur asks, how then could one increase the number of cases but 
stay firmly in the context of case-oriented research? He suggests that the first task in the 
comparative approach is to increase the number of cases without compromising 
the strengths of case-oriented analysis. He calls this Medium-N comparative 
 
42 Barrington Moore’s book has provided particular inspiration for this study, as it starts from a 
clear and straightforward central research question: ‘Why did the process of industrialization in 
England culminate in the establishment of a relatively free society?’. It then develops the answer 
by drawing from the rich but fragmented literature on agrarian change, history and politics in 
the other countries or historical contexts with which the author makes comparisons: France, the 
US, China, Japan and India.  
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analysis (Levi-Faur, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). He recommends three techniques for 
increasing N:  
• split the case to the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of an important event in time;  
• introduce a new condition; e.g. as well as looking at levels of opium cul-
tivation, look also at the absence of it;  
• increase the units and measures; e.g. don’t look only at Afghanistan, look 
at Myanmar and coca-producing countries as well.  
Thus, from just a single case study, the cases have been increased to at least four, 
while still remaining firmly within the context of case-oriented research. Inherent 
in redefining the nature of the case is the stepwise addition of cases, which is 
different from the simple addition or selection of cases.  
Another advantage of the comparative method is that it can combine 
qualitative reasoning, which uses comparison as a key operation, with 
quantitative analysis and experiments. This could be particularly useful for 
probing into phenomena with many unknowns, anomalies, and misconceptions 
that present challenges for causal inference, such as the commodity chains of 
illicit drugs and their actors. The value of combining methods can be drawn from 
David A. Freedman’s (2010) examination of the research methods that led to 
some of the most important breakthroughs in medical history.  
Freedman points out that it was the combination of methods, drawing on 
experimentation and comparisons, which led English physician Edward Jenner 
to the development in 1796 of the process now called ‘vaccination’ that ended 
deadly smallpox epidemics.43 Similarly, the discovery of the cure to puerperal 
fever in 1844 came from a rejection of conventional explanations of the disease, 
which emerged from a simple comparison of why some get the disease but not 
others.44 Another historical breakthrough came in 1854 with the discovery in 
 
43 In 1796, when most diseases were thought to be caused by external influences, Jenner 
showed that inducing a mild case of the disease from cowpox sores would later confer immunity 
to smallpox. Hence, the process came to be called ‘vaccination’ after vaccinia, another term for 
cowpox (Freedman, 2010: 222–223).  
44 In 1844, decades before the discovery of microbes as the cause of infectious diseases, obstetri-
cian Ignac Semmelweis found answers to the puzzle over puerperal fever — a disease that caused 
high maternal and infant mortality — by rejecting conventional explanations. His starting point 
was a simple comparison: that while some were susceptible to the disease, others in similar con-
ditions were so strikingly spared (Freedman, 2010: 223–224). 
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London that the simple cure for cholera is clean water45 — which again followed 
a process of research based on comparisons and a combination of methods.46    
The point to be emphasised is that these breakthroughs in medical knowledge 
happened due to certain attributes of the research processes used. A 
mathematical statistician, Freedman lists these steps. First, qualitative thinking 
preceded quantitative investigation. Second, the researchers recognised 
anomalies in the conventional thinking (or had ‘hunches’) and acted on them, 
‘refuting (them) when they were wrong, developing new ones that were better, 
and testing new as well as old ones’ (Freedman, 2010: 202). Where and when 
possible, they conducted experiments. And third, Freedman emphasises that the 
medical researchers did not rely solely on observational data. Instead and most 
importantly, they probed the underlying mechanisms or the causal processes or 
sequence that led to the outcomes they were attempting to understand (ibid.: 232, 
italics added).  
Hence, Freedman concludes that causal process observations using a diverse 
mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques to exploit the available 
information, ‘can be extremely helpful’ in the search to both prove and disprove 
hypotheses and conclusions. The failure to search for, as well as to recognise, 
anomalies in conventional thinking, Freedman emphasizes, ‘could lead to a kind 
 
45 In 1854, physician John Snow discovered that cholera was an infectious disease that could be 
prevented by cleaning the water supply. His research started with a refutation of the predomi-
nant theory that attributed the epidemic to ‘miasmas’ or noxious odours. Snow conducted tedi-
ous tasks of data collection, including tracking how the disease spreads, observing that cholera 
never goes faster than people travel, and that it ‘travels along the great tracks of human inter-
course’. He used his investigations to make qualitative arguments against the miasma theory, 
and then did more research to find the real cause. Snow created a ‘spot map’ showing the loca-
tion of cholera fatalities. As he sorted through his data, simple comparison made it apparent 
that water drawn from public water pumps run by the Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company 
was contaminated, unlike the water drawn from the pipes of the Lambeth Water Company. 
Hence, he famously ordered the much-used Broad Street water pump closed despite strong local 
opposition. He was immediately vindicated when the epidemic quickly abated (Freedman, 2010: 
225–227).    
46 Further examples cited by Freedman are microbiologist Christiaan Eijkman’s 1888 failed exper-
iments and eventual accidental discovery of the real cause of beriberi, a disease widespread in 
Asia at the time and caused by a lack of thiamine (vitamin B); and Joseph Goldberger’s 12-year 
research starting in 1914 to prove that pellagra was a deficiency, not an infectious disease. Gold-
berger asked a simple question of comparison — if pellagra was an infectious disease, why is it 
that in hospitals and asylums, the inmates frequently developed the disease, while the attend-
ants almost never did? (Freedman, 2010: 227–230). 
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of sterility in research programmes’47. Thus, ‘scientific progress often begins with 
inspired guesswork’ but ‘if guesses cannot be verified, progress may be illusory’ 
(Freedman, 2010: 233).  
A further value of comparative methods lies in its use of triangulation, 
described by Sidney Tarrow as ‘particularly appropriate in cases where 
quantitative data is partial and qualitative investigation is obstructed by political 
conditions’. Triangulation, states Tarrow, is the best strategy for combining 
qualitative and quantitative research (2010: 108). Triangulation is defined by 
Brady and Collier (2010: 356) as the ‘research procedure that employs empirical 
evidence derived from more than one method or from more than one type of 
data’; it ‘can strengthen the validity of both descriptive and causal inference’. It 
can also be called ‘nested inference’, or a ‘causal inference that draws on both 
data-set observations and CPOs (causal process observations), sometimes at 
different levels of analysis, to take advantage of the distinctive contribution 
offered by each type of observation’ (ibid.: 340).     
Comparisons can also be made across time, i.e. between the new and the old, 
or before and after a historical event. Tarrow (2010) provides useful reminders 
on making decisions for historical comparisons: a) by what rules can we choose 
the period of history most relevant to the problem? b) what kind of history are 
we to use: the history of kings and victors or of everyday people? c) how can the 
effect of a particular historical period be separated from that which precedes or 
follow it?  
In other words, comparisons can be systematised to improve their inferential 
leverage on the causes of the outcomes and consequences of the conditions. In 
sum, the comparative method will be used in this PhD study for the following 
reasons:  
• The known areas where illicit crops are cultivated for commerce are 
naturally limited in number. Moreover, the interesting objects for 
examination — e.g. volume of illicit crops grown and harvested; bribes 
paid and received; career criminals involved in the trade; ease or difficulty 
of entry into the illicit market; symbiotic relationships between criminals 
and agents of the state; violent threats made or received; protection and 
security provided by specialising criminal organisations; etc. — are also, 
 
47 Freedman referred to Ronald Rogowski in the same volume, who decries how standard scien-
tific inquiry emphasizes the testing of hypothesis almost to the exclusion of: (a) the elaboration 
of precise models; and (b) the deduction of their (ideally, many) logical implications (Rogowski, 
2010: 90).   
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more often than not, deliberately obscured, distorted or denied. 
Furthermore, close study of these phenomena is obstructed by political 
conditions. Systematic comparisons could be a way to establish trends 
and tendencies, to test whether conditions are sufficient and/or 
necessary, and to trace causal processes and sequences that lead to the 
outcomes reported in the UN and US surveys.  
• There are theoretical and policy anomalies in the global narcotic drugs 
control regime that need to be challenged, refuted or otherwise 
explained. It is now nearly 60 years since the United Nations agreed, in 
1961, the first of three conventions for global narcotic drug control. 
With billions of dollars spent, thousands of lives lost, and specialist 
counter-narcotic institutions created, the illicit drug trade has not 
reduced, but has grown into a multi-billion, dispersed and multi-national 
criminal enterprise.48  Opium production and cocaine manufacturing, 
states UNODC’s Executive Director in the WDR 2018, are ‘at the 
highest levels ever recorded’ (2018a: 1). If the solutions are not working, 
then either something must be wrong with the way the problems have 
been defined, or new cures need to be found. This PhD study reviews 
and challenges the way in which the problems have been defined.  
• Though the UNODC has diligently collected and systematised 
information on the illicit drugs trade through its Illicit Crop Monitoring 
Surveys, and while these quantitative reports are useful in providing 
policy-makers and law enforcement authorities with simplified 
information on such metrics as hectares of illicit cropland eradicated, 
tonnes of drugs seized, arrests made, or prosecutions secured, these have 
proved inadequate in driving needed changes in policy. A fresh approach 
— using CCM and CPOs — may now be needed to challenge or 
complement the measurement and monitoring systems of the UNODC 
and to utilise the available data more effectively.  
 
48 These statements are drawn from the findings of the June 2011 report of the independent 
Global Commission on Drug Policy: https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/10/GCDP_WaronDrugs_EN.pdf, which recommended an end to prohibition and a 
considered response to the legalisation of narcotic drugs. Among its 25 commissioners are the 
former presidents of drugs-affected countries Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Nigeria, and former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.   
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1.3.4 Using comparative methods to address problems of measurements 
of illicit economies 
As already noted, since 1998 quantification and measurement have become the 
norm in the UN’s reporting and analysis of the clandestine commerce in illicit 
drugs. This dependence on quantification is widespread elsewhere in the UN 
System. Agenda 2030, also known as the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), is structured around quantification and measurement, comprising 17 
goals, 169 targets and 232 quantitative indicators.49  
The use of measurable targets and indicators has been accompanied by the 
proliferation of indices for quantification. Again, the UN system was the 
trendsetter with the introduction of its Human Development Index (HDI) back 
in 1990, seen at that time as a progressive idea to shift the focus of development 
policy from reliance on the standard measurement of national accounts (e.g. 
gross domestic product, national income, etc.) into indicators of individual well-
being such as life expectancy, access to public health, or education, and much 
later, even the measurement of inequality.  
Over time, global indices and country rankings for just about everything were 
created. To name a few: corruption was measured via the Corruption 
Perceptions Index of Transparency International; the Economist came out with its 
Big Mac Index to compare purchasing power; the World Bank began to use its 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessments to evaluate the approval of loans 
to countries. In the field of conflict and peace studies various attempts emerged 
to measure ‘fragility’. By 2008, the UNDP reported that in the field of 
development, there were already 178 indices in use for various purposes.50   
Underlying the increasing reliance on measurement — and the consequent 
expansion of ‘quantitative imperialism’ — is the proposition that quantification 
is ‘more scientific’ and robust because, among other things, it is said to reduce 
scientific uncertainty (lack of complete knowledge), or at least to make an explicit 
calculation of it. ‘Inferences without uncertainty estimates’, states a principal 
reference book on research methodology in the social sciences, ‘are not science 
as we define it’ (King et al., 1994: 9).  
But it is also necessary to keep in mind the various critiques of quantification 
and measurement. There are certain areas of inquiry, for example, that cannot be 
 
49 For more on the SDGs and their measurement and tracking through targets and indicators, see 
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/, last accessed 5 July 2019. 
50 See http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Development%20Stud-
ies/measuring_country_performance_2005.pdf, last accessed 21 July 202 
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easily split, broken up, or expressed in units. If they are expressed in units, the 
boundaries may be fuzzy. As explained by Rihoux and Ragin (2009: loc. 525), it 
is important not to assume that certain conditions or variables are readily discrete, 
delineated by boundaries or mutually exclusive from each other. For example, 
the territory often called ‘province’ may be unambiguously delineated by 
imaginary politically constructed lines on a map, yet its economy on the ground 
— transactions, trading, movement of actors, prices — will not necessarily be 
limited by either intra- or inter-state boundaries. Income, an often-used variable 
in statistics, does not always come only from a single source, and may sometimes 
be more meaningfully measured in non-monetary terms (such as more time, or 
more flexibility resulting from the waiver or extension of a debt).  
Furthermore, Rihoux and Ragin continue, it is essential not to assume that the 
causality emanating from a single variable, like income, is permanent. In many 
cases, configurations compel the researcher to examine how the supposed causal 
effects of low income may vary or apply unevenly across time. It is also better 
not to assume that there is causal symmetry across variables, because causal 
contributions may not be uniform and regular. For example, in certain situations 
decreasing incomes may become a driver of poverty, but only when households 
have no secure access to land.  
In other words, this study proceeds with an awareness that the usual 
quantification and measurement deployed in the sources and references it will be 
using may be riddled with fundamental problems because variables are not 
discrete; causality is not permanent; causality is not uniform or regular; and 
variables could not be added together.  
Another of Rihoux and Ragin’s observations that guides this PhD study is 
how many of the causal conditions that interest social scientists are not clearly 
categorical or could not be reduced to dichotomies. They give a useful example 
that while some countries are democracies and some are not, there are many in-
between cases – the countries that ‘are not fully in the set of democracies, nor 
are they fully excluded from this set’ (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: loc. 1936). In 
addition, these countries may also not be fully in the other set of non-
democracies — but then similarly not be fully excluded from that set either. 
Using this point, Ragin introduced the idea of a ‘fuzzy set’ (e.g. democracies), 
where cases or units of analysis (e.g. countries) may not be fully included or 
excluded. In contrast to fuzzy sets are the categorical or crisp sets, where cases 
are simply and unambiguously either a member of the set or not (Ragin, 1987, 
2000).  
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A further critique of indices and their quantification methodologies comes 
from a team of Colombian academics who found a common mistake of 
aggregation made even by reputable institutions like the World Bank and the 
Harvard Kennedy School of Governance — i.e. confusing data recoded into 
nominal and ordinal numbers as having numerical qualities. Hence, the scoring 
and ranking made in the indices of these institutions, which ascribe numerical 
qualities to nominal classifications or ordinal sequencing, ‘is very similar to an 
act of magic’. The ranks and scores thus produced ‘are an artefact of ad hoc 
decisions that have no substantive justification’ (Gutierrez et al., 2011: 2, 10). 
In fact, Gutierrez et al. argue that indices ‘are not reality: they are a radical 
simplification of it for the purposes of abstraction and data manipulation’ (ibid.: 
9). It is important to note, however, that despite their damning criticism, these 
authors argue for the continued use of indices and label as ‘dubious’ many of the 
criticisms against indices. What is necessary, they say, is to be aware that indices 
and quantifications are extreme simplifications of reality — that is the job these 
tools are designed to do. They should not be expected to describe the context or 
tell the whole story. Variables were created to isolate and simplify, which has 
significant benefits. Because the numbers in indices are simple and context-free, 
they may be used for some aggregation and generalisation (ibid.).  
In summary, the methodology that this PhD study will use is not a 
compromise between the qualitative and the quantitative, but rather a set of 
techniques and methods in a combination that will hopefully transcend the 
respective limitations of the qualitative and quantitative approaches.  In the 
following sub-sections, some background is given into the research plan and 
analytical operations that will be conducted for Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this PhD 
study.  
1.3.5 Using comparisons to challenge anomalies: Unpacking survival and 
resilience in illicit crop economies  
Chapter 4 will be comparing four cases of illicit crop production in order to 
challenge or refute the most common assumptions of drug and development 
policy. The cases are: 
• Afghanistan and Helmand Province 
• Colombia and Putumayo Department 
• Myanmar and Shan State 
• Bolivia and the Chapare. 
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It is often assumed that the illicit crops opium and coca are sources of 
instability, an ‘evil’ that breeds fragility and violence. Fragile states are supposed 
to be most vulnerable to their production and attendant harms. Yet by looking 
into the local contexts of the four cases, which represent the world’s leading 
opium and coca producers, these illicit crops are found to also be sources of 
stability, even drivers of economic growth. They enable marginalised 
communities and territories abandoned by the state to be reinserted into national 
and global markets. Within so-called ‘fragile’ and conflict-affected areas are 
displaced and dispossessed households adopting innovative and unorthodox 
strategies for coping and survival in changing and insecure environments.  
Chapter 4 thus maps out an approach which is useful for examining the 
resilience that has emerged amidst violence and uncertainty in illicit-crop-
producing territories, and which can hopefully tackle the continuing disconnect 
between drug and development policies. It begins by identifying the key 
assumptions that have shaped drug and development policies, and then assesses 
these assumptions against actual cases on the ground. This analytical process is 
a form of empirical testing — a means to evaluate whether an assumption holds 
true in reality. This process may also be considered a crude substitute for 
experimentation — to check whether the assumption applies or changes when 
compared or controlled across the four cases.  
The cases in Chapter 4 provide a basis for deterministic causation: judging 
whether an assumption is a necessary or sufficient condition (or both) in 
producing or causing the outcome of illicit crop economies. It will use causal 
process observations (CPOs), using pieces of data that provide information 
about the context, process, or mechanism as a frame for making causal 
inferences. As elaborated in Brady and Collier (2010: 318), CPOs do not involve 
directly observing causation, but rather making inferences of the underlying 
causal processes and causal sequences that lead to the outcome. As such, Chapter 
4 is a search for proof or refutation concerning the most common assumptions 
around illicit crop economies. It also uses triangulation to test for internal and 
external validity of the assumptions in question.  
1.3.6 Step-wise comparison based on reasoned sequence: The careers of 
criminal entrepreneurs 
Chapter 5 is a comparative analysis of the careers of selected criminal 
entrepreneurs that draws inferences and new insights on illicit crop economies. 
This chapter will also supply much of the basis for answering this study’s central 
research question. It provides a critical reconstruction and evaluation of the life 
stories and criminal careers of the following drug lords:  
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• Lo Hsing Han,51 the Burmese opium drug lord, whose 
life story and criminal career are not only extensively 
documented (e.g. Lintner, 2000; McCoy; 2003; Renard, 
1996); but could also be triangulated with more recent 
political economy research (e.g. Meehan, 2011, 2015; 
Woods, 2011, 2018), and cross-validated with 
information from the US Sanctions List.  
• Lal Jan Ishaqzai, a major Afghan drug smuggler re-
ported by US President Obama in June 2011 to the US 
Congress as a Foreign Narcotics Kingpin and included 
in the US Specially Designated National (SDN) list. No 
photo could be found. Bashir Noorzai52 was an Afghan 
mujahid who fought the Soviets, and a Pashtun chieftain 
who originated from Maiwand District in Kandahar, 
birthplace of the Taliban. He was identified as a Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin and included in the SDN list.  
• Roberto Suarez Gomez, 53  Bolivia’s ‘king of cocaine’ 
during the coca boom of the 1980s, a big cattle rancher and 
latifundista who owned the largest fleet of aircraft in the 
region.  
• The Castaño brothers54 — Fidel, Vicente and Carlos — 
were ranchers and former associates of Pablo Escobar in Colombia’s 
Medellin drug cartel who became fearsome paramilitary leaders. Vicente and 
Carlos were on the SDN list, as was a foundation established by Carlos.   
 
51 The photo, credited to AP, is sourced from the Daily Telegraph’s obituary of Lo, 12 September 
2013 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/10305743/Lo-Hsing-
Han.html). The name is also alternatively spelled as Luo Xhinghan.  
52 Photo sourced from the New York Times.  
53 Photo from the cover Suarez’s biography (Levy, 2012).  
54 Photo from Verdad Abierta. 




Chapter 5 contends that these drug lords were specialists in coercion, actors 
who regulated and manipulated access to land and resources, who mobilised 
labour and shaped its divisions, and who promoted certain forms of capital 
accumulation. They therefore promoted, whether deliberately or inadvertently, 
specific forms of local economic and political order, often marked by coercive 
land dispossession. A better understanding of their roles, therefore, may provide 
ways of unpacking the policy dilemmas over illicit crop economies as well as the 
key challenges to peace-building and post-war economic development in 
borderlands where illicit economies thrive.  
The comparisons are inspired by Mollinga and Gondhalekar’s (2014) 
contention that a comparative approach is suitable:  
(a) when rich but fragmented case studies are already available;  
(b) when ‘big ideas’ — concepts such as market, governance and 
sustainability — globalise the debates on the impact of the cases;  
(c) when there is intense contestation on whether the problems are about 
scarcity, inefficiency, security, governance, or equity, and debates on what 
is the role of state and market in all these; (d) when attributes, effects, 
modalities and impacts being studied will not always be self-evident. 
Mollinga and Gondhalekar point out that ‘comparative inquiry expands the 
political imagination to bring into view new possibilities’ (2014: 183).  Thus, this 
approach is being embraced in order to harness rich localised knowledge that 
can be gleaned through life stories, to expand the ‘political imagination’ and 
develop conceptual models.  
Chapter 5 will test the main proposition advanced by this study: that criminal 
entrepreneurs survive and thrive because they establish interdependencies as 
pioneers for capital, intermediaries in commodity chains, and arbitrageurs especially in 
the dangerous places at the margins of state and market. Like Chapter 4, Chapter 
5 will use CPOs to gain leverages for making causal inferences. The assumption 
is that criminal careers, when assessed against and superimposed on social and 
political contexts, may provide useful inferences into how certain conditions or 
variables — such as violence, political protection, peasant and labour 
displacement — are either necessary or sufficient to produce a central outcome in 
borderland economies: illicit drug crops.  
1.3.7 Limitations of the step-wise comparative approach 
It is important to acknowledge limitations of the approach taken by this study. 
Strictly speaking, it is difficult to put complex phenomena into boxes of 
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similarities and differences. Furthermore, conditions and outcomes can be 
interchangeable. Hence, there is a degree of arbitrariness when comparing a 
configuration in this way. Nevertheless, the value of this approach is that the 
comparative analytical process is ‘stretched’ or controlled to improve leverage in 
drawing inferences.  
Hence, the steps to be taken in the analytical routines of this study do not 
follow a strict linear pattern. Moreover, liberties have been taken in the choice 
of cases because of limitations in time, availability of materials and access to 
sources.  
A further limitation of the approach adopted is its use of cases from which 
inferences are drawn. There is already an underlying, embedded theory just by 
making a decision to use ‘cases’. First, it pre-supposes that there are ‘cases’ and 
‘non-cases’, and that the cases selected are ‘similar enough and separate enough to 
permit treating them as comparable instances of the same general phenomenon’. 
Furthermore, the ‘term case and the various terms linked to the idea of case 
analysis are not at all well-defined’ (Ragin and Becker, 1992: 1–8). There are, in 
other words, underlying precepts to be aware of: the cases used in this study are 
what Lund describes as ‘edited chunks of empirical reality where certain features 
are marked out, emphasized, and privileged, while others recede into the 
background’. A case, therefore, is not natural: it is a ‘mental or analytical 
construct aimed at organising knowledge in a manageable way’ (Lund, 2014: 
224). Establishing a case is also a form of coding (Saldaña, 2009: 3). The cases in 
this study are thus edited constructs that recode phenomena that often remain 
hidden.  
A last note is that this PhD study does not present new empirical material 
from fieldwork. Rather, what is new is that it uses carefully selected material from 
the various countries in a comparative way to unpack the discourses on global 
drugs policy. 
1.3.7 Prices: Their role and limits as a mechanism for coordination in illicit 
crop economies   
Chapter 6 focuses on the third configuration: prices. The criminal entrepreneurs 
driving the commerce in illicit drugs are often referred to as a drug cartel, in 
technical terms a collusion of market actors to manipulate prices to maximise 
profit, often by controlling the volume of commodities made available on the 
market. This study argues that while prices and profits are indeed important 
factors shaping incentives, behaviours, and relationships of market actors, they 
are a woefully inadequate explanation for the survival, resilience and growth of 
the illicit commerce.  
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As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, a number of scholars and 
analysts have pointed out that even the most powerful of these ‘cartels’ could 
hardly exercise control over the volume of production of drug crops, even with 
the systematic use of violence. Furthermore, the farm-gate and consumption 
retail prices of cocaine and heroin do not always slump when there is excess 
supply; and neither do prices automatically spike when supply becomes limited 
either due to a poor cropping season or aggressive law enforcement. A more 
consistent explanation, this study argues, may be provided by identifying, 
measuring and then analysing the inherent interdependencies of the various 
actors across the commodity chain.  
The earliest opium survey data in Afghanistan validates this contention. 
According to the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2000, only 123 out of 
344 districts (certainly not the entire country) were cultivating opium poppy.55 
And most importantly, among the 123 opium-producing districts, the levels of 
cultivation varied sharply: there was more concentrated cultivation in some 
districts than in others. In fact, the survey stated that nearly three-fourths, or 
73%, of total opium poppy production came from only 20 districts, located 
mostly in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar (UNDCP, 2000: p. ii). This 
means that the other 103 opium-producing districts, with a 27% share of 
production between them, were only marginal producers. If price was the main 
driver of opium cultivation, it would be reasonable to assume that production 
across all 123 opium-producing districts would be similar. What can therefore be 
inferred is that there are plenty of reasons other than price that determine how 
supply is produced and delivered, who does it, and how rewards are distributed.   
Chapter 6 will present a comparison of prices and context in the four 
countries before and after a major event has taken place: (a) the 1989 signing of 
ceasefire agreements in Myanmar; (b) the 1996 ‘cocalero uprising’ in southern 
Colombia; (c) the 2000–2001 Taliban-imposed opium ban in Afghanistan; and 
(d) the 2006 ascension to power of cocalero president Evo Morales in Bolivia. 
In other words, Chapter 6 will analyse the relative stability of prices of illicit crops 
despite massive changes in the socio-economic and political contexts.  
1.4 Conclusion  
To summarise, four of the most important illicit-crop producing countries have 
been selected and will be analysed by drawing inferences across three 
 
55 Note that the Afghanistan Opium Poppy Survey 2000 claims to be a ‘ground-based census that 
covers all known poppy cultivating villages of the entire country’ (UNDCP, 2000: 2).  
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configurations (combinations of conditions): resilience, careers and prices. 
Comparisons guided by key theoretical constructs, and structured systematically 
in explicit steps — as this study will attempt — are intended to improve 
inferential leverage on the causes of the outcomes and the consequences of the 
conditions in the study of interdependency and resilience in the illicit commerce 
of opium and coca. From this analysis, answers to the central research question 





Illicit Drugs Capitalism: 
Historicising the Social 




2.1 Introduction: Common sense and the social 
construction of illicit drugs  
 
In June 1998, representatives of coca-growers from South America tried to 
attend the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the 
‘world drug problem’ 56  to call for a reconsideration of UN-mandated drug 
prohibition policies that were destroying their livelihoods and causing untold 
human rights violations. But they were denied entry to the USA, because they 
were regarded as criminals involved in the illegal cocaine trade.57 The peasant 
cocaleros also had to endure a further stigma: they were often mocked for the 
way they spoke and routinely dismissed as ‘less educated’ and ‘less civilised’.  
Yet they remained undaunted. By then, the cocaleros had already resolved 
that the only way to get their voices heard was to demonstrate real political 
strength. In Bolivia, a political party they had established, the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) or MAS, had already won most local 
government seats in the coca-producing Cochabamba area (Grisaffi, 2017: 58). 
In December 2005, less than seven years after the humiliation of their exclusion 
from the UN conference, the cocaleros and their allies stunned the international 
community with a dramatic and major victory. One of those denied a visa, a 
cocalero and ethnic Aymara Indian named Evo Morales, was elected President 
of Bolivia, with the largest margin ever in the country’s election history.58 As 
 
56 UN General Assembly Special Sessions (UNGASS) on the ‘world drug problem’ took place in 
1998 and 2016; see https://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/special.shtml, accessed December 
2019.  
57 I was informed of these visa denials by staffers at WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America; 
see www.wola.org) who were to host the cocaleros had their visas been granted.  
58 Morales’ party, MAS, was established after the 1994 Popular Participation Law but struggled 
through considerable infighting and internal divisions in its early years. Morales had been a MAS 
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Morales took office in January 2006, Bolivia invigorated the task of not only 
removing the stigmas cocaleros had long endured, but also of changing 
prevailing legal norms and global attitudes towards the coca plant.59   
The cocaleros’ remarkable transformation from marginalised and 
criminalised peasants to effective wielders of state power offers an interesting 
case study not only into the social construction of what gets to be interpreted as 
‘criminal’ and ‘illicit’ livelihoods, but also into how the ‘common sense’ on illicit 
drugs may be critically examined, challenged, and perhaps even reversed. Some 
caveats are, however, necessary. It should be noted that though the rise of the 
cocalero social movement in Bolivia was part of a wider trend of resistance to 
social and political exclusion, and was spurred by disillusionment with new post-
authoritarian democratic regimes, including mass mobilisations against the 
incumbent presidents in October 2003 and June 2005, Morales and MAS chose 
a more traditional path to politics by supporting national parties and politicians 
(Biekart, 2005: 89–92). This is why Morales and MAS, despite their left-wing 
tendencies, have sometimes been called ‘oscillating forces’ in Bolivian politics 
that belonged neither to the left-indigenous bloc constituted by worker and 
peasant organisations in La Paz, Cochabamba, and the mining towns, nor to the 
eastern-bourgeois bloc of agro-industrial, financial and petroleum capital in 
Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando and Beni (Webber, 2010; 2016). Hence, when finally 
in power, the Morales government’s record of ‘ruling in the name of indigenous 
workers and peasants’ was criticised on the grounds of its continuation of certain 
neoliberal policies that opened it to the charge of merely implementing a more 
stable version of the model of accumulation it inherited (Brabazon and Webber, 
2014). It was also accused of facilitating an agro-capital–state alliance which 
allowed the top tiers of indigenous-peasant movements to be absorbed into the 
apparatuses of the state, thus effectively decapitating the movements (Webber, 
2017: 330).  
Yet despite these critiques, it is still possible to assess the Morales 
government’s contribution to changing the ‘common sense’ understanding of 
illicit crops and coca, and to examine how MAS used the state platform that it 
acquired to elaborate its agenda of ‘yes to coca, no to cocaine’ nationally, regionally 
and globally. Even with the limits of their record as pointed out by Webber and 
 
congressman; he first ran for the presidency in 2002 and came within a slim margin of winning 
(Grisaffi, 2017: 58–59).  
59 Morales’ ‘resounding victory’ took added significance because he pledged to ‘reverse a cam-
paign financed by the United States to wipe out coca growing’. See New York Times (19 Decem-
ber 2005). 
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others, the cocaleros’ ascent to power not only gave them the opportunity to 
represent the views of other poor, illicit crop growers around the world who 
depend on criminalised livelihoods for coping and survival. They were also able 
to pose a direct challenge to the anti-drugs policies of the world’s major powers, 
the US, China and the EU — policies that often flatten a complex social 
phenomenon into a single story, which is the main focus of this study. Elements 
of that accepted ‘common sense’ include the belief that: (a) illicit crop growers, 
like the cocaleros, are complicit in illegal, criminal activity; (b) stronger law 
enforcement solves the proliferation of illicit drugs; and (c) halting drug traffic is 
best achieved by striking at the supply. Further elements of this ‘common sense’ 
include: (d) that illicit drug crops are evil or are sources of instability; (e) that 
fragility, violence and illegality breed each other; and (f) that fragile states are 
most vulnerable to illicit crop production and its consequent harms.  
Senso comune, roughly translated into English as ‘common sense’, was a key 
theme problematised by Antonio Gramsci in his prison notebooks. He used 
different labels to refer to it, including a given social stratum’s ‘popular science’; 
a ‘traditional popular conception of the world’; and ‘spontaneous philosophy’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 430–433; 625–626). In other words, these are ‘heterogenous 
beliefs people arrive at, not through critical reflection, but encounter as already 
existing, self-evident truths’ (Crehan, 2016: ix). Kate Crehan adds an important 
clarification: the English term common sense has overwhelmingly positive 
connotations with its emphasis on ‘sense’; but the original Italian actually stresses 
the held-in-common (comune) nature of the beliefs (Crehan, 2016: x). Gramsci 
presented a critique of the philosophy of philosophers and their contained 
specific conception of the world (1971: 626), and proceeded to map out this senso 
commune, or popular opinion, in which he saw the fundamental inequalities of 
class woven into aspects of everyday life and reproduced over time in complex, 
nuanced, and never crudely deterministic ways (Crehan, 2016: x–xi).    
Thus, the ‘common sense’, popular science, traditional conceptions, or 
spontaneous philosophy over coca and illicit crops did not arise spontaneously 
from nowhere. It could be said to be built upon the understanding and shared 
values of those with the power to enforce it — an understanding which the 
Bolivian cocaleros effectively challenged. Drawing again from Gramsci, he stated 
that ‘common sense’ is best seen as a creation of the blocco storico (historic bloc), 
or the ensemble of historically determined social relationships that establishes 
dominance by normalising a version of what is supposedly good or bad, 
acceptable or unthinkable (Gramsci, 1971: 690, 768; see also Cox and Sinclair, 
1996: 131–133). Also referred to as a coalition or a socio-historic process, this 
bloc has become legally, institutionally and ideologically embedded in the global 
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complex that rises out of the two principal agencies, UNODC and the US 
government’s ONDCP. The cocaleros’ rise to power, therefore (even given the 
recent ousting of Morales) rewrote, or at least put into doubt, the ‘common 
sense’ enforced by the bloc.  
Scholarship is also moving in the direction of challenging this common sense. 
The work of Gootenberg and Campos (2015), for example, brings the 
contemporary issue of drug trades into conversation with historiography to 
examine often-lurid popular accounts of so-called ‘narco-states’ and ‘narco-
terrorism’ by asking whether it was ‘the criminalization of once licit and 
recreational activities that led, ironically, ‘to the intensification, expansion, and 
“cartel”-ization of the trade’. Because historians will tend to ask different 
questions than law enforcers or criminologists, focus may move to how social 
geographies of illicit production and distribution map onto belts of political and 
social marginalisation, or whether border smuggling waves are episodic or 
structurally tied to politics (ibid.: 11–14).   
This chapter attempts not only to make a contribution to this ‘new drug 
history’, but also to put into historical perspective the forms of capital 
accumulation that appear to have been missed by the common sense-challenging 
Morales government. This chapter outlines an approach that traces the genealogy 
of the global enterprise in illicit opium and coca through processes of 
commodification and the subsequent emergence of commodity chains that gave 
these plants their ‘social life’ as tools for colonisation, incubators of capitalism, 
and means for capital accumulation. This approach suggests the following 
periodisation of a history of opium and coca: (a) pre-commodification; (b) the 
beginnings of regimes of accumulation; (c) instrumentalisation as tools for 
colonisation; (d) concentrated commodification; and (e) illicit commodification 
versus prohibition. The concluding section iterates the variability of the existing 
‘common sense’ and the need for its fundamental reinterpretation as a step 
towards constructing new policy responses.  




Summary: historical overview of coca and opium as 
‘incubators for capitalism’ 
Early uses – opium poppy is one of the oldest 
medicinal plants in recorded history, since 3000 
BC; coca has been chewed since 1500 BC. An-
cient traders found commercial value in the 
crops. 
‘Seeds of change’: commodification of plants 
began. Quinine allowed Europeans to carry 
the White Man’s Burden. Sugar and cotton 
constructed slave economies. Tea inspired 
globalisation. Potato politics created a nation. 
The opium poppy and coca bush complete 
the list.  
Commodity chains emerged; regions became 
specialised in producing specific crops. A true 
division of labour consolidated over time that 
created massive social reorganisation and re-
quired coercive force. Commodified plants be-
came tools for colonisation. 
The Catholic Church clashed with Spanish 
mining firms on whether to allow coca in the 
Spanish colonies. In 1569, King Philip II of 
Spain overruled the bishops and allowed coca 
production, citing the need to protect the fi-
nancial interests of the Crown.  
From the late 1600s to the late 1800s, opium 
funded colonial expansion. Without opium, 
‘there probably would have been no British Em-
pire’ (Trocki, 1999: loc. 158). The British East 
India Company emerges as the world’s first 
global ‘drug cartel’. 
Opium restructures China’s economy and ter-
ritory. Britain invades China in the First 
Opium War (1839–42) and takes possession of 
Hong Kong. China legalises opium after its 
next defeat in the Second Opium War (1858).  
Technology expands the commodification of 
opium and coca. Morphine extracted in 1806; co-
caine in 1859; and heroin in 1874. German, US, 
British, French and other western European 
pharmaceutical companies expand the legal trade 
of the substances. 
Prohibition movement consolidates in the late 
1890s and early 1900s. The US emerges as the 
foremost global champion of drug prohibition.  
A global drug prohibition system is constructed from 1909, culminating in the three UN treaties in force today: the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Drugs of 1988. Meanwhile, much of the capitalism behind drugs production con-
tinues underground and in the shadows. Despite its prohibition, the drug trade continues to retain its capacity for 
generating power and profit.    
Figure 2.1:  Historicising the social construction of opium and coca 
Sources:  Booth (1996); Gagliano (1994); Gootenberg (2001); Hobhouse (2005); McCoy (2003); Petersen (1997); Trocki 
(1999) 
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2.2 Definitions: The circulation of opium and coca as 
commodities in social life 
Marx’s idea that commodities should not be seen only as simple objects that 
conceal the nature of their production but also understood as ‘bundles’ of 
institutions and social relationships (moral, legal, economic and political), is 
central to understanding how opium and coca circulate as commodities in social 
life, and how processes of commodification have shaped their history.  
To illustrate, when a kilogram of illicit opium or coca paste is seized at a police 
checkpoint, it should not be seen merely as a banned product. Rather, it should 
also be seen and unpacked as the ‘bundle’ of institutions and social relationships 
that got it to that checkpoint: it was most likely cultivated by a land-poor 
subsistence peasant household excluded from growing licit crops by falling 
prices; it was grown on marginal land beyond the usual reach of markets and 
infrastructure; it relied on credit from drug traffickers that would not normally 
be available for licit crop production; and it was harvested and then processed 
into its current form by seasonally migrating workers dispossessed or displaced 
from elsewhere by agricultural commercialisation or conflict. This unpacking 
exposes the processes of commodification and the links in its chain that may 
shift the common sense on that kilogram of banned product.  
What then is a commodity? Appadurai introduced the idea that it is any thing 
intended for exchange: this definition explores ‘the conditions under which 
economic objects circulate in different regimes of value in space and time’ (1986: 
8). A commodity — which in contemporary use, as Appadurai recognised, has 
been narrowed down to products, objects, or special kinds of manufactured 
goods or services that are typical material representations of capitalism — may 
be seen in terms of distance (space between producer and consumer), value 
(reason why it is desired), exchange (what is given up and the manner of 
acquiring what is valued), and power (strategies that make the creation of value 
and facilitation of exchange a politically mediated process) (ibid.: 3–4). If that 
kilogram of opium or coca paste seized at the checkpoint had not been intended 
for exchange, but, say, for medical application or personal consumption, its 
status as an illicit product and use value for others completely changes. The 
dynamics of exchange are what makes a commodity licit or illicit and shapes its 
value to others.  
Other factors in the production of that kilogram that have similarly been 
commodified also need to be unbundled. Polanyi pointed out that not everything 
that is for sale in the market has been produced; he gave the examples of land, 
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which is not produced by man; labour, which is human activity that could not be 
detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilised; and money, which is 
merely a token of purchasing power (2001 [1944]: 75). But the land, labour and 
money (credit) used in the production chain of that kilogram have all been 
commodified. Commodification, therefore — which may be described as the 
process by which parts of nature, the needs of subsistence, and products of 
labour are ascribed a value, turned into commodities for sale and then exchanged 
in the market, mediated by politics and social relationships — is the organising 
principle that needs to be examined.  
Two further qualifications are necessary. O’Laughlin adds that though 
commodification may come from simple exchange brought by expanding 
markets, it may also be prescribed or enforced by power and policy, for example, 
when the commons, such as land or bodies of water, are legally alienated and 
transformed into private property (2007: 41). Labour, during the time of slavery, 
was similarly prescriptively commodified.  
A ‘commodity chain’ was defined by Hopkins and Wallerstein as ‘a network 
of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’ 
(1986: 158–159). This definition suggests that labour networks and production 
processes are not confined by national or geographic borders, making notions 
of where a ‘market’ or a ‘national economy’ may lie more fuzzy, relative, or 
movable. Indeed, borders do not always reflect reality on the ground. The 
definition also draws attention to how the ‘true division of labour’ may cut across 
borders, or traverse distant points trading their surpluses. Thus, what needs to 
be examined is not just who does what, but how distant economies begin to 
support each other to produce that from which they make a surplus. This is 
particularly important in understanding the enabling factors behind the local 
emergence of illicit opium and coca. If the local economy, for example, becomes 
entirely dependent on opium poppy cultivation, then it will need to rely on 
another distant local economy to supply its food requirements; this distant local 
economy, in turn, may rely on another local economy for its supply of fertilizers 
and fuel; and so on. In many ways, this ‘chain’ may be framed as interdependent 
relationships marked by conflict and accommodation, rather than solely by 
market relationships that may or may not be shaped by prices and profit. 
Wallerstein has indeed argued that what is called ‘globalisation’ today is 
misleading because it is in no way new. The rise of shipping, use of maps and 
wide acceptance of gold and silver as currency over 500 years ago facilitated the 
global trade in commodities (Wallerstein, 2000) — and this includes the trade in 
opium and coca leaf. And these in turn restructured and shaped what is produced 
where, who does what, who gets what, and what is consumed. Thus, rather than 
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conceive of the commodities opium and coca as products of particular, self-
contained markets, they should be seen as the end result of these labour and 
production processes across borders that structure a true division of labour.  
Steven Topik adds an important clarification — that even though the word 
chain implies something deterministic, rigid, unidirectional, or functionalist, 
commodity chains ‘have in fact been flexible, dynamic and varied’. He points out 
that a commodity has a ‘social life’, with ‘numerous phases and competing 
meanings and values over time and even at the same time’ (2009: 780). 
Furthermore, participants in a commodity chain, Topik emphasises, are also 
involved in broader production systems, commercial circuits and markets; they 
allocate their time across several economic activities, including off-farm labour; 
and they actively negotiate their respective interests amongst each other and with 
other socio-economic and socio-political actors (ibid.). 
Having set down the organising principle of commodification as the filter, a 
periodisation of the history of opium and coca may be developed, as elaborated 
in the next sections.  
2.3 (Period 1) Pre-commodification: Opium and coca as 
‘crops’  
The first sign of opium and coca’s commodification is their classification as 
‘crops’. Crops are not simple plants that grow in the wild; they are found mostly 
where they are cultivated by local households or communities. This suggests a 
symbiosis between a crop’s growers, traders and consumers (Chouvy, 2009: 1). 
Medical and religious uses appear as the reasons why opium and coca were first 
cultivated as crops. The opium poppy became valued as a medicinal plant, ‘one 
of the oldest in recorded history’ (Booth, 1996: 15). Booth argues it was probably 
the first drug to be discovered, especially given that it predated alcohol, which 
required knowledge of fermentation. The first mention of opium, writes Schiff, 
was an inscription from about 3000 BC found at Nippur, a spiritual centre of the 
Sumerians located south of Baghdad. The Sumerians named opium ‘Gil’ or 
happiness, and the opium poppy as ‘Gil Hul’ or plant of happiness. Opium also 
became a well-known drug of ancient Egypt where its use was generally restricted 
to priests and warriors. The word ‘opium’ itself, Schiff tells us, is thought to be 
of Greek origin. Ancient Greeks regarded the sleep-inducing opium ‘as a symbol 
of consolation and oblivion and crowned all their nocturnal gods with a wreath 
of poppy blossoms’ — a manifestation of their belief that ‘sleep was the greatest 
of all physicians and most powerful consoler of humanity’.  The Romans 
continued the use of opium as medicine and poison: the combination of opium 
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and hemlock was commonly used for the execution of condemned individuals 
(Schiff, 2002: 186). 
Likewise, the coca leaf became institutionalised in social life and has been 
prominent in sierra rituals since ancient times, according to Gagliano. When a 
new home is built, coca leaves are placed on its foundations to ensure good 
fortune and protection from evil spirits for its occupants. Coca leaves are offered 
to calm nature when storms or earthquakes occur, and also used in rituals 
intended to end drought and pestilence. Shamans offered coca to Pachamama, 
the earth mother, imploring her protection of crops and provision of bountiful 
harvests (1994: 8–10). Evidence of coca leaf chewing has been found in tombs 
along the coast of Peru dating back to 1500 BC (Carter and Mamani, 1986: 24). 
Mummies from the sixth century AD were found buried with supplies of coca 
leaves and pottery portraying the characteristic cheek bulge of the coca chewer 
(Petersen, 1977: 17).  
Many historians, however, note the lack of 
sources for reconstructing this early history of 
opium and coca. Booth (1996: 1) states that opium 
has a ‘dubious history’ because there is no positive 
proof of how the crop may have evolved or been 
generated from the wild poppy. Gagliano notes that 
apart from archaeological evidence, the earliest 
information on the role of coca in Andean cultures 
was derived from 16th century accounts of Peru’s 
conquest and colonisation — sources that are 
problematic and more important for their depiction 
of attitudes towards the coca leaf rather than being 
records of coca production and usage (1994: 13).  
Still, inferences can be made that opium and coca 
had medical and religious value, leading to their 
cultivation as crops and their emergence as proto-
commodities produced for use with little or no 
intention for commercial or for-profit exchange, in 
the terms used by Appadurai. These crops were therefore valued and exchanged, 
bartered, or given as gifts, but not yet fully commodified. It is also safe to assume 
that cultivation did not occur to the extent that the land, labour and loans needed 
for the production of these crops became commodified. Capital had, as yet, very 
little role in the production process. But over time, because the crops carried 
value, they began to be commercialised, and capital and power came to play an 
increasing role in their reproduction. 
   Figure 2.2: a clay figure of a 
coquero (coca leaf chewer), 
with the characteristic cheek 
bulge, from between 850 and 
1500. A gift given to the 
Brooklyn Museum (No. 
113874). Reproduced under a 
creative commons license  
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2.4 (Period 2) The beginnings of regimes of accumulation 
Despite its value, neither the Greeks nor the Romans, writes Booth, regarded 
opium as a commodity to trade. But the Arabs did, and therefore went about 
organising production and trade. Not only did Arab scholars and medical men 
publish texts about opium and its uses, they also travelled with merchants in the 
footsteps of armies that raided and traded as the Arab empire expanded. They 
brought and made opium known in Persia, India and China. Booth notes that 
once the efficacy of opium was established in a land conquered by either arms 
or trade, ‘poppies were soon under local cultivation’ (1996 21–22).  The Arabs 
used opium to treat a variety of ills, from diarrhoea to male impotence. Early 
Chinese works tell of ‘Arab traders exchanging poppy capsules for the 
merchandise of China’. Thus, by ‘the beginning of the Christian era the 
knowledge in opium may be said to have become universal’. An 1892 article in 
the journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland argues 
that writings of the Roman author Pliny suggest that by around 75 AD, the art 
of extracting opium from the poppy plant constituted an important industry in 
Asia Minor.60 But the opium poppy was not only a medicine source, the article 
continued. It was also used and eaten as food. In Garhwal, India, where several 
species of papaver were plentiful, the young plant was used as a raw vegetable, 
eaten as a salad, or cooked with buttermilk. In Jalandhar, poppy was also grown 
for making post, an infusion consumed as a beverage.  
Cultivation for trade turned opium into a product intended for exchange. 
Though there is little material on the details of how production may have been 
organised and what the terms of trade were at this stage, what is clear is that: (a) 
land would have been set aside for cultivation; (b) slaves or farmers were either 
required or convinced to grow it; (c) traders carried opium as a merchandise by 
sea or land; and (d) capital and credit started to play an essential role for 
reproduction and exchange. Opium was an ideal merchandise not only because 
it is low-volume, high-value, and did not spoil easily, but also because it qualifies 
for marine insurance or ‘bottomry’. According to Trennery (1926: 5–6), the 
contract of Bottomry or Respondentia originated in a practice similar to the 
Commenda of Islam, an arrangement in which the merchant advanced goods to 
the trader, who handed over, in return, a sealed inventory on the value of the 
goods on the understanding that security and interest will be paid on successful 
sale or exchange. However, in the event of the trader being robbed on the 
 
60 These two quotations are from this 1892 journal article (p.330) — no authorship mentioned. 
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journey or losing the goods through no negligence of his, he would be freed from 
the debt.   
When Arab influence faded, Booth writes, the commercial for-profit trade in 
opium was taken up by Venice which became the centre of European trade 
(Booth, 1996: 22–23). Opium was imported from the Middle East, and the 
Venetian Republic became the centre for the production of the highest-quality 
theriac known as ‘Venice treacle’ (a medical ointment used as a universal 
antidote, which contained significant amounts of opium), whose export to the 
rest of Europe provided an important source of revenue (Wexler, 2014: 41). 
Venice and Genoa also became financial centres that were sources of credit and 
insurance. Colonial explorers including Columbus, Magellan and Vasco de Gama 
were all briefed to bring back opium in addition to other commodities. When 
the Portuguese displaced the Venetians as explorers and traders, they included 
opium in their cargoes after purchasing it on the Indian sub-continent where 
poppies were widely grown in the late 1500s under a state monopoly enforced 
by the Mogul emperors (Booth, 1996: 22–23; Blue, 2000: 32).   
Coca use became associated with the Inca Empire, from the 12th to the 15th 
century, in what is now Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, northern Chile and 
northern Argentina. In this period, it is evident that coca has gained a social life. 
The herb, explains Petersen, was thought to be of divine origin, created by the 
Inca sun god Inti, and provided to mitigate the hunger and thirst of the Incas ‘so 
that they may meet earthly demands’. Thus, plantations were established and the 
mass production of coca, Petersen continues, became a state monopoly towards 
the end of the 15th century under Topa Inca. The use of the coca leaf became 
identified as a privilege reserved for the ruling classes, but ‘sometimes extended 
to soldiers during military campaigns, workers engaged in public works projects, 
and others judged especially deserving.’ With the decline of the Inca empire after 
the 15th century, coca cultivation and use became less restrictive (Petersen, 1977: 
18). 
 At this stage in the history of opium and coca, the intention for exchange 
has become clearly evident, and it can be inferred that regimes of accumulation 
have started. Long-distance trade and mass production require investments and 
insurance, and sources of such capital, needed to reproduce and expand, have to 
be embedded in networks of power. These networks of power not only 
guarantee the security of capital, but also engineer the creation of plantations by 
mobilising the land, labour and loans necessary. Thus, plantations and 
apparatuses of trading can be seen as manifestations of capital accumulation. 
Prescriptive commodification and regimes of accumulation have begun.  
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2.5 (Period 3) Tools for colonisation and economic 
restructuring  
Because value is embodied in commodities that are exchanged, and politics 
creates the link between value and exchange, ‘the conceit that commodities, like 
persons, have social lives’ is justified (Appadurai, 1986: 3). In Seeds of Change, 
Hobhouse argues that plants, not just the exploits of men and women, make 
history by causing change, development and catastrophe. He lists quinine, sugar 
cane, cotton, tea, potato, opium and coca as plants whose social lives enabled 
colonialism, created slavery, and sparked wars, thus transforming mankind 
(Hobhouse, 2005).  
Plants indeed have a social life, but natural occurrence is not sufficient to 
create that social life. These plants first have to be commodified. For some crops 
this meant mass production: in addition to land, capital and labour being set 
aside, whole areas and regions became specialised in one crop, and massive social 
reorganisation ensued. Hobhouse argues that when quinine became mass-
produced, it supplied the medicine that allowed Europeans to overcome swamp 
fever or malaria, permitting them to carry the ‘White Man’s Burden’ and leading 
to eventual domination of the tropics. Sugar cane changed the demographics of 
the Caribbean: the native Amerindians (Arawaks and Caribs) were supplanted by 
foreign white masters from Europe and black slaves from Africa. Slave-run sugar 
plantations were created to supply the huge demand for sugar in a Britain that 
became so specialised in manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution that it 
had to import food to feed itself.61 Similarly, the slave economy of the southern 
United States was built upon cotton, and became the rallying cry of the 
confederate states in the American Civil War (1861–1865). Potato produced 
huge increases in Ireland’s population and, when disease struck the potato, the 
famine that followed triggered the chain of events that culminated in Irish 
independence (Hobhouse, 2005).  
Thus, the specialisations put in place to mass produce these plants triggered 
massive changes. First, they entailed displacement or ‘de-specialisation’ in food 
crops, livestock production, or a combination. Second, smallholders with access 
to land and some tools would have become landless workers or slaves. Third, 
new financial instruments, more sophisticated than the bottomry contract, would 
 
61 In the 1790s, the Quakers in Britain campaigned actively to boycott the use of sugar in order 
to hasten the abolition of the slave trade: see http://www.quakersintheworld.org/quakers-in-
action/153, accessed 31 May 2019. The boycott was started after Parliament rejected the 
Abolition (of Slavery) Bill in 1791. 
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
72 
have been developed, which in turn created merchants in money, and more 
firms, partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs).  According to Wolf, 
these specialisations explain the reorganisation of the ‘true division of labour’, 
and gave capitalism its ‘great leap forward, escalating demand for raw materials 
and foodstuffs and creating a vastly expanded market of worldwide scope’ (Wolf, 
2010 [1982]: 310).  
In other words, a local economy would not spontaneously specialise, i.e. 
abandon food production in favour of opium poppy or coca cultivation, unless 
there was extraordinary force or pressure (economic, political) applied on it. The 
so-called ‘spontaneous order’ emerged not solely out of the ‘invisible hand’ of 
prices, but also, and perhaps more so, from the visible hand of power. What was 
enforced, following Wolf’s sweeping historical account, was a coercive 
specialisation that entailed huge social costs, as seen in the transformation of 
coca and opium into tools for colonisation.   
2.5.1 Coca prohibition vs. commercialisation under Spanish colonialism 
In the 1500s, Spanish colonial administrators of Latin America were at odds over 
the coca plant: on one side was the Catholic Church seeking to abolish the 
practice of coca leaf chewing to promote Christianisation; while on the other 
were Spanish mining interests, firms and other groups of colonial merchants in 
the Andes who sought to protect it (Gagliano, 1994; Gootenberg, 2008).  
In 1552, at the First Council of Bishops held in Lima, church leaders endorsed 
steps to discourage the indigenous population from making offerings to the ‘sun, 
earth, and sea with coca, maize, water and any other thing’. The Archbishop of 
Lima, Geronimo de Loayza, according to historian Joseph Gagliano, rallied 
clergymen to hasten Christian conversions with the belief that, despite the 
complexities of converting an ‘alien and often hostile people’, the eradication of 
coca would facilitate the task. Thus, a prohibitionist movement emerged within 
the church, with missionaries as its leading activists. They affirmed that the coca 
bush was ‘the single most important cause of the persistence of idolatry in the 
vice-royalty’. Among these missionaries were the Primeros Augustinos (Pioneer 
Augustinians), who exclaimed that ‘God only knows how many idolatries and 
how much witchcraft would cease if there were no coca’ (Gagliano, 1994: 48–
49).  
But there was an equally powerful pro-coca lobby made up of Spanish 
merchants and mining firms who found that handing out coca leaves as part-pay 
to mineworkers improved labour productivity because coca chewing enabled 
workers to deal with the physical burden of back-breaking work in the mines. 
The biggest of these mines was in Potosi, Bolivia, which in 1611 is believed to 
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have had a population of 160,000 — the largest mining community in the world 
at that time — and which lay at an average altitude of 14,000 feet (4267 metres). 
Coca leaf chewing not only provided comfort in the extreme working conditions, 
including lack of oxygen and various forms of altitude sickness in the mines, it 
‘also allowed the mine owners to reduce food rations by between one-fifth and 
one-quarter’. This meant considerable savings, since food was ‘always the major 
cost of slavery after interest on the capital value of the slaves’ lives’. According 
to Hobhouse, conditions in the mines were constantly cold and wet; fuel was so 
scarce it had to be rationed and used only for cooking. Conscripted from as 
young as eight years old, mineworkers would wield hammers as heavy as 20 
pounds or serve as porters carrying baskets of broken ore up ladders or cliff faces 
unprotected. It was therefore no surprise that ‘the death rate in the mine would 
have made Potosi commercially impossible without coca leaves’ (Hobhouse, 
2005: 298; 334–335).  Thus, the Spanish pro-coca lobby argued that not only was 
coca ‘a gift from God’, but also that the vice-royalty would not survive if it 
eliminated the coca trade.  
At the Second Council of Lima in 1567–68, though the prohibitionist bishops 
intensified their demands that the shrub be destroyed, ‘a more moderate, albeit 
reformist, position regarding the coca question’ was adopted. The council heard 
testimonies that illustrated prohibitionist social construction, variations of which 
would be repeated through time. Most of these testimonies, writes Gagliano, 
were without supporting evidence — for example, that the coca fields threatened 
much of the sierra Indian population with extinction; that women working in the 
coca fields became barren; or that those who gave birth had children who were 
demented or suffered from some affliction. It was claimed that the Indians 
seldom lived to old age. But several prelates like the Bishop of Cusco, continues 
Gagliano, refused to support the blanket condemnation because in addition to 
sharing a favourable view of the leaf’s virtues, they derived revenues from its 
commerce. These prelates also refused to accept that the Spanish planters and 
merchants who mass produced coca were insensitive to the plight of the coca 
workers. Many were thought to be receptive to reforms and engaged in 
philanthropy, building hospitals and other charitable institutions in the region. 
Hence in 1569, the council submitted a coca declaration to the Spanish Crown 
that requested a comprehensive policy ‘that would discourage the use of the leaf 
in superstitious practices, limit its cultivation, and reduce camayo [coca worker] 
deaths by preventing forced labour for [its production] in the Andes’ (Gagliano, 
1994: 55–57).  
Eventually, the Spanish King himself, Philip II, resolved the matter by 
approving coca, citing that its production was needed to protect the financial 
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
74 
interests of the Crown. Although there were conditions imposed — i.e. that the 
Viceroy improve working conditions in the coca farms, prohibit forced labour, 
and limit production quantities (ibid.: 59) — it was clear that commercial and 
financial considerations had triumphed over religious objections. Coca was 
accepted as legitimate, and the bundle of institutions necessary for its mass 
production was fully commodified by Spain. Coca commerce was deemed 




2.5.2 Opium finances the expansion of the British Empire 
Like the Spanish, the British Empire became similarly divided over the lucrative 
opium trade that had started to bring in the revenues it needed as it fought to 
retain northern American colonies in the mid-1700s. Again, there was a stark 
public policy dilemma. Debates were fought in the British Parliament and 
campaigns were launched to sway public opinion to eliminate the opium trade. 
But efforts to eliminate the opium trade failed because opium was ‘no hole-in-
the-corner petty smuggling trade’, in the words of Greenberg. It was, he said, 
‘probably the largest commerce of the time in any single commodity’ (1970: 104). 
Trocki further argued that it was opium that made British colonial expansion 
Figure 2.3:  An engraving called Mining in Potosi, by Thedoor de Bry, in Historia Americae 
sive Novi Orbis, 1596. Source: International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, 
https://socialhistory.org/en/today/04-10/potosi-silver-mines   
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affordable. Without opium, he said, ‘there probably would have been no British 
Empire’ (1999: loc. 158). 
In 1600, the British East India Company (EIC) obtained a royal licence to 
monopolise all commerce in the British colonies in Asia. As such, it became the 
commercial, political and military arm of Britain in enforcing effective sovereign 
control over British possessions in that part of the world. One of the first 
empire-builders in the successful expansion of the EIC was Major-General 
Robert Clive; he was followed during the next 150 years by Warren Hastings, 
Lord Cornwallis, Thomas Stamford Raffles, Alexander Matheson, David 
Sassoon, Frank Swettenham and Victor Purcell (Trocki, 1999: loc. 159).62  
In 1773, as the colonial ruler of Bengal and Bihar in India — then the world’s 
main opium-producing regions — the EIC resurrected the state monopoly over 
opium. Only the EIC could purchase opium grown in India, which the company 
then brought to Canton and other trading ports like Singapore and Jakarta, where 
it was bartered or sold. This monopoly, Trocki states, centralised opium traffic, 
and restructured much of the affiliated social and economic terrain by bringing 
two major changes: mass markets, and the generation of unprecedented cash 
flows. This concentrated the accumulation of wealth which, in turn, expanded 
the depth and scope of British banks, created aggressive profit-seeking by 
investment houses, and drove the creation of more trading firms. The opium 
trade, Trocki emphasises, formed the primary foundations of capitalism and the 
modern nation-state itself. ‘It may be argued’, he concludes, ‘that the entire rise 
of the west from 1500 to 1900 depended on a series of drug trades’ (Trocki, 
1999: loc. 165). 
China was the destination of the Indian-produced opium that the EIC traded. 
In 1729, the Chinese emperor had already banned opium, ‘the first among many 
failed Chinese attempts at its suppression’. As explained by McCoy, opium 
prohibition failed because ‘all early European colonial ventures in Asia promoted 
and profited from the commercialization of drugs’. British imperial economic 
expansion was the extraordinary force that ‘transformed opium from a luxury 
good into a bulk commodity similar to other stimulants — coffee and tea’ (2003: 
4-5). In other words, because opium effectively became a tool for maintaining 
 
62 Robert Clive was the General whose victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 secured India for 
the EIC. Trocki writes that Clive and his successors laid the foundations of the imperial economy 
through their involvement in opium. ‘None of them started the trade, and only put their hands 
to situations which already existed’, Trocki explains, ‘yet each left behind an enhancement of the 
trade. All seem to have collaborated in some way or another in assuring that the opium business 
was either promoted or at least protected’ (Trocki, 1999: loc. 159).  
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and expanding colonial ambitions, disquiet at home that the drug was a ‘social 
poison’ was ignored. Concerns over its dangers were trumped by the need to 
fund the expansion of the empire.    
From the 1760s onwards, the Chinese imperial government once again 
sought to reduce opium consumption and regulate the trade. According to 
historian Gregory Blue, this caused concern among EIC directors in London, 
who worried that China may retaliate against EIC’s involvement in opium by 
closing down the rapidly expanding Sino–British trade in legitimate goods. It was 
for this reason, according to Blue, that the EIC invented a scheme. From 1781, 
the company purchased all the opium produced in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 
India, and then sold it at auctions in Calcutta to private merchants called ‘country 
traders’ who were working under a company licence. Many of these country 
traders were ‘privateers’ who ran fully armed and crewed ships: without a 
company licence, they were technically pirates and smugglers. The company used 
subterfuge — it issued papers forbidding these ships to smuggle opium to China, 
while at the same time the company administration in Calcutta secretly 
contracted those traders to carry Indian opium to the Chinese coast, where it 
was unloaded covertly63 (2000: 32–34). 
Thus, despite Chinese efforts, continues Blue, opium consumption in China 
increased. Even when the Chinese emperor Jia Qing banned opium completely 
in 1796, it did little to dent the trade, mainly because systemic corruption and 
bribery were allowing opium cargoes to pass through customs and border 
controls. In 1821, when a serious crackdown was enforced that also targeted 
corrupt Chinese officials, the British simply moved their base to Lintin Island, in 
international waters, ‘where armed British ships received consignments of the 
drug from India and passed it on to Chinese fast boats, which carried it off for 
distribution on the coast’ (Blue, 2000: 32–34). 
 
63 Thus, long before the term was coined, the EIC had effectively put into practice the legal prin-
ciple of ‘plausible deniability’. According to the website www.uslegal.com, plausible deniability 
‘refers to circumstances where a denial of responsibility or knowledge of wrongdoing cannot be 
proved as true or untrue due to a lack of evidence proving the allegation. Officials can “plausibly 
deny” an allegation even though it may be true’. See http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/plausable-
deniability/, accessed 15 October 2015. 





Back in Britain, opium’s huge profitability opened up further debates — not 
about its abolition, but rather about removing the EIC monopoly and opening 
up competition. In 1833, the British Parliament abolished the company’s 
monopoly, thus allowing the entry of dozens of other British companies to 
compete in the opium trade. This resulted, according to Blue, in a ‘dramatic spurt 
of growth’ in opium trading from 1834 to 1838. More British trading houses 
became dealers in Indian opium. A number of these British companies, including 
those led by William Jardine, pushed ‘successive British governments to use force 
to compel the Qing rulers to change the trading system in ways favourable to 
British interests’ (Blue, 2000: 34).  
In 1836, China began to adopt a more forceful approach, especially because 
the opium traffic was draining much of its stocks of silver, the currency used in 
trade (Greenberg, 1970; Blue, 2000; McCoy, 2003). After new regulations were 
drafted, Beijing dispatched Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu to enforce them. 
Tensions came to a head in 1839 when Lin blockaded Canton and other Chinese 
Figure 2.4: Opium for mass consumption. Lithograph by WS Sherwill showing an industrial-
scale balling room where opium gum is repacked into 10-kg balls at a factory at Patna, 
India, ca. 1850. Source: Wellcome Trust Digital Library, under a creative commons license. 
https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/V0019155.jpg/full/full/0/default.jpg 
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ports. He also confiscated 1,210 tons of British-owned opium stocks (with an 
approximate worth of more than £230 million at today’s prices) and detained the 
small British expatriate community in Canton. In response, the British Navy, 
then at the height of its prowess, invaded and successfully occupied not only 
southern China (see map) but also ports further north and inland along the 
Yangtze River, beginning with Shanghai, 1,400 km to the northeast of Canton 
(Beijing is another 1,200 km to the northwest from Shanghai). An empire then 
in decline, China lost the first Opium War, and was forced to sign the 1842 
Treaty of Nanking which, among other clauses, indemnified the owners of the 
confiscated opium, opened five more ‘treaty ports’ (Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Ningbo, Fuzhou and Xiamen) to Western trade, and handed possession of the 





Map 1.1: A portion of an 1878 map of southern China showing the criss-cross of rivers through Canton, making it a 
smuggler’s paradise. Coloured red is Hong Kong, then only an outpost. In the middle of the bay towards Canton is 
Lintin Island, where in 1821 British ships unloaded their cargoes of Indian opium and passed them on to Chinese 
fast boats for smuggling to the coasts (Blue, 2000: 32–24). Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at 
the University of Texas at Austin (open access) 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/kwang_tung_1878.jpg  
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Not surprisingly, tensions continued after the Treaty of Nanking, because 
opium still remained illegal in China, and the Chinese resented how British 
merchants undermined Chinese law. In 1856, when the British licence of a ship 
containing opium cargoes expired, the Chinese wasted no time in seizing it. This 
ignited the second Opium War. Again, China was defeated, now by a combined 
British and French force, which successfully deployed its forces as far as Beijing. 
This time, the imperial government in Beijing was forced, through the 1858 
Treaty of Tienstin, to legalise the importation of opium into its territory (Blue, 
2000: 36). The commercial power of opium, backed by the military force of 
imperialist powers, broke down the political resistance of China’s rulers. The 
British Empire’s eastward commercial expansion was complete. 
 
 
Politically humiliated and unable to enforce its policies on opium, Chinese 
officials and merchants changed tack. Because opium had become legal, some 
Qing officials started advocating for import-substitution — i.e. rather than 
import Indian opium, why not grow it locally instead? Even before the Opium 
Wars started, certain parts of China had already been growing opium poppy. 
Booth explains what happened next. Alarmed at losing the major market for its 
top agricultural export, the Indian Board of Revenue dispatched an envoy to 
China in 1868, who confirmed that not only was Chinese-grown opium 
Figure 2.5: Part of the Anglo-French fleet that invaded China in the Second Opium War, seen 
here gathered at the Bay of Hong Kong. Photo from the Wellcome Trust Digital Library. 
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becoming cheaper in price, it was also better in quality. When the price of 
Chinese opium dropped well below the price of imports, British traders were 
indignant, ‘arrogantly believing that the Chinese did not have the right to 
compete with them’ (Booth, 1996: 148).  
The Chinese economy thus appeared to have been restructured, with 
unintended consequences emerging as a result. Although no systematic figures 
are available, Booth repeats the widely held belief that a significant area of land 
previously devoted to food production was lost to opium poppies. From this 
time onwards, food crises were reported in different parts of this huge country 
which had, for centuries, been self-sufficient in food. The problem, says Booth, 
‘was that more money could be earned from poppies than from wheat or rice; 
furthermore, the poppies were hardy and not prone to disease’. Booth reports 
that in 1870, the Chinese Censor, Yew Peh-chuan, had warned against poppy 
farming, declaring opium to be ‘the greatest national danger to food production’, 
and estimating that 10,000 mow (approx. 17,000 acres) were dedicated to poppy 
cultivation at any one time (Booth, 1996: 148). As such, the food crises were 
outcomes of the forces of capitalism led by opium displacing the peasant food 
economy and embedding itself in Chinese agriculture. 
Meanwhile, British-held Hong Kong prospered from its opium wealth while 
the rest of China was in turmoil. The colony’s population grew exponentially as 
it handled up to 40 % of China’s global trade. Booth quotes a December 1888 
report by The Times of London that opium was being produced in all parts of the 
empire, except the islands of Formosa and Hainan. About a third of the 
cultivated area in Yunnan province was devoted to opium. The report also 
estimated that up to seven-tenths of adults in Szechuan Province’s population of 
70 million were opium smokers (Booth, 1996: 148–149). Thus, as Trocki 
concludes: 
Drug trades destabilised existing societies not merely because they destroyed 
individual human beings but also, and perhaps more importantly, because 
they have the power to undercut the existing political economy of any state. 
They have created new forms of capital; and they have redistributed wealth 
in radically new ways. As such they have been the incubators of capitalism. 
(Trocki, 1999: loc. 182–204) 
2.6 (Period 4) Concentrated commodification: 
Technology and capitalist expansion  
Until the mid-1800s, the substances heroin and cocaine had not yet been 
‘discovered’: the commerce in opium and coca was a trade in plant products. As 
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such, it was technological breakthroughs in Europe — leading to the 
development of morphine, heroin and cocaine — that enabled the further 
commodification of the plant crops, along with the expansion of their markets 
in Europe and America. The new substances were mass-produced, further 
increasing the creation of new forms of capital along with its power to undercut 
the political economy significantly (Gootenberg, 2001: 3).  
German researchers and companies were at the forefront. They invested in 
technological innovation and in building key links in the commodity chains that 
transformed heroin and cocaine into global commodities. In 1805 in Paderborn, 
Germany, the young pharmacy assistant Friedrich Sertürner conducted 
experiments that dissolved opium in acid, then neutralised it with ammonia, 
producing a substance he called morphine, after the Greek god of dreams, 
Morpheus (Schmitz, 1985: 61). In the 1850s, there was similarly a race to discover 
and isolate the active ingredients of the coca leaf, led by renowned German 
chemists like Friedrich Wohler (Gootenberg, 2001: 3). The breakthrough came 
in 1859 when chemistry student Albert Niemann, a graduate student of Wohler, 
isolated coca’s main active ingredient and called it ‘Kokain’ (cocaine) (Petersen, 
1977: 21). Sigmund Freud famously published articles on cocaine’s medical uses, 
and the ophthalmologist Karl Koller’s discovery in 1884 of cocaine’s local 
anaesthetic properties revolutionised Western surgery. Their supplies came from 
the company E. Merck of Darmstadt, which produced it from modest imports 
of dried Bolivian and Peruvian coca leaf (Gootenberg, 2001: 4).  
The French and the British were not far behind. In the 1860s, coca wines 
became popular in Europe. A leading manufacturer was Angelo Mariani of Paris, 
who in 1863 named his mix of Bordeaux wine and coca leaves ‘Vin Mariani’, 
which became so popular in Europe and the United States that it was even 
awarded a medal of appreciation by no less than Pope Leo XIII (Haas, 1995: 25). 
In London, Royal Kew Gardens began its own experiments on coca tonics and 
coca medicine. In 1874, pharmacist Charles Romley Alder Wright of St Mary’s 
Hospital boiled morphine in acetic anhydride, and produced diacetylmorphine, 
‘which was named heroin because of its “heroic” qualities as an analgesic’ (Schiff, 
2002: 191). It was, however, the German firm Bayer in Wuppertal that developed 
a method for the synthesis of diacetylmorphine, and eventually registered the 
brand name ‘heroin’, paving the way for its further commodification and mass 
distribution.64  
 
64 Since heroin had already been discovered by Alder Wright, it could not be patented. Neverthe-
less, Bayer registered the word mark ‘heroin’. See the entry https://www.sciencehistory.org/his-
torical-profile/felix-hoffmann, accessed 1 December 2019. 
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In 1885, Gootenberg tells us, a decade-long coca boom began, centred on the 
port of Hamburg and the company Merck. After cocaine was adopted as an 
anaesthetic in surgery, the skyrocketing demand could hardly be met by existing 
supplies: ‘prices and output jumped five and twenty-times respectively’. Merck, 
which made about a quarter of world output, then made what Gootenberg sees 
as a far-reaching decision that radically sped up the commodification of cocaine. 
The company encouraged its Peruvian coca leaf suppliers to produce ‘crude 
cocaine’ instead of exporting dried coca leaves. The semi-processed (80–90% 
pure) jungle cocaine-sulfate cake ‘shipped far easier and efficiently than dried leaf 
and was processed into medicinal grade cocaine in Germany for Merck’s global 
distribution network’. The success of the German business model prompted 
rival colonial coca projects — British, Dutch, American — to be abandoned in 
the 1890s (Gootenberg, 2001: 4). By then, German pharmaceutical companies, 
including Merck and Bayer, were commercially manufacturing not only cocaine 
but also morphine and heroin for mass consumption.  
In the US, Parke-Davis became the largest manufacturer of cocaine. The 
company promoted the mass use of coca, marketed cocaine as a cure-all wonder 
drug, and sold a line of cocaine cordials, cocaine cigarettes, ointments and sprays. 
In 1886, a ‘dry’ or non-alcoholic version of Vin Mariani was launched in Atlanta 
by the pharmacist John Pemberton. It contained a small dose of cocaine, and in 
a matter of years had risen to become the US national ‘softdrink’ Coca-Cola 
(Booth, 1996: 192; Gootenberg, 2001: 6). 
Towards the end of the 19th century, coca and cocaine, and opium poppy and 
opiates, were extensively produced and widely used legal commodities around the 
world, supported at every step by distinctive networks around its commodity 
chains. Coca and cocaine, explained Gootenberg, could not anymore be 
interpreted only in terms of the binaries ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ or as commodities 
that enter undifferentiated into depersonalised world markets. These were now 
commodities ‘embedded in long transnational social and political networks’ 
(Gootenberg, 2001: 2). 
To sum up this sub-section, the case put forward is that the plants that 
became tools for colonisation — sugarcane, cotton, tea, opium and coca, which 
later became processed into heroin and cocaine, thus intensifying their 
commodification — introduced new forms of ‘economics’ and became, to 
borrow Trocki’s phrase, ‘incubators of capitalism’. The opium poppy and the coca 
bush are clear examples of crop commodities that gained a ‘social life’ and played 
a role in shaping history. Commodity chains emerged around them, where the 
interaction of participants produced particular economic, social and political 
configurations that structured the ways in which land was used, investments were 
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mobilised and deployed, labour was appropriated, trade networks were 
organised, and exchange arrangements put in place. 
2.7 (Period 5) Illicit commodification in an age of 
prohibition  
The global spread of the opium and coca economy, however, was countered by 
an international prohibition movement that grew in assertiveness because of 
growing fears that an addiction epidemic, particularly in China, was getting out 
of control. According to the UNODC, by 1906 the number of opium users had 
grown to 25 million, or 1.5% of the global population, and there ‘was little 
interest in suppressing a business that was so profitable for opium merchants, 
shippers, bankers, insurance agencies, and governments’. Many national 
economies of that period were described as being ‘as dependent on opium as the 
addicts themselves’ (UNODC, 2008: 3).  
Active and passionate campaigns for prohibition emerged in Britain, the most 
important beneficiary of the opium trade. Chinese speakers against the opium 
trade campaigned in London in the 1870s, supported by members of the House 
of Lords including the Earl of Shaftesbury, Lord Ashley, who had introduced a 
Parliamentary motion stating that the opium trade and monopoly ‘were utterly 
inconsistent with the honour and duties of a Christian kingdom’. In 1874, the 
Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade was founded in 
Britain, with Lord Ashley as president, and with funding and inspiration derived 
from the Quakers (Booth, 1996: 152–153). 
It was the United States, however, that made the 
first official moves against opium on the 
international stage. After annexing the Philippine 
Islands in 1898, US colonial administrators 
immediately organised an Opium Committee led by 
Bishop Charles Brent who, in 1903, urged US 
President Theodore Roosevelt to mobilise global 
cooperation to fight the opium trade. In January 
1909, Brent represented the US government in 
chairing the first International Opium Commission, 
convened in Shanghai (Blue, 2000: 53). It is symbolic 
of opium’s sheer commercial power that the 
Shanghai conference had to be postponed by a 
month, out of respect for the recently deceased 
Figure 2.6: Photo of the 
Dowager Empress Cixi 
(Wikimedia Commons) 
 
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
84 
Emperor Guangxu and Dowager Empress Cixi, who was known to be an opium 
user herself and who died 22 hours after Guangxu’s passing (Booth, 1996: 181).  
From this point forward, the US began an explicit quest to internationalise 
the doctrine of drug prohibition (Bewley-Taylor, 2002; 2012). After the 1909 
Shanghai Conference, a codified drug control system evolved. In 1912, the 
International Opium Convention of The Hague curbed shipments of narcotic 
drugs not meant for medical purposes. In 1920, the tasks of international drug 
control were assumed by the newly founded League of Nations, which 
developed three conventions — signed in 1925, 1931 and 1936 — that laid the 
groundwork for the operations of the international drug control system. After 
the Second World War, the United Nations took over, and established protocols 
to improve the control system (UNODC, 2008).  
Through these years, a ‘prohibition culture’ built up in the UN as US support 
for global drug control consolidated and expanded. A 1952 report to the UN 
ECOSOC’s Commission on Enquiry on the Coca Leaf, for example, supported 
racist views that only when the ‘primitive population’ are Christianised do they 
‘show themselves to be physically and mentally capable of freeing themselves 
from coca-leaf chewing’.65 In 1961, the Preamble of the UN Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs stated the duty of states ‘to prevent and combat this evil’. 
The wording is notable, explains Rick Lines, because under international treaty 
law, the Single Convention is the only UN treaty ‘characterising the activity it 
seeks to regulate, control or prohibit as being “evil”’ (2010: 3).  
Today, three global treaties provide the mandate for the UN’s enforcement 
of a global policy of drug control and prohibition:  
• The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 
Protocol, which consolidates into a single document all treaties and 
agreements between states since 1912. The 1961 Convention is a legal 
instrument that imposes a blanket prohibition on plant-based drugs, 
including coca leaf and cocaine, concentrate of the poppy straw and 
opium, morphine and heroin, and cannabis and cannabis resin. It allows 
exceptions, such as medical use of the drugs, but only under strict 
controls. Plant-based drugs are grown mostly in ‘Southern’ countries.  
 
65 From the report by P.O. Wolff, January 1952. The report is available online: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1952-01-
01_2_page003.html, accessed 28 June 2019. 
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• The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, which is concerned with 
synthetically manufactured substances that affect the mind, emotions 
and behaviour, such as amphetamines, barbiturates or sleeping pills. 
These are drugs which are manufactured by the pharmaceutical industry 
located mainly in ‘Northern’ countries.  
• The Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988, which obliged state parties to criminalise and treat as 
serious criminal offences all aspects of illicit drug cultivation, trafficking, 
manufacture, sale, possession, and money laundering. The most 
controversial legal obligation is the criminalisation of possession of illicit 
drugs for personal consumption.66  
2.8 The changing nature of illicit drugs capitalism 
Various scholars have noted that the international drug control apparatus is a 
remarkable achievement. Buxton observes that no equivalent global control 
system — with its treaties, institutions and monitoring — has emerged for any 
other commodity. Not only do states have to work cooperatively in enforcing 
the treaties, many even have to surrender their own sovereignty on national drug 
policy (Buxton, 2006: 100).  
Given the power and resources mobilised for drug eradication through the 
20th century, including various wars on drugs, the question remains as to why the 
production of opium and the manufacture of cocaine were reported to be at the 
highest levels ever recorded in the 2018 UN World Drug Report. Why, in spite of this 
concerted international effort, does prohibition continue to fail?  
The answers may lie at least partly in how opium and coca continued their 
social life, but this time as fully illicit commodities. Prohibition focuses on 
removing the banned product from circulation, but not on unbundling the 
embedded institutions and social relationships behind its reproduction. Thus, 
what needs to be examined are the processes of commodification, the status of 
the commodity chains, the concentration of opium and coca capitalism, and their 
 
66 As of March 2020, there are 186 UN member countries that are parties to the 1961 treaty (see 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
18&chapter=6&lang=en); 184 parties signed up to the 1971 treaty (see https://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-16&chapter=6&lang=en); and 
191 parties to the 1988 treaty (see https://trea-
ties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=vi-19&chapter=6&lang=en). All sites 
last accessed 20 March 2020.    
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expansion as illicit products. How were the land, labour, capital and 
specialisations required for their production transformed or adapted to the 
constraints enforced by prohibition?   
Gootenberg and other scholars have used historiography to provide an 
important set of answers. They argue that there is a more specific origin for the 
massive and unprecedented turn to illicit coca crops across the western Amazon 
from the 1950s: failed state-led modernising projects, in particular the vast and 
unprecedented project to build the Carretera Marginal de la Selva (Marginal 
Highway of the Jungle) from Venezuela to Bolivia, that encouraged population 
movement into the Amazon to appease poor and rebellious rural folk. When this 
project failed in the late 1970s, it ‘left hundreds of thousands of impoverished 
non-indigenous peasants stranded in the Amazon without government credits, 
schools, social and judicial services, communications, and business opportunities 
or jobs originally promised by the colonization schemes’. Under such conditions, 
coca became the perfect market crop for coping and survival in these peripheries, 
produced by an army of dispossessed and displaced poor peasants who are best 
described as ‘orphans of development’ (Gootenberg and Davalos, 2018). 
Through a periodisation of opium and coca history, this chapter has shown 
that law enforcement alone will not solve the ‘drug problem’ for two reasons. 
First, there exists a global ‘army’ of illicit crop producers (or the ‘ants’ of the drug 
trade), mostly poor and impoverished peasants are mostly ‘orphans of 
development’. Second, the policy of prohibition is attempting to ban illicit crops: 
(a) for which demand exists; (b) whose social structures and division of labour 
have been reorganised; and (c) which deliver profit and power for the 
entrepreneurs, intermediaries and arbitrageurs operating between the producers 
and consumers in global commodity chains. A reiteration of Wolf’s analysis 
underscores the power relations framing these social processes, i.e. that the 
specialisations that created opium and coca commodity chains meant massive 
social reorganisation that could only be achieved by the visible hand of political 
and coercive enforcement at huge social costs (2010 [1982]: 310). As McCoy 
concluded, these crops have been an extraordinary ‘source of profit and power, 
corruption and collusion’ (2003: 3).   
The presence of commodity chains dismantles the notion of a perfectly free 
market — a crucial difference that often appears to be missed in drug policy 
analysis. As Wallerstein argues, in commodity chains, the interest of the capitalist 
is not to lower costs like all others, but to maximise profit and market power. 
Thus, the key actor in this chain — the criminal entrepreneur — can be the most 
uncompetitive, most inefficient, and least productive, and yet still capture the 
most profits, if he or she can maintain relative monopolies or control of political 
 Chapter 2: Historicising Illicit Drugs Enterprise  
87 
 
levers, which is dependent on state action of various kinds. These relative 
monopolies then build up quite distinct forms of capital accumulation 
(Wallerstein, 2009: 84). Profit maximisation based on political power, not 
economic efficiency, is particularly evident in the commerce of opium and coca. 
The business model of the British East India Company, the predecessor of 
today’s drug cartels, is the main historical example. The extent of 
commodification processes and structures today — the ‘bundle’ of institutions 
and social relationships discussed at the beginning of this chapter — is 
documented in the INCSRs. 
Illicit drugs capitalism continues to transform, deepen and resist state control. 
Drug cartels and criminal gangs that are sometimes better resourced and armed 
than small countries have emerged. Today, many are no longer petty criminals 
and have been compared to multinational companies. With markets less and less 
limited by political boundaries, and with communications and travel becoming 
cheap, quick and easy, illicit drugs capitalism penetrates national economies in 
the same way that the reach of legitimate business has extended globally.  
2.9 Power relations and political divides on drug control 
It is against these historical contexts that current policy and political divides, and 
consequently the competing schools of thought on drug control, could be 
examined. These divides were on full display in the run-up to and during the UN 
General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem of 19–21 April 
2016, when 193 member-states convened to decide, among other issues, whether 
or not to strengthen prohibition; whether to approach the drug problem as a 
criminal or a public health problem; and whether to look for alternative 
development or substitute crops to replace opium and coca. The impact of ‘wars 
on drugs’ was also debated, with countries at the forefront — like Colombia, El 
Salvador and Guatemala — challenging their effectiveness.67 
Arguments for prohibition have been largely de-contextualised: drug policy 
has mainly concentrated on the enforcement of the crops’ illegality, with very 
little attention devoted to their impacts as ‘incubators of capitalism’ or to the 
long history of these commodities’ social construction. Throughout decades of 
expanding and deepening prohibition, there has been very little focus in policy 
debates on the way that illicit commerce has sustained national economies, or on 
how capitalist interests — both legal and illegal — have fought for control over 
illicit markets. Furthermore, progress in prohibition was largely measured in 
 
67 I was an NGO observer in the Special Session and in prior and subsequent meetings at the UN. 
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terms of perceived reductions in supply, with relatively little thought for how to 
manage demand. As such, despite the huge resources deployed for prohibition, 
very little is actually known about the real economics and messy politics of the 
illicit commerce in opium and coca.  
2.9.1 The divides on drug policy 
It was the historian David T. Courtwright who asked why alcohol, tobacco and 
caffeine — which are also psychoactive and equally highly commodified 
products — have remained relatively impervious to prohibition (Courtwright, 
2001: loc. 82–129). Among UN member-states, for example, there are Muslim 
countries that strictly enforce bans on alcohol sale and consumption in their 
respective territories, yet there are no UN-wide treaties prohibiting alcohol. The 
answer, presumably, is because alcohol, tobacco and caffeine are ‘softer’ 
psychoactive products, and therefore are assumed to be less harmful than opiates 
and cocaine. But then, Courtwright continues, why have other regionally popular 
plant drugs such as kava, betel, khat or peyote failed to become global 
commodities like the banned cocaine, opium or cannabis? (Courtwright, 2001: 
loc. 82–129). In her analysis, Sue Pryce concludes that the ‘drug problem’ is 
unsolvable: even the word ‘problem’, she states, ‘is problematic because it implies 
that there is a solution, whereas drug use is endemic, a part of the human 
condition’ (Pryce, 2012: viii).  
Yet tensions remain in the global community over drug policy. According to 
Martin Jelsma of the Transnational Institute (TNI), there are at least four key 
policy divides on drug control:  
• The first divide is over assumptions that narcotic drugs are harmful, and 
here Jelsma underscores an inconsistency which reflects the underlying 
power relations in the negotiation of international treaties. The drug 
crops opium, coca and cannabis — produced largely in developing 
countries — are deemed to be harmful, and therefore automatically 
banned. But man-made addictive substances produced largely by the 
pharmaceutical companies of developed countries are considered safe, 
unless otherwise proven. Hence, they can be banned only if an 
appropriate investigation has been made into their health impacts. In 
other words, naturally occurring plant crops produced largely in 
developing countries are automatically criminalised, whereas 
manufactured drugs from developed countries have to be rigorously 
tested before they can be banned (Jelsma, 2003: 183). 
• A second divide is over obligations associated with supply and demand 
reduction: restricting supplies of coca leaf, cocaine, opium, heroin and 
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cannabis is made an international legal obligation, but restricting the 
demand for these plants and products is not. Hence, while producer 
(mostly developing) countries can be sanctioned for not doing anything 
to reduce supply, consuming (mostly developed) countries are not 
subject to similar monitoring and sanctions systems (Jelsma, 2003: 183).  
• A third divide is around harm reduction, mainly comprising initiatives 
by European countries, and now supported by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), involving programmes such as safe needle 
exchanges, regulated supply for registered habitual users, or access to 
medical advice and treatment, like opioid substitution therapy.  This is 
intensely controversial because it treats drug abuse as a public health, not 
a criminal problem, and hence is regarded with suspicion by 
prohibitionists. Harm reduction has been labelled a ‘Trojan Horse’ for 
the legalisation of illicit drugs (Jelsma, 2003: 185).  
• Inevitably, the fourth divide is along the line of prohibition vs. 
legalisation. On the polar ends are countries that stand by prohibition on 
one hand, and the proponents of various forms of legalisation, on the 
other. While some countries including China, Russia and Pakistan have 
taken a hard-line stance against narcotics in various UN fora,68 a number 
of other countries are relaxing national restrictions, at least for cannabis. 
In December 2013, Uruguay became the first country to legalise 
cannabis or marijuana for personal consumption, under a government-
controlled market. But it is changes in North America that are 
particularly worth watching. Following Uruguay, Canada became the 
first G7 country to fully legalise cannabis.69 In the US as of June 2019, 
11 states plus the District of Columbia have become legal markets for 
recreational cannabis use; over 30 states have legalised its medical use; 
and 11 have decriminalised cannabis possession. More US states are 
poised to follow the trend. US President Donald Trump himself was 
 
68 China, Russia and Pakistan are the three main countries whose delegations have taken the 
lead against any relaxation of drug policy reform, including harm reduction, in the meetings of 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the UNGASS 2016, in which I was present as an NGO 
observer.  
69 From https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/02/legalise-cannabis-treasury-3bn-
drugs, accessed 13 June 2018.   
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reported to be in favour of leaving the decision on whether or not to 
legalise cannabis to individual states.70  
It is not just countries, but also law enforcers and NGOs that are divided — 
some support prohibition while others support legalisation. In the UK in 10 July 
2012, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee heard Chief Constable 
Tim Hollis arguing for prohibition, while former Cambridgeshire Chief 
Constable Tom Lloyd argued for legalisation. Hollis supports prohibition but 
considers the ‘war on drugs’ as ‘unhelpful’, because ‘it is a wrong approach to 
what is a deep-seated and complex social problem’ (December 2012: 82). Lloyd, 
on the other hand, supports decriminalisation and legalisation because, ‘it is 
much more harmful for those drugs to be produced and supplied by criminals 
who care only for profit’ (ibid.: 83). The UNODC has taken steps to clarify the 
nuances on where it stands on many of these issues. In an informal interview, 
senior official and key UNODC expert on drug economies, Thomas 
Pietschmann, sought to distance the UN from the US war on drugs position. 
The UN, Pietschmann maintains, ‘has never declared war on anything. Our 
programmes and policies are all based on the legal mandates provided by the 
three global drug control treaties’.71  
There is also disquiet over the UNODC’s published history on A Century of 
International Drug Control. Despite the claim that drug control policy works, the 
counter-charge has been made that the UNODC was trying to ‘hide the failures 
of drug control policy behind a bad history lesson’. The Transnational Institute, 
an activist think tank, pointed out that when the UNODC published the history 
in 2008, it failed to acknowledge that the UN’s own 10-year drug control targets 
endorsed in 1998 were not met. Hence, according to TNI, the UNODC ‘offers 
a narrative of 100 years of success, fabricating a comparison with Chinese opium 
production and use at the turn of the 20th century’ (TNI, 2008). TNI was 
 
70 The list of US states that have legalised cannabis in some form, or decriminalised its use, 
comes from http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-
recreational.html. On President Trump’s break with his own Attorney-General on cannabis 
policy, see https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/us/politics/trump-marijuana-bill-states.html, 
both accessed 13 June 2018.  
71 I informally interviewed Pietschmann at his office in Vienna in June 2013, which was author-
ised by the head of his division, Jean-Luc Lemahieu.  
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unequivocal in its conclusion: ‘the current UN conventions have not curbed the 
illicit market’.72  
2.9.2 Illicit drugs economies as a development issue 
In July 2019, the international NGO Christian Aid (the development agency of 
the Anglican Church) and the Drugs and (dis)order Project, led by SOAS,73 
published a report warning that current approaches, particularly the wars on 
drugs, are counter-productive with potentially disastrous consequences for some 
of the world’s poorest and most left-behind groups (Christian Aid, 2019). In a 
press statement for the report, Christian Aid emphasized that ‘ill-conceived 
approaches of criminalisation and enforced eradication of illicit croplands 
destroy livelihoods and exacerbate human rights violations of already stigmatised 
and marginalised groups’. Arguing that illicit drugs production is more than just 
a law enforcement problem, the report emphasises that ‘it is a development 
problem too requiring developmental solutions’. The central problem to be 
resolved, argues the report, is not illicit crop production, but the continuing 
marginalisation and exclusion from markets and state protection of the 
communities who rely on that production in order to cope and survive.74  
I am the main author of the Christian Aid report; during its preparation, a key 
point of debate was how to present the balance of harms and gains in illicit crop 
production. The growing of illicit crops can indeed involve violence and 
coercion; but it can also deliver incomes, employment and protection amidst 
continuing instability and fragility. Hence, the report adopted the phrase 
developed by Jonathan Goodhand in a 2005 article, arguing that illicit economies 
are sources of both order and disorder. More discussion of the drugs vs. 
development policy debate is presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
 
72 In 2006, TNI had already criticised the UNODC for constructing success stories to convince the 
world that international drug control policy is working. For more on the questions raised, see TNI 
(2006, 2008). 
73 See https://drugs-and-disorder.org/ for more details on this four-year research project which 
received a £7 million grant from the UK’s Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF).  
74 The press statement was carried by the UN’s humanitarian news service, ReliefWeb, see 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/peace-illicit-drugs-and-sdgs-development-gap. Alongside the 
report, there are two related blogs: https://www.christianaid.org.uk/news/curious-case-unu-
sual-economic-transformation; and https://www.christianaid.org.uk/news/illegality-violence-
and-fragility-do-they-breed-each-other.  
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2.10 Conclusion: Narratives that provide the historical 
setting 
On 17 June 1971, as the United States struggled to gain the upper hand in the 
Vietnam War, US President Richard Nixon opened a new offensive: the ‘war on 
drugs’. Speaking to members of the US Congress, 75 Nixon decried the fact that 
America had the largest number of heroin addicts in the world, ‘and yet America 
does not grow opium, nor does it manufacture heroin’. He asked Congress for 
$155 million in new funds, bringing the total US budget to tackle drugs to over 
$350 million that year. He also created a central authority to coordinate all efforts 
— the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention. Nixon asked Congress 
to amend the laws on aid, so that funding could be more flexibly provided to 
countries that would rally behind the US war on drugs.  
Nixon emphasised his intent to leave no room ‘for other nations to question 
our commitment to this matter’. The focus would be ‘to strike at the “supply” 
side of the drug equation — to halt the traffic by striking at the illegal producers 
of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, and 
trafficking in these drugs beyond our borders’. The problem, he stressed, ‘has 
assumed the dimensions of a national emergency’. In a press conference two 
hours later, Nixon declared: ‘America’s public enemy number one is drug abuse. 
In order to defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive. 
This will be a world-wide offensive dealing with problems of supply’.76 
It is through speeches and declarations like Nixon’s, repeated in different 
forms and at varying levels of intensity since the beginning of the 1900s, that the 
‘common sense’ of drug policy evolved. It is a common sense that is built upon 
a political agenda, based on the shared understanding and values of those with 
the power to enforce it. As such, this ‘common sense’ — following Gramsci — 
is best seen as a creation of a ‘historic bloc’ (blocco storico), that has become legally, 
institutionally and ideologically embedded in the global complex that rises from 
the UNODC and ONDCP structures, and which consequently normalises a 
version of what is supposedly good or bad, acceptable or unthinkable (Gramsci, 
1971: 690, 768; Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 131–133).  
 
75 See Nixon’s speech at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048. 
76 Nixon’s press statement, from which this quote was taken, is available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047, accessed 12 May 2018. Curiously, Nixon made 
no mention at all of coca or cocaine. In contrast, he mentioned heroin 18 times, and opium 11 
times, and mentioned cannabis, barbiturates, LSD and other drugs once each.  
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The normalisation of this common sense has been challenged by the 
cocaleros’ rise to power in Bolivia, no matter how problematic that rise may be. 
But another way to challenge the ‘common sense’ is to historicise the social 
construction of what is licit or illicit, legal or illegal through time. Nixon’s 
offensive not only needs to be seen from a wider historical perspective but 
framed as a product of historical development itself. The transformation and 
emergence of the plants opium and coca from being sources of medicine, 
through being market commodities, into becoming what Nixon called a ‘clear 
and present danger to society’ thus triggering a ‘national emergency’, were 
transitions through which the running theme, this study argues, has been 
commodification. Through the five periods elaborated in this chapter, the 
following narratives emerge.   
First, illicit crops and the commodity chains that result from their trade have 
been incubators of capitalism. Their emergence and patterns of trading through 
history rearranged commodity chains and much of the affiliated social and 
economic terrain. Mining in the Andes that financed Spanish colonialism would 
not have been possible without coca. Similarly, without opium, ‘there probably 
would have been no British Empire’ (Trocki, 1999: loc. 158). As Trocki has 
highlighted, the British opium trade created mass markets and generated 
unprecedented cash flows, leading to far-reaching changes in the accumulation 
of wealth, expansion of banks, and growth of trading firms. As such, the opium 
trade formed the primary foundations of capitalism and the modern nation-state 
itself. 
Second, plant commodities including illicit crops acquire a ‘social life’ that 
ultimately change the course of history and transform society. As Hobhouse 
(2005) has documented, opium and tea have sparked wars; sugar and cotton 
enslaved whole social classes; and coca profoundly shaped the politics and 
economics of Latin America from the 16th century. In other words, the plants 
and their commerce introduced new forms of ‘economics’ involving not just a 
different way of accumulating capital for those who gained most from the trade, 
but also different livelihood strategies for the growers of the crops, and different 
governance strategies for state actors involved. Thus, rather than thinking of 
opium and coca exclusively in terms of market forces or the law of supply and 
demand, a lot more can be gleaned by unbundling the relationships and 
enterprises that develop around them when analysed in terms of interdependent 
commodity chains.  
The establishment of these commodity chains appears central, as Wolf has 
noted, to developments in the latter part of the 19th century, when capitalism 
took a ‘great leap forward, escalating demand for raw materials and foodstuffs 
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and creating a vastly expanded market of worldwide scope’ (Wolf, 2010 [1982]: 
310). As a result, ‘whole regions became specialised in the production of some 
raw material, food crop, or stimulant’, which explains the reorganisation caused 
by an emergent ‘true division of labour’ (ibid.).  
Most importantly, the presence of commodity chains cancels the notion of a 
perfectly free market. As Wallerstein argues, in commodity chains, the interest 
of the capitalist is not to lower costs like all others, but to maximise profit and 
market power. Capital accumulation, he said, ‘is not about free enterprise but 
about monopolies’ (2009: 84). As this chapter has shown, profit maximisation 
based on political power, not economic efficiency, is particularly evident in the 
licit and illicit commerce of opium and coca. The British East India Company’s 
business model is not only the central historical example, it is also the precursor 
of today’s drug cartels and the tools that they use for expanding their business.  
The third narrative is the emergence and entrenchment since 1909 of a global 
prohibition movement, with the United States as its key mover. Today, 
prohibition is codified into the three global drug control treaties under the UN. 
Despite these treaties, however, key divides remain. These divides, documented 
by Jelsma, are over assumptions and processes as to how a commodity comes to 
be deemed illegal; over imbalances in the legal obligations related to the supply 
and demand of crops and products that are deemed illicit; splits over harm 
reduction; and finally, the continuing debate over narcotic drug prohibition 
versus legalisation.  
The next chapter probes deeper into these divides and the sources of accepted 
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The illicit trade in coca and opium products is a global enterprise — its 
markets cut across national boundaries. Since these are illicit markets that are 
deliberately concealed, official information comes from two global 
monitoring and tracking systems: (a) that put in place by the United Nations 
and coordinated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), its 
findings published in the annual World Drug Reports (WDRs); and (b) that put 
in place by the United States, coordinated by the White House’s Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) which publishes the annual Illicit 
Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSRs). This chapter tracks the evolution 
of these systems and critically assesses the material they have compiled and 
published on the illicit crops’ global commodity chains. To the best of my 
knowledge, a sustained critical scholarly evaluation, particularly of the 
INCSRs, has not previously been attempted. 
In the WDR published in 2005, the UNODC presented an Illicit Drugs 
Index (IDI) ‘that would provide a single, standard, and comparable measure 
of a country’s overall drug problem, weighted by the size of its population’77. 
It was spurred on to develop the IDI, the UNODC states, because the drug 
problem has been traditionally presented as a supply-demand issue, split 
between production, trafficking and consumption, and further broken down 
into drug categories that result in a ‘heterogeneity that has made it difficult to 
establish benchmarks and to make straightforward comparisons of the drug 
problem across regions/countries over time’. Hence, the UNODC points 
 
77 As shown in the table, the IDI aggregated its figures from countries to regions.   
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out, it has been difficult to bridge policy divides between producing and 
consuming countries, and to explore possible correlations with other socio-
economic indicators and indices (WDR 2005, Vol. 1: 165–174). The WDR 
2005 divided the world into 16 sub-regions and reported their IDI, as shown 
in Table 3.1. 
  
 Table 3.1: Illicit Drugs Index (per capita values) 
Sub-region Production Trafficking Abuse IDI 
Caribbean 2.46 7.21 2.39 12.06 
Central America 0.25 4.04 3.32 7.61 
Central Asia  3.53 6.07 4.96 14.56 
East Africa 0.3 1.13 0.8 2.23 
East and SE Asia 2.4 0.6 2.09 5.09 
East Europe 0.15 1.26 10.96 12.37 
Near and M.East/ SW 
Asia 32.24 14.95 5.48 52.67 
North Africa 4.85 1.12 1.54 7.51 
North America 4.98 9.79 9.63 24.4 
Oceania 3.87 5.56 9.42 18.85 
South America 14.46 9.31 4.49 28.26 
South Asia 0.28 0.1 2.68 3.06 
Southeast Europe 1.4 9.19 2.15 12.74 
Southern Africa 1.52 1.45 2.35 5.32 
West and Central        
Europe 1.07 5.8 6.23 13.1 
West and Central Africa 0.82 0.73 3.49 5.04 
Mean 4.33 3.26 3.77 11.36 
Source: WDR 2005, Vol. 1: 172 
 
‘Production’, ‘trafficking’ and ‘abuse’ were chosen by the UNODC as the 
three indicators to comprise the IDI. Values were assigned to each indicator, 
weighted according to the size of the population, and the sum of all three 
indicators then constituted the IDI. The higher the IDI, the bigger the drug 
problem. Across time, reductions in IDI would mean progress in drug policy 
implementation, while increases in IDI would generally mean worsening drug 
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problems. As Table 3.1 shows, the leading producers are the sub-regions of 
Near and Middle East/South-west Asia (32.24) and South America (14.46); 
the leading trafficking regions are Near and Middle East/South-west Asia 
(14.95) and North America (9.79); and the regions with the highest abuse 
problems are East Europe (10.96) and North America (9.63).   
In many ways these indicators correspond to the three markets that will 
be examined in this chapter as highlighted in the chapter title: the consumer 
(abuse), intermediary (trafficking), and producer markets. While the 
development of the IDI is useful for measuring the success or otherwise of 
drug policies and such indices are ‘fundamental to continuous, economic and 
community improvement’ as rightly argued by Ritter (2009: 475), it is 
important to reiterate that indices ‘are not reality: they are a radical 
simplification of it for the purposes of abstraction and data manipulation’ 
(Gutierrez et al., 2011: 9). Hence, while useful for analysis, the information 
contained in the IDI will be essentially contested. This may be why the 
UNODC published the IDI only once: it appears to have been discontinued 
and is not included in any subsequent issues of the WDR since. This chapter 
therefore goes back to the basics, which means sketching the consumer, 
intermediary and producer markets for illicit opium and coca, and running its 
own assessment and analysis based on these sketches.  
It is important to emphasise that this chapter is based almost exclusively 
on the two sets of primary sources — the WDRs and INCSRs — that are the 
certified legal documents which provide official knowledge on the illicit 
crops. Statements and claims made in this chapter should be assumed to 
derive directly from these official sources, unless otherwise indicated.78  
Illicit drugs reports produced by the UN have been published every year 
from 1999 to 2019 (the last year covered by the research).79  The report 
published in 1999 was entitled Global Illicit Drug Trends, and the publisher was 
then called the UN Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention, or UN 
ODCCP. The 2003 edition was still entitled Global Illicit Drug Trends, but UN 
ODCCP had by then taken on its current name, the UN Office on Drugs and 
 
78 Citations from these sources are made sparingly, especially because some of the matters 
discussed occur repeatedly in various years of publication; for example there are legal claims 
repeated each year that have become the standard introduction for these reports.  
79 There may have been publications in earlier years, but they are not listed as such on the 
UNODC website. For example, an article in the New York Times (26 June 1997) quotes from a 
World Drug Report (https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/26/world/un-report-says-tens-of-
millions-use-illicit-drugs.html).  
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Crime, or UNODC. In 2004, the report was renamed the World Drug Report, 
published by UNODC, and this is how it remains to date. For ease of 
reference, this study uses the shortcut (WDR + year) when citing from these 
reports (even when the original report was named Global Illicit Drug Trends). 
Other official documents will be cited in the standard way.  
The second primary source is the INCSR, produced by the US 
government. The first INCSR was published in 1986, and it has appeared 
each year since then. However, this study was not able to retrieve the INCSRs 
for 1992, 1993 and 1995. Also, INCSRs retrieved for certain years — from 
1996 to 2004 — were in HTML format that gives no actual page numbers. 
In certain years (2005 to 2009), the INCSRs retrieved was broken up into 
separate pdf files, hence pages cited may be repeated. From 2010 onwards, 
all INCSRs were published in single pdf format and could be properly cited. 
Again, for ease of reference, the shortcut (INCSR + year) is used when citing 
from these reports.  
This chapter analyses content, tracks socio-political trends and patterns, 
develops coding categories, and attempts an interpretation of the underlying 
text and meaning of official statements and claims. All these sources are 
declassified and accessible to public scrutiny, enabling their inclusion as a 
chapter in this study.  
3.2 The global measuring and monitoring mechanisms 
of illicit drug economies 
The UNODC today is the principal multilateral institution mandated to 
monitor the illicit drug trade. It relies on various tools to make its 
quantifications. The most important are the survey reports derived from its 
Annual Research Questionnaires (ARQs), satellite mapping, and aerial 
imagery, which are then validated through field visits, and coordinated with 
local police reports, among others. The data are published as the Illicit Crop 
Monitoring Surveys, which become the core information for the World Drug 
Report (WDR) published every year.80  On top of this core information, the 
UNODC receives and processes information submitted by UN member-
states, as part of their treaty commitments, to the International Narcotics 
 
80 For a discussion of the methodology used initially, see for example WDR (2000: 69–70); for 
more recent years, see WDR (2018f) and WDR (2019f).  
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Control Board (INCB). The UNODC and the INCB, along with associated 
bodies, are headquartered in Vienna.81  
The US government, however, conducts its own unilateral monitoring of 
illicit drug markets. Aside from commissioned research projects, mainly 
funded by the US National Research Councils, the US produces its own 
annual report. On 1 March of every year since 1986, the US Department of 
State has submitted to the US Congress an International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report (INCSR). This report is a legal requirement. 82  Before the US 
government can provide development, military, drug control or any other 
form of aid or assistance to any country, that country has to be formally 
certified by the US President as compliant with international narcotics control 
standards. Countries that do not pass the evaluation are ‘designated’, which 
means ‘failing demonstrably’ to adhere to international drug control 
obligations. Countries whose anti-drug efforts are ineffective could be 
‘decertified’, i.e. rendered unqualified to receive US aid support. The INCSR 
presents four lists that effectively lay out the scope and depth of the illicit 
markets:  
• The ‘Major List’, which identifies the major illicit drugs-producing 
and drugs-transit countries, according to US evaluation;  
• The ‘Designated List’, which enumerates countries deemed not 
compliant with international drug control standards; these countries 
may be decertified for eligibility to receive US aid and trade benefits;  
• The ‘Suppliers of Chemical Precursors List’, which details countries 
that are sources of the chemicals needed to transform opium and 
coca into heroin and cocaine;  
 
81 There is considerable discussion and debate around the knowledge gap and 
methodological challenges inherent in the measurements made not just by the UNODC, but 
also by the US government and private companies using remote sensing technology. Buxton, 
for example, notes that in national surveys on drug use, the bias towards quantification 
means less focus on and understanding of essential qualitative information, such as how 
people were introduced to drugs, why they chose certain drugs, or how drug careers evolved 
(Buxton, 2006: 68). These observations are also applicable for the UNODC’s surveys. 
However, appraising methodology is outside the scope of this chapter, hence, only 
abbreviated discussions are presented here.  
82 The legislation includes Sec. 489, 481(d)(2) & 484(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 
and Sec. 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 2003 (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 2).  
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• The ‘Money-Laundering List’, which identifies countries and 
jurisdictions around the world that facilitate the illicit drug trade by 
providing financial and legal services.83  
The production of the INCSR is coordinated by the ONDCP, and 
implemented by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL). As explained in the introductory statements of the INCSRs 
through various years, the reports source their raw data from the relevant US 
embassies worldwide, the DEA, and US intelligence operatives who feed into 
the CIA’s Crime and Narcotics Center. The WDRs, on the other hand, are 
published by the UNODC jointly with respective government institutions in 
host countries, and are based on jointly-owned research operations, such as 
conducting the Illicit Crop Monitoring Surveys. According to one informed 
source, the UNODC’s methodology for collecting data covers almost the 
entire territory in producer countries (at least from 1999 to 2008), whereas 
ONDCP’s surveys cover only a representative sample (Mejia and Posada, 
2008: 8). 
It is important to emphasise that although both the WDR and the INCSR 
cover the same phenomena, they are substantially different from each other 
in a number of ways:  
• The WDR, at its core, is based on survey data from questionnaires 
administered by the UNODC as well as national government 
personnel. In other words, its publications are owned by many 
governments and it is produced for UN member-states. The INCSR, 
on the other hand, comes mainly from intelligence reports and 
assessments conducted by one government, the United States, and is 
produced for the US Congress.   
• The authors of the WDRs are accountable to the member-states of 
the UN. The authors of the INCSRs are ultimately accountable for 
what they publish only to Washington DC.  
• WDR research operations within a country are guided by mutually 
agreed research protocols and agreements — for example, that there 
will be sign-off from the host country in the event of the publication 
of sensitive material.84 It is not clear if the US has similar protocols 
 
83 This information is presented at the beginning of each INCSR since 1996 as the standard 
preface.  
84 According to UNODC research staff in Vienna, one protocol is that data identifying villages 
and individuals could not be published, an ethical standard to protect research subjects. 
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and agreements on sensitive matters and the eventual ownership of 
intellectual property. But what is clear is that developing countries 
will not get US official development aid — by far the world’s biggest 
by volume — if they score badly and are ‘designated’ in the INCSR.  
• The WDR covers practically all countries. The INCSRs’ detailed 
country coverage varies — from 33 country reports in 1986, to 136 
in 2010, and back to 66 in 2019. Thus, it appears that the INCSR is 
less sensitive to possible reaction from countries; the WDR, because 
of the way it is governed, has to be more ‘diplomatic’. 
Together, these two sets of official narratives construct much of what is 
known about the clandestine commerce and illicit markets of opium and coca 
today. 
3.2.1 Evolution and legal basis of the US monitoring system 
The origins of the US worldwide reporting system on illicit drugs can be 
traced back to a speech made by President Ronald Reagan on 14 October 
1982 calling anew for a ‘war on drugs’, echoing a call made by Richard Nixon 
in 1971.85 Among other things, Reagan announced the creation of 12 anti-
drugs task forces across the US; the setting up of a criminal justice 
commission to tackle organised crime; the organisation of a cabinet-level 
committee to review inter-governmental cooperation; and lastly, he ordered 
the Attorney General to submit a yearly report to the President and Congress 
on progress in the worldwide campaign. Four years later, in 1986, when he 
signed the ‘Just Say No to Drugs’ Proclamation, Reagan claimed that the 
‘epidemic’ of drug abuse was ‘every bit as much a threat to the United States 
as enemy planes and missiles’ and that, as a result, America was ‘losing its 
future by default’. Finally, in November 1988, Reagan signed into law the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
Henceforth, US global counter-narcotics policing became more 
systematic. In 1986, the start of Reagan’s second term, the US Congress began 
regularly receiving a comprehensive cross-governmental report on global 
narcotic trends, signed off by the departments of State, Justice, Defense, 
Treasury, Health and Human Services, as well as the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The reports were coordinated by the 
 
85 See https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/101482c, accessed 19 August 
2019. 
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Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM),86 with inputs from US 
embassies, the DEA and the CIA. It is not clear whether the 1986 document 
presented to Congress can be seen explicitly as the first INCSR. What is clear, 
though, is that its 296 pages established the framing, language and 
organisation of data that would structure international counter-narcotics 
narratives for the following decades (INCSR 1986).  
From a cursory glance at the press statements that accompany the release 
of the INCSR each year (see for example INCSR 1997), the most anticipated 
parts of the INCSR are what came to be known as the ‘Major’ and 
‘Designated’ lists. These are, after all, the document’s unique contribution. 
Unlike the UN, which is governed by its member-states, the US can 
unilaterally identify and publish those countries it considers to be the major 
drugs-producing, drugs-transit and drugs-linked money-laundering centres, 
on the grounds that such identification is necessary to prevent illicit drugs 
from entering US territory or to block dirty money from passing through the 
US financial system. The US regards its publication of the lists as a global 
public service — that the best way to rout out what thrives underground or 
in the shadows, and which drives corruption and other harms, is to expose it 
to public scrutiny. But at the same time, through this process of publishing 
INCSRs, the US has unilaterally awarded itself the power to declare who is 
good or bad in terms of international drug control and money laundering.  
The first INCSR retrieved for this study — published in 1 February 1986 
— did not make public any explicit Major, Designated or Money-Laundering 
lists. This does not mean there were no lists — they could have been provided 
to Congress as confidential briefings. But the report was published during a 
period in which the State Department was asking for legislative guidance on 
the definition of a major drug-trafficking and a major money-laundering 
country before and after amendments to the 1986 and 1988 Acts (INCSR 
1989: 2; INCSR 1991: 46). Thus, as the INCSR 1986 provided country reports 
on 33 jurisdictions of interest in the global US campaign against narcotics, 
questions were being raised with regard to the legality of the Americans 
making their own unilateral predetermination of which countries could be 
classified as major drugs-producing or not. It seems that this is why all 
subsequently published INCSRs are introduced with the standard 
clarification ‘Legislative Basis for the INCSR’. 
 
86 Since 1995 the INM has been called Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforce-
ment Affairs, or INL. See https://www.state.gov/about-us-bureau-of-international-narcotics-
and-law-enforcement-affairs/, last accessed 9 September 2019.  
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On 29 February 1988, a ‘presidential determination’ was made in which 
Reagan identified 17 major narcotics-producing or narcotics-transit countries, 
that had ‘cooperated fully’ with the US and were therefore certified to receive 
aid (see Figure 3.1). Also identified as ‘majors’, but considered to be in the 
vital national interests of the US to be certified, were Laos, Lebanon and 
Paraguay. Finally, Afghanistan, Iran, Panama and Syria were designated as not 
cooperating and therefore decertified. The nuanced wording of ‘cooperated 
fully’ or ‘taken adequate steps’ in the presidential determination reflected the 
lack of resolution on the meaning of ‘major’.  In subsequent House debates, 
how to define and weigh whether a country was a direct or indirect source 
was also asked. No uniformly reliable criteria had been agreed by the time 
INCSR 1989 was produced (INCSR 1989: 2). 
 




Figure 3.1: Ronald Reagan's 1988 presidential determination of major-producing, transit, and designated countries 
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Another policy dispute that affected the extent to which the INCSRs could 
label countries as drugs-producing, transit or money laundering arose from 
doubts as to whether withholding US aid was sufficient as a diplomatic or 
policy tool to get the desired changes or results. Discussions emerged about 
deploying stronger tools, such as the use of sanctions, whether diplomatic 
(e.g. severing of diplomatic ties); economic (e.g. embargoes, asset freezes, 
restriction of trade, or denial of access to international banking); military (e.g. 
arms sales suspension or imposition of no-fly zones); or travel control (the 
denial of visas to key individuals and organisations).87  
The use of sanctions came into sharp focus after Myanmar’s military 
regime violently suppressed widespread popular protests in 1988 and refused 
to recognise the election results of May 1990. Over the next few years, at least 
six Burma-specific laws and presidential executive orders were passed by the 
US to legally impose sanctions. These include Section 138 of the Customs 
and Trade Act of 1990, which authorised the President to impose economic 
sanctions if human rights and counter-narcotics obligations had not been 
met; and (some time later) the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003, which authorised a range of range of sanctions including a ban on the 
import of products from Myanmar, asset freezes, visa bans, and a US vote 
against loans being provided to Myanmar by the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions (Hadar, 1998; Martin, 2012). Together with 
measures taken by other countries, from 1990 to 2016, Myanmar’s economic 
and diplomatic isolation outside the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) was near complete. Myanmar suffered worse punishment than the 
simple withholding of US aid, which was the raison d’etre for the INCSRs’ lists. 
On 21 October 1995, US President Bill Clinton issued EO (Executive 
Order) 12978 that declared a national emergency due to the ‘unparalleled 
violence, corruption, and harm’ that Colombian narcotics traffickers were 
causing in the US and abroad. He invoked emergency powers to block assets 
and prohibit transactions with significant foreign narcotics traffickers.88 The 
order authorised the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of State to employ all necessary powers. This led to the creation of 
the Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers (SDNT) list — a database kept 
 
87 The ‘ramifications of certification’ were discussed in the early INCSRs. In one, it was 
asserted that the US must oppose loans by multilateral development banks to decertified 
countries, and that trade sanctions could be imposed by presidential discretion (1991: 47).   
88 The text of EO 12978 is available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc-
tions/Documents/12978.pdf, last accessed 21 August 2019. 
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and maintained by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 
OFAC included in the SDNT hundreds of names of individuals, firms and 
organisations from the INCSR’s list of major drug-producing and transit 
countries. This approach appears to have been modelled on the successful 
application of sanctions on the Cali cartel, particularly the seizure of the 
cartel-owned Drogas La Rebaja drugstore chain in 28 of Colombia’s 32 
provinces. In Myanmar, investments were already banned. But the EO took 
the policy a step further by making it illegal for US individuals, firms and 
banks to enter into any economic transaction with individuals, firms and 
groups on the SDNT list, unless a special licence was obtained from OFAC 
(INCSR 1996: Executive Summary). 
However, the legal basis of EO 12978 rests on the declaration of a national 
emergency, which by definition is only a temporary occurrence and thus 
necessarily terminates over time. To avoid the possibility of a future legal 
challenge on the designations, asset seizures and sanctions, a bill was 
submitted to Congress to turn the tools provided by the EO into time-
unlimited law. Thus, on 3 December 1999, the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
Designation Act, or the Kingpin Act, was passed into law to deny foreign 
narcotics traffickers and their related businesses and operatives access to the 
US financial system, and to prohibit all trade and transactions between the 
traffickers and US companies and individuals. 89  Over time, the SDNT 
transformed into the list of Specially Designated Nationals or SDN — any 
individual, entity or organisation deemed detrimental to the security of the 
US, and which may be involved in such activities as terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking or weapons proliferation. The US had by this time become fully 
equipped to be the global counter-narcotics policeman.90  
3.2.2 Definitions, trends and patterns 
The INCSRs define91 a ‘major illicit drug-producing country’ as one in 
which: a) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or 
harvested during a year; b) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated 
or harvested during a year; or c) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is 
 
89 The text of the Act and explanations are available at https://www.hsdl.org/?ab-
stract&did=446825, and https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-
overview-foreign-narcotics-kingpin-designation-act, last accessed 21 August 2019.  
90 The provisions were further strengthened after the Patriot Act of 2001 was passed, follow-
ing the 9/11 attacks. 
91 These definitions appear in the introduction of almost all INCSRs published each year 
under the section ‘Legislative Basis of the INCSR’. 
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cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that 
such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States.  
On the other hand, a ‘major drug-transit country’ is one: a) that is a 
significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs significantly 
affecting the United States; or b) through which are transported such drugs 
or substances.  
The INCSR also tracks the category ‘major precursor chemical source 
country’, defined as countries that are the major sources of the essential 
chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics. Most countries on this 
list have large licit chemical industries.  
A ‘major money-laundering country’ is defined by statute as one whose 
financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant 
amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking. However, the 
INCSRs also make a clarification: because the complex nature of money-
laundering transactions makes it difficult in many cases to distinguish the 
proceeds of narcotics trafficking from the proceeds of other serious crime, 
the countries that it identifies are those whose financial institutions engage in 
transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from all serious crime.   
Lastly, a ‘designated country’ is one which has failed demonstrably 
during the previous 12 months to adhere to its obligations under international 
narcotics agreements and is therefore designated by the US president as not 
qualified to receive US aid, support and trade benefits, and can be subject to 
further sanctions.   
Aware of the serious political and legal implications that such designations 
may create, and in order to ensure that the authority and integrity of the 
designations may not be challenged or contested (e.g. a country may sue the 
US government for inclusion in the list), no lesser figure than the US 
president has the task of making these decisions, known as the ‘presidential 
determination’.  
This study compiled all available INCSRs that could be retrieved from 
three US government websites (the State Department; Homeland Security 
Digital Library; and the National Criminal Justice Reference System) and 
encoded the identifications and designations into a spreadsheet so that the 
data could be grouped and sorted.92 All INCSRs from 1996 to 2019 published 
 
92 For a full list of all INCSRs reviewed and their sources, see the References list at the end of 
this study.  
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
108 
lists of major illicit drug-producing, drug-transit and money-laundering 
countries. INCSRs 1992 and 1993 are missing, and not all INCSRs from 1986 
to 1995 uniformly presented the lists (perhaps due to the ongoing debates in 
Congress over the legal definitions, mentioned above).  
There were also other forms of sanctions, like those imposed on Bolivia 
after September 2008, when its cocalero President Evo Morales expelled the 
US Ambassador, USAID and the DEA, charging them with supporting right-
wing unrest. In response, the US declared that Bolivia was no longer a partner 
in the campaign against drugs, withdrew most US programmes in the country, 
raised duties on imports from Bolivia and restricted exports to the country 
(INCSR 2009, Vol. 1: 7–11). Bolivia has remained on the INCSR Designated 
List ever since.  
The lists — the symbol of US power to declare who is good or bad — 
became regularised after their legal foundations were determined and 
established. After EO 12978 had been signed in 1996, the Major, Designated, 
Chemical Precursor Source and Money-Laundering lists of the INCSR were 
published regularly. And in 2000, after the passage of the Kingpin Act, the 
US started publishing the SDNT list along with an online searchable database. 
Since then, its publication has become an annual ritual of US foreign policy. 
Having laid out the two official global mechanisms in monitoring the illicit 
drug trade, the next sections proceed to discuss the consumers, intermediaries 
and producers of the global illicit drug trade.  
 
3.3 The consumer markets for illicit opium and coca, 
1989–1993, United States (US) 
Data from the US ONDCP and the UNODC make it possible not only to 
sketch the consumer markets for illicit opium and coca, but also to run some 
tests to check the internal consistency of the official estimates of market size, 
scope and depth. In this presentation, the focus is on the period 1989 to 1993, 
so that it may be compared to the current period, and thus provide a basis for 
establishing trends and patterns through time. Scrutiny of a dated dataset 
offers some insights that remain relevant today and on a global scale, as will 
be discussed in the subsequent section. In this section, averages are 
extensively used, not because average figures are analytically superior, but 
because they are useful for making comparisons. However, averages have 
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limitations, such as concealing distributions and disparities, that are also 
necessary for analysis.  
3.3.1 The US market for cocaine, 1989–1993 
An ONDCP-commissioned report published in 1995 provides estimates on 
the size of the US market for cocaine from 1989 to 1993, as shown in columns 
A and B of Table 3.2 (Abt Associates, 1995).93 Thus, in 1989 there were an 
estimated 2.6 million ‘hardcore’ users and 6.47 million ‘occasional’ users of 
cocaine. ‘Hardcore’ users are those ‘who use the illicit drug at least weekly and 
exhibit behavioral problems stemming from their drug use’, while ‘occasional’ 
users are those who use drugs less often than weekly, as defined in the Na-
tional Drug Control Strategy (ONDCP, 1995: 14).  
Column C provides official estimates of cocaine available for 
consumption. In 1989, an estimated 417 metric tons of cocaine (expressed at 
100% purity) was thought to be available for consumption — a figure 
computed from the cocaine estimated to be destined for the US, minus 
foreign seizures and federal seizures.94 If the 417 tonnes are divided by the 
number of estimated users, an average annual consumption per user could be 
computed (Column D). The average for 1989 is 45 grams, and the average 
for the five years (1989 to 1993) is 53 grams. In other words, users in the US 
during those five years are estimated to have consumed on average roughly 1 





93 A key task of the ONDCP is to quantify market size for illicit drugs. Hence it commissioned 
a consulting firm, Abt Associates Inc., to work with such agencies as the National Institute for 
Drug Abuse (NIDA), and to draw from data from the annual National Household Survey on 
Drug Abuse (NHSDA) which started in 1972, as well as the Drug Use Forecasting Survey (DUF) 
which started in 1987. In 1995, Abt Associates submitted the report What America’s Users 
Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988–1993.  
94 The 1995 Abt Associates report presented a range; and what is presented in Column C is 
the midpoint of this range. 
95 This study makes an assumption that the cocaine available for consumption (C) could be 
divided by the number of users because there is no other explanation in the report on how 
the available cocaine was used or consumed (e.g. seizures, losses during processing and 
transport, legitimate processing for licit medical use, etc.).   








i = Composite NHSDA + DUF (Abt Associates, 1995: 12) 
ii = Abt Associates (1995: 6, Table B) presents a range; Column C presents the midpoint of this 
range 
Source: Abt Associates Inc. (1995). 
 
In 2010, the US National Research Council published a report that pre-
sented a Table on the amount of cocaine consumed (Reuter, 2010: 50),96 
which is incorporated here in Table 3.3 (Column C).97 Although a different 
set of annual average consumption of pure cocaine emerges in the new Col-
umn D, the average over five years, at 54 grams per user each week, remains 





96 Note that ‘cocaine consumed’ is different from the earlier ‘cocaine available for consump-
tion’.  
97 The difference in figures in the two column Cs of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 may be explained by 
the fact that Table 3.2 reports the midpoint within a range, while Table 3.3 reports an esti-
mate of the cocaine actually consumed. So for example in 1989, the figure of 576 metric 
tons consumed in Table 3.3 is within the range covered in Table 3.2, but higher than the mid-























pure cocaine per 
user, in grams 
1989 2,624,312 6,465,843 417,000,000 45 
1990 2,468,509 5,584,686 405,500,000 50 
1991 2,218,700 5,440,115 409,900,000 53 
1992 2,339,381 4,330,521 457,500,000 69 
1993 2,127,166 4,050,117 291,500,000 47 
Five-year average 53 




Table 3.3: US market for cocaine (1989–1993) with consumption adjusted 
Source: Abt Associates (1995); Reuter (2010: 50). 
 
In both cases, the average annual consumption figures are too high to be 
plausible. Consumption of 1 gram of pure cocaine per user per week means 
that all those surveyed are ‘hardcore users’, i.e. by definition there will be no 
‘occasional users’. Further, ingesting 1 gram of pure cocaine in a single dose 
can be fatal. Therefore, either the number of users is under-reported, or the 
amount of cocaine available for consumption is over-estimated. Or it may be 
a combination of both. The NRC report (Reuter, 2010) provides no 
breakdown between hardcore and occasional users. This shows limitations in 
the science and data that inform US national drug policy.  
 
3.3.2 Checking for consistency in the US market for heroin, 1989–1993 
The corresponding figures for the US heroin market from 1989 to 1993 are 
shown in Table 3.4. Not only are estimates of the number of heroin users 
significantly lower; what also emerges is a much lower average annual 
consumption for the five years, at just 14.96 grams of heroin per user.98 This 
 
98 The Abt Associates report could not develop a supply flow model for heroin, hence the 
report does not have data on ‘total heroin available for consumption’ similar to that for 
cocaine in Table 3.2. The report cites two reasons for this omission. First, it is difficult to 
estimate to estimate total harvest in the main producing areas of Southwest and Southeast 
Asia. Second is that Europe and North Africa are the primary export markets for heroin from 
these regions. Hence, Table 3.4 presents data from the NRC report on estimates of total 










Total amount of co-




C/(A+B) - Average 
annual consump-
tion of pure co-
caine per user in 
grams 
1989 2,624,312 6,465,843 576,000,000 63 
1990 2,468,509 5,584,686 447,000,000 55 
1991 2,218,700 5,440,115 355,000,000 46 
1992 2,339,381 4,330,521 346,000,000 52 
1993 2,127,166 4,050,117 331,000,000 54 
Five-year average 54 
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is likely to be a more realistic estimate, and also shows significant differences 
in the US consumer markets for cocaine and heroin.  
Table 3.4: The US market for heroin 1989–1993 
Notes:  
i = Composite NHSDA + DUF (Abt Associates, 1995: 12) 
ii = Reuter (2010: 50) 
Source: Abt Associates (1995); Reuter (2010: 50) 
 
 
3.3.3 Cross-validating per capita spending on drug use 
Further cross-validations may be conducted, this time on expenditures on 
illicit drugs. The 1995 Abt Associates report provides data on weekly median 
expenditures on drug use from a survey of arrestees, as shown in Table 3.5: 
Table 3.5: Weekly median cocaine and heroin expenditures reported by 
arrestees in the US, 1989–1993 (in 1994-dollar equivalents) 
 
Source: Abt Associates Inc. (1995: 14, Table 2).  
 
It should be noted that the US war on drugs had changing targets. In 1971 
when President Nixon announced his global offensive on drugs, the target 
was heroin from Asia’s Golden Triangle — there was no mention of coca 
and cocaine in his speech to Congress or in the press releases. In President 




















user in grams 
1989 607,046 504,446 16,600,000 14.9 
1990 533,630 469,891 13,600,000 13.6 
1991 465,305 368,102 12,500,000 15.0 
1992 444,372 289,557 11,700,000 15.9 
1993 496,309 229251 11,200,000 15.4 
Five-year average 14.96 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Cocaine (hardcore user) 276 265 251 231 221 
Heroin (hardcore user) 312 316 291 206 251 
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suggesting that South American cocaine trafficking had expanded and taken 
priority.  
Returning to our cross-validation: if there were 2.62 million hardcore 
cocaine users in 1989 (as estimated by Abt Associates) with a weekly median 
cocaine expenditure of $276 (as reported in the arrestees’ survey), that would 
equate to roughly $724 million being spent weekly to purchase cocaine. Abt 
Associates provide a further table (ibid.: 15, Table 3) on total annual 
expenditures on cocaine and heroin in the US markets, reflected here in 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7.99  




i = Composite NHSDA + DUF (Abt Associates, 1995: 12) 






99 The estimates of expenditures may vary due to assumptions on the number of hardcore 
and occasional users, and about what constitutes their average expenditures. Furthermore, 
Abt Associates (1995: 15, footnote 20) explains that because the factors that entered the 
calculations were not derived from probability samples, ‘it is impractical to develop a 
statistically-based margin of error’. In other words, the figures are what they are – estimates 
with limitations. 


























(B + D) 
Total users’ an-
nual expendi-
ture, in $ bil-
lion (1994 $ 
equivalents) 
1989 2,624,312 34.7 6,465,843 7.7 42.5 
1990 2,468,509 31.1 5,584,686 7.8 38.9 
1991 2,218,700 26.7 5,440,115 8.5 35.2 
1992 2,339,381 25.5 4,330,521 7.6 33.1 
1993 2,127,166 23.3 4,050,117 7.5 30.8 
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Table 3.7: Total expenditures on heroin in the US market, 1989–1993 
Notes:  
i = Composite NHSDA + DUF (Abt Associates, 1995: 12) 
Source: Abt Associates (1995) 
 
It needs to be emphasised that the core data from which most of these 
figures are extrapolated are the weighted averages in the surveys of arrestees 
in the US on how much they spent a week for cocaine or heroin consumption. 
The medians of weekly expenditures are then multiplied by the estimated 
number of users, thereby arriving at the dollar equivalents, that total billions. 
The most important observations from Tables 3.6 and 3.7 is that from 1989 
to 1994, cocaine and heroin expenditures in the US market were progressively 
decreasing.  
3.3.4 Testing for consistency in drug use expenditure 
A question that may be raised is whether the weekly median cocaine and 
heroin expenditures as reported in the surveys are realistic: i.e., is the 1989 
figure of $276 per user spent on cocaine per week a credible representation 
of reality? Unfortunately, this has become much more difficult to cross-
validate, owing to the different base years used in the computations. 
Nevertheless, what can be presented are the weekly median figures reflected 
as annual expenditures, as shown in Table 3.8 below.  
The figures in Table 3.8 raise questions on whether cocaine and heroin 
users are all gainfully employed middle-class Americans able to afford an 
annual expenditure of $11,000–14,000 for cocaine and $13,000–16,000 for 
heroin consumption. Thus, another limitation of the figures emerges. Using 
these figures alone, stripped of context, will likely create a misleading picture 
of reality. 








on heroin of 













on heroin of 
users (C) in $ 
billions (1994 $ 
equivalents) 







1989 607,046 9.9 504,446 1.6 11.5 
1990 533,630 8.8 469,891 1.5 10.3 
1991 465,306 7.1 368,102 1.1 8.2 
1992 444,372 6.2 289,557 0.8 7.0 
1993 496,309 6.5 229,251 0.6 7.1 




Table 3.8: Expenditures on cocaine and heroin reported by arrestees, 
1989-1993 (‘hardcore’ users, $, 1994-dollar equivalents) 
Source: Abt Associates (1995) 
 
To summarise, knowledge about the size, scope and depth of the markets 
for cocaine and heroin in the US (since 1989, after Reagan’s declaration of a 
second war on drugs) are riddled with inconsistencies — limitations of the 
data that, unfortunately, have not been highlighted in the development of US 
drug policy.  
• First, the estimates on the numbers of hardcore and occasional users 
do not tally with the estimates of the volume of cocaine and heroin 
thought to be available on the market. Either the number of users is 
under-reported, or the quantity of cocaine or heroin available for 
consumption is over-estimated.  
• Second, if the estimates on the number of users on one hand, and 
quantities of illegal drugs available for consumption on the other, 
were to be accepted as representative of reality, then there would be 
no difference between ‘hardcore’ and ‘occasional’ users. 
• Third, estimates of what users are thought to spend to procure the 
drugs also reveal some real limitations. The projected annual expend-
itures would imply that all users are middle-class Americans with 
comfortable incomes.  
Recent studies confirm that taking the prevalence of drug use alone as the 
primary performance indicator in US drug markets is indeed restrictive. 
Caulkins et al., for example, point out that three other indicators are relevant: 
(a) number of heavy users; (b) total expenditures; and (c) total amount 
consumed. They conclude that for all drugs in the US market, ‘total 
consumption and expenditures are driven by the minority of consumers who 














1989 $276 $14,393.29 $312 $16,270.68 
1990 $265 $13,819.64 $316 $16,479.27 
1991 $251 $13,089.55 $291 $15,175.53 
1992 $231 $12,046.56 $206 $10,742.82 
1993 $221 $11,525.06 $251 $13,089.55 
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consume on 21 or more days each month’ (2015: 728). However, as has been 
demonstrated so far in this section, tests of internal validity and consistency 
across all the measurements (e.g. do the number of heavy users tally with 
estimates of consumption and expenditure?) are necessary. But more 
importantly, quantified measurements also require qualitative interpretation 
and analysis.  
The next sub-section conducts a similar examination and cross-validation, 
this time focused on global markets and using recent available data.  
3.4 Global consumer markets 
In WDR 2019, the UNODC estimates that between 201 million and 341 
million people worldwide aged 15–64 had used drugs at least once in the 
previous year. The midpoint in this range is 271 million, which corresponds 
to 5.5 per cent of the global population aged 15–64, representing one in every 
18 people (WDR 2019b: 9). This, in a nutshell, is the global illicit drugs 
consumer market, as officially estimated by the UNODC. As it states in the 
WDR, ‘more than a quarter of a billion people use drugs’ (ibid.: 2).     
Of the estimated 271 million past-year users of any drug, WDR 2019 
identifies a subset of 35 million people ‘with drug use disorders’ — those 
whose ‘drug use is harmful to the point where they may experience drug 
dependence and/or require treatment’ (ibid.: 11). This corresponds to an 
estimated 0.71% of the global population aged 15–64. The number of people 
who died as a result of drug use in 2017 — estimated at 585,000 — is of 
epidemic proportions (ibid.: 1).100 This partly explains the sense of urgency 
that accompanies the WDR. 
Over time, the categories in use have changed. ‘Hardcore users’ are now 
called ‘people with drug use disorders’, while the definition of ‘occasional 
users’ has been broadened to ‘those who have used illicit drugs once in the past-
 
100 On page 19, WDR 2019 quotes the 585,000 deaths due to drug use from the Global 
Burden of Disease Study. However, there is an apparent inconsistency. In a previous page 
WDR 2019, quoting from the same source, states that ‘the use of opioids accounted for 
110,000 (66 per cent) of the 167,000 deaths attributed to drug use disorder’ (2019b: 12, 
italics added). Without explanations, it becomes uncertain whether the number of deaths is 
585,000 or 167,000.  
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year’ (italics added). WDR 2019 provides the following breakdown of the 271 
million people estimated as using drugs (2019b: 11–13): 
• More than two out of three, or 188 million, are past-year users of 
cannabis, which represents 3.8% of the global population aged 15–
64. The figure includes those who have used cannabis at least once in 
the past year.  
• There are 53.4 million past-year users of opioids, corresponding to 
1.1% of the global 15–64 population, of which 29.2 million were past-
year users of opiates (heroin and opium).101  
• There are 28.9 million past-year users of amphetamines, or 0.6% of 
the 15–64 global population. Within these are 21.3 million users of 
ecstasy.  
• There are 18.1 million past-year cocaine users (0.4% of the 15–64 
population).  
An illustration of this breakdown is presented in Figure 3.2. Note that 
there may be overlaps in the WDR’s count (e.g. cannabis users also being 
ecstasy users), and the figures quoted are typically the midpoints in a range. 
Hence, the sum is more than the 271 million global estimate of users. The pie 









101 Note that ‘opioid’ is the broad generic term that includes opiates and other, mostly syn-
thetic, pain-killing drugs such as oxycodone, fentanyl and methadone. ‘Opiate’ is a drug nat-
urally derived from the flowering opium poppy plant, such as the opium gum itself, mor-
phine and heroin. Hence, for the purposes of this study, we can use the figure 29.2 million as 
the official estimated size of the global illicit opiate market.  
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The question to ask is whether or not the UNODC data have the same 
limitations concerning internal consistency as the official data on US markets 
in the previous sub-section. This breakdown shows that the overall 
conclusion (‘more than a quarter of a billion people use drugs’) is overstated, 
since nearly 70% of those counted are only ‘past-year’ users of a ‘soft’ drug 
(cannabis) that is now increasingly being legalised globally. Since 2012, 11 US 
states and the District of Columbia have become legal markets for 
recreational cannabis use, and a further 11 have decriminalised cannabis 
possession. 102  Uruguay has legalised cannabis for personal consumption 
under a government-controlled market since 2013. Thus, if cannabis use is 
taken out, and assuming that cannabis users do not use the other drugs, the 
number of people using narcotic drugs globally would from 271 to 83 million. 
 
102 The inclusion of Washington DC means that cannabis can now be legally acquired right 
inside the US capital. For details, see http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-
laws-map-medical-recreational.html 
Figure 3.2: Breakdown of global drug users Source: WDR (2019b: 11–13) 
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This can be juxtaposed against WHO estimates of 1.46 billion users of 
tobacco in 2015,103 and 2.3 billion drinkers of alcohol in 2016.104  
For the purposes of this study, the global illicit market for heroin and 
opium, as estimated by WDR 2019, are as follows: 29.2 million users for 
heroin and opium; and 18.1 million users for cocaine. WDR 2019 does not 
provide estimates on number of coca-leaf chewers.  
3.4.1 Cross-validating annual consumption per user 
It is important to emphasise that given the clandestine nature of illicit drugs, 
these estimates on the numbers of consumers in illicit markets may not reflect 
reality and are always tentative. Nevertheless, these are the official figures 
used as the basis for policy and decision-making. Hence, simple tests of cross-
validation to check for the internal consistency of the figures are warranted.  
As in the previous sub-section, one test is to look for average annual con-
sumption per user, and make a judgement on its plausibility. Consider the 
WDR estimate that globally there were 18.1 million past-year users of cocaine 
in 2017, corresponding to 0.4% of the global population aged 15–64.105 Table 
3.9 presents figures from the latest five years for which UNODC data are 
available.  
Table 3.9: Estimates of number of past-year cocaine users (2013–2017) 
 
Source: Statistical pages of WDRs 2014 to 2019 
 
To compute for average annual consumption per user, the quantity of 
cocaine available for consumption is divided by the estimate number of users. 
 
103 The WHO tobacco figures are from https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1138280/re-
trieve, last accessed 9 September 2019.  
104 For alcohol figures, see https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alco-
hol_report/en/ , last accessed 9 September 2019. 
105 Note that WDR 2019 does not provide a breakdown of how many of the 18.1 million past-
year users used cocaine only once and how many used it more than once. 
Year Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania Global 
2013 2,660,000 8,970,000 1,340,000 3,680,000 390,000 17,040,000 
2014 2,770,000 9,710,000 1,360,000 4,040,000 390,000 18,260,000 
2015 2,840,000 8,500,000 1,300,000 4,060,000 390,000 17,090,000 
2016 3,180,000 9,230,000 1,040,000 4,330,000 430,000 18,200,000 
2017 1,300,000 9,930,000 1,670,000 4,740,000 430,000 18,070,000 
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For 2017, the UNODC estimated that 1,976 tonnes of cocaine (expressed at 
a purity of 100%) were produced.106 Thus, average consumption per user in 
2017 may be derived by dividing the volume produced (1,976,000 kg) by its 
18.1 million users. The result is 109 grams per user annually, or roughly 2 
grams per week. Table 3.10 repeats the process for all years from 2013 to 
2017. 
 
Table 3.10: Estimate average cocaine consumption/user, 2013–2017 
Source: Table 3.9 and WDR 2019b: 68 
From Table 3.9, a snapshot of the global consumer market for cocaine 
emerges, summarised in Figure 3.3 below. The two main markets are the 
Americas (55.95%) and Europe (26.23%). This confirms the status of cocaine 
as a Western drug of choice. And from Table 3.10, users on average consume 
about 2 grams of pure cocaine per week.  
What emerges is that — once again — the figures appear to be overstated. 
The 2017 estimate of cocaine users includes those who had used cocaine ‘at 
least once’ in the previous year, yet on average, consumption levels were at 
109 grams, or about 2 grams of pure cocaine each week. This is an extremely 
high estimate, especially since a single gram of cocaine at 100% purity can 
cause a fatal overdose. The limitations seen in the previous cross-validation 
of the US market figures thus carry over to the global level, suggesting that 
either the estimated size of the market (18.1 million users) is understated, or 
the production volume (1,976 tonnes) is overstated. If production is not 
 
106 The WDR 2019 statistical tables note that the figure of 1,976 tonnes was arrived at using 
new conversion ratios that included licit coca leaf produced in Bolivia and projected its con-
version into cocaine hydrochloride, taking yield into account. 
Year A 
Global estimate 
of cocaine users 
B 
Potential annual 
manufacture of 100 
per cent pure co-
caine, in grams 
B/A 
Potential average 
available per user 
per year in grams 
(rounded off) 
2013 17,040,000 902,000,000 53 
2014 18,260,000 943,000,000 52 
2015 17,090,000 1,124,000,000 66 
2016 18,200,000 1,586,000,000 87 
2017 18,070,000 1,976,000,000 109 
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overstated and the figures hold true, where did all that cocaine go, and how 
was it consumed?  
 
 
Part of the answer to this question can be found in WDR 2019b (p.52, 
Figure 32), which shows cocaine seizures of over 320 tonnes in 2016–2017. 
This may mean that only 1,656 tonnes were available for consumption. But 
even taking this into account, the resulting approximate annual consumption 
per user of 93 grams is still way too high, especially given that the estimated 
18.1 million users include those who tried it only once in the past year.  







Figure 3.3:  Estimated global cocaine market. Source: WDR 2019b 
 




Table 3.11: Best estimates on the number of opiates users, 2013–2017 
Source: Statistical pages of WDRs 2014 to 2019 
 
A most noticeable change in Table 3.11 is the big increase in the number 
of estimated opiate users in Asia – a jump from 11.2 million to 21.7 million – 
between 2016 and 2017. The increase is attributed to ‘improved knowledge 
on drug use’ from new surveys conducted in India. This reiterates that even 
the most reliable official figures are at best approximations that may be 
wrong. 
 
Table 3.12: Estimate average opiate consumption per user, 2013–2017 
Year A 
Global estimate 









per user per year 
in grams 
(rounded off) 
2013 16,530,000 555,000 33.6 
2014 17,440,000 542,000 31.1 
2015 17,670,000 327,000 18.5 
2016 19,380,000 388,000 20.0 
2017 29,160,000 867,000 29.7 
Source: Table 3.11 and WDR 2019b: 66 
 
From Tables 3.11 and 3.12, a snapshot of the global consumer market for 
opiates can be constructed. As summarised in Figure 3.4 below, this market 
would have the following characteristics:  
• Three fourths of the consumers of opiates (74.51%) are in Asia 
(India, China, Southwest and Southeast Asia). This is followed by 
Europe (11.04%) and the Americas (9.22%).  
Year Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania Global 
2013 1,880,000 1,630,000 10,010,000 2,970,000 30,000 16,530,000 
2014 1,960,000 2,090,000 10,160,000 3,190,000 50,000 17,440,000 
2015 2,010,000 1,760,000 10,780,000 3,110,000 30,000 17,670,000 
2016 2,060,000 2,840,000 11,230,000 3,200,000 40,000 19,380,000 
2017 1,470,000 2,690,000 21,730,000 3,220,000 40,000 29,160,000 
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• WDR 2019b explains that the jump in the global number of users of 
opiates from 20 million in 2016 to 29 million in 2017 was due to new 
surveys being conducted in India and Nigeria.  
• Given the official estimates of heroin availability in 2017 at 867 
tonnes, this would imply a potential average available per user of 29.7 
grams.  
Note that these computations are not in any way being offered as 
representations of reality: they are mainly tools for comparative analysis and 
for probing into potential distribution. Note also that the product being 
considered here is only heroin — the estimates do not include other opiates 
like morphine or raw opium gum, which by definition are also being 
consumed by this cohort of consumers.  
 
 
3.4.2 Cross-validating expenditures per user 
Another cross-validation test is to consider the retail street prices paid by the 
average cocaine or heroin consumer. Much of this will of course depend on 
the location. In 2017, the UNODC reported that the inflation-adjusted 
weighted average street price in euros of cocaine in Western and Central 
Figure 3.4: Estimated global users of opiates. Source: WDR 2019b 
 
 Gutierrez, 2020: Criminals Without Borders 
 
124 
Europe was €73 (or $82) per gram.107 This means that a European person 
who used cocaine at least once in the past year paid €73 for that single gram, 
which is plausible. However, if we assume, citing the previous estimates, that 
the typical user’s average annual consumption is between 93 and 109 grams 
of cocaine for the year, this means the user is paying between €6,759 and 
€8,030 over the year. Though not an impossibility, this seems unlikely 
especially since, according to Eurostat, the median equivalised net income for 
Europe in 2017 was €16,943.108 If the typical user earns that median income, 
it is unlikely that 40% to nearly 50% will be spent on cocaine use alone, while 
the rest is divided between food, rent and utilities. 
What emerges therefore is that the same limitations of data seen in the US 
market are reproduced in the global market. When put together, or cross-
validated against each other, inconsistencies emerge in the estimates of 
number of users, volume of production, and expenditures by the average user 
in procuring cocaine or heroin in their main markets in the US and Europe.  
3.4.3 The consumer markets for illicit coca and opium remain elusive 
Efforts have been made by the US ONDCP and the UNODC to identify, 
quantify and measure the consumer markets for illicit coca and opium 
products. What emerges from the tables above are figures showing the 
estimated sizes of the global consumer market for cocaine and opiates in 
2017. 
Yet as this section has shown, mainly by cross-validating officially supplied 
figures, while those markets can be identified, there are limitations as to what 
is known about their size (number of users) and scope (distribution). A 
conclusion that can be derived is that the estimates have a number of 
limitations:  
• Estimates of market size (number of individual users) are not 
consistent with estimates on volume of production.  
• Average consumption per user computed based on the official figures 
are unlikely. 
 
107 See https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/heroin_and_cocaine_prices_in_eu_and_usa-2017  
accessed 31 August 2019.  
108 Source: Eurostat Website, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?da-
taset=ilc_di04&lang=en  
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• Estimates on the users’ expenditures on cocaine and heroin remain 
far too high to be realistic.   
Various authors and experts who have analysed these markets have 
highlighted similar limitations and caveats in their findings. Reuter and 
Trautmann, for example, state that ‘drug problems and drug policy may 
attract considerable policy and political attention but that has not been 
matched by large scale data collection and analysis’ (Reuter and Trautmann, 
2009: 51). Addressing the issue of indexes, they emphasise that:  
There remains a dearth of data sets or indicators for comparing how one 
nation’s drug problem compares to that of other nations, for describing 
how a nation’s drug problem has changed over time; and for assessing 
how drug policies contributed to observed changes in national drug 
problems over time. (ibid.)  
Storti and de Grauwe likewise note that it is broadly accepted that data on the 
illicit drug industry are very poor, the quality of statistical information weak, 
and the variety of information limited (2009: 51), while Savona and Riccardi 
(2015) further note the lack of data and consensus over estimation 
methodologies. In short, extreme care should be taken when making 
assumptions about the markets for illicit cocaine and heroin because officially 
supplied figures are weak and wobbly. 
 Having examined the consumer markets, this chapter now proceeds to 
examine the intermediaries — the entrepreneurs and enablers of the illicit 
opium and coca markets. 
3.5 Intermediaries: Traffickers, enablers, and US 
power to declare who is ‘good’ or ‘bad’  
This section examines the territories and services that enable the illicit 
markets for opium and coca. It draws from data supplied by the US 
government’s annual worldwide reporting system, as presented in the 
INCSRs and in the application of US sanctions.  
3.5.1 The US process of tagging major drugs-producing, transit and 
designated countries 
On 9 November 1997, US President Clinton notified Congress that the 
following 30 countries and territories were the major drugs-producing or 
drugs-transit countries in the world for 1996:  
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• Afghanistan, Aruba, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam (INCSR 1997: 26).109 
Clinton further identified the Netherlands Antilles, Turkey and other 
Balkan Route Countries, Cuba and Central Asia as territories of concern to 
US drugs authorities. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines and South 
Africa were identified as ‘important cannabis producers’ but were not 
included in the list because ‘their cannabis production does not significantly 
affect the US’ (INCSR 1997: 364).  
However, 22 of the 30 countries tagged were described as ‘cooperating 
fully with the US’ in counter-narcotics efforts, and as having ‘taken steps to 
comply with the 1988 UN convention’. Hence, these 22 countries were 
certified as qualified to receive US aid and other forms of support:  
• Aruba, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, 
Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, 
and Vietnam (ibid.). 
The essential part of the INCSR is the ‘designation’ of countries as ‘not 
compliant with global counter-narcotic standards’, leading to decertification. 
Four countries were decertified in 1997:  
• Afghanistan, Burma, Iran and Nigeria.  
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright explained that Afghanistan and 
Burma were decertified because the production of heroin was increasingly 
concentrated in these two countries. Burma at that time had the largest area 
under opium cultivation anywhere in the world.110 Albright stated that ‘opium 
and heroin remain as Afghanistan’s largest sources of income’; that the 
Burmese government continues to allow the most notorious drug lords of 
Southeast Asia to keep the things they value most — their money and their 
freedom; and that Nigeria ‘remains the hub of African narcotics trafficking’ 
and its ‘gangs run networks that bring in much of the heroin which ends up 
 
109 In his letter to Congress, Clinton said that he had removed Lebanon and Syria from the list 
because the two countries had jointly begun a campaign to eradicate opium poppy cultiva-
tion in the Beka’a Valley (INCSR 1997: 364) 
110 Afghanistan produced more opium, because its yield per hectare was higher than Myan-
mar’s. However, Myanmar’s opium has a higher morphine content.  
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in the US’. Albright noted that trends in Iran had been more encouraging, but 
the US was unable to certify the country because of a lack of hard data to 
verify the extent of the progress reported (INCSR 1997: 10).  
There were four other designated countries, but Clinton recommended 
that it is in ‘the vital national interests of the US’ that they be certified. This 
exemption from decertification occurs where US foreign policy interests are 
prioritised over drug policy. The four countries that were tagged as major 
drugs-producing or transit countries but were recommended for exemption 
from decertification were:   
• Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan and Paraguay. 
In response to questions from members of Congress why Colombia was 
designated, only to be exempted, Albright explained that the decision to 
decertify was caused by the lack of full cooperation from the Colombian 
government. However, this decision was waived ‘to lay the groundwork for 
increased future cooperation, and to support those in Colombia who are 
striving to strengthen the rule of law and buttress their embattled democracy’ 
(ibid.: 10). It should be noted that the previous year, Clinton had declared a 
‘national emergency’ because of the ‘threat’ posed by Colombian cocaine 
exports. It was also during this time that further US sanctions came into force, 
including the Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker (SDNT) list, which 
became the wider Specially Designated National (SDN) list from 2000, after 
the passage of the Kingpin Act.  
Assistant Secretary Andy Beers explained that the waivers for Cambodia 
and Paraguay were recommended because the US wanted to be in a situation 
to ‘provide electoral and other assistance in the future’. The decision for 
Pakistan was more complex but boiled down to Pakistan being a strategic US 
ally in counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, and hence needing US 
assistance for its economy (INCSR 1997: 21).   
The INCSR 1997 also identified Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, India, 
Mexico and the Netherlands to be the major sources of precursor chemicals 
in the manufacture of illicit drugs. The US’s stated goal on chemical control 
is to support the establishment of chemical control regimes in source 
countries, and to improve chemical diversion investigation. It also seeks to 
improve the exchange of information through the Multilateral Chemical 
Reporting Initiative (MCRI), which was launched in 1997, hosted by the DEA 
and the European Commission. In 1997, the US concluded that countries in 
which chemical control was considered a law enforcement issue were more 
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supportive of the MCRI, while countries in which chemical control was 
considered a regulatory issue have been more cautious (INCSR 1997: 41).  
Another important role of the INCSR is its tagging of countries and 
territories as money-laundering jurisdictions and centres of financial crime. 
This is based on the guidelines adopted by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), a body created by the G7 in 1989 and attached to the International 
Monetary Fund. In 1997, the INCSR reported that all FATF member-
countries already have anti-money-laundering (AML) legislation ‘that 
comports with the FATF 40 recommendations’. The US supported the 
development of multi-agency programmes for these countries, including 
central bank training and assistance. It was also in 1997 that the US imposed 
stricter reporting requirements to reduce the Colombian drug cartels’ 
suspected use of money transfer services to repatriate drug profits. For 
example, the US Treasury issued a Geographical Targeting Order (GTO) 
requiring New York area transfer services to report, for a limited period, all 
remittances of $750 or more to Colombia. This is said to have caused an 
immediate and dramatic reduction of drug profits via the money transmitters, 
and an increase in the seizure of cash at east coast border areas (INCSR 1997: 
42–43). The countries tagged as money-laundering centres in INCSR 1997 
were:       
• Antigua, Argentina, Aruba, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, 
Germany, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Russia, Singapore, Spain, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The INCSR included the US itself in this list, partly because of questions 
from members of Congress who asked why the US points its fingers at many 
other countries, but not at itself. One question put to Albright was: ‘Why 
can’t our (US) failures also be underscored in writing?’. General Barry R. 
McCaffrey, the Director of the ONDCP, replied that the US has a national 
drug control strategy and has identified 88 areas by which to evaluate itself. 
He enjoined members of Congress to participate in that process (INCSR 
1997: 13).   
From this point and through the succeeding years, the INCSR lists were 
regularly published, under the authority of the US president, to notify 
Congress of other countries’ compliance with international drug control 
standards. Changes in the Major lists over the years include the following:  
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• Various countries were taken off the Major-Producing and Transit 
list: Iran, Malaysia (1998); Aruba, Belize (1999); Hong Kong, Taiwan 
(2000); Cambodia (2001); Thailand, Haiti (2004); China, Vietnam 
(2005); Brazil, Nigeria, Paraguay (2010).  
New countries added to the Major lists were: Costa Rica, Honduras (2010); 
Belize, El Salvador (2011). The list of decertified countries included:  
• Afghanistan, Burma, Iran and Nigeria were added in 1997.  
• Guatemala and Haiti were included in 2003; but Haiti removed was 
in 2004. 
• Venezuela was added in 2005. 
• Bolivia was added in 2008. By this time other countries had been 
removed, and only Bolivia, Burma and Venezuela were decertified111.  
• In 2016, following the ending of the Burma Sanctions Program, 
Burma was taken off the decertified list.   
In 2019, the INCSR’s Major lists were as follows:  
• Major drugs-producing and transit countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, 
Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, 
Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. 
• Designated countries: Bolivia, Venezuela. 
• Major money-laundering jurisdictions: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Burma, Cabo Verde, 
Canada, Cayman Islands, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Curacao, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Macau, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
 
111 In many of its annual reports, the INCSRs do not explicitly mention countries it considers 
decertified. For example, INCSR 1998 and 1999 contains a section called “Statement on De-
certification”, but did not list the countries that were added, kept, or removed from decerti-
fication during those years. Hence, a continuing list of confirmed decertified countries from 
1997 to 2019 is a gap in the study – what is presented here is information on countries only 
when explicit mentions have been made. My speculation is that this vagueness in decertifi-
cation could have been used as leverage in on-going negotiations with the target countries.  
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Mozambique, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, St Kitts and Nevis, S. 
Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Sint Maarten, 
Spain, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam. 
• Major precursor chemical source countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom and Venezuela (INCSR, Vol. 1, 2019). 
Overall, because of the considerable resources it commands, the US has 
effectively accorded itself the unilateral power to declare who is good or bad, 
narcotics-wise, in the world.  
3.5.2 Overview of intermediaries and enablers of the illicit drugs 
market, according to the INCSR 
The INCSRs provide a comprehensive list of how illicit drugs commerce is 
enabled by many countries all over the world, as elaborated below:  
Argentina is not a major drug-producing country but consistently 
appeared as a precursor chemical source country from 1996 to 2019, being 
one of South America’s largest licit producers of precursor chemicals (INCSR 
2013, Vol. 1: 51). It also shares a border with Bolivia and is thus a 
transhipment point for cocaine exports to Europe and the US.  
The Bahamas has been on every INCSR to date as a major drugs-transit 
and money-laundering country. Its 700 islands scattered over 100,000 square 
miles have historically been pirate lairs and smuggling bases, offering ideal 
isolated sites and routes for deliveries, refuelling and stockpiling. The 
Bahamas has 73 airstrips and 110 small-boat harbours that local authorities 
could not fully monitor and control against better-resourced traffickers 
(INCSR 1986: 152).  
Brazil is a major transhipment country for cocaine from Colombia, Peru 
and Bolivia. Most importantly, after the US it is also the world’s second-
largest consumer of cocaine HCL. Brazil is South America’s major legal 
producer of ether and acetone. It is also a coca cultivator country and a large 
producer of marijuana (INCSR 1990: 116; INCSR 2019, Vol. 1: 121).  
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Dominican Republic is recorded as a major transit country in all 
INCSRs, and also as a money-laundering country in some years. Though its 
location makes it a transhipment point for drugs entering the US, its 
significance, claims the INCSR, lies in its diaspora — there are over a million 
Dominican immigrants in New York city alone that provide an embedded 
social network for drugs trafficking (INCSR 1990: INCSR 2019; Vol. 1: 147). 
Neighbouring Haiti is also recorded in many years as a major transhipment 
point for cocaine from South America and marijuana from Jamaica (INCSR 
2019, Vol. 1: 177). 
Ecuador lies between the two largest cocaine-producing countries, 
Colombia and Peru, and is identified as a major transit country for cocaine 
and precursor chemicals from 1988 to 2019. Since 2016, it has been listed as 
a major source of precursor chemicals. It has coca plantations owned by 
Colombians who freely cross the unmarked border area (INCSR 1986: 105; 
INCSR 2012, Vol. 1: 206).  
Guatemala: most countries in Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua) figure prominently in many years on the INCSR, but it is 
Guatemala that emerges consistently from 1994 to 2019 as a major drugs-
transit country. It became the Colombian cartels’ choice for cocaine 
transhipment in the early 1990s because Guatemala has hundreds of 
unmonitored airfields, a good network of roads leading to Mexico, and coastal 
areas on both the western (Pacific) and eastern (Caribbean Sea) sides. This 
makes it possible for smugglers to switch routes — whether by air, land or 
sea — as needed. Opium is also grown in its mountainous regions of San 
Marcos and Huehuetenango (INCSR 1994: 133). 
Jamaica appears every year in the INCSR mainly on account of its exports 
of marijuana, although Jamaican traffickers are also known to trade in 
cocaine, which is easier to transport because of its higher value and lower 
volume.  Jamaica is also listed as a money-laundering hub, but since 2007 has 
had a more robust anti-money-laundering framework after the passage of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act.  
Laos is a major opium-producing country, and a significant transit hub 
and consumer of other illicit drugs, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants. 
Most of the opium grown in Laos is destined for export and refinement into 
heroin. Poppy cultivation in Laos decreased 96% between 1998 and 2007 due 
to aggressive government action and US international development assistance 
(INCSR 2019, Vol. 1: 203).   
Mexico consistently emerges in all years as a major narcotics-producing, 
transit, chemical source and money-laundering country, but it has never been 
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designated because it cooperates with the US. It is a significant source and 
transit country for heroin, marijuana and synthetic drugs. Mexico is also a 
main transit route for fentanyl originating from China. The Merida Initiative 
is the US government’s primary assistance mechanism for civil security 
assistance to help Mexico deal with its drug problems (INCSR 2019, Vol. 1: 
212). Mexico is also a major money-laundering country. In 2012, the US 
Senate found drug traffickers were converting US dollars into Mexican and 
other currency with Mexican currency exchange firms that had accounts with 
HSBC112.  
Nigeria is listed in most of the years as a major transit country. Nigerian 
organised criminal networks remain major actors in trafficking cocaine and 
heroin worldwide, facilitated by the Nigerian diaspora. Nigeria is also a 
significant centre for financial crimes and cyber-crime, where money 
laundering occurs through real estate investment, wire transfer to offshore 
banks, round tripping (reciprocal sales of identical assets), jewellery, bulk cash 
smuggling, and the reselling of luxury goods such as imported cars (INCSR 
2019, Vol. 2: 147).  
Pakistan continues to be one of the world’s top transit corridors for 
opiates and cannabis, trafficked through the porous borders with Afghanistan 
and Iran. Illicit drugs are distributed globally through Pakistan’s seaports, 
airports, postal services and unpatrolled coastal areas. The UNODC estimates 
that up to 40% of opiates produced in Afghanistan pass through Pakistan, 
while precursor chemicals for producing heroin and methamphetamine pass 
through it in the other direction (INCSR 2018 Vol. 1: 236).  
Panama is a global transit hub, and its canal and transportation 
infrastructures are used by drug traffickers to smuggle cocaine to the US and 
across the globe (INCSR 2018, Vol. 1: 241). It is also a financial centre where 
Colombian cartels have bought and operate banks (Micolta, 2012: 66). As 
revealed in the ‘Panama Papers’ scandal on the firm Mossack Fonseca, the 
country is also a pivotal centre for purchasing secrecy services for use in 
cross-border transactions and money laundering.  
Paraguay is listed a major drugs-transit country from 1988 to 2010, and 
as a money-laundering hub from 2011 to 2019.  
Peru: for most of the 20th century, Peru was the world’s top producer of 
coca leaves and cocaine. However, production in Peru declined, due mainly 
 
112 Source: US Senate Report 
(https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20REPORT-
HSBC%20CASE%20HISTORY%20(9.6)2.pdf) 
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to eradication policies, and in 1996–1997, it was overtaken by Colombia as 
the top producer. It remains the world’s second-largest producer of cocaine. 
Peru is also a major importer of precursor chemicals used for cocaine 
production (INCSR 2018, Vol. 1: 247).  
Thailand was for many years a major opium-producing and transit 
country but has been successful in eradication and in introducing alternative 
crops through programmes sponsored by the royal family. However, 
Thailand remains a net importer of illicit drugs for domestic use. Thailand’s 
status as a logistics and financial hub with porous borders and uneven law 
enforcement make it vulnerable to trafficking and money laundering (INCSR 
2019, Vol. 2: 179). 
Venezuela was added to the Designated list in 2005, after Hugo Chavez 
won a referendum, and has been designated ever since. Its proximity to 
Colombia makes it a transit hub, and current conditions allow ample 
opportunities for financial abuses (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 194).  
Further details of what the INCSRs report on offshore financial secrecy 
jurisdictions are presented in the next section.  
3.5.3 Offshore secrecy and financial services jurisdictions 
The INCSRs over the years remain an important source of information on 
how the criminal, the corrupt, and the tax cheat hide and move dirty money. 
The most important scheme deployed is to process cross-border transactions 
in plain sight, through normal bank accounts that conduct regular transfers 
to receive or transmit payments. Normally, these bank accounts are owned 
by entities or legal persons such as companies, trusts, foundations and even 
charities. A company or legal person, once established in law, can open bank 
accounts, legally trade, transact business, or make and receive payments, even 
if its real owners are unknown. Hence, they become front companies or 
entities that cannot be linked to real owners, and which can then purchase 
property, including mansions and yachts; buy shares in a publicly traded 
company; or invest in profit-maximising portfolios run by fund managers.  
The creation of such entities is made possible by secrecy service providers, or 
the lawyers, bankers, accountants and other middlemen whose principal role 
is to maintain the legal front and the fiction of the ‘limited liability company’ 
as a legal entity. The sheer magnitude of the abuse — a glimpse of which was 
revealed through the 2015 Panama Papers exposé — shows how easy it is for 
drug traffickers to register companies and open bank accounts to enjoy the 
proceeds of crime, legally.  
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The Panama Papers exposé in 2015 came after an investigation by the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) into the 
operations of Panama-headquartered Mossack Fonseca, a firm that provided 
secrecy services to clients who can pay.113 A whistleblower leaked more than 
11.5 million documents in a hard-drive that detailed attorney–client 
information for more than 214,488 offshore companies, trusts and 
foundations. Operating in more than 21 jurisdictions, Mossack Fonseca is 
considered one of the world’s five biggest wholesalers of offshore secrecy. 
Of the companies that appeared in the Panama Papers, over half — or more 
than 113,000 — were incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Panama was 
the next most favoured jurisdiction in registering front entities.114 Panama has 
been flagged in the INCSR consistently over the years as a major money-
laundering country. 
In many cases, it was banks themselves that requested Mossack Fonseca 
to register an offshore company for bank clients (see Figure 3.5). The Panama 
Papers revealed that more than 500 banks had registered 15,600 shell 
companies, including HSBC affiliates that registered more than 2,300 
offshore companies for clients, after which more bank accounts were 
opened.115   
 
113 ICIJ is a global network of more than 190 investigative journalists in more than 65 coun-
tries. For more discussion on the Panama Papers, see the ICIJ investigations: 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/explore-panama-papers-key-figures/  
114 An example of how drug traffickers, such as Joaquin Guzman, use secrecy services, is 
presented in a magazine article written by this researcher in 2016: see 
https://volteface.me/feature/secrecy-for-sale/, last accessed 21 August 2019.  
115 See https://projects.icij.org/panama-papers/graphs/8/, last accessed 21 August 2019. 





Since 2011, the INCSR had flagged the British Virgin Islands (BVI), a UK 
overseas territory, as a major narcotics-linked money-laundering centre. BVI 
is a well-established financial centre offering accounting; banking and legal 
services; captive insurance; company incorporations; mutual funds 
administration; trust formation; and shipping registration. Because the BVI is 
a UK overseas territory, it cannot sign or ratify international legal conventions 
in its own right — it is the UK’s responsibility to arrange for the ratification 
of any convention to be extended to and enforced in the BVI (INCSR 2011, 
Vol. 2: 67-68).  
In the last five years, campaigning organisations in the UK such as 
Christian Aid, Global Witness and Transparency International have put 
pressure on the UK government to compel its overseas territories to require 
real owners (in legal parlance ‘beneficial owners’) to be declared in the 
registration of companies, and to publish publicly accessible lists of the true 
identity of owners of companies sheltering assets.  In May 2018, a cross-party 
alliance of MPs forced the government to concede that it would introduce an 
order in council requiring public registers to be set up by 2020 if overseas 
territories had not done so voluntarily by then. However, in early 2019, it was 
reported that the order will be delayed, after overseas territories threatened to 
Figure 3.5: The 10 banks that requested the most offshore companies for its clients  
Source: ICIJ https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/explore-panama-papers-key-
figures/ last accessed  March 2020 
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take the government to court or even to secede from the UK. As a result, the 
UK Foreign Office moved the date to 2023.116  
The full list of ‘Treasure Islands’117 and offshore secrecy and financial 
service jurisdictions monitored by the INCSR is presented below (note: the 
list is not evidence of wrongdoing, and simply quotes from the INCSRs). 
Antigua and Barbuda: a two-island nation first flagged in 1996 and 
appeared in INCSRs every year since as a money-laundering jurisdiction. 
Because of US concerns on money-laundering vulnerabilities, it passed the 
Money Laundering Prevention Act.    
Aruba: first flagged in 1990 and identified from 1996 to 1998 as a major 
drugs-transit country. It was removed from the lists but re-emerged as a 
money-laundering jurisdiction in 2018 and 2019. 
Bahamas: consistently on the INCSR list as a drugs-transit and money-
laundering jurisdiction. 
Barbados: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2017 to 2019. 
Its key weakness is that the government could not seize assets acquired 
through criminal activity without a prior conviction (INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 43). 
Belize: flagged since 1988 as a drugs-transit country; included as a money-
laundering country from 2007 due to the lack of law enforcement and strong 
bank secrecy protections. 
Benin: listed from 2017 to 2019 as a money-laundering jurisdiction. The 
port of Cotonou is a transportation hub for the sub-region and serves Nigeria 
and land-locked countries in the Sahel. Criminal networks exploit the volume 
of goods and people moving through Benin (INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 45). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: emerged as a money-laundering jurisdiction 
in 2006 and 2007; re-emerged in 2017 to 2019. Its political structure and 
ethnic politics hinder the effectiveness of its anti-money-laundering regime 
(INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 51). 
 
116 A key news report on this development can be found at: https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2019/jan/11/mps-attack-ministers-over-delay-to-tax-havens-public-registers, 
last accessed 21 August 2019. 
117 ‘Treasure Islands’ is the title of the book by Nicholas Shaxson that provided the first 
comprehensive overview of the damage done by offshore banking, tax havens and secrecy 
services. He compared the tax havens to the ‘treasure islands’ where pirates in the 16th and 
17th centuries kept their loot (Shaxson, 2011).  
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British Virgin Islands: flagged from 2011 to 2019 as a money-laundering 
jurisdiction in the INCSRs. Tagged as a major secrecy provider in the Panama 
Papers (see above).  
Cambodia: listed from 1996 to 2000 as a major drugs-transit country 
particularly for methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants. Re-
emerged from 2006 to 2018 as a money-laundering jurisdiction. 
Cabo Verde: listed from 2017 to 2019 as targeted by drug traffickers for 
money-laundering operations due mainly to its large informal economy 
(INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 71). 
Cayman Islands: a UK overseas territory listed consistently from 1990 
to 2019 as a money-laundering jurisdiction. As of June 2017, the Islands held 
$1.03 trillion in international assets through 158 banks; 146 trust company 
licences; 143 licences for company management and company service 
providers; 836 insurance-related licences; and five money services businesses. 
The Cayman Islands had a population of 61,559 in 2017, while at the same 
time 98,686 companies and 10,621 mutual funds were domiciled in its 
territory (INCSR 2018, Vol. 2: 77).   
Costa Rica: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 1990 to 1997, 
and from 2002 to 2019. From 2011, it was also listed as a major drugs-transit 
country. 
Cuba: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2017 to 2019, but 
with low risks. Its key weakness is the lack of a Suspicious Activity Reporting 
(SAR) system. Continuing US sanctions prevent Cuba’s banking system from 
fully integrating with the international financial system (INCSR 2018, Vol. 2: 
85–86). 
Cyprus: listed from 1990 to 2019 (except 2017) as a money-laundering 
jurisdiction despite having a comprehensive AML framework. It is a regional 
financial centre which has a significant number of non-resident businesses — 
about 255,521 as of 31 October 2015 (INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 105). It has issued 
orders to financial entities to be vigilant against shell companies. By law, all 
companies registered in Cyprus must disclose their ultimate beneficial 
owners, but ‘some Cypriot law and accounting firms help construct layered 
corporate entities to mask the identities of financial beneficiaries (INCSR 
2019, Vol. 2: 87). 
Dominica: emerged intermittently as a money-laundering jurisdiction 
from 1997 to 2005, and from 2018 to 2019. It hosts two internet gaming 
companies, 13 offshore banks, and an unknown number of insurance entities, 
trusts and international business companies. In 2015 the number of firms it 
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registered was close to 19,000. It permits bearer shares and provides 
citizenship to individuals who donate at least $100,000 or through an 
investment in real estate valued at a minimum of $200,000 (INCSR 2019, Vol. 
2: 91–92). 
Dominican Republic: recorded as a major drugs-transit country 
throughout the INCSRs, and also a money-laundering country in some years. 
It has one of the largest economies in the Caribbean, and has eight 
international airports, 16 seaports, and a large porous frontier with Haiti. 
Eastern, Dutch and French Caribbean: in various years, the INCSR 
reported on these groups of islands collectively as money-laundering 
jurisdictions, some of which are individually identified in this list.  
Gaza and the West Bank: from 2014, the INCSR started reporting on 
Gaza and the West Bank, which were previously included as part of the Israel 
report. Although there are few little data available, the INCSR included Gaza 
and the West Bank as money-laundering jurisdictions in 2015 and 2016 on 
account of its hawala networks that are widely used for both legitimate and 
illicit purposes (INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 219). 
Guernsey: the Bailiwick of Guernsey (the Channel Islands of Guernsey, 
Alderney, Sark and Herm) is a British Crown Dependency that is INCSR-
listed from 1997 to 2016 as a money-laundering jurisdiction. It is a financial 
centre with a risk of proceeds of crime passing through its system because 
the majority of its customers are based elsewhere, and such proceeds are likely 
to arise from foreign predicate offences (INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 120–121). 
Guinea-Bissau: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2009 to 
2018 for not being compliant with international standards. The country’s 
riverine geography and weak law enforcement make it a transhipment point. 
In 2013, the US DEA arrested its Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Jose Americo 
Bubo Na Chuto, for complicity with drug trafficking (INCSR 2018, Vol. 2: 
110). 
Haiti: listed from 1994 to 2019 as a drugs-transit or money- laundering 
country, or both. Haitian gangs are engaged in international drug trafficking, 
and money-laundering activities use Haitian couriers primarily via maritime 
routes (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 108). 
Honduras:  listed as a drugs-transit or money-laundering country since 
2010. Money laundering stems mainly from organised crime, for example, 
human smuggling fees are regularly paid via money service businesses. It does 
not have an AML strategy or a money-laundering risk assessment (INCSR 
2019, Vol. 2: 110). 
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Hong Kong: a jurisdiction that has regularly appeared in INCSR lists 
since 1986. It is the world’s sixth-largest banking centre in terms of external 
transactions, and fifth-largest foreign exchange trading centre. In the 1986 
INCSR, Hong Kong was cited for its lack of currency controls and for 
banking secrecy laws that made it attractive to narco-traffickers. The 2019 
INCSR claimed that Hong Kong’s low tax rate and simplified tax regime, 
sophisticated banking system, shell company formation agents, free port 
status, and absence of currency and exchange controls make it vulnerable to 
money laundering, trade-based money laundering, and underground finance 
(INCSR 1986: 185; INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 112). 
Isle of Man: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 1997 to 2016. 
It is a British Crown Dependency that is neither part of the European Union 
nor a member of the Financial Action Task Force. Its significant offshore 
banking and corporate registration businesses make it an ideal environment 
for financial crimes and money laundering (INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 142). 
Israel: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 1996 to 2016. Until 
1997, money laundering was not a prosecutable crime in Israel. Hence by 
1996, 35 major crime bosses from Russia and Ukraine had established a 
presence, drawn too by liberal immigration laws. Home-grown criminal 
groups or those with ties to Russia, the US and the EU, often utilise a maze 
of offshore shell companies and bearer shares to obscure ownership (INCSR 
1997: 74–75; INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 143–144). 
Jersey: the largest of the Channel Islands is identified as a money-
laundering hub from 1997 to 2016. It is a British Crown Dependency with 
offshore banking facilities and corporate registration businesses believed to 
be used to structure tax reduction and avoidance mechanisms for citizens of 
the EU (INCSR 1997: 77). A common practice is the use of nominees as 
directors or officers of offshore entities or as holders of bank accounts. In 
recent years, these services are publicised on the internet. However, Jersey is 
regarded as a cooperative jurisdiction in AML enforcement (INCSR 2015, 
Vol. 2: 148). 
Kazakhstan: has emerged as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2017 
to 2019. It is listed as a transit country for Afghan heroin bound for Russia 
and Europe. It has the most developed economy and financial system in 
Central Asia and is transforming its capital city into a financial offshore zone 
(INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 114). 
Kenya: listed as a money-laundering hub from 2007 to 2019. Nairobi is 
East Africa’s financial hub and is at the forefront of a growing mobile banking 
system. Money laundering occurs in the formal and informal sectors. 
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Diaspora remittances to Kenya totalled $1.38 billion between January and 
June 2018. Most of Kenya’s 165,900 mobile-money agents use Safaricom’s 
M-Pesa system, and there are 14 million accounts on M-Shwari, a mobile 
lender. Kenya is a transit point of regional and international drug traffickers, 
and trade-based money laundering remains a problem. Its regular trade in 
goods provide counter-valuation that facilitate transactions in regional hawala 
networks (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 127). 
Lebanon: listed from 1997 to 2018 as a money-laundering hub. It signed 
up to the 1988 UN drug convention but registered reservations regarding 
bank secrecy. It is an active financial centre of the Middle East. Proceeds in 
the region from illicit trade are thought to be moved to Lebanon for 
laundering. Lebanon has a huge black market for consumer items, and its 
global diaspora remits $7.5 billion annually. Hizbollah, active in Lebanon, is 
designated by the US as a terrorist organisation (INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 123). 
Liberia: included in the 2017 to 2019 money-laundering lists. Smuggling 
is a big problem, and illicit transactions are facilitated by a cash-based 
economy. Money exchange operations are poorly controlled (INCSR 2019, 
Vol. 2: 131). 
Liechtenstein: the richest country in the world on a per capita basis is 
listed as a money-laundering centre from 1994 to 2016. It is a major European 
financial centre due to its low business tax rates, liberal incorporation rules 
and strict bank secrecy. In 1997, it had some 25,000 holding or ‘letter box’ 
companies, and fees associated with these activities accounted for 30% of 
state revenues. In the last few years, banking secrecy has been softened to 
allow for greater cooperation to identify tax evasion (INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 
161). 
Luxembourg: one of the largest financial centres of the world is 
identified as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 1994 to 2016. It has 
domestic banks, but the majority are foreign subsidiaries of banks in 
Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland. It has been called a ‘magical 
fairyland’ for well-known corporations that seek to drastically minimise their 
tax bills (INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 163). 
Macau: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2001 to 2016, and 
in 2018. It is not a significant regional financial centre but is the world’s largest 
gaming market with gaming revenues of $33.2 billion for 2017. Asian 
organised crime groups are active in gaming services and also in drug 
trafficking. Macau is a Special Administrative Region of China and on its own 
could not sign or ratify international conventions. China is responsible for 
Macau’s foreign affairs. 
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Malaysia: Malaysia was identified in 1988 and 1994 to 1997 as a drugs-
transit country, and as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2017 to 2019. 
Morocco: known as a producer of cannabis, Morocco was listed from 
2017 to 2019 as a money-laundering jurisdiction.  
Philippines: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2000 to 2019 
and considered a producer and exporter of cannabis (INCSR 2000: 227). It is 
not a major financial banking or offshore centre, but rising crime and weak 
AML enforcement allow for criminal proceeds to be easily laundered. Money 
laundering is not a stand-alone criminal act in the Philippines and requires a 
predicate crime in order to be investigated (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 159). 
Senegal: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 2017 to 2019, 
Senegal serves as a regional business centre for Francophone West Africa. Its 
most important vulnerabilities are bank transfers to offshore accounts in tax 
havens and real estate transactions conducted with cash (INCSR 2019, Vol. 
2: 166-167). 
Singapore: listed from 1990 to 2016 as a money-laundering jurisdiction. 
Singapore is a major international financial and investment centre as well as a 
major offshore centre. Secrecy protections, a lack of routine large currency 
reporting requirements, and the size and growth of Singapore’s private 
banking and asset management pose significant money-laundering risks 
(INCSR 2015, Vol. 2: 198). 
St Kitts and Nevis; St Lucia; St Maarten; and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines: in 2018 and 2019, the INCSR reported these four jurisdictions 
as money-laundering centres. St Kitts and Nevis had previously been listed in 
2000, 2006 and 2007. St Maarten was listed in 2012 and 2016, while St Vincent 
and the Grenadines was listed in 2000 and 2001. 
Taiwan: listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction from 1994 to 2016. The 
INCSR 1997 said that Taiwan is a money-laundering concern because of the 
participation of people from Taiwan in international organised crime. Money 
laundering is carried out through Taiwan’s banking system and non-bank 
financial systems (INCSR 1997: 108). 
Ukraine: listed in 2002–2003 and from 2005 to 2019 as a money-
laundering centre. It is seen as having adequate counter-narcotics legislation, 
but money-laundering schemes are becoming more elaborate and complex. 
Ukraine’s large shadow economy represents a significant money-laundering 
vulnerability (INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 180–181). 
United Arab Emirates: a stable hub for transportation, trade and 
financial activity, UAE is listed as a money-laundering centre each year from 
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1990 to 2019. UAE’s open business environment is used by illicit actors. It 
has a large number of exchange houses, hawalas, and general trading 
companies. A portion of the money-laundering activity in the UAE is likely 
to be the proceeds from heroin produced in Afghanistan. Other money-
laundering vulnerabilities include the real estate sector, the misuse of the 
international gold and diamond trade, and the use of cash couriers to transfer 
illicit funds. Domestic public corruption contributes little, if anything, to 
money laundering (INCSR 2017, Vol. 2: 183).   
Uruguay: listed as a money-laundering hub from 1994 to 2018. Uruguay 
often uses the US dollar as its business currency: about 75% of deposits and 
55% of credits are denominated in US dollars, making it easier to launder 
criminal proceeds (INCSR 2018, Vol. 2: 207).  
Vietnam: listed as a major drugs-transit country from 1994 to 2005 and a 
money-laundering centre from 2017 to 2019. 
3.5.4 We’re all in it together 
The INCSRs frequently use the phrase ‘vulnerability to money laundering’ 
when assessing and classifying countries and jurisdictions as ‘major money-
laundering’ sites. The idea of ‘vulnerability’ suggests that there may be others 
that are not vulnerable, i.e. that are resistant or impervious to narcotics-related 
money laundering, presumably because of robust financial legislation and 
monitoring systems. However, when the big countries and economies are 
considered and found to be ‘vulnerable’ as well, it suggests that the entire 
global economy is susceptible to this behaviour. Below, the descriptions from 
the INCSR lists continue, but this time focused on OECD countries and 
emerging economies.  
Australia is listed as a money-laundering jurisdiction in 1990, and from 
1997 to 2016. The INCSR 1997 contains an apparent contradiction on 
Australia. In the Introduction, it includes Australia in the list of money-
laundering countries, but in the subsequent country report it opens with the 
statement that Australia is not a centre for drug-related money laundering. 
This may be a reflection of the report’s balancing act as it mitigates the 
possibility of offending an ally. The document goes on to cite Australia’s 
balanced and comprehensive system to detect, prevent and prosecute money 
laundering. Yet in the section ‘Changes in INCSR Priorities 1997–1998’, the 
report upgraded Australia from medium priority to ‘country of primary 
concern’ on money laundering (INCSR 1997).  
In 2012, the INCSR reported that the majority of illegal proceeds in 
Australia were derived from fraud-related offences, though narcotics offences 
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provided a substantial source of crime proceeds (INCSR 2012, Vol. 2: 56). In 
2016, an explanation is provided that according to the Australian Crime 
Commission, financial crimes continue to increase in diversity, scale and the 
level of overall harm. It conservatively estimated that serious and organised 
crime cost Australia about $10.67 billion each year (INCSR 2016, Vol. 2: 66–
69). 
Austria, where the UNODC is headquartered, is listed as a country of 
primary concern on money laundering from 1996 to 2016. The INCSR 2016 
explains that money laundered by organised crime groups derives primarily 
from fraud, smuggling, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in 
persons. The report also claims that there are migrant workers in Austria who 
send money home via all available channels (INCSR 2016, Vol. 2: 70). One 
apparent reason for Austria’s inclusion is that it has only recently enforced 
strict legal requirements on banking secrecy. In 2014, Austria accepted a long-
delayed EU law to curtail bank secrecy and tax evasion by requiring EU 
member-states to automatically exchange information on accounts held by 
their citizens abroad. It appears that this is the reason for Austria’s removal 
from the list in 2016.  
Belgium appears in the INCSR as a source of precursor chemicals from 
2013 to 2018, and as a money-laundering country in 2018 and 2019. It is 
identified as a primary entry point for cocaine smuggled into Europe, mainly 
through the Port of Antwerp, which has experienced record-breaking cocaine 
seizures from containerised cargo — 30 tonnes in 2016; 41 tonnes in 2017; 
and 35 tonnes in the first ten months of 2018. Another 28 tonnes were seized 
in South America before the container proceeded to Antwerp. The seized 
cocaine in 2017 alone would have generated $1.2 billion. Belgium has a robust 
chemical industry but has not been historically a source of precursor 
chemicals. However, it serves as a transit point for precursor chemicals 
sourced out of China and India and destined for clandestine synthetic drug 
laboratories in the Netherlands, Mexico and elsewhere (INCSR 2019, Vol. 1: 
109).  
China is listed in the INCSR as a major producing and transit country 
from 1994 to 2005; as a narcotics-related money-laundering country from 
1996 to 2019; and as a source of precursor chemicals used in illicit narcotics 
from 1994 to 2019. China’s land size, population and expanding economy 
have all contributed to the country becoming a hub for drug and chemical 
precursor production and trafficking. Its numerous coastal cities with high-
volume seaports, and its vast network of major international airports make 
China an ideal destination and transit hub for illicit drugs. China is also a 
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major source of synthetic drugs, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and 
precursor chemicals that are smuggled to clandestine laboratories all over the 
world. China is also the principal source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-related 
compounds fuelling the opioid crisis in the US (INCSR 2019, Vol. 1: 133–
134). 
France is listed in the INCSRs as a money-laundering country from 1997 
to 2015. With banking, financial and commercial relations, especially with 
Francophone countries around the world, it is seen as an attractive venue for 
money laundering because of the size of its economy, political stability and 
sophisticated financial system. It is also an important transit country for 
narcotics (INCSR 1997: no page; 2015, Vol. 2: 112).  
Germany is listed in the INCSRs as a major source of chemical precursors 
from 1994 to 2019, and as a money-laundering country from 1994 to 2016. 
The basis for its inclusion in the money-laundering list is that while it is not 
an offshore financial centre, it has one of the largest (regular) financial centres 
in Europe and is a member of the Eurozone, making it attractive to organised 
criminals and tax evaders. Thus, the size of its economy makes it susceptible 
to money-laundering and terrorist-financing operations. The reports also 
state that Germany continues to be a consumer and transit hub for narcotics. 
It allows the use of shell companies, trusts, holdings and foundations that can 
help obscure the source of assets and cash. Germany is estimated to have a 
large informal economy, such as the hawala systems used by its immigrant 
population, although there is little official data on this activity. Bulk cash 
smuggling by organised crime elements is also reported as prevalent in 
Germany, especially illicit drug proceeds arriving or passing through from the 
Netherlands (INCSR 2016: Vol. 1: 115–116).  
Greece is included as a money laundering country from 2000 to 2016. 
Greece is the regional financial centre for the Balkans, and also a bridge 
between Europe and the Middle East; hence it is a gateway country for 
narcotics and illicit money flows. Heroin and hashish transit from Turkey, 
while cannabis and other drugs transit from Albania, Bulgaria and North 
Macedonia. It has porous marine and land borders. Official corruption, 
organised crime and a large informal economy make the country vulnerable 
to money laundering and terrorist financing (INCSR 1998: no pages; 2016, 
Vol. 2: 119).  
India is the world’s largest producer of licit raw opium, managed through 
a system of licensing land for opium planting based on existing stocks and 
estimates of future demand (INCSR 1986: 235; INCSR 2013 Database: 194). 
Over the last two decades, however, it has become an increasingly important 
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transit point for illicit narcotics produced from Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Burma (INCSR 1990: 244). India is also a source of chemical precursors for 
Burmese traffickers. India is a financial centre with formal as well as an 
extensive informal economy and remittance systems. The most common 
money-laundering methods include opening multiple bank accounts, 
intermingling criminal proceeds with assets of legal origin, purchasing bank 
cheques with cash, and the routing of funds through complex and opaque 
legal structures (INCSR 2014, Vol. 2: 123).   
Indonesia, the world’s biggest archipelago, is listed as a money-
laundering country from 1997 to 2019 and as source of precursor chemicals 
from 2013 to 2019. It was included in 1997 because it did not have anti-
money-laundering laws in place. By 2019, it still had gaps in its financial 
system legislation and regulation. Most money laundering in the country is 
connected to corruption cases, followed by drug trafficking and other 
criminal activities like tax crimes, illegal logging, wildlife trafficking or bank 
fraud. Comprising thousands of islands, it has a long history of vulnerability 
to smuggling of illicit goods and bulk cash, made easier by unpatrolled 
coastlines, sporadic and lax law enforcement, and poor customs infrastructure 
(INCSR 1997; 2019, Vol. 2: 116–117).  
Iran is listed as a major producing and transit country in 1988 and from 
1994 to 1998. It was in the money-laundering list in 2007–2009, and from 
2011 to 2019. Iran was one of the first countries to be denied certification, in 
1987 and 1988. It was described as continuing to profit from narcotics 
cultivation, thereby rejecting obligations to the world community. From 1985 
to 1988, it was reported as producing 200 to 400 metric tons of opium and 
had no narcotics control programme. It had a high number of opium addicts 
(INCSR 1988: various pages). In 2018, the US re-imposed all sanctions on 
Iran. It has a large underground economy, spurred by uneven taxation, 
widespread smuggling, sanctions evasion, currency exchange controls, and a 
large expatriate community. It remains a major transit route for opiates 
smuggled from Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2015, Iran’s Minister of Interior 
estimated the combined value of narcotics trafficking and sales in Iran at $6 
billion annually (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 118).  
Italy is listed as a money-laundering country from 1994 to 2019. Italy’s 
economy is ninth-largest in the world and third-largest in the Eurozone, but 
activities associated with organised crime and a large unregulated shadow 
economy make it vulnerable to money laundering. Much of the illicit money 
made from illegal activities is funnelled into commercial and financial entities, 
including buying large amounts of real estate, especially hotels in resort areas. 
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The illegal gold market is also believed to be heavily used by money launderers 
(INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 120–121). In 1997, money laundering in Italy was 
estimated informally to total over $50 billion annually (INCSR 1997).  
Japan is listed as a money-laundering country from 1994 to 2016. It is a 
regional financial centre but not an offshore financial centre. Its risk of money 
laundering comes from organised crime, including by Japanese groups 
(Yakuza), Mexican drug-trafficking organisations, and other domestic 
criminals. Over the last few years, there has been an increase in financial 
crimes in Japan committed by citizens from West African countries, such as 
Nigeria and Ghana. The major sources of laundered funds include drug 
trafficking, fraud, loan sharking, remittance frauds and bulk cash smuggling 
(INCSR 2016, Vol. 2: 152–153). Japan is one of the largest markets for 
methamphetamines in Asia: 80% of all drug arrests involve 
methamphetamines and ATS. Japan is an important trafficking base — in 
February 2009 authorities seized 8.4 tonnes of acetic anhydride being shipped 
to Afghanistan concealed in shipping containers at the ports of Yokohama 
and Nagoya (INCSR 2010, Vol. 1: 386).  
The Netherlands is listed as a money-laundering country and source of 
precursor chemicals from 1994 to 2019, according to the INCSRs. It is 
Europe’s main gateway, with Rotterdam as the world’s largest container port. 
It is also a financial centre, and a centre of the international chemical industry. 
Narcotics criminals take advantage of Dutch commercial assets for illicit 
purposes, and the country attracts individuals seeking to produce precursor 
chemicals (INCSR 1996). A government-commissioned study in November 
2018 showed that $18.2 billion is laundered annually in the Netherlands. It 
has six islands in the Caribbean falling under its jurisdiction, half of which are 
also monitored by the INCSR.  
Switzerland is listed as a money-laundering country from 1994 to 2018, 
and as a source of precursor chemicals from 2013 to 2019. It is described as 
a major financial centre managing an estimated 25% of offshore global wealth 
from private clients, and a country in which illicit financial activity occurs. 
Historically, drug traffickers from Russia and the Balkans have dominated 
attempts at narcotics-related money-laundering in Switzerland. The country’s 
adoption of Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements has changed 
money-laundering standards as well as the compliance culture (INCSR 2018, 
Vol. 2: 188).  
Turkey is listed from 1994 to 2019 as a money-laundering jurisdiction. 
Turkey is recognised as a transit (although not ‘major’) country for heroin and 
cocaine headed to European markets. Money laundering takes place through 
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banks, non-bank financial institutions and the informal economy. Turkish-
based traffickers transfer money, and sometimes gold, via couriers to pay 
narcotics suppliers in Pakistan or Afghanistan (INCSR 2019, Vol. 2: 177). 
The United Kingdom is listed as a money-laundering country from 1994 
to 2019 and a source of precursor chemicals from 2008 to 2019. As a 
consumer country of illicit drugs, crime syndicates from around the world 
exploit the UK market and use the UK as a major transhipping route. In 2008, 
the government estimated that 25–35 tonnes of heroin and 35–45 tonnes of 
cocaine enter the UK each year (INCSR 2010, Vol. 1: 638). However, what 
the INCSRs do not say is that the UK itself, in particular the ‘square mile’ of 
London, is an important offshore financial centre that provides secrecy 
services, like the UK overseas territories and Crown Dependencies.  
Finally, the INCSR also includes the United States as a money-laundering 
centre from 1994 to 2019, and as a source of precursor chemicals from 2000 
to 2012. However, there are no country reports on the US in any of the 
INCSRs. The INCSRs are a US tool to point at others, but not at itself.  
3.5.5 Analysing American-structured international drug control 
standards 
Various scholars have noted that the international drug control apparatus is a 
remarkable achievement. As Buxton observes, there is no other global control 
system — with its treaties, institutions, and monitoring — that has emerged 
for any other commodity. Not only do states have to work cooperatively in 
enforcing the treaties, many even have to surrender their own sovereignty on 
national drug policy (Buxton, 2006: 100). The INCSRs illustrate how part of 
that sovereignty is effectively surrendered to the United States.  
The preceding review shows that there appears to be no other country 
with a wider understanding and deeper knowledge of global illicit drug 
markets than the US. The US tracks and monitors what is going on, and in 
the process has given itself the power to structure global drug policy. As a 
result, global drug policy has become patterned after the approach that the 
US defined and adopted back in 1986 when it stated its goals to be the 
following (paraphrased from INCSR 1986: 28–29): 
• To break the grower-to-user narcotics chain which stretches across 
five continents through a comprehensive programme of international 
control. To apply pressure at all points in the chain through: crop 
control; increased seizures of both drug products and financial assets; 
intensified investigation and prosecution of traffickers; and effective 
treatment and prevention of drug abuse.  
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• To prioritise crop control in international strategies, supported by 
enforcement programmes operating as close to the source as 
possible. To make the people and governments of illicit drug-
producing countries aware of the problems they export to other 
countries, and the domestic problems they are creating within their 
own societies. To convince other governments to raise the foreign 
policy priority assigned to narcotics control.  
• To provide assistance, including by other donor countries, with 
clearly defined crop control objectives. To support governments of 
producing nations to demonstrate the political will to undertake 
effective crop control and interdiction programmes, to commit social 
and political as well as material resources, and to promulgate and 
adopt laws which facilitate control objectives. To stamp out the 
corruption that has undermined control efforts in many source 
countries, led by strong and determined governments. 
• To provide treatment and prevention programmes, which should be 
developed and sustained by each nation, according to their own needs 
and in keeping with their resource capabilities. To continue efforts to 
enhance and expand intelligence collection. 
• Above all, to encourage the international community to make 
common cause in a more vigorous, more widespread, and more 
united effort to control international narcotics production and 
trafficking.  
The puzzle is why — despite all the information and knowledge generated 
by the INCSRs — US and global drug policy is unable to break away or at 
least revise these principles despite the apparent failure of drug control. 
Information from the INCSRs themselves demonstrate a number of reasons 
why the narcotics commodity chain could not be easily broken and why the 
US approach continues to fail. Among these are:  
• Financial systems. Existing informal as well as formal financial systems 
facilitate transactions and enable the transfer of payments across 
borders in global illicit drug markets. For example, hawalas are 
widespread, deeply entrenched and widely used, and are not only 
found in places like the Middle East or East Africa, but also in 
diaspora communities in the US, UK, Germany or France. In some 
countries, long traditions of bank secrecy — and the lack of 
government oversight on non-bank financial activities, including 
currency exchange houses, illicit casinos, cash transporters, informal 
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exchange houses and wire transfer businesses — allow money to be 
transferred freely across borders without being subject to money-
laundering controls. Most importantly, entire networks exist that are 
served by secrecy services providers and offshore financial systems 
that allow drug profits to be kept and laundered into the financial 
system in plain sight. Among the biggest offshore jurisdictions that 
enable money laundering are the US itself, the UK, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Japan and Australia — to cite just a handful.  
• Industries. A globalised economy which includes industries for the 
manufacture of precursor chemicals for licit profit-making purposes 
enables such chemicals also to be supplied for illicit purposes. Aside 
from G7 countries, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, China and India are 
all major economies that supply precursor chemicals that enable the 
illicit manufacture of coca and opium products. The US is advocating 
a shift in the approach to tackling precursor chemicals, from 
economic regulation to law enforcement. But as experience has 
shown, this only brings short-term solutions: criminal entrepreneurs 
will find new chemicals to use in expanding industries in developing 
countries that will be more difficult to control and will remain a step 
ahead of law enforcement.  
• Infrastructure. The infrastructure for trading and distribution/ 
trafficking is well entrenched. This includes locations like the 
Bahamas that offer over 100,000 square miles of isolated sites which 
are ideal for deliveries, refuelling or stockpiling; or countries like 
Guatemala where traffickers can switch between land, air and sea 
routes to avoid detection as needed. The diaspora is also a key 
consideration — the social networks that can be tapped by 
enterprising traffickers are wide and deep. Finally, there is also the 
financial infrastructure put in place by secrecy providers.    
Yet, although its own reports make it clear that financial systems, industries 
and infrastructure are what sustain illicit trade, the INCSRs appear to be 
deeply wedded to price theory. The wealth of US knowledge on the illicit 
drugs market has not been deployed to resolve the mystery of prices. Price 
theory has remained an unchallenged narrative that guides drug policy. This 
is examined in detail in Chapter 6.  
The INCSRs stand out as a reference, a source from which many 
academics, organisations and the media will quote, just as students consult a 
general reference source or encyclopaedia. Assessments of drug, foreign, aid 
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or military policy can hardly be made without referring to information 
sourced from the INCSRs. Yet critical examination of INCSR as an artefact 
of US policy and as representative of existing political and economic relations 
between the US and other countries appears to be scant. This is perhaps a 
topic for a future research agenda.     
Having laid down the limitations of official narratives on the size and 
scope of illicit markets, and having outlined the reasons why such illicit 
markets could not be easily broken or eliminated, the next section focuses in 
more detail on the source of illicit drug crops — their primary agricultural 
producers.  
3.6 Producers: Contextualising estimates on illicit crop 
production  
Having sketched the consumer and intermediary markets in illicit opium and 
coca, the stage is now set to examine the producers. As elaborated in INCSR 
1986, global and US drug policy consists of a comprehensive programme of 
international crop control supported by enforcement programmes as close to 
the source — i.e. the producers — as possible. This section describes the 
depth and resilience of illicit-crop-producing areas and how illicit coca and 
opium have evolved in the last 35 years, focusing on four key producing 
countries: Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia, and using 
information from the INCSRs and the WDRs. Table 3.13 shows how the 
four countries have been classified in the INCSRs since publication started in 
1986.  
 
Table 3.13: Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia and Bolivia as represented in 
the INCSRs 






All four countries listed as producers of illicit drugs, with a country-
specific assessment supplied for each (status of illicit narcotics, pro-
duction trends, adequacy of legal and law enforcement measures, 
etc.).  






The document is technically not an INCSR, but rather a briefing to 
Congress on the review conducted of the ‘International Narcotics Con-
trol Activities of the United States’. All four countries are identified as 




Bolivia, Burma and Colombia are identified as major narcotics-produc-
ing and/or major narcotics-transit countries but also as cooperating 




Only the Executive Summary is available. Country summaries identical 
to the 1988 report are supplied. Afghanistan and Burma denied certifi-




No explicit mention of denials of certification in this report, but the 
four countries continue as major producers and individualised country 
narcotics assessments are made for each. Accomplishments from the 




Colombia and Bolivia praised for anti-drug efforts. Summaries for all 
four countries as producers are provided. Section on methodology for 
estimates first included in report. 
1992 No copy retrieved 




Statement on the legislative basis of the INCSR is more comprehen-
sive; explicit lists included. All four countries are listed as major 
drugs-producing and/or transit countries. Colombia is further listed as 
a money-laundering country. Full reports on each provided. Full sec-
tion on chemical controls included for first time.   





First INCSR published when all legal questions and definitions are set-
tled. All four countries are listed as major drugs-producing and/or 
transit countries. Colombia is further listed as a money-laundering 





Includes statements from Secretary of State Albright, Assistant Secre-
tary Beers, Attorney-General Reno and ONDCP Director McCaffrey. All 
four countries continue to be listed as major drugs-producing and/or 
transit countries. Burma and Colombia are listed as money-laundering 
countries as well. No mention about denials of certification.  







All four countries continue to be listed as major drugs-producing 
and/or transit countries. Burma and Colombia are listed as money-
laundering countries. No mention about denials of certification. In-





All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia further listed 





All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia further listed 










All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia further listed 




All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia further listed 
as money-laundering countries. No mention of denials of certification. 
Includes a special section on Offshore Financial Services that indicates 
number of offshore banks, registered international business compa-
nies, etc. Provides a comparative chart of services provided in off-





All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia further listed 
as money-laundering countries. Burma (along with Guatemala and 
Haiti) is denied certification. Includes an appendix on the Financial 
Action Task Force’s Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 





First time INCSR goes over 1000 pages. Provides full reports for 131 
countries. All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia fur-
ther listed as money-laundering countries. Burma (along with Haiti) is 
denied certification.   







All four still listed as before, with Burma and Colombia further listed 





All four are listed as major-drugs producing/transit countries. Burma 
and Colombia remain in list of money-laundering countries; Afghani-
stan is added because of its ‘extremely huge informal financial sys-





All four are tagged as major drugs producers. Afghanistan, Burma and 
Colombia are further listed as money-laundering countries. Burma con-
tinues to be decertified. President Bush expresses concern about Bo-





All four are tagged as major drugs producers. Afghanistan, Burma and 
Colombia are further listed as money-laundering countries. Burma con-





All four countries are now tagged both as major drugs producers and 
as money-laundering countries. Burma continues to be decertified. Bo-





All four countries are listed both as major drugs producers and as 






All four countries are listed both as major drugs producers and as 






All four countries are listed both as major drugs producers and as 






All four countries are listed both as major drugs producers and as 
money laundering countries. Burma and Bolivia continue to be decerti-
fied, and memoranda for their continued decertification is included by 
President Obama. A big change in 2013 is the addition of all four coun-
tries in the list of major sources of chemical precursors: Afghanistan 
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has huge stockpiles that make it a distributor of chemicals; Burma 
leads in the production of synthetic drugs that require chemicals; Bo-
livia has found new chemicals (not under any form of control) to use 
for processing cocaine; and in Colombia, chemical diversion is a seri-





All four countries are listed as major drugs-producing, money-launder-






All four countries are listed as major drugs-producing, money-launder-






All four countries are listed as major drugs-producing, money-launder-
ing and chemical source countries. Bolivia and Burma remain decerti-
fied. President Obama signals possible changes in the April 2016 
UNGASS but does not indicate a clear US position on a public health 






All four countries are listed as major drugs-producing, money-launder-
ing and chemical source countries. Bolivia and Burma remain decerti-
fied. Reports on ‘Significant Illicit Drug Manufacturing Countries’ is 





All four countries are listed as major drugs-producing, money-launder-
ing and chemical source countries. Bolivia remains decertified, but 
Burma is taken off the designated list. The Burma Sanctions Program 
of the US government was earlier terminated, and most entities in the 






All four countries continue to be listed as major drugs-producing, 
money-laundering and chemical source countries. Only Bolivia remains 
decertified.  
Note: Where the INCSR is split into two volumes, Volume 1 is a report on drug and 
chemical control, while Volume 2 is dedicated to money laundering, and has also 
been collected for this study. 
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3.6.1 Status of the four producer countries in this study 
The INCSRs confirm the status of the four countries in this study as among 
the world’s leading illicit drug crop producers.   
Afghanistan is consistently identified from 1986 to 2019 as a major illicit 
drug-producing country. Since 1986, the INCSRs have supplied a country 
report on Afghanistan’s production figures, institutional development, supply 
reduction efforts, corruption issues, and public information and treatment 
efforts. Afghanistan surpassed Burma in opium production in the mid-1990s, 
and since 2003 has had the largest number of hectares under opium 
cultivation in the world.  
From 2006, Afghanistan started to be recorded as a major money-
laundering country as well. This is because, while Afghanistan is not a regional 
financial or banking centre, its informal financial system is extremely large, 
deeply entrenched and widely used. INCSR 2006 estimated there were then 
330 known hawala dealers in Kabul, and 100–300 additional dealers in each 
of the 34 provinces. These dealers are organised into unions in each province 
and maintain a number of agent–principal relationships throughout the 
country and internationally that enable ‘money transfer without money 
movement’. A hawala broker hands over cash to a recipient-beneficiary based 
on a promise from another hawala broker elsewhere or abroad, who has 
received a payment from the donor. The record-keeping of promises and 
accounting practices of the hawaladars are known for being robust and 
‘extremely efficient’, and could take note of currencies traded, international 
pricing, and debits and credits with other dealers. The hawala system’s main 
difference from a formal banking system is that it cannot take deposits for 
lending or investing purposes as regular banks do. It is best suited for many 
but small cross-border payments such as remittances being sent by overseas 
workers back to their families. It also suits the illicit trading of heroin, which 
is typically broken into small packages and smuggled across borders — like 
an ‘ant’ trade — and payments are then processed through the hawala system 
(INCSR 2006, Vol. 2: 51-53).  
Starting in 2013, Afghanistan was further listed as a major source of 
precursor chemicals, such as ammonium chloride, acetic anhydride or 
hydrochloric acid, that are used in refining raw opium into its morphine, 
brown heroin or white heroin base, and finally into heroin HCL. While 
Afghanistan does not have industries to produce the chemicals, it has huge 
stockpiles that make it a distributor. For example, in 2008, Afghan counter-
narcotics police seized 2,229 kg of ammonium chloride and 736 kg of sodium 
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carbonate smuggled through the Pakistani border — sufficient to produce 
hundreds of tonnes of heroin.118  
Bolivia is also consistently reported each year from 1986 to 2019 as a 
major drugs producer. Bolivia is flagged by the INCSR for being one of the 
three largest cocaine producing countries and a significant transit zone for 
Peruvian cocaine.  
Bolivia was designated in 2008, after President Evo Morales expelled the 
US ambassador, USAID and the DEA from the country. Though some form 
of cooperation between the two countries has now been restored, Bolivia 
generally remains, by its own choice, to be outside US foreign policy influence 
and is very critical of the figures and assessments on the coca economy 
produced by US authorities. Hence, its designation can be seen as influenced 
by its opposition to US drug and foreign policy. Bolivia is different from 
Afghanistan and Colombia in that the latter two countries have had a long 
history of cooperation with the US and are therefore not designated despite 
being major illicit crop producers at a scale higher than Bolivia.  
In 2009, Bolivia came to be reported too as a major money-laundering 
country. Although Bolivia is not a financial centre, the INCSR attributed its 
assessment to money laundering linked to narcotics trafficking, public 
corruption, smuggling and trafficking of persons, Bolivia’s long tradition of 
bank secrecy, and the lack of government oversight on non-bank financial 
activities. Hotels, currency exchange houses, illicit casinos, cash transporters, 
informal exchange houses and wire transfer businesses are known to transfer 
money freely in and out of Bolivia without being subject to money-laundering 
controls. Bolivia was also suspended from the Financial Action Task Force 
of South America (GAFISUD) from July 2007 to November 2009 due to 
failure to pay three years of membership dues. In July 2007, Bolivia was also 
suspended from the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, and 
barred from using the group’s secure web, on the grounds that the country 
lacked terrorist financing legislation (INCSR 2009, Vol. 2: 125-127).  
From 2013, Bolivia came to be listed as a major source of precursor 
chemicals, even though it is not a major producer of chemicals. This was due 
to the discovery by Bolivia’s Special Counter-narcotics Police Force 
(FELCN) of drug traffickers using new chemicals in cocaine manufacturing 
such as isopropyl alcohol, liquid ethyl acetate, sodium bisulphate and cement. 
Because of restrictions on regular precursor chemicals, the traffickers did 
 
118 See https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/targeting-precursor-chemicals-in-af-
ghanistan-and-beyond.html, last accessed 21 August 2019.  
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their own research and discovered alternative chemicals. Not only were these 
new chemicals not among the controlled precursors, these are also locally 
produced in the country. The INCSR further criticised the weakness of 
Bolivia’s system of licensing the transport of controlled substances: unless 
found next to a cocaine lab, unlicensed transport and commerce in these 
chemicals incur only an administrative fine (INCSR 2013 Vol. 1: 66–67). 
Since 1986, when the INCSRs started, Colombia has been included as a 
major drugs-producing and a major money-laundering country. From 2013, 
it also became a source of precursor chemicals, like Bolivia, after its 
underground cocaine cocineros (cooks) learned about new chemicals to use in 
the manufacturing of cocaine. But unlike Bolivia, Colombia has never been 
designated, as the country has pursued a policy of close cooperation with the 
US in tackling its illicit coca economy.  
Myanmar, consistently referred to as Burma by the US, has a similar track 
record in the INCSRs to the other three countries: it is consistently identified 
from 1986 to 2019 as a major illicit drug-producing country. When the 
INCSRs started in 1986, Burma was the world’s largest producer of heroin, 
and the trade was protected by insurgent armies in ethnic enclaves at the 
periphery of central government control. According to INCSR 1994, the 
ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) espoused a policy 
that emphasised economic development in the ethnic areas, rather than 
attempting to apply drug enforcement measures. This was based on the belief 
that economic development would reduce opium cultivation. The problem 
was — continued the report — neither development nor a reduction in 
opium cultivation occurred. Yet the US could not do anything more — it 
could not threaten to decertify Burma because the country was already 
subjected to the more severe sanctions that isolated its economy to the point 
of collapse. SLORC could not be pressured to, for example, resume aerial 
eradication that ceased after its 1988 takeover. The Burmese government 
remained primarily concerned with keeping the border area insurgents 
quiescent and did not prioritise counter-narcotics programmes in those 
regions (INCSR 1994: 241–242). However, SLORC did bring the country’s 
legal code into compliance with the main provisions of the UN conventions 
by passing the 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Law. It also 
cooperated with the UNDP and the UN Drug Control Programme for drug-
related development aid which it was not qualified to receive from the US.   
3.6.2 Estimates of areas under cultivation and production 
The estimates of areas under illicit crop cultivation supplied by the US 
ONDCP (INCSRs) and the UNODC (WDRs and Illicit Crop Monitoring 
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Surveys) do not always tally. In many cases the figures reported by the 
ONDCP are different from figures reported by the UNODC. But more 
importantly, there are also differences in figures reported by the same report 
in different years. For example, WDR 2004 Table 5 reported that Bolivia’s 
dried coca leaf production in 2003 was 17,100 tonnes (Vol. 1: 95, 97). 
However, a similar table in WDR 2005 reported the 2003 figure as 18,500 
tonnes (Vol. 2: 207, Table); while WDR 2006 reported an even higher figure 
of 27,800 tonnes (Vol. 1: 81, Table).   
The UNODC explains that these estimates represent the best effort to 
sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem. The numbers come 
from various sources with varying degrees of quality, including data that 
become softer as more variables come into play. The field research 
undertaken to build or validate the figures is far from easy, and it is difficult 
to develop precise information. The harsh terrain on which many drugs are 
cultivated is furthermore not always easily accessible. In May 2011, for 
example, four UNODC staff and two Bolivian Air Force pilots conducting 
aerial monitoring were killed in a plane crash in Bolivia (WDR 2011).  
The INCSR 2000 explains that the most reliable information on illicit 
drugs is on the hectares under cultivation, which is based on ‘proven statistical 
methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops’ (INCSR 2000: 
17). But the picture is less clear, it states, on crop yields, where small changes 
in soil fertility, weather, farming techniques and crop disease can produce 
widely varying results. Not all estimates include allowances for losses. As 
such, estimates in one year may be revised in succeeding years. But the major 
challenge lies in estimating the amount of heroin or cocaine that can be 
processed from the volume of crops harvested. Despite these caveats, the 
ONDCP and UNODC stress that these figures ‘are useful for determining 
trends’, even if the best figures are ultimately approximations. 
Sometimes, the differences may be attributed to a lack of clarity on 
whether the area being estimated was monitored before or after some form 
of crop control or eradication. But a common likely explanation is that 
different methodologies have been used, thus producing significant variations 
in the estimates. In order to deal with these differences in figures, this study 
has taken the following steps: 
• In the case of opium, this study entered all the differing figures 
provided for succeeding years in both INCSRs and WDRs into a 
single spreadsheet. Where only one entry exists, that was used. Where 
a newer entry revised an older entry, the newer figure was used. But 
in all other rows, the average of the different entries was computed. 
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Although this is an ad hoc process, the goal here is merely to sketch 
the outlines and the trends, not to produce alternative figures with 
scientific certainty.  
• The differences in the figures for coca are much more difficult to 
overcome because changes in methodology produced significant 
variations. One example is the changing estimates on Colombia’s 
coca leaf production from 1995 to 1998. INCSR 1998 reported that 
in 1994, coca leaf production was at 40,800 tonnes. However, when 
a different methodology was adopted by the Colombian government, 
INCSR 1999 reported the 1995 figure to be 229,300 tonnes — a more 
than fourfold upward change, and making the figure substantially 
different from that reported in the WDRs. Hence, in producing the 
graphs on coca, this study has taken the decision to report separately 
on what the INCSRs and the WDRs supply.  
Taking a cue from a graph constructed by Laserna in 1995 (see Chapter 6, 
Figure 6.1), it is still possible, despite the wide variations in estimates, to plot 
a measure of central tendency in order to construct a broad outline and to 
sketch the trends that shape the illicit crop trade.  
3.6.3 Areas under cultivation: Opium 
Figure 3.6, based on data from both INCSR and WDR, provides the broad 
outline of the area under opium cultivation from 1985 to 2017 in the two 
main producing countries, Afghanistan and Myanmar. The figure shows that 
Myanmar (orange line) had more land under opium cultivation until around 
2003 when its cultivation went down while Afghan opium poppy fields 
expanded.  
There are key differences that need to be considered when comparing 
opium cultivation in the two countries. For example, most of Myanmar’s 
opium-growing land is on rain-fed hillsides, while in Afghanistan, the main 
opium-growing areas, Helmand and Kandahar, are desert regions crossed by 
river valleys with irrigation canals and diversion ditches that distribute water 
from two main dams collecting water flowing down from the Hindu Kush 
mountain ranges. It is for this reason, the WDR notes, that yields per rain-fed 
hectare in Myanmar are typically four times lower than the yield from mostly 
irrigation-fed opium cropland in Afghanistan (WDR 2001: 6). Myanmar’s 
opium crop, however, has a higher morphine content, which is why in certain 
years typical Myanmar opium was three to four times more expensive than 
Afghan opium.  
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The orange line in Figure 3.6 adds another layer of information on 
Myanmar: from 1985 to 1989, the area under cultivation increased 
significantly. This was a period in which the country’s multiple insurgent 
groups rearranged and repositioned themselves amidst political agitation in 
the main cities, elections, and the military coup of 1988. In the early 1980s, a 
stalemate had emerged in Myanmar’s multi-ethnic conflicts, prompting the 
military to adopt a new and unorthodox counter-insurgency strategy in which 
private militias engaging in the drug trade were allowed access to government-
controlled highways, as long as they fought on the military’s side. In addition, 
Myanmar’s generals exploited rifts within the bigger rebel armies, by 
tolerating splinter groups making money from the illicit drug trade (FEER, 
June 1990; Lintner, 2015; McCoy, 2003: 434–435). By 1989, many of these 
insurgents started signing ceasefire agreements with government. Thus, from 
1989 to 1997, while insurgencies were generally in abeyance, Myanmar also 
recorded its highest level of areas under opium cultivation.  
The most striking feature of the blue line (Afghanistan), on the other hand, 
is its generally upward slope from 1985 to 2017, which tracks Afghanistan’s 
rise to become the world’s major producer of opium and heroin. But within 
this rise are dramatic decreases and increases. The most notable is the 
decrease in land under opium cultivation and opium production from 2000 
to 2001, which is attributed to the Taliban-imposed opium ban. In the 
subsequent years, the WDRs attributed production decreases to crop diseases 
and unfavourable weather patterns. In 2003, Afghanistan overtook Myanmar 
with a greater area under cultivation, but it was some time earlier, in the mid-
1990s, that Afghanistan surpassed Myanmar’s opium production (Figure 3.11 
below).119  
 
119 All data tables from which graphs in this section are drawn are supplied in the Annexes to 
this thesis. 





3.6.4 Areas under cultivation: Coca  
Figure 3.7 shows the changes in the area under coca cultivation in Colombia 
from 1985 to 2018. Note, however, that rather than merge data from the two 
official sources, the graph shows separately what is reported by the INCSRs 
(blue line) and what is reported by the WDRs (orange line). From 1987 to 
1998, the estimates provided by the two agencies are almost identical. But 
from 2001 onwards, the INCSRs consistently reported higher estimates. The 
greatest difference was in 2006, when the INCSR reported an estimate of 
157,100 hectares, which is more than double the WDR estimate of 78,000 
hectares. However, despite these differences from 2001, the two lines are 
more or less parallel to each other, which suggests differences in 
methodology. Mejia and Posada observe that UNODC’s methodology for 
collecting data covers almost the entire territories of producer countries, 
whereas the ONDCP’s surveys cover only a representative sample (2008: 8).  
 Figure 3.6: Area (hectares) under illicit opium cultivation in Afghanistan and Myanmar.  
Source: See Annex 
 





From 1982 to 1989, growing levels of violence in the war on drugs in 
Colombia coincided with a steady increase in areas under cultivation. The 
enforcement statistics for 1985 were impressive: 725 cocaine labs destroyed; 
280 weapons, 109 radios and 167 vehicles confiscated; 21 aircraft impounded; 
and 132,407 gallons of gasoline (petrol), 67,368 gallons of ether, 39,057 
gallons of acetone, 15,200 gallons of acid and 70,108 kg of sodium carbonate 
seized (INCSR 2000: 80–81). Yet enforcement appears to have barely made 
a dent, as areas under cultivation continued to increase. This could have been 
accounted for by the so-called ‘balloon effect’ — pressure in one area merely 
forces the illicit trade to reappear in another area. When the war on drugs 
intensified from 1989 to 1995 — leading to the dismantling of the main 
cartels — the area under coca cultivation did not substantially decrease as 
expected.  
A similarly broad sketch of the area under cultivation in Bolivia is 
presented in Figure 3.8. It shows the rise of Bolivia as a major coca producer 
beginning in the early 1980s during a coca boom (Laserna, 1995) and peaking 
from 1989 to 1996, after which cultivation decreased, reaching historic lows 
by 2000. Thereafter it generally rose again until 2010, when it started to 
decline. However, from 2013, the INCSR and WDR reports diverge, with the 
INCSR giving much higher figures than the WDR.  
Figure 3.7: Differences in estimates of the INCSRs and WDRs on illicit coca cultivation in Colombia 
 





Two questions emerge from Figure 3.8. First, what explains the rise in area 
under cultivation in Bolivia from the early 1980s to the peak in 1989?120 In 
the first half of the 1980s, Bolivia was a main supplier of coca paste during 
the rapid expansion of the Colombian cartels. It is plausible therefore that the 
driver of the rise of coca cultivation was demand from Colombia. This will 
be investigated further in subsequent chapters. Second, what explains the 
decrease from 1996 to 2000? One hypothesis is that this was due to US 
pressure – especially since US Executive Order 12978, which reinvigorated 
the American-led global counter-narcotics campaign, was issued in 1995.   
Figures 3.9a and 3.9b present a comparison of areas under cultivation in 
Bolivia and Colombia, based on INCSR (3.9a) and WDR (3.9b) data. Though 
the INCSR and WDR figures differ, the story is more or less the same. Bolivia 
produced more coca than Colombia from the 1980s until 1995, when coca 
 
120 Note that in the Annexes this thesis, data from a table created by Painter (1994: 15) on 
coca cultivation in Bolivia (1963–1991) have been entered in the spreadsheet. Plotted onto a 
graph, this confirms coca cultivation was below 10,000 hectares until 1975, rising to about 
20,000 hectares in 1980. In the years that overlap with INCSR and WDR, Painter’s estimates 
tended to be higher. 
Figure 3.8: Differences in estimates of the INCSRs and WDRs on illicit coca cultivation in Bolivia 
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cropland in Colombia overtook and rose steeply until 2001. There is 
divergence from 2003, when the INCSRs reported an increase, but the WDRs 
showed gradual decrease until 2014. However, there is convergence again 
from 2014 onwards, when both reports suggest similar steeply rising estimates 
for Colombia (though INCSR estimates are larger).   
 
 








1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Comparison of hectares under coca cultivation in 
Colombia and Bolivia from 1984 to 2018, using INCSR 
data only
Bolivia (INCSR) Colombia (INCSR)
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Figure 3.9b: Area under Coca Cultivation (WDR data) 
 
According to WDR (2001: 67), the sharp increases in Colombia (orange 
lines) from 1995 to 2001 were due to the implementation of a new monitoring 
methodology under the UNODC’s Illicit Crop Monitoring System that 
started in 1999 which was then backtracked to the 1995 estimates. This new 
methodology led to higher estimates being reported. The WDR notes that 
due to differences in methodologies, the UNODC and US reporting systems 
are not comparable. However, when tracked on the graph and compared to 
the nearly identical estimates on Bolivia (blue lines), the differences come 
across as two variations of what is essentially a similar story. It needs to be 
emphasised that these are broad outlines, and not precise representations.   
The WDR 2000 explains that though Colombia is the major manufacturer 
of cocaine hydrochloride, it initially did not grow a lot of coca but imported 
the necessary cocaine base from Peru and Bolivia (see Figure 3.10). This 
changed in the 1990s. By 1997, Colombia’s cultivation and production were 
on a par with Peru’s, and by 1999, two-thirds of all coca leaf was produced in 
Colombia. The WDR attributes the shift to the following factors. First, a 
fungus destroyed significant amounts of the coca harvest in Peru. Second, 
clandestine flights for the delivery of coca base from Peru and Bolivia to 
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Colombia were curtailed. The closure of the air corridor caused coca farm-
gate prices in Peru to collapse and in Bolivia to decline. As the Colombian 
cocaine manufacturers lost their supply chains, they looked for other sources 
of supply and found it inside Colombia itself. Sourcing coca paste within 
Colombia became necessary because the successors to the Cali and Medellin 
cartels, as WDR 2000 notes, ‘did not have the kind of infrastructure to 
organise the logistics to transport large amounts of coca leaf or paste from 
Peru and Bolivia’. In addition, coca could be more easily grown in the 
territories where the Colombian government did not exercise control, like the 
areas controlled by guerrilla or paramilitary groups (WDR 2000: 29–30). 
 
 
3.6.5 Production figures: Opium  
Figure 3.11 tracks the estimated production (in tonnes) of dried opium in 
Afghanistan and Myanmar from 1983 to 2018. From 1983 to 1993, Myanmar 
was the global leader, but Afghanistan started to surpass it in 1994. By 1997, 
Myanmar had entered a long-term decline in production, while Afghanistan 
started to produce more. In 2001, however, there was a precipitous drop in 
Afghanistan’s production. This was attributed to the Taliban-imposed opium 
ban that, according to Farrell and Thorne (2004: 81), achieved an 
unprecedented 99% fall in production in Taliban-controlled territories. This 
was quickly followed by a dramatic increase, reaching 7,800 tonnes by 2007 
— at that time the highest recorded level. 
Figure 3.10: Colombia’s rise and the changes in illicit cultivation and coca leaf production. Source: WDR 1999: 42 
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After 2007, disease affected opium crops, leading to a sharp decline with 
production reaching pre-opium ban levels.  Since then, production levels have 
fluctuated due to a host of other factors, including weather and soil 
conditions. WDR 2019a and INCSR 2019 Vol. 1 both report that in 2017, 
world production estimates reached their highest levels since records began, 
driven largely by record opium production in Afghanistan which went beyond 
9,000 tonnes.  
 
3.6.6 Production figures: Coca 
As noted earlier, there are huge variations in the estimates of production 
reported by the INCSRs and the WDRs, hence, it is necessary to present their 
figures separately. In Figure 3.12, the production estimates for Colombia’s 
dried coca leaf, as reported by the INCSRs (blue line) and by the WDRs 
(orange line), tell two substantively different stories.  
 Figure 3.11: Estimated production of dried opium (tonnes) in Afghanistan and Myanmar 
 





As with estimates of area under cultivation (Figure 3.9b), WDR 2001 
attributes increases in production from 1995 to 2000 to the adoption of a new 
monitoring methodology by the Colombian government which started in 
1999 and was then retroactively applied to the prior five years, back to 1995, 
thus revising previous estimates. The details of the methodology and how it 
changed are not available in the publicly accessible documents, so little can 
be said about it here. However, as can be seen from Figure 3.12, it resulted in 
dramatic changes in the estimates, especially of the INCSR figures. In 1994, 
the INCSR reported coca production estimates at 40,800 tonnes. In the 
following year, the estimate increased more than fourfold to 229,300 tonnes. 
Although the orange and blue lines follow a similar overall trend, the numbers 
are startlingly different. In 2000, the INCSR estimated Colombia to have 
produced 583,000 tonnes, compared to the WDR’s estimate of 261,058 
tonnes, or a difference of 321,942 tonnes. No statements from either 
organisation were seen to explain such huge discrepancies, which seem to 
represent two very different stories of Colombia’s coca production. 
The lines do not start and begin on the same years. This is because the 
earliest figure supplied by the UN publications came only in 1986. The lines 
end in 2013 (WDR) and 2014 (INCSR) because after these years, the two 
publications reported only on cocaine production, and did not supply figures 
Figure 3.12: Two different stories on coca production 
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on coca leaf production. This reveals a law enforcement predisposition in the 
reports and a lack of focus on what mattered more to the poor peasant 
growers of illicit coca.  
In contrast, there is more similarity in the production estimates from the 
two reports for Bolivia, as shown in Figure 3.13. Prior to 1992, the WDR 
estimates were higher. From 1992 to 1999, the two reports supplied nearly 
identical estimates. From 1999 onwards, WDR estimates tended to be lower 
than the INCSR’s. Estimates in the WDR extend to 2018 because the Bolivia 
Illicit Crop Monitoring Surveys supplied the figures until that year.  
 
 
A most interesting point regarding Colombia, as seen in Figures 3.7 and 
3.12, is the rise in area under cultivation and coca leaf production from 1992 
to 2000. This period of growth in hectarage and production was immediately 
preceded by the elimination of drug kingpins like Escobar and the Rodriguez-
Orejuela brothers, as well as the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali cartels, 
along with the majority of their legal fronts and enterprises. But instead of 
decreasing due to an apparently ‘victorious’ war on drugs, hectarage and 
production actually increased at unprecedented speed. It appears that the 
atomisation of drug production from ‘the large, visible Medellin and Cali 
cartels to a much greater number of smaller drug producers’, and the 
consequent emergence of ‘boutique drug traffickers’ (Crandall, 2002: 160), 
Figure 3.13: Comparison of production estimates in Bolivia 
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led to the overall expansion of the illicit trade. An unintended consequence 
of the war on drugs apparently was the transformation of the illicit trade from 
centralised cartel to dispersed small-scale ‘ant’ traffic that may have caused or 
contributed to the reported expansion in cultivation and production. It is also 
worth noting that the growth in hectarage and production occurred at the 
time that paramilitaries consolidated after the demise of the big cartels. 
Similarly, the later decline in hectarage and production, after 2001, coincided 
with the fragmentation and demobilisation of the paramilitaries.  
Again, it must be emphasised that the graphs are not without limitations 
and offer only broad sketches that may be challenged. Their value lies in 
providing reference points: the stories of resilience and careers which are 
elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5 can now be assessed against a trajectory of 
illicit crop production over a number of years.  
3.7 Conclusion  
There is a well-known Indian parable about blind men who approached an 
elephant from different sides and made their respective descriptions of what 
it must look like. The first touched the elephant’s side and concluded that an 
elephant is like a wall. The second touched the tusk and said it is like a spear. 
Another got hold of the squirming trunk and said it was like a snake, while a 
fourth felt about its legs, and said it is like a tree. The parable has now become 
a metaphor about how different versions of the same ‘reality’ emerge.  
Similarly, there are different versions of the same reality of illicit crops, 
their commodity chains, and the actors within them — the consumers, 
intermediaries and producers. This is perhaps why debates over drugs and 
development policies seem to be interminable. Hence, prior to presenting and 
developing the central research question and research design of this study, it 
was necessary to historicise the main elements of what is known about illicit 
opium and coca economies (Chapter 2), and to probe and test at least the 
official versions of that reality today (Chapter 3). 
This chapter has not only presented broad sketches of the consumer, 
intermediary and producer elements of the illicit trade in opium and coca. It 
has also provided critical commentary on the internal consistency of the 
official measurements of the consumer markets using three tests: (a) checking 
whether official estimates on number of users and volume of production 
validate each other; (b) computing for the possible annual average 
consumption per user and assessing whether the sums are reasonable; and (c) 
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calculating average spending per user and making a judgement on its 
plausibility.  
The tests in Section 3.3 show that estimates of market size (number of 
individual users) are not consistent with estimates on volume of production, 
because average consumption per user as computed on the basis of official 
figures are very unlikely. The tests also show that estimates on users’ 
expenditures on cocaine and heroin are far too high to be realistic. These 
results do not belittle or undermine the importance of the policies intended 
to tackle the harms and deaths being attributed to drug abuse. Rather, the 
results raise the possibility that political agendas are shaping the data, and not 
(as it should be) the other way around.  
If the estimates are not internally consistent, it is therefore necessary to 
examine the wider picture, and consider what the other ‘blind men’ say. 
Proponents of prohibition insist that the ‘drug problem’ is a public order issue 
that can only be resolved through law enforcement. Harm reduction experts 
assert that it should be tackled as a public health matter. Development 
contends that at the roots of the problem lie social and economic inequalities. 
It is likewise possible that the solution will not be a one-size-fits-all silver 
bullet, but rather that many different, bespoke, context-specific fixes that do 
not rule out proposals like legalisation will be needed.  
The lack of consistency brings policy debates to an impasse. Yet there is a 
way to resolve this conundrum: comparative analysis. Because figures and 
data can always be framed in a particular way to emphasise a certain type of 
urgency, or to overturn perceived policy complacency, critical comparative 
analysis may offer a way of testing and checking. What this chapter has shown 
is that a comparative approach is essential in tackling the ‘known unknowns’ 
and ‘unknown unknowns’ of this study.    
This chapter has also examined what is known about the intermediaries of 
illicit economies in the world’s main opium and coca producing countries. 
Though opium and coca economies are illicit, the mechanisms that enable 
them are hidden in plain sight in financial systems, industries, infrastructure 
and the labour supply — both formal and informal. It is in this regard that 
the US system of reporting indeed provides a public service. Unlike the 
WDRs which can be hamstrung by objections from member-states and are 
thus constantly balancing on a diplomatic tightrope, the INCSRs readily 
identify the transit as well as the money-laundering countries involved in the 
illicit drugs trade. Hence, intermediaries and enablers across the world are 
known; offshore secrecy and financial services providers are identified; and 
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the benefits that illicit drug profits deliver to economic giants and big 
countries can be documented.  
Yet at the same time it must be said too that the maverick US system also 
exercises some form of malign influence in the global tracking and 
monitoring of illicit economies. The UN system, which traces its origins to 
the 1909 Opium Conference in Shanghai, was a US initiative, an explicit quest 
to internationalise the doctrine of drug prohibition. It was also US influence 
over the decades that built up a ‘prohibition culture’ (Bewley-Taylor, 2002; 
2012). The international drug control apparatus of the UN system today, 
therefore, is an achievement of US policy. But despite being part and parcel 
of this international apparatus, the US maintains its own unilateral system. 
Part of the reason is that as the US intensified its pursuit of prohibition, it 
created laws that required its own apparatus to be independent of, although 
linked to, the multilateral system. Having two systems creates some problems. 
First, the UN system, where decisions are made based on a one-country, one-
vote process is effectively undermined by the US vote, which though only a 
single vote like all the others, carries a lot of behind-the-scenes influence and 
the constant threat of a veto. Second, countries need to surrender some of 
their sovereignty in accepting US policy because the US has awarded itself the 
power to label who’s good or bad, narcotics-wise. Those who don’t align 
themselves with US policy — like Bolivia, Venezuela or Iran — tend to be 
decertified. And third, the existence of two systems produces two versions of 
reality that, while not necessarily cancelling each other out, will nonetheless 
bend the direction and scope of global policy-making towards US policy. 
Though the UN distances itself from the US, stating that it has not declared 
any ‘war on drugs’ and that all its actions are all in accordance with legal treaty 
mandates, it will be seen as complicit in US-sponsored and militarised 
counter-narcotics operations that destroy livelihoods and violate human 
rights. When Bolivian cocaleros attempted to represent themselves before the 
UN in June 1998 during the General Assembly Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem, UN officials did not object when they were not granted their 
US visas.   
Finally, this chapter has provided some contextualisation of the estimates 
on land and harvests generated by the US and UN monitoring systems. It has 
highlighted how informal financial systems, like the hawalas, enable 
transactions and payments across borders; it has demonstrated that 
enforcement barely dents the ‘ant’ traffic; that criminal entrepreneurs 
innovate and find better ways and new chemicals to produce plant-based 
drugs; and that ultimately, national governments have their own priorities that 
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may not be aligned with global prohibition. The chapter shows that 
understanding local contexts is essential. Therefore, in the later chapters, this 
study will pay particular attention to highlighting local social, political and 
economic contexts.  
This chapter started with the statement that the illicit trade in coca and 
opium products is a global enterprise, and its various sections have confirmed 






The Paradox of Illicit Economies: 
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4.1 Introduction: The disconnect between drug and 
development policy 
On September 2015, the United Nations unanimously adopted Agenda 2030, 
or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Agenda 2030 is billed as a 
‘roadmap for the future’, and consists of 17 goals, the delivery of which will 
be measured through 169 quantitative targets and 262 indicators, with nation-
states (countries) as both the unit of analysis and reporting entities.121  First 
in Agenda 2030’s list of commitments is a promise to ‘leave no one behind’ 
and to ‘put the last first’. Yet the reality is that the reach of development 
programmes and the implementation of the SDGs are barely touching the 
margins. The most dangerous places122 — borderlands with high levels of 
 
121 For a full list of all 17 SDGs with their 169 targets and 232 indicators, see the UN’s SDG 
website https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/. The SDGs are available in text 
and spreadsheet form. SDG monitoring consists largely of tracking how a country (i.e. not a 
sub-national area or a region, but a ‘country’) has delivered on the quantitative targets and 
indicators. Countries typically conduct ‘Voluntary National Reviews’ (VNRs), which are then 
submitted and peer-reviewed in the UN system.   
122 The label ‘dangerous places’ is used by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to 
refer to territories in the top 25% in terms of violent death rates; in addition, they are the 
source of 40% of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons. Such territories are 
found in a total of 110 countries. See the SIPRI 2017 Yearbook: 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c06.pdf.  As one example of how devel-
opment is ‘barely touching the margins’ today, in early 2012, after conflict erupted in north-
ern Mali, Christian Aid evacuated its staff from most of its areas of operation, and since then 
has been unable to send them back due to the risks.   
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violence, conflict and ongoing displacement — remain marginalised and 
excluded from markets, beyond the reach and protection of state and 
multilateral institutions, and hence subsist, typically, by relying on illicit 
economies for coping and survival strategies.123  
Debates more than 20years ago on reframing the understanding of 
conflicts, particularly the persistence within such conflicts of illicit and 
criminal enterprise (e.g. drug crops, ‘blood’ diamonds, human trafficking, 
etc.), should have shifted the understanding about SDGs, borderlands and 
dangerous places. Duffield pointed out that global markets have expanded 
even into unstable regions, thereby creating a ‘grey zone of international 
commercial activity’ in which companies are able to secure a degree of 
privilege and protection through negotiation and private deals with rulers 
(1998: 84). Reno argued that clandestine economic systems ‘have become 
widespread and integral to building political authority in parts of Africa’, thus 
challenging existing assumptions about ‘how political actors calculate their 
interests’ (1998: ix). Goodhand suggested that war economies could be 
reflections of long-term innovative adaptations of marginalised and excluded 
economies to globalisation, ‘linked to expanding networks of parallel (illegal) 
and grey (semi-legal) economic activity’ (2000: 265). Keen offered the view 
that conflict is not simply the irrational breaking down of societies and 
economies; it is also ‘the reordering of societies and economies in particular ways’ (italics 
in original). In examining the ‘economic benefits of war’, as well as top-down 
and bottom-up economic violence, Keen concluded that internal forms of 
war may now be better understood as the ‘continuation of economics by 
other means’ (Keen, 1998: 9–13).  
But such reframing and the research that came with it, unfortunately, 
never really gained currency. In a review of subsequent literature, for example, 
Bhatia points out that war economies characterised by illicit drugs cultivation 
and the proliferation of criminal and quasi-criminal networks have been 
predominantly regarded by policy-makers managing post-war transitions and 
counter-narcotics policies not in terms of ‘the reordering of societies in 
particular ways’ as Keen suggested, but as the outcome of ‘peace spoilers’ 
(Bhatia, 2019). The areas where illicit crop cultivation emerged were typically 
written off as ‘dangerous places’, implying an undesired deviation from the 
‘normal’. Goodhand notes that representations of these places as 
ungoverned, rebellious zones of illegality ignore the empirical clues and 
 
123 See further discussions in the July 2019 report published by Christian Aid on Peace, Illicit 
Drugs, and the SDGs (Christian Aid, 2019). 
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anomalies that coping, survival and adaptation take place in contexts of 
fragility and conflict by whatever means possible, with or without state or 
development interventions (Goodhand, 2019). Ballve argues that despite the 
typical depiction of these spaces as ‘ungovernable’ or ‘stateless’, narco-
frontiers ‘are wracked by extra-legal regimes of rule in which the state is 
simply one actor among others’ (2019: 211) enforcing or attempting to 
enforce its authority. And even though various ‘unruly’ areas absorb 
displacement and exclusion from elsewhere, thereby actually providing 
solutions rather than being simply problems, flawed assumptions persist that 
illicit economies can only be sources of instability and are distinct and could 
easily be separated from licit economic activities.  
As such, blind spots have emerged in the understanding of illicit 
economies. Official narratives, summarised in the WDRs and INCSRs, 
overwhelmingly support the eradication of illicit economies by law 
enforcement, and not through the introduction of development programmes 
to finally address what actually is the more fundamental problem: the 
marginalisation and exclusion of the affected territories and communities. 
This chapter examines these blind spots and traces their genealogy not only 
to show that marginalisation and exclusion are the foundational problems to 
be solved, but also to find ways of bridging the disconnect between drug 
policy and development policy. 
Today, the ‘drug problem’ remains one of the most difficult policy 
challenges for the United Nations, donor agencies and national governments. 
Global opium harvests in 2016–2017 were officially estimated to be between 
9,100 and 9,400 tonnes, from which 700 to 1,050 tonnes of heroin were 
processed (WDR 2018a: 12). That is equivalent — using the often-cited 
observed retail street price of heroin in London of $135,000 per kg (see Table 
1A of this study) — to a potential global annual turnover of between $94.5 
billion and $141.75 billion. Similarly, global turnover of cocaine sales is huge 
at an estimated $169.2 billion, based on the street prices of cocaine in Chicago 
of $120,000 per kg (Reuter and Trautmann, 2009: 23).124 In comparison, the 
 
124 There appears to be some discrepancy in Reuter and Trautmann’s Table 1 (2009: 23), due 
to notations of ‘ounces’ and ‘100 mg. pure’. However, this Chapter uses the figures of 
$135,000 per kg for heroin and $120,000 per kg for cocaine based on the logic of the table. 
Note that these authors’ estimates are inferences into hidden activities, not actually ob-
served sales and consumption.  
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worldwide trade in cane sugar was estimated to be worth $69.7 billion in 2018, 
while the global coffee business was estimated at $107.8 billion in 2019.125  
Despite such scope and magnitude, the disconnect between drug and 
development policies remains. This is no better reflected than in the lack of 
links and complementarities between the Systematic Country Diagnostics 
(SCDs) of the World Bank Group (WBG) on one hand, and the WDRs of 
the UNODC on the other. The SCDs examine economic development 
problems to inform the WBG’s strategy for a particular country. Because the 
WBG is also a ‘knowledge bank’, the SCDs arguably offer a most authoritative 
official socio-economic and fiscal assessment of a country under review. Yet 
the SCDs suffer from a fundamental flaw: they pay scant attention to illicit 
economies and their impact on local communities.  
• The last SCD for Myanmar, published in November 2014,126 includes 
just one marginal reference to ‘opium’ in one paragraph of its 67 
pages. This omission is despite footnotes in the SCD mentioning that 
the country was undergoing historic ‘triple transition’ changes since 
the elections of 2011. In each of these changes — from military to 
democratic governance; from a centrally directed, closed economy to 
a market-oriented one; and from 60 years of conflict towards peace 
in the border areas (World Bank, 2014: 7) — opium plays a key role, 
and yet the analysis remains wilfully blind to opium’s existence and 
impact on the changing local context. 
• Similarly in Afghanistan’s SCD, published in 2016, opium is given 
only passing mention. 127  Described as ‘a country-level analytical 
document that provides an evidence-based diagnostic to help identify 
development priorities’, the Afghanistan SCD reports that inequality 
has increased, growth is not equally distributed, and economic growth 
fell sharply in 2015–2016. Furthermore, it points out that while 
 
125 Figures on sugar were sourced from https://www.statista.com/topics/1224/sugar/; the 
figures on coffee came from https://www.statista.com/outlook/30010000/100/cof-
fee/worldwide, both last accessed 31 March 2019.  
126 See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/427501468109465674/Myanmar-Sys-
tematic-Country-Diagnostic-Ending-poverty-and-boosting-shared-prosperity-in-a-time-of-
transition, accessed 28 January 2020. In January 2019, the Bank announced the start of prep-
arations to produce a new SCD for Myanmar. See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/info-
graphic/2019/01/21/myanmar-systematic-country-diagnostic , last accessed 31 March 2019. 
127 See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/302911468190767498/Afghanistan-
Systematic-country-diagnostic, accessed 28 January 2020.  
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international development aid contributed to growth and job creation 
in high-conflict areas, it did not contribute to raising productivity. 
This SCD therefore recommends three priorities: a) strong and 
inclusive growth and job creation; b) expansion of prioritised service 
delivery; and c) fiscal stability to reduce dependence on aid in the 
medium-term (World Bank, 2016). Again, the omission of opium is a 
fundamental flaw because the opium economy — as shown by 
evidence provided by Mansfield, Fishstein, Fitzherbert, Pain and 
others — is a most important creator of jobs and distributor of 
income; it delivers services, including protection, to those involved; 
and it is a main source of cash in places not reached by development 
aid. It is a puzzle how an institution as well equipped and informed 
as the World Bank has allowed a massive blind spot to restrict its 
analysis and diagnosis of the situation in Afghanistan.   
• In Colombia’s 2015 SCD, the first of only three mentions of ‘coca’ 
appears late — on page 89.128 This SCD argues that in order ‘to 
achieve poverty eradication and shared prosperity in a sustainable 
manner’, Colombia must tackle its ‘three defining characteristics’: 
first, an uneven territorial development; second, the presence of a 
protracted armed conflict; and third, almost two decades of 
extractives-based economic growth (World Bank, 2015b: 7). Why 
coca was not included in the analysis is baffling. Published research 
from Ramirez (2011) and Torres (2011) details the key role played by 
coca for coping and survival in the neglected territories where armed 
conflict was particularly acute. More specifically, coca enables those 
areas abandoned by the state to be reconnected to markets. Though 
insurgent groups use the illicit coca economy as a source of funding, 
it is also the case that peasants displaced by conflict and by extractive 
industries are among those who turn to coca for survival. Despite its 
obvious central role in Colombia’s marginalised regions, coca 
receives only passing mention.  
• Bolivia’s SCD, also published in 2015, has no mention at all of ‘coca’ 
or ‘drugs’ in its 109 pages (World Bank, 2015a). This, again, is a 
significant omission, given that Bolivia’s president Evo Morales was 




28 January 2020.   
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movement. A key concern raised and analysed in the SCD is Bolivia’s 
public debt, but there is very little attention paid to household debt 
— a widespread and constant problem for poor households surviving 
in marginalised areas and resorting to coca cultivation.  
Thus, despite the claim that the SCDs draw upon ‘all available 
information’ from research by both the WBG and other international and 
domestic partners, there is little to show that the WBG has seriously 
considered incorporating illicit economies into its analyses. This is 
unfortunate because, as this study contends, tackling illicit trades — especially 
those that are routinely or deliberately overlooked in development 
programming — is strategically important not only in ensuring that deprived 
and marginalised communities have a stake in a country’s national 
development plans, but also in providing the basis for sustainable 
development and peace. 
One reason for the omission may be that illicit crop production is 
considered a ‘shadow’ or illicit economic activity.  Hence jobs, income or 
revenues from these clandestine economic activities may not be explicitly 
captured by usual measurements and are instead assumed or recorded as 
‘proceeds of crime’, for which monitoring is patchy and limited to law 
enforcement agencies. But one also wonders if the WBG avoided considering 
illicit crop economies, because this field is regarded as the sole domain of the 
UNODC.  
To be clear, though, the neglect is mutual. On one hand the SCDs do not 
consider illicit crop economies in their scope, apparently ignoring UNODC 
data. But on the other hand, despite the availability of relevant data and 
analysis from the World Bank, the WDRs do not cite the SCDs in their 
analysis of, for example, employment levels, access to credit, or other socio-
economic trends in the illicit-crop-producing territories surveyed. Thus, 
UNODC data and analyses are not taken up by the WBG, and the WBG’s 
development data are not used by the UNODC. The mutual exclusions are a 
source of methodological and analytical weakness in both sets of reports.  
These omissions represent a serious error. Among other things, it leads to 
a failure to acknowledge and analyse the paradox that illicit economies, 
though a driver of criminal activity, may also be a source of order under 
certain conditions, and that criminal actors, though drivers of predation and 
violence, can be development actors too, no matter how counter-intuitive 
that may seem. The disconnect also explains the fundamental conundrum. 
Drug policy could not solve the so-called ‘drug problem’, as evidenced by the 
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failure of prohibition. Solutions may perhaps be found in the application of 
development policy, but current development orthodoxy, as reflected in the 
WBG’s approach, remains far too limited and unable to penetrate the 
interdependencies — the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of coping and survival in illicit-
crop-producing territories with high levels of violence and conflict. What 
emerges therefore is a segregation between drugs policy and development 
policy: official drugs policy and development policy are effectively siloed from 
each other.   
Despite the disconnect, it is essential to emphasise that the WBG and 
UNODC share some common understandings: they have more or less similar 
assumptions over illicit economies and their supposed harms, differences 
notwithstanding. The rest of this chapter is an examination of these shared 
assumptions, a step that may be key to unravelling the paradox of illicit 
economies. This chapter first groups these assumptions into four threads, and 
then attempts to unpack and deconstruct them. This elaboration is necessary 
because, collectively, drugs and development agencies get to define to a 
significant degree what is presumed to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in illicit-crop-
producing territories. These assumptions, whether explicit or implicit, 
become the frameworks for understanding; they construct the dominant 
depictions with which these territories are typically framed; and shape what is 
measured, and how, in the respective countries. These assumptions may 
explain why resilience — the innovative and unorthodox strategies for coping 
and survival in the constantly changing and insecure environments of illicit-
crop-producing territories — remains a blind spot in both drugs policy and 
development policy orthodoxy.  
Thus, the principal difference between the licit and the illicit entrepreneur 
may simply be the socially constructed and politically applied label ‘criminal’, 
because both are, after all, involved in similar processes of commodification 
of crops, accumulation of wealth and assets, and appropriation of labour. The 
coercive specialisation of criminal entrepreneurs does not make them less or 
more reliant than licit capitalists on interdependent relationships. As 
Abraham and van Schendel note, there is an uncanny symmetry between 
criminal networks and strategic business models. The dominant imagery of 
nation-states fighting valiantly against global criminal networks, as 
represented in institutions like the UNODC and the WBG, ‘is far too 
simplistic and even misleading’. The labels ‘illegal’ or ‘criminal’ are applied to 
those who defy the norms and rules of formal political authority, ‘but they 
are quite acceptable, “licit”, in the eyes of the participants in these transactions 
and flows’ (2006: 3–4). Nordstrom points out that trillions of dollars move 
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around the world outside legal channels, flowing through millions of hands, 
thousands of institutions and hundreds of borders, as ‘they ruin the lives of 
some and create vast empires of profit for others’ (2007: xvi).  
Before proceeding, a short note is necessary on this chapter’s 
methodology. This chapter uses comparative analysis, drawn from existing 
discussions of specific local contexts and cases that cover almost all illegal 
opium production (Afghanistan and Myanmar) and the vast majority of coca 
production (Colombia and Bolivia). Thus, the chapter does not present new 
empirical material, or data sourced from primary sources as in Chapter 3. 
Rather, what is new here is that it uses carefully selected material from the 
four countries in a comparative way to unpack the discourses on global drugs 
policy. As noted in Chapter 1, this comparative approach has been suggested 
as a way to tackle the research problems that emerge when much of the 
phenomenon under study remains hidden; when available data are uneven; 
and when the conditions which have a bearing on the analysis are often 
incomplete or piecemeal (Mollinga and Gondhalekar, 2014). Inferences are 
then developed from the comparison of the material gathered. Systematic 
comparisons can be a useful strategy to address the limitations of knowledge 
on phenomena that are hidden, understudied, piecemeal or incomplete, and 
can potentially generate new insights through which long-running divides 
between drugs and development policies may be better addressed. 
 
4.2 (Thread A) ‘Fragile states are most vulnerable to 
illicit crop production and its harms’: The case of 
Afghanistan and Helmand  
A central and widely held assumption of both drugs and development 
agencies is that fragile states129 are most vulnerable to illicit crop production 
and its harms. Illicit drug crops are understood to be a cause, or at least an 
essential attribute, of violent conflict. As the UN Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND) stated in its 2009 Political Declaration, ‘drugs infect society 
through open wounds’, and fragile states are understood to be among those 
 
129 Defined as ‘states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, 
comprehensive service entitlements, or legitimacy’ (Stewart and Brown, 2009: 3). 
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‘open wounds’ (CND, 2009).130 Fragile states not only provide safe havens 
for criminals but are also the most likely places where illicit crops could be 
grown ‘with impunity’. A working paper published by the OECD adds, 
‘conflict-affected and fragile states are especially vulnerable to the dynamics 
of transnational organised crime and may provide more favourable conditions 
for its development’ (Miraglia et al., 2012: 2). Afghanistan is one such ‘deeply 
fragile and conflict-affected state’, according to the opening sentence of its 
2016 SCD (World Bank, 2016: 1).  
Indeed, fragility and conflict have been emphasised as Afghanistan’s ‘most 
important constraints’ in addressing poverty and achieving development. To 
these the World Bank SCD added further ‘critical constraints’: a demographic 
bulge; significant risks of earthquakes, floods, droughts and landslides; and 
declining aid (World Bank, 2016: 1–25). In 2018, the UNODC reported that 
78% of the world’s land area under opium poppy cultivation was located in 
Afghanistan; Afghanistan also produced between 550 and 900 tonnes, or 66–
85% of the total estimated world production of heroin of 700–1,050 tonnes. 
Helmand Province in south-western Afghanistan, with the biggest 
concentration of opium producers, is the epicentre of this production (WDR 
2018a: 12). 
4.2.1 The social reproduction of fragility meets the social reproduction 
of resilience 
These depictions of fragility, conflict and crisis are not new. They have been 
the dominant narratives on Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet invasion and 
again after the ousting of the Taliban by US-led NATO troops in 2001 (Pain 
and Sutton, 2007: 1–9). These depictions, though, have been disputed by 
scholars who criticise the implicit assumption that Afghanistan’s population, 
particularly those rural-based and beyond the immediate reach of state or aid 
institutions, are helpless and dependent. Rural Afghan society, they argue, has 
inherent strengths, as seen in the robustness and resilience of its farming and 
pastoral systems that enable survival under conditions of extreme fragility and 
conflict (Fitzherbert, 2007: 29).  
The volume edited by Pain and Sutton (2007), entitled Reconstructing 
Agriculture in Afghanistan, includes chapters on the dynamics of livelihood 
change, the evolution of food security information, the limits of price and 
 
130 See page 4 of https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/V0984963-English.pdf, ac-
cessed 28 January 2019.  
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profitability, and the understanding of real markets. In their introduction, 
Pain and Sutton point out:   
The assumption that reconstruction post-September 2001 started with a 
clean slate (marketless, social capital-less Afghanistan) is not only bad 
history but also extremely misleading. The processes of significant 
economic and social change that relate to the mobilisation and 
consolidation of ethnic and regional identities, regional economies, the 
development of shadow and informal economies — of which opium 
poppy is but one aspect — and deep unresolved conflicts at multiple levels 
over resources and identities are all key facets of contemporary 
Afghanistan. (2007: 2)  
Afghans, claim Pain and Sutton, ‘have been anything but passive and 
static, adopting brilliant, innovative and unorthodox strategies to secure food, 
livelihoods and stability in a shifting and insecure environment’. As such, 
macro-, meso- and micro-level agro-pastoral environments define and order 
social and political structures and livelihood opportunities. Most importantly, 
Pain and Sutton call attention to the ‘dynamic social production of resilience, 
or the capacity to manage, adapt to, cope with or recover from risks to 
livelihoods’. These variables ‘not only reflect social relations over time, but 
also are themselves social relations linked to hierarchies and resistances of 
society in which they circulate’. The key point is that there is a need to recover 
and examine the ‘minutiae of coping and survival that has been all but erased’ 
in development orthodoxy. Attention needs to be drawn to the 
‘interdependencies of production, livelihoods and the mosaic of environments at 
even the small scale’ or to the ‘multi-layered livelihood strategies which 
include migration, manipulation of aid, remittances, and of course, narcotics 
production’ (ibid. 3–5; italics added). 
Thus, the dominant depiction of fragility is simply a ‘convenient device’ 
to tell a story that supports a particular, state-centred, aid-dependent and elite-
focused humanitarian and development agenda (Pain, 2007). Fitzherbert is 
scathing, arguing that these orthodoxies are ‘frequently simplistic, outdated, 
and ignorant, or based on a perspective that overvalues the role of state and 
aid agencies in agricultural recovery and change’ (2007: 29). Especially in 
volatile rural areas, informal and local structures persist in spite of the fragility 
and conflict, ‘consolidating the resilience born of centuries of survival in a 
harsh and unforgiving land’ (Pain and Sutton, 2007: 2–3).  
The photo in these pages of a woman spooling wool by hand, in 
preparation for making a rug, in Zendajan, Herat Province, provides some 
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evidence that not all ‘fragile’ areas and local economies are automatically 
vulnerable to illicit crop productions and its harms. Her household is one of 
those receiving support from the Zenan-Herat Silk Co. set up by the 
Rehabilitation Association and Agriculture Development for Afghanistan 
(RAADA), a local NGO that is a partner organisation of Christian Aid. Herat 
is a comparatively peaceful area that has not relied too heavily on the illicit 
drugs trade, despite lying along the normal trade route from west and 




David Mansfield is another strong critic of the ‘fragility’ discourse. Data 
produced by the UNODC, he states, reinforce the portrayal of ‘the farmer’ 
in accordance with neoclassical economic theories of the firm. He points out 
that the simple act in UNODC surveys of categorising the population into 
‘opium poppy farmers’ or ‘non-opium poppy farmers’ implies that ‘those who 
grow opium are landed and produce nothing else, while those who do not 
grow opium poppy on their land are not working on the opium crop of 
others’ — assumptions that are ‘flatly untrue’ (2016: 42–43). Mansfield builds 
Figure 4.1: Woman in Herat spooling wool by hand  
(Photo by Uruj Perwaiz for Christian Aid, July 2018) 
 
Box 5.1: The processing of opium and the different types of heroinFigure 4.1: Woman in 
Herat spooling wool by hand  
(Photo by Uruj Perwaiz for Christian Aid, July 2018) 
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up a ‘rural livelihoods approach’ (ibid.: 50–51), drawing on authors like James 
Scott, who views peasants as political and moral actors defending their values 
and individual security, and who argues that unlike a capitalist enterprise a 
peasant family is a unit of consumption as well as a unit of production (1976: 
13–34), Alexander Chayanov (1966 [1925]), who asserted that peasants will 
prioritise a stable subsistence over a higher risk/higher return strategy, and 
Eric Wolf, who maintained ‘peasants run a household, not a business 
concern’ (1966: 2).  
4.2.3 Unintended consequences 
The term ‘unintended consequences’ 131  finds particular resonance in 
Helmand Province, where well-intentioned policies to tackle poorly 
understood ‘fragility’ have unfortunately backfired. After the US-led invasion 
in December 2001, British forces prepared to assume administrative control 
of the province. Its aid agency, the Department for International 
Development (DfID), offered compensation to farmers who voluntarily 
destroyed their opium crop, to wean them away from its cultivation. But the 
scheme backfired, because as it turned out, it incentivised rather than 
discouraged opium-growing: it became even more risk-free, because opium 
can be grown to claim compensation, or else sold in the bazaars. In addition, 
there were cases of local authorities pocketing the money. In 2006, angry 
Helmand farmers were still demanding that the British pay for crops 
destroyed four years earlier.132  
The British also made the removal of Helmand’s then provincial governor, 
Sher Mohamed Akhundzada, a precondition for continued UK development 
support to the province. The governor had a reputation as a notorious 
warlord, accused of corruption and involvement in the drugs trade, though 
admittedly an effective regional and tribal leader 133 . Because the central 
government in Kabul resisted, the pressure for removal was ramped up by no 
less a figure than British Prime Minister Gordon Brown himself, on a surprise 
visit to Helmand in March 2009. Again, the move — a step to consolidate 
better governance practice in the province — backfired. Removed from his 
 
131 ‘Unintended consequences’ is a widely used term in drugs policy, and was the title of a 
series of reports commissioned by the UN Research Institute for Social Development in 1995; 
see Tullis (1995). 
132 Details and sources of this compensation fiasco can be found in a 2015 Christian Aid re-
port (Gutierrez, 2015: 4–5).  
133 Felbab-Brown (2017) provides a useful discussion on political-criminal alliances in Afghan-
istan.  
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sources of patronage, Akhundzada told his over 3,000 armed followers — 
whose ‘salaries’ he could no longer pay — to go and find ‘employment’ with 
the Taliban. In late 2009, the army commander in charge of Britain’s Task 
Force Helmand, Brigadier Ed Butler, confirmed that his troops had become 
embroiled in fiercer battles against Taliban-led troops significantly 
strengthened by Akhundzada’s men, ironically their former allies (McElroy, 
2009).   
But perhaps the most important unintended consequence in Helmand was 
that triggered by the ‘Food Zone Initiative’, a joint effort of the US, UK and 
Afghan governments in the autumn of 2008 to reduce instability and 
dramatically improve Helmand’s food security. Troops were provided; roads 
and irrigation were rehabilitated and improved; farmers were given subsidies 
to grow alternative crops (wheat, saffron, nuts, etc.); and other forms of 
essential support — credit, agricultural extension, access to markets — were 
provided (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2015). The Food Zone Initiative became 
an unqualified success in the short run, resulting in better productivity, higher 
incomes and improved food security for participating farmers. But it was 
precisely this ‘success’ that triggered the displacement of land-poor 
households, contend Mansfield and Fishstein. Because the land-owning 
farmers of Helmand, who previously had to rely on seasonal migrant workers 
as farmhands during labour-intensive months, and who typically rented a 
portion of their smallholdings to sharecroppers as a form of guaranteed 
income, now had better incomes and more efficient production, they found 
less need for seasonal farmhands and could get more by ending sharecropping 
arrangements and using the rented-out land themselves. Thus, the 
consequence of ‘success’ meant that poorer farmhands and sharecroppers not 
only lost their livelihoods; they were also excluded from government support 
because they were not registered as owners of property (ibid.: 5–8).  
The irony is that it was a fairly successful development project, not violent 
conflict, that triggered the forced migration of the land-poor. They moved 
north of the Boghra canal, beyond the reach of opium-eradication campaigns, 
buying desert land from local commanders or arriving as sharecroppers or 
tenants hoping to save enough from opium cultivation to buy their own land 
in the future. With generous loans from opium traders, they constructed deep 
wells with diesel or solar-powered pumps that converted desert land to 
agriculture. As a result, according to Mansfield and Fishstein, the once-desert 
land planted to opium north of the canal increased from 752 hectares in 2002 
to 34,270 hectares in 2012, a 45-fold increase (ibid.).  
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A 2016 video from Alcis, a research and mapping firm, documents 
opium’s role in converting over 300,000 hectares of desert into agricultural 
land, sustaining the livelihoods of over 1.2 million people in the largely desert 
southwest from 2000 to 2015.134 The 2016 SCD statement that Afghanistan’s 
‘unrecorded export of opium’ is ‘large’, or ‘7–8% of GDP’, makes it even 
more of a puzzle why the impact of the illicit crop has been omitted in the 
WBG’s analysis. Opium is not insignificant to Afghanistan. 
4.2.3 Balancing harms and gains 
An argument can now be made that for the poorest and the land-poor, 
survival may come less from official development aid and state interventions, 
and more due to engagement with expanding shadow and informal 
economies. Contrary to the common belief that engaging in illicit trade is 
simple criminality motivated by greed or need, the decisions taken are not 
simplistic: they are based on poor households’ evaluation of risk and 
opportunities, including getting protection elsewhere when they cannot 
expect it from state institutions — processes that are typically invisible to 
outsiders. As shown in the case of Helmand, growing opium, in addition to 
growing food crops or livestock, allows a household living outside the formal 
economy and unable to rely on the state for security of income, to access a 
form of protection provided by drug traffickers — often the actors with the 
acknowledged capacity to enforce violence locally. In other words, these 
households are treading a careful balance between harms and gains. Opium 
cultivation by poverty-stricken and land-poor farmers in Afghanistan is a 
resilience strategy. 
Goodhand’s (2004) unpacking of a ‘war economy’ into three categories 
merits restating here. First is the combat economy, which ‘includes the 
production, mobilisation and allocation of economic resources to sustain a 
conflict and economic strategies of war aimed at the deliberate 
disempowerment of specific groups’. Second is the shadow economy, which 
‘refers to economic activities that are conducted outside state-regulated 
frameworks and are not audited by state institutions’. Finally, the coping economy 
‘refers to population groups that are coping (maintaining their asset base) or 
surviving but undermining their asset base’. Though these categories are 
interconnected, they are not static and ‘may change over time according to 
the influence of changing political regimes and various external shocks’, each 
 
134 The video can be seen at:  https://vimeo.com/173599228, last accessed 31 December 
2019. 
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involves ‘different types of actors, incentives, commodities and relationships’. 
Goodhand explains, for example, that while entrepreneurs in both combat 
and shadow economies may profit from the conflict, entrepreneurs in the 
shadow economy may nevertheless have an interest in peace, unlike those in 
the combat economy (Goodhand, 2004: 155–157). This framework is 
particularly useful in making the necessary distinctions for policy — for 
example, a war on drugs that destroys coping economies and does little to 
affect the better-protected combat and shadow economies would be counter-
productive. 
Like the World Bank, other development agencies appear to deny, or 
choose to ignore, the significant economic impact and consequent political 
repercussions that an illicit trade of such size can have on Afghanistan’s 
development. DfID, despite having implemented programmes to finance the 
substitution of opium with other crops in Helmand in the early to the mid-
2000s, does not mention opium at all in its 2011–2015 Operational Plan for 
the country (DfID, 2012). Documents from USAID, such as its country 
profile of Afghanistan and its rapid assessment reviews, pay very little or no 
attention to the opium economy (e.g., USAID, 2014). Thus, Mansfield and 
Fishstein rail against Western donors for keeping their ‘eyes wide shut’, 
accusing them of ‘almost wilful short-sightedness’ and ‘gross negligence’ 
(2015: 3). William Byrd, a former World Bank consultant, argues that the 
Bank did meaningfully engage on illicit drugs in Afghanistan in the mid-2000s, 
although he acknowledges too that prospects for replicating such engagement 
are not good. Using that experience, however, Byrd introduces ‘entry points’ 
that may be considered by the Bank’s member-countries. ‘Older’ entry points 
include tackling the public health dimension; addressing rural development in 
illicit crop cultivating areas; supporting better governance reforms; and 
addressing the cross-border nature of opium (i.e. single-country approaches 
may not work). Byrd also introduces ‘newer’ entry points such as using 
political economy analysis; tightening money-laundering tracking, prevention 
and apprehension; and including the illicit economy in peace-building 
processes (Byrd, 2019). 
In summary, the dominant interpretation that ‘fragile states are most 
vulnerable to illicit crop production and its harms’ is at best an incomplete 
assessment of what is actually going on. Within so-called fragile states are 
resilient communities, many of which adopt innovative and unorthodox 
strategies, and build interdependencies with licit and illicit actors, to protect 
their assets, livelihoods and security in constantly changing and insecure 
environments. The conflicts in Helmand are not simply an irrational breaking 
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down of society, but are also, following Keen, a reordering of that society and 
its local economy in particular ways (Keen, 1998); or, following Duffield, 
conflicts that may be ‘symptomatic of new and innovative forms of political 
economy’ (Duffield, 1998); or they could be reflections of long-term 
innovative adaptations of marginalised and excluded economies to 
globalisation (Goodhand, 2000). To further test these propositions, an 
examination of the case of Colombia and Putumayo, compared to 
Afghanistan, follows in the next section. 
 
4.3 (Thread B) ‘Fragility, violence and illegality breed 
each other’: The case of Colombia and Putumayo  
The dominant depiction of areas where violence and illicit economies thrive 
as unruly, disorderly, or less civilised frames a picture of lawlessness or 
absence of local order. This obscures attention — and development aid — 
from being focused on the structures, norms and adaptations for coping and 
survival amidst the violence and conflict. It distorts the understanding of the 
relationships (or lack of them) between marginalised communities and state 
institutions. It fails to appreciate the dilemmas — for example, that criminals, 
belligerents and ordinary people caught in conflict may have agendas that, 
while completely different from each other, sometimes overlap and may even 
merge temporarily. More importantly, drugs and development orthodoxy 
seldom see the agency of local people. The conclusion that emerges is that 
because the world’s leading producers of illicit crops and drugs, Colombia 
and Afghanistan, are beset by violence and conflict, it therefore follows that 
fragility, violence and illegality can be thought to breed each other. But as will 
be pointed out below, leading Colombian scholars have argued strongly 
against such framing, emphasising that it is not the unruliness, disorder, or 
illicit crop production that are the fundamental problems, but the 
marginalisation and exclusion of subsistence peasant communities caused by 
the structural inequalities of the political economy, heightened by violence 
and conflict. 
 
4.3.1 A comparison of the world’s leading illicit crop producers 
To elaborate on these claims, it is useful to begin with a simple comparison 
of the world’s top coca producer with the world’s top opium producer, 
provided in Table 4.1. 





Table 4.1: Essential data on the top two illicit drug crop producers, 2017 
Notes on sources: 
i: https://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. GDP was higher in 2013, at $20.56 
billion  
ii: https://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia. GDP was higher in 2014, at U$381.112 
billion 
 
Like Afghanistan, Colombia’s violence is brutal; it has been going on now 
for more than 60 years, according to the Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 
a public body reconstructing the history of conflict that has caused over 
218,000 deaths and displaced over 5.7 million people (CNMH, 2012).135 In 
 
135 CNMH documentation reveals the following: a) of the more than 218,000 killed, 81% 
were civilians; b) the displacement of 5.7 million people was the highest recorded in the 
 Afghanistan  
(opium and heroin) 
Colombia 
(coca and cocaine) 
Population  35.53 million 49.06 million 
GDP  $19.54 billioni  $314.46 billionii 
Land area 652,864 square kilometres 1.142 million square kilome-
tres 
Land area 
planted to illicit 
crop  
328,000 hectares (78%) of 
world total of 420,000 hec-
tares (WDR 2018a: 12) 
146,000 hectares (68.5%) of 
world total of 213,000 hec-
tares (WDR 2018a: 29).  
Illicit crop pro-
duction level  
9,000 tonnes (85%) of 
10,500 tonnes of opium pro-
duced globally in 2017 (WDR 
2018a: 12)   
No figures supplied. Since 
2014, the UNODC stopped pub-
lishing on coca leaves produc-
tion, and only reported co-




550 to 900 tonnes (66% to 
85%) of 1,100 to 1,400 
tonnes of heroin produced 
globally (WDR 2018a: 13)  
Estimated production is 866 
tonnes (61%) of the total of 
1,410 tonnes of cocaine pro-
duced globally, of which 378 
tonnes were seized in Colom-
bia (WDR 2018a: 29).  
Estimate of the 
size of the illicit 
economy as a 
proportion of 
GDP 
SCD states that exports of 
opium comprise 7–8% of Af-
ghanistan’s GDP  
 
The farm-gate value of coca 
leaf production in Colombia is 
about 0.2% of GDP, or 3% of 
the agricultural sector’s GDP   
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1999, the World Bank, building on the work of violentologos,136 attempted to 
conceptualise and quantify this long history of violence, and concluded that 
government and civil society alike ‘recognise that violence is the key 
development constraint’ of Colombia. The assessment categorised the 
violence into three types: political, economic and social. To reduce violence, 
it then recommended interventions at national level (e.g. a peace programme), 
sectoral level (e.g. curriculum reviews of the education system, strengthening 
the justice system, etc.), and municipal level (e.g. social capital projects) 
(World Bank, 1999: vii–x). The parallels with Afghanistan are recurrent.   
 CNMH traces the roots of Colombia’s violence back to the 1948 El 
Bogotazo urban insurrection that destroyed the centre of Bogota, which started 
La Violencia — the period of partisan conflict between Liberals and 
Conservatives through the 1940 and 1950s. In the next decades, the violence 
expanded into a left-wing insurgency (CNMH 2012: 1). From 1985 to 1989, 
there was a huge surge in the violence. In November 1985, the M-19 guerrilla 
group attacked the Palace of Justice in central Bogota and held the entire 
Supreme Court hostage. Following a brutal military response, around 300 
people — including 12 justices of the 25-member Supreme Court — were 
killed (New York Times, 10 November 1985). Four years later, from August to 
December 1989, drug traffickers went to war in response to efforts to capture 
Pablo Escobar, among others. By early October 1989, Colombian police had 
linked 142 deadly bomb attacks to the Medellin cartel, with up to 88 car 
bombs exploding at banks, hotels and malls in major Colombian cities. An 
Avianca commercial airliner, reportedly with two government drug 
informants as passengers, was also targeted, killing all 107 on board (New York 
Times, 30 August 1989; 4 October 1989; 20 December 1994).  
Another similarity in the two countries is heavy US involvement. The US 
invaded Afghanistan in December 2001 and, along with its NATO allies, 
became the effective government for years while the central Kabul 
government was strengthened and reinforced. The extent of US involvement 
in Afghanistan can be gleaned from a 2008 Oxfam report, which shows that 
 
world, until the 2015 Syrian conflict; c) 25,000 people disappeared; d) 25,482 people were 
kidnapped by guerrillas; 2,541 by paramilitaries; e) 10,618 people were killed or wounded by 
landmines; and e) over 489,000 women in the 2000s were victims of sexual violence.    
136 The long history of violence in Colombia is such that a discipline of ‘violentology’ has 
emerged, involving violentologos devoted to the study of the causes and quantification of 
social costs of violence in the country, as noted in the World Bank paper (World Bank, 1999: 
2).   
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the US military was spending nearly $100 million a day, or $36 billion a year, 
in Afghanistan. By way of comparison, the volume of development aid 
provided by all donors to the country was around $7 million a day, or $2.5 
billion a year (Waldmann, 2008: 1). This shows the glaring disconnect 
between security and development policy. Another contrast is provided by 
the issues of scrutiny: while development aid was intensely reviewed, security 
spending was largely outside the scope of publicly accessible monitoring and 
evaluation processes. Principles of aid effectiveness have been adopted 
following the 2005 Paris Agreement, but there are no similar principles 
applied to security spending. The US also funded Afghanistan’s Criminal 
Justice Task Force and built the high-security, self-contained Pul-e-Charkhi 
prison near Kabul, which was created to insulate the Task Force’s special 
prosecutors, judges and prison officials from political pressure and security 
threats; they were mentored by experienced US Assistant Attorneys and DOJ 
Senior Trial Attorneys (INCSR 1999: 108–110).  
US involvement in Colombia, on the other hand, is exemplified in Plan 
Colombia, initially a $1.3 billion programme started by the Clinton 
administration in 2001, and continued by the Bush administration, to put in 
place policy initiatives that support an aggressive anti-drug strategy (Crandall, 
2002: 160). The US has also repeatedly used the threat of decertification on 
Colombia. This certification process has also been used to qualify for military 
support in the form of equipment, weapons, transport, information and 
advice. Colombia therefore has to show that it is eradicating illicit croplands, 
attacking drug traffickers and allowing US DEA operatives to operate within 
the country in order to receive aid. US threats of decertification have often 
triggered harsh eradication operations by the Colombian government, as well 
as extradition to the US of captured drug traffickers, so that the country can 
be reported in the INCSR as ‘cooperating fully’ with American authorities 
and taking ‘adequate steps’ to fight drugs.137  
However, although Colombia and Afghanistan share similarities in the 
intensity and scope of violence, there is a major difference: the size of their 
economies. Colombia’s GDP is more than 16 times that of Afghanistan. 
Thus, while beset by violent conflict for far longer than Afghanistan, 
Colombia evades easy categorisation as ‘fragile’. It has, at least in theory, 
resources to deliver ‘comprehensive service entitlements’, the lack of which 
defines ‘fragility’ (Stewart and Brown, 2009: 3). The stark difference in size of 
 
137 See for example the extended discussion between Secretary Albright and US congress-
men on questions as to why Colombia was decertified only to be exempted, in INCSR 1997.  
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the economy also suggests that illegality and violence will not always breed 
fragility: Colombia’s economy expanded over the last 50 years, despite the 
ongoing violence. Foreign direct investments continued, showing how firms 
could adapt their business models even to unpredictable and violent local 
conditions.  
The unequal distribution of economic growth in Colombia, and the 
inability to distribute the benefits of growth to large areas that have suffered 
from long-term neglect, are widely accepted. It is precisely in this regard that 
the illicit coca economy can be contextualised. Not only are large quantities 
of coca being grown in neglected parts of the country; more importantly, the 
crops are also grown by campesinos (peasants), those who have been historically 
marginalised and excluded from the mainstream economy, state protection 
and public services provision.  
4.3.2 Marginalisation and exclusion = coca-growing areas 
One key coca-growing area is Putumayo, characterised by its poor 
infrastructure and largely agrarian economy. It is also where the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest rebel group, 
has been most active. For the last 35 years, Putumayo has been a major 
producer of coca and cocaine. The central state, explains Maria Clemencia 
Ramirez, typically represents Putumayo ‘as uncivilized and disorderly, where 
inhabitants follow alternatives codes of behaviour and justice beyond (the 
state’s) hegemonic control’ (2011: loc. 299). Many inhabitants of Putumayo 
are colonos, or campesino settlers displaced from other regions by conflict and 
exclusion from the market. They are often depicted as ‘migrants without roots 
— therefore without any regional identity’ (ibid.). Since the 1960s, continues 
Ramirez, they have been portrayed as people ‘in search of easy money’, or the 
‘first and weakest link in the global chain of cocaine trafficking’. Many are 
regarded as either guerrilla supporters or criminals. This stigmatisation not 
only makes them legitimate military targets, it also further reinforces their 
exclusion and marginalisation (ibid.).  
The two main international development banks in Colombia — the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) — recognise how 
violence and conflict hobble economic growth in the country but ignore the 
coca economy and fail to analyse its role, despite the fact that it could be the 
most important coping and survival mechanism in the marginalised areas. The 
2015 World Bank SCD on Colombia mentions coca cultivation only in 
relation to its environmental impact on the Pacific and Andean ecosystems 
(World Bank, 2015b). The IDB focuses exclusively on the legal economy: 
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there is no mention at all of coca cultivation, cocaine exports, or the size of 
Colombia’s shadow economy in its Country Strategy 2015–2018 (IDB, 2015).  
Other agencies, notably USAID, pay more attention to the coca economy. 
In its Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014–2018, USAID 
pledged to promote peace by supporting alternatives to coca production. It 
will invest in agricultural value chains that can create alternative livelihoods 
for small producers in areas vulnerable to coca cultivation and drug 
production. USAID cites the success of its programmes in developing cacao, 
specialty coffee, rubber and dairy sectors in former coca-growing areas 
(USAID Colombia, 2014: 9). 
The inclusion of illicit drugs as one of six agenda items in the 2016 
government–FARC peace agreement initially offered promise.138 It included 
the provision ‘to build a joint and comprehensive solution to the problem of 
illicit drugs’, and sought new, evidence-based alternatives that will ‘treat illicit 
crop cultivation and drugs consumption differently from the problem of 
organised crime’. But as Ricardo Vargas Meza points out, this approach is 
simply a reiteration of orthodoxy. The agreement, Vargas argues, is weak 
because it fails to even define the problem of illicit drugs; it does not take into 
account that the criminal economy is able to continue regardless of who 
controls security in the producer regions; and the ‘community participation’ 
it envisages is limited to crop substitution, ‘not with regard to life in the 
territory as a whole’ (Vargas Meza 2014: 1–2).139 Ramirez, an anthropologist 
who investigated the reasons for the 1996 Cocalero Uprising in southern 
Colombia, adds the crucial critique. She argues that marginalisation and 
exclusion — not illicit crop cultivation, unruliness, or disorder — are the real 
problems in coca-producing Putumayo. This is a view that finds resonance 
with the scholars of Afghanistan mentioned earlier. 
Putumayo was neglected by the state, which considered it a peripheral area 
of little importance, and useful only because its ‘empty’ territories could 
absorb migrating campesinos displaced by upheavals and violence in other 
regions of the country. When the state finally acted, it was ‘not to meet its 
responsibilities and compensate those who suffered by its absence, but to 
represent [the people in Putumayo] as criminals and punish them with 
 
138 For a summary of the final agreement in English, see http://www.altocomisionadopara-
lapaz.gov.co/herramientas/Documents/summary-of-colombias-peace-agreement.pdf.  
139 Vargas Meza’s assessment refers to the 2014 joint Peace Communique, before the agree-
ment was signed. 
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violence’, thus further reinforcing their exclusion and marginality (Ramirez, 
2011: loc. 338). Often lost in the dominant interpretation is a key point that 
Ramirez emphasises: ‘that coca growers were seeking to free themselves from 
dependence on illegal armed actors’ by participating in civil society and 
seeking commitments from the state in the provision of public services (2011: 
loc. 331 and 382). As she argues:  
In conflict-ridden zones, an alternative model is emerging where there is 
continuity between the state and civil society, each seeking to establish 
cooperative relations with the other to oppose violence and bring state 
presence back to areas where it has been wholly or partially absent. (ibid.1: 
loc. 401) 
4.3.3 The coca-cocaine economy: A means for reintegration into 
markets? 
Another Colombian scholar, Maria-Clara Torres Bustamante, rejects the 
depictions of illicit crop growers as simply passive and unable to influence the 
world in which they live. Torres points out, for example, that the cocaleros 
of Bajo Putumayo were also creating and developing their own version of 
political and social order. Despite their stigmatisation, they lobbied for the 
creation of local municipalities in order to bring state institutions closer, 
making them into more accessible administrative centres where the cocaleros 
can press for the delivery of public services. The cocaleros — regarded as 
criminals — were asserting and reclaiming their citizenship (Torres, 2011: 33–
68).  
More importantly, Torres points out, it is precisely the illegal coca 
economy which has enabled an excluded territory and people to be inserted 
back into the market. Among other things, the coca economy accelerated the 
use of money in ‘peripheral’ and ‘out-of-the-way’ Putumayo, not only because 
it brought in more cash, but also because other food crops, such as cassava 
or corn starch, displaced by coca, now had to be purchased and transported 
from other regions, consequently invigorating those other regions’ agrarian 
economies. Villages in Bajo Putumayo — La Dorada, La Hormiga and San 
Miguel — which became centres of trade in coca paste consequently 
transformed into small ‘boom’ towns where hotels were set up, transportation 
expanded, and demand for goods like cars, chainsaws, outboard motors and 
firearms increased. The importation of electricity generators created further 
downstream stimulation to the local economy. Migrants from across the 
country streamed or migrated to Putumayo in search of livelihood 
opportunities or seasonal work in coca farms (ibid.: 60–68).   
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As the volume of transactions expanded, a local financial system was 
consolidated. Torres documents how per capita bank deposits in Putumayo 
grew, from COP (Colombian peso) 179 in 1995, to COP 1,049 in 2005, a 
more than fivefold increase in a decade of coca-led growth.140 Though Torres 
cautions that data on banking in Putumayo are unreliable and should not be 
made the sole basis for calculating the extent to which the illicit coca trade 
monetised the local economy (ibid.), the case could still be made that, from a 
position of extreme isolation, Putumayo became increasingly integrated into 
national and global markets as a result of its coca economy.141  
4.3.4 Fragility and state absence vs. narco-frontiers and indirect rule  
Whether or not the changes brought by coca constitute genuine development 
remains debatable, but clearly the coca economy transformed both state and 
market structures in Putumayo. Ballve’s analytical concept of ‘narco-frontiers’ 
offers some key insights. The drug trade, he explains, finds fertile ground in 
frontier zones because these are spaces where rule of law is contested, 
political authority is in question, and economic relations are wrought by 
violence. And yet, he continues, a growing body of research has found that 
drug trafficking networks often end up ‘bolstering legal circuits of power and 
profit in these hinterland spaces’. Frontiers, he concludes, ‘are contradictory 
spaces produced by both power and the limits of reigning regimes of 
accumulation and rule’ — forces that are both brutal and brittle (Ballve, 2019: 
212).  
Gutierrez Sanin (2019) offers a similar analysis of these ‘contradictory 
spaces’. The central state is not completely absent in these spaces because it 
maintains indirect rule, i.e. ‘non-bureaucratically mediated territorial control’ 
marked by ‘the combined development of a thin bureaucracy and a thick 
system of partisan networks, which regulated the transactions between 
territories and central decision-making structures’. The instruments of 
indirect rule have been a heterogeneous assortment of notables and 
middlemen, ‘who because of their territorial power base have had access to 
both to the crucial “Bogota tie-in” and to regional/municipal resources’ such 
 
140 Torres notes that the figure is still eight times lower than the national average, showing 
the extent of marginalisation of Putumayo’s economy.  
141 Note, however, that Lyons (2016), in her ethnographic study of poor farmers in 
Putumayo’s coca-growing heartland, argues that forms of resistance emerge to the violence 
and criminalisation produced by militarised, growth-oriented capitalist development.  
Hence, although Putumayo’s overall economy is indeed being increasingly integrated into 
markets by coca, other forms of survival are emerging.   
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as votes, access to rents and (frequently) specialists in violence. These new 
coalitions, he continues, more often than not include narco-traffickers and 
other new economic elites (Gutierrez Sanin, 2019: 15–16). The concepts of 
fragility and state absence that have so dominated the conventional 
understanding of illicit crop economies quickly melt away under Ballve’s and 
Gutierrez Sanin’s analyses. 
In sum, the notion that fragility, violence and illegality breed each other 
has stigmatised coca-growing areas and cocaleros to such an extent that it has 
become difficult to focus attention on the real and more fundamental 
problems of marginalisation and exclusion. Sadly, such views also found their 
way into the final peace agreement. Orthodox assumptions about fragility and 
its links to violence and illegality are not always true, as demonstrated by 
Colombia’s overall economic growth despite the violence, the emergence of 
‘narco-frontiers’, and the continuation of indirect rule. The case of Putumayo 
in particular — a marginalised area reinserted into national and global markets 
by its illegal coca economy — sheds light on the roles that illicit economies 
may play in the expansion of capital and markets especially among excluded 
and displaced populations.  
4.4 (Thread C) ‘Illicit crops and drugs production are 
sources of instability’: The case of Myanmar and Shan 
State  
The failures of drugs and development orthodoxies could be attributed to the 
continuing neglect of interdependency, in the shape of symbiosis, quid pro 
quos, collusion, or other similar relationships that become essential for 
coping and survival in contexts of marginalisation and exclusion. 
Interdependency can also be a form of reciprocity created and maintained to 
better manage risks, or a form of insurance in constantly shifting and insecure 
environments. Where there is interdependence, illicit crops could be a source 
of order, contrary to orthodox understanding. 
This claim plays out in the case of Myanmar and Shan State, a classic 
example of a marginalised and excluded economy making innovative 
adaptations to globalisation (Goodhand, 2000), while reordering society and 
economy in particular ways (Keen, 1998). It is also an example of an initially 
clandestine economic system which became widespread and emerged as 
integral to building political authority (Reno, 1998). This case disproves the 
set of assumptions that posits that illicit crops and drugs production are only 
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and exclusively sources of instability. As will be shown in this section, illicit 
crop economies can also be sources of stability and economic expansion. To 
start this discussion, an examination of recent opium production in Myanmar 
is necessary. 
4.4.1 Declining opium production in Myanmar 
The UNODC reports that in contrast to the situation in Afghanistan, opium 
production in Myanmar decreased over the period 2015 to 2017 by some 14% 
to 550 tonnes. In addition, despite the constriction in supply, the opium price 
fell by almost 30% to an average of $153 per kg, which in combination with 
the decrease in seizures, suggests a decline in demand for opiates produced 
in the country (WDR 2018c: 13–14). Earlier, the UNODC reported that a 
2016 survey in Shan State, which in recent years accounted for up to 90% of 
Myanmar’s opium production, revealed that the proportion of villages 
producing opium ‘fell from 31% of all villages in Shan State in 2015 to 22% 
in 2016’ (WDR 2017a: 14). However, while more villages are abandoning 
opium, villages that continue opium production have increased the average 
area under cultivation — from 0.4 hectare to 0.6 hectare per household — 
suggesting increasing concentration (ibid.).  
The Myanmar Opium Survey 2018 (UNODC 2018) reports a continuing 
declining trend which started in 2014 and saw the area under cultivation fall 
from 41,000 to 37,300 hectares. In the two main producer states, Shan and 
Kachin, the area under opium cultivation decreased by 12% in 2018. Thus, 
reductions have taken place in practically all regions. However, the survey 
reported an increased opium yield per hectare, at 13.9 kg per hectare, a 4% 
increase compared to 2017. It also estimated the gross value of the opium 
economy at $1.2 to $2.3 billion, or 1.5% to 3.3% of GDP in 2017. Of this 
total, it is believed that $62 million to $103 million, or 0.4% of the agriculture 
sector’s value, was earned by farmers cultivating opium. The period also saw 
massive decreases in the farm-gate prices of fresh and dry opium, falling by 
35% and 45% respectively (UNODC 2018: iii–iv), which suggests a 
reorganising political economy.  
The UNODC thinks that declining opium production in Myanmar may 
be linked to the massive expansion in supply and lower prices in Afghanistan. 
Because the Afghan and Myanmar opium production markets ‘have mainly 
existed in isolation from each other’, this trend (of a link between prices and 
supply in the two countries) ‘would constitute a new phenomenon’ (WDR 
2018c: 14). The UNODC also suggests that decline in the demand in 
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Myanmar could be caused by a switch to the use of ATS and other synthetic 
drugs in the region. Further comparisons are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Comparing basic data (latest available) of the top two opium 
producers 
 Afghanistan: world’s main pro-
ducer of opium and heroin (ca. 
78-85% of total) 
Myanmar: world’s second main 
producer of opium and heroin (ca. 
10-20% of total) 
Population 
2018 
37.172 million 53.708 million 
GDP 2018  $19.363 billioni  $71.215 millionii 
Land area 652,864 square kilometres 676,590 square kilometers 
Land area 
planted to 
illicit crop  
328,000 hectares (78%) of 
world total of 420,000 hectares 
(WDR 2018c: 12) 
41,000 hectares (a decline from 
55,000 hectares in 2015, and the 
lowest level since 2010) (WDR 
2018c: 12)  
This reduced further to 37,300 hec-




9,000 tonnes (85%) of 10,500 
tonnes of opium produced glob-
ally in 2017, an 87% increase 
from the previous year (WDR 
2018c: 12)   
550 tonnes of opium (a decline of 






550–900 tonnes (66%–85%) of 
1,100– 1,400 tons of heroin pro-
duced globally (WDR 2018c: 13)  
 
20-45 tonnes of heroin for export; 
7.6 tonnes of heroin for domestic 
consumption; 114 tonnes of unpro-
cessed opium for consumption and 
potentially available for export 
(UNODC 2018: 19) 
Farm-gate 
prices of il-
licit crop  
February 2018: 
Dry opium: $113/kg (down from 
$195/kg in 2017)iv 
Fresh opium: $94/kg (down from 
$177/kg in 2017)  
No breakdown between dry and 
fresh provided. Using the lower 
price, value of 9,000 tonnes of 
opium is at least $846 million  
All of 2018 
Dry opium: $154/kg 
Fresh opium: $136/kg 
Total farm-gate value of opium is 
estimated at $62-103 million 
(UNODC 2018: vi)  
Street 
prices of il-
licit drugsv  
The average wholesale price of 
heroin in 17 western European 
countries is $31,549/kg. The 
550–900 tonnes is therefore 
The average wholesale price of her-
oin in 17 western European coun-
tries is $31,549/kg The 20–45 tonnes 
is therefore worth $630.9 million 
to $1.419 billion   
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worth $17.35 billion to $28.4 
billion   
Globally, the estimated annual 
street market value of heroin is 
around $55 billionvi 
 
Estimate of 




tion of GDP 
 
World Bank’s diagnostic states 
that exports of opium comprise 
7-8% of GDP.  
 
UNODC estimates: 1.5-3.3% of GDP 
(UNODC 2018: 4). 
 
Notes on sources: 
i: https://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan, last accessed 19 July 2019 
ii: https://data.worldbank.org/country/myanmar, last accessed 19 July 2019 
iii: According to UNODC 2018  
iv: Sourced from the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
and UNODC-Kabul, http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghani-
stan%20Drug%20Price%20Monitoring%20February%202018.pdf, page 4, accessed 28 
Jan 2019. Farm-gate opium prices in Afghanistan have been falling. 
v: The weighted average retail and wholesale prices of cocaine and heroin in 17 
western European countries are sourced from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/se-




 Another explanation suggested by the UNODC for the declining trend is 
that the peace process is slowly establishing long-term stability. Because the 
UNODC believes that there is a direct connection between drugs and conflict 
— i.e. the drug economy supports the conflict and in turn the conflict facili-
tates the drug economy — ‘providing solutions to the conflict will break this 
cycle’. The drug economy’s influence can, the UNODC continues, be miti-
gated through the scaling-up of alternative development programmes that 
provide viable sources of legitimate income, as well as by addressing the pres-
ence of transnational organised groups (UNODC 2018: 5).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to support or rebut the UNODC’s 
explanations for the decline. It could also be that the decline in opium 
production in Myanmar is due to the long-term diversification of local 
economies that is enabling poor villages to wean themselves away from their 
income- and employment-dependence on opium. This is a matter for future 
research. For the moment, what this study could examine are cross-country 
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comparisons with the other three focus countries, particularly with Bolivia 
that has also experienced a significant decline in coca production which will 
be discussed in the next section. For this section, the focus is an examination 
of the underlying assumption that illicit crop production and drugs trafficking 
are sources of instability.  
4.4.2 State-sponsored protection rackets 
Snyder and Duran-Martinez define ‘state-sponsored protection rackets’ as 
‘informal institutions’ through which quid pro quos are arranged between 
public officials who refrain or selectively enforce the law on one hand and 
criminal entrepreneurs on the other, in return for a share of the spoils 
generated by illicit activity (2009: 254)142. The benefits from such rackets are 
not inconsequential, as the case of Myanmar demonstrates. Before 1990, 
there were some 25 ethnic armies operating in remote regions, the largest of 
which emerged in the borderlands of Shan State. As the conflicts dragged on, 
most if not all insurgent groups turned to taxing opium cultivation for 
financing their armed struggles. The curious phenomenon observed by 
Snyder and Duran-Martinez was that, following the dramatic increase in 
opium and heroin production after 1989, the biggest of these opium-financed 
armies did not expand. Neither did they engage in more battles, widen their 
bases, nor extend the scope of their operations. Instead, most demobilised 
and appear to have focused instead on opium-growing to rebuild their lives. 
Consequently, there was a dramatic reduction in the levels of violence (ibid.: 
262).  
The explanation, according to the two authors, lies in the military’s 
successful construction of ‘institutions of protection’. Such institutions, they 
argue, could emerge only under certain conditions. First, state officials must 
have a credible capacity to enforce the law because, without a credible threat 
of enforcement, why would criminals pay for non-enforcement? Thus, the 
stronger the illicit actors, the stronger and more capable the state must be if 
it is to successfully induce those illicit actors to participate in the protection 
racket. Second, criminal organisations also need to have the capacity to offer 
a credible guarantee to ‘share the spoils’, to refrain from violence when 
needed, share information, or control ‘public hazards’. Thus, to be credible 
partners in a protection racket, ‘criminal organisations require a certain level 
of internal command, control, and coherence’ (ibid.: 255–256).  
 
142 In an earlier article, Snyder discussed whether ‘lootable wealth’ breeds disorder (2006: 
943). This 2009 article provides the answers to that question.    
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With these conditions apparently met in Myanmar’s borderlands, opium 
‘transformed from being a source of violence into a source of political order’. 
Opium not only provided a lucrative ‘exit option’ for battle-weary rebels 
looking for a settlement or compromise with the enemies they could not 
defeat, but who also could not win: the quid pro quo also created ‘a powerful 
pacifying effect on the illicit markets’. By 1997, continue Snyder and Duran-
Martinez, opiates had become Myanmar’s largest export, ‘pumping more than 
half-a-billion dollars annually into the economy, an amount exceeding the 
government’s official tax revenues’. More importantly, these drug profits 
were invested into the legal economy, at a time when Myanmar was suffering 
from international sanctions and therefore had neither foreign direct 
investments nor official development aid and was perennially lacking hard 
foreign currencies. Thus, aside from helping in the demobilisation of 
insurgents, the racket provided an important revenue source. For the under-
funded military units on the front lines, this provided an added bonus of 
making them financially self-sustaining in their operations. In short, the 
creation of a protection racket around opium enabled not only the partial 
demobilisation of the largest insurgent armies, it also stemmed capital flight 
and allowed the cash-strapped and diplomatically isolated government to 
weather the crippling effects of the international embargo imposed on the 
country (ibid.: 269).  
The interdependency that was created is further illustrated in the 
retirement of Khun Sa, one of the major drug lords in Shan State who led the 
Mong Tai Army and at one point even declared himself head of an 
independent Shan State. Khun Sa’s ‘surrender’ and turnover of the sizeable 
arms cache of his 20,000-strong army, including portable surface-to-air 
missiles, is generally regarded as a setback for the drug lord. McCoy, the first 
Westerner to have interviewed Khun Sa, argues that the drug lord 
miscalculated because his bid for Shan independence drew powerful states — 
Rangoon, Bangkok, Beijing and Washington — into an ad hoc alliance against 
him (McCoy, 2003: 435–436) 
 The surrender, however, was not a complete loss to Khun Sa, according 
to Snyder and Duran-Martinez. It actually brought him economic benefits, 
since it not only freed him from the expense of having to provide for his own 
protection by maintaining a large private army, but also opened up doors that 
enabled him to invest in the legal economy. While living in luxury in the 
capital and protected by the military, he made major investments in real estate 
and the hotel industry. Despite US pressure on Rangoon to extradite Khun 
Sa and the substantial increase to $20 million of the bounty on his head, he 
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remained protected in the Burmese capital, enjoying a life of opulence in the 
company of his teenage wives, until his death by natural causes in 2007, at the 
age of 73 (Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009: 269–270).  
4.4.3 History repeating itself: Opium as an incubator of capitalism? 
The global community was not unaware of the state-sponsored protection 
racket. Over successive years, the INCSRs had been stating that drug profits 
had become the seed capital for many otherwise legitimate commercial and 
manufacturing enterprises. In 2002, for example, the INCSR reported that 
Myanmar had adopted ‘policies that facilitate the funnelling of drug money 
into commercial enterprises and infrastructure investment’ (INCSR 2002: 
XII–94). Indeed, in an evaluation of Myanmar’s anti-money-laundering 
efforts in 2002, Brian P. Joyce confirmed what by then had become a public 
secret: ‘As a means of maintaining peace and apparent stability, criminal 
elements were not only permitted to engage in illegal activity but also 
encouraged to invest ill-gotten gains into legitimate commercial development’ 
(2002: 81).  
As such, it was illicit enterprise that arguably began the revival of 
Myanmar’s moribund economy. Over the years, more of these opium-
capitalised legitimate enterprises were tagged in the Specially Designated 
Narcotics Traffickers (SDNT) database. The state-sponsored protection 
racket as an incubator of capitalism is captured in Patrick Meehan’s (2015)143 
enumeration of some of the country’s largest private companies believed to 
have been created or capitalised by revenues from the drugs trade.     
Table 4.3: Firms and tycoons with known or suspected links to the Shan 












Asia World was founded by Lo Hsing Han, one of Myan-
mar’s best-known drug lords. By the time he died on 6 
July 2013, he had built Asia World into the biggest con-
glomerate in Myanmar, with subsidiaries in Singapore. 
Key news organisations around the world published obi-
tuaries for him. The Economist described him not only 
 
143 This paper by Meehan was commissioned by Christian Aid in 2015 but has remained un-
published out of concerns over possible repercussions on the organisation’s humanitarian 
and development programmes in Myanmar. However, much of the information it contained 
came from publicly ava 
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Chaired by U 
Tun Myint Na-
ing, also known 
as Steven Law 
as a ‘heroin king’ but also ‘a pillar of the economy’ (27 
July 2013).i The Daily Telegraph described how he 
started as a militia captain who became successful as a 
drug lord by undercutting his rival traffickers, charging 
lower commission fees for the opium and heroin he 
trafficked. Steven Law is Lo’s son; he was educated and 
groomed to take care of his family’s legitimate business 
enterprises. Law was once wanted by the US on drug 
trafficking charges and Asia World was on the US Sanc-
tions List for years and has been investigated for money 
laundering. After the US government terminated its 
Burma Sanctions Program in October 2016,ii Asia World 
has become a fully legalised and legitimate multina-
tional conglomerate.    
Hong Pang 
Group 









Wei is a leading figure in the United Wa State Army, 
(UWSA) formerly in charge of its Southern Command 
and 171 Military Region. UWSA is a splinter of the Com-
munist Party of Burma, and the second insurgent army 
to sign a peace agreement with the government, in May 
1989. Later, UWSA was mobilised alongside the Burmese 
Army (Tatmadaw) to fight the Shan State Army-South. 
Wei is a known drug lord and close associate of Khun Sa. 
Wei was indicted by a Brooklyn Grand Jury in January 
2005 and is wanted by both the US and Thailand on drug 
trafficking charges. In 2008 the US Treasury Department 
named 26 individuals and 17 companies linked to Wei 
and the UWSA as ‘Specially Designated Narcotics Traf-
fickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Desig-
nation Act (Kingpin Act)’. The Treasury’s OFAC de-
scribed the UWSA as the ‘largest and most powerful 
drug trafficking organization in Southeast Asia’ (from 





eral Ye Myint 
Construction General Ye Myint was a member of the State Peace and 
Development Council, the official name of the military 
government that took power from 1988 until it was dis-
banded in 2011. Ye served as the head of Special Opera-
tions Bureau (1) and has been one of the government’s 
leading negotiators with the UWSA and other Kokang-
based insurgent armies over the past two decades. In 
2008 he was forced to resign from the government as a 
result of his son’s arrest on drug trafficking charges, 
though reports stated that in 2009 he continued to 
serve as a government interlocutor with the Kokang-led 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).  




importer of steel 
and gilding glue, 
used for the 
Maung Weik had close links with a number of senior gov-
ernment officials and is believed to have been closely 
involved in trafficking drugs from Burma to Malaysia. In 









November 2008 he was sentenced to 15 years imprison-
ment on drug trafficking charges following an investiga-
tion into the drug trafficking activities of Aung Ye Zaw 
Myint, the son of Lt. General Ye Myint (see above). 
Myanmar May-
flower Group 
Chaired by U 





Also known as May Flower Kyaw Win, he was born to a 
poor Chinese family from northern Shan State, but rose 
to become Chair of Myanmar May Flower Bank, at one 
time the third largest in Myanmar. He has close connec-
tions with the government, especially with General 
Maung Aye, Deputy Chairman of the State Peace and 
Development Council. Myanmar Mayflower Bank was 
shut down in 2005 after intense pressure on the Myan-
mar government from the US, which stated that the 
bank was ‘of primary money laundering concern’ (entry 
in OFAC database). He was reported to have been the 







Chaired by U 
Eike Htun 




Established in 1990, Olympic is one of Myanmar’s larg-
est construction companies, focusing on real estate in 
Yangon. It built Yangon’s first shopping centre. U Eike 
Htun forged close links with former Prime Minister Khin 
Nyunt and the Olympic Construction Company has been 
involved in numerous joint ventures with the govern-
ment’s Housing Development Agency. By the end of 
1996, Olympic had invested $700 million in property de-
velopment projects, and is linked to Asia Wealth Bank 
(see next item).   
Asia Wealth 
Bank 
Chaired by U 
Eike Htun 




Banking Asia Wealth Bank was Myanmar’s largest private bank 
prior to the banking crisis in 2003. Little is known about 
the exact source of U Eike Htun’s capital though it is 
strongly believed that he has close links with the drug 
trade in his native Kokang region. In 2003, the US Treas-
ury imposed sanctions on Asia Wealth Bank and Myan-
mar Mayflower Bank, stating that they posed ‘an unac-
ceptable risk of money laundering and other financial 
crimes, and are linked to narcotics traffickers. The spe-
cific information concerning these two banks justifies 
their exclusion entirely from the U.S. financial system’ 
(entry in OFAC database) iii.  The US Treasury explicitly 
cites Eike Htun as ‘having connections with the narcot-
ics trade’.   
Peace Myanmar 
Group (PMG Co. 
Ltd) 
Chaired by Yang 
Mao-Liang 
Spirits and liquors  
(Myanmar Rum 
and Myanmar Dry 




Yang Mao Liang is a leading figure in the MNDAA, one of 
the splinter groups of the CPB which signed a ceasefire 
agreement with the government in March 1989. 
Founded in 1994, Peace Myanmar Group has previously 
entered into joint ventures with the Ministry of Com-
merce. Throughout the 1990s the Yang family domi-





nated drug production and trafficking in the Kokang re-
gion of Shan State, controlling many of the estimated 
23 heroin refineries that emerged in the area following 
the 1989 ceasefire. In 1994 Yang Mao-Xian (Yang Mao-
Liang’s younger brother) was arrested and executed by 
Chinese authorities for drug trafficking. 
 




Chaired by Lin 
Ming Xian (aka 





Ling Ming Xian, a former CPB Commander, is the leader 
of the National Democratic Alliance Army, a position he 
has held since 1988. The NDAA formed following the 
collapse of the CPB and signed a ceasefire with the gov-
ernment in 1989. During the 1990s Lin forged close links 
with the government. He is described as a ‘leader of 
national races’ in the state press and hosted US Con-
gressman and House of Representatives’ Speaker Dennis 
Hastert in 1993 and Congressman Charles Rangel in 
1996, during their visits to Myanmar. He was also se-
lected as one of the government-appointed representa-
tives at the National Convention to draft the country’s 
2008 constitution. Throughout the early 1990s the 
NDAA, under Lin, monopolised drug production and re-
fining in the area of eastern Shan State under his con-
trol. In 1997 Lin claimed to have made this area opium-
free and he was taken off the US SDNT List in 2000. 
Many still believe the NDAA derive significant income 
from heroin trafficking, although this is hard to verify. 
Lin’s Green Light Company was commissioned to con-
struct parts of the Asian Development Bank Greater Me-
kong Subregion (GMS) Route highway ‘3B’ (itself a use-
ful drug-money laundering channel), which has been a 


















Aik is the son-in-law of UWSA President, Bao Youxiang. 
He has close links with Wei Hsueh Kang (see Hong Pang 
Group above) and is closely involved in the drug trade. 
Aik Hawk had personal links with former Prime Minister 
Khin Nyunt and is close to other senior generals. The 
Company has won numerous large-scale construction 
contracts from the Yangon City Development Council. 
Aik has also provided capital for businesses owned by 
high-ranking generals, including General Myint Hlaing, 
the former commander of the Northeast Regional Com-
mand. Aik was also a principal investor in Myanmar May-
flower Bank (see above). In 2009 a number of his associ-
ates were arrested after heroin seizures in Yangon, and 
Aik himself came under increasing government pres-
sure, apparently fleeing to UWSA-controlled territory. 
In 2008, under the Kingpin act, the US placed sanctions 
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on both Yangon Airways and Tetkham, designating both 
as entities of a ‘significant narcotics trafficker’, and 
added them to the SDNT List.  
 
Notes: 
i: Other news organisations that published obituaries about Lo included the New York 
Times, Al-Jazeera, ABC News Australia and the Bangkok Post 
ii: See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/burma_fact_sheet_20161007.pdf 
iii: Some of the information are sourced from a search of the US Specially 
Designated Nationals Sanctions SDNT database: see - 
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. It should be noted though that since the 
US terminated its Burma Sanctions Program in 2016, many of the names and firms 
in the sanctions list have been removed and could not anymore be searched.  
 
4.4.4 Illicit crop enterprise as sources of order, too 
Myanmar is a typical developing country that has rich mineral areas, forests 
and fertile valleys that have, since independence, become dangerous places 
where armed groups ruled, engaging in civil wars in which no side could win 
or be defeated. Much of the conflict was in the rugged and mountainous Shan 
State, which according to Bertil Lintner (2000, 2015) was historically the 
poorest and most marginalised area because its terrain did not allow intensive 
agriculture, lacked water resources, and had poor infrastructure for bringing 
harvests to markets before they spoiled. But two crops were suited to its 
conditions: tea and opium. When the conflicts ignited, tea diminished in 
importance, while opium, which can be grown on just about any hillside, over 
a much shorter period, and with considerably less maintenance, became the 
crop that provided a lifeline to those trapped by the conflict. An interesting 
observation by Lintner is that, while there was intense fighting over territory 
and political causes, very little violence was triggered by the opium trade itself.  
Myanmar’s economic isolation contributed to the utility of opium to its 
national economy. When in 1988 the government declared martial law and 
enforced a bloody crackdown, painful international economic sanctions were 
imposed by the US and the global community. It became illegal for US banks, 
firms and individuals to engage in transactions in Myanmar or with Myanmar 
firms and individuals, without first obtaining special licences from the US 
Treasury. Deprived of access to global markets, starved of foreign direct 
investments and hard foreign currency, and barred from receiving 
development aid, Myanmar’s economy teetered on the verge of collapse. Yet 
it did not go belly up, thanks not just to the investment of opium profits into 
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the national economy, but also to opium’s most effective redistribution of 
income especially in the most marginalised areas.  
Given such conditions, it is not a surprise that the most important firms 
and enterprises to have emerged in Myanmar, as detailed by Meehan in Table 
4.3, are those capitalised by opium profits. As Renard observed back in 1996, 
despite the diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, muddled rules on 
property ownership, lack of industrial capacity, and most importantly the 
possibility of US prosecution for sanctions breaches, there were still 26 
foreign banks that decided to open representative offices in Myanmar that 
year. Wasn’t this, he asked, because ‘there was such a thriving opium trade?’ 
(Renard, 1996: xiv–xv). 
The question that remains is whether the state-sponsored protection 
racket of the 1990s has ended and has now been replaced by something else, 
as signalled by the decline in opium production since 2014 flagged by the 
UNODC. Like Asia World, Lo Hsing Han’s conglomerate that has 
successfully managed the transition from an illicit firm under US sanctions to 
a legitimate multinational enterprise that transacts normal cross-border 
business, is Myanmar now moving out of the illicit economy, and settling 
strategically and firmly into the legal economy? If so, this will not be the first 
time that such a transition has been made. Myanmar and its opium-capitalised 
conglomerates will simply be treading the same path, as elaborated in Chapter 
1, that British investment houses and trading firms such as Jardine Matheson 
and Company, Dent and Company, or Russell and Company took in their 
transition from opium traders to diversified capitalist enterprises (Trocki, 
1999).  
In sum, illegality does not always breed violence: there is no singular 
relationship between illicit crop economies and instability. Although it 
appears counter-intuitive, under certain conditions — as elaborated in the 
case of Myanmar and Shan State — illicit drugs can transform from being a 
source of violence into being a source of stability, and even a driver of 
economic growth. This appears also to be the situation in Afghanistan and 
Colombia. An understanding of interdependency — rather than theories of 
the firm or instrumentalist theories of violence — is necessary to resolve the 
failures of the orthodoxy.  
However, it is important not to lose the nuances. Myanmar’s decades of 
economic isolation — starting with its largely self-imposed isolation from 
1962 and expounded by the harsh international sanctions from 1988 — may 
have created enabling conditions not possible in other contexts. Additionally, 
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there has been a resurgence in violence in the opium croplands since 2011, 
showing that even apparently stable quid pro quos and relationships of 
interdependency are subject to wider processes of social, political and 
economic change. 
4.5 (Thread D) ‘Illicit crops are evil’: The case of 
Bolivia and the Chapare  
A fourth widely-held assumption of the orthodoxy is the notion that illicit 
crops are a social evil. In the 1952 UN ECOSOC Enquiry on the Coca Leaf, 
a team of UN scientists reported that ‘…we are convinced that coca-leaf 
chewing is a social evil’ and went on to support racist views that coca-chewing 
populations were ‘little civilised’, needed to be ‘saved’, or that it was only 
through Christianisation that the ‘primitive population’ could ‘show 
themselves to be physically and mentally capable of freeing themselves from 
coca-leaf chewing’ (Wolff, 1952: 3–8). But more importantly, in 1961, no less 
a document than the Preamble of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs stated that it is the duty of states ‘to prevent and combat this evil’. The 
wording is notable, explains Rick Lines, because under international treaty 
law, the Single Convention is the only UN treaty ‘characterising the activity it 
seeks to regulate, control or prohibit as being “evil”’ (2010: 3). 
It is important to remember that this ‘evil’ is variably allowed — the licit 
cultivation of these plants and the licit manufacture of its products (like 
morphine or heroin) are allowed under regulation in order to supply medical 
and scientific needs. For example, in 2018 licit opium was harvested in 
Australia (12,826 hectares); France (8,054 hectares); Hungary (876 hectares); 
India (5,165 hectares); Spain (5,685 hectares) and Turkey (45,135 hectares) 
(INCB, 2018: 114–117). In the UK, there are thousands of hectares of 
farmland in Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire that are called 
‘the painkilling fields’ because they grow opium poppies for the production 
of morphine, diamorphine, codeine and other opioids for the UK’s National 
Health Service. The UK Home Office licensed the company Macfarlan Smith 
to produce the opium and process the opioids. The company then sub-
contracted the cultivation of the crops to British farmers. The Home Office 
clarified that Papaver somniferum can be grown in the UK without a licence, 
‘but the extraction of the drugs is a complex industrial process and the people 
who work to produce the drugs have to be licensed’ (Evening Standard, 14 July 
2007; see also Ffrench, 2013).  
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Similarly, there is also licit coca leaf growing. The INCB reports that Peru 
has been the only country that exports coca leaf to the global market since 
2010; in 2017, it reported an export volume of 147.3 tonnes. The other major 
licit producer is Bolivia, with its ‘zones of traditional production’ in which 
coca is legally grown and harvested for the coca-chewing market. But there 
are also ‘zones of excessive production under transition’, and ‘zones of illicit 
production’. Bolivian sindicatos (coca workers unions) play the key role in 
identifying zones of excessive and illicit production, which are then 
subsequently targeted for eradication in order to prevent the excess harvest’s 
conversion into cocaine for the criminal market.144 Cultivation in Bolivia is 
allowed in accordance with the reservation expressed in 2013 at the UN, 
when the country re-acceded to the 1961 Convention (INCB, 2018: 22). 
If opium effectively resuscitated Myanmar’s economy when it was 
constrained by economic sanctions, as argued in the last section, coca and 
cocaine acted similarly for Bolivia in the 1980s, when the country suffered 
hyperinflation. In his cost-benefit analysis of Bolivia’s national accounts 
during these years, James Painter concludes that the coca-cocaine economy 
not only prevented a major social collapse (there was already a virtual 
economic and political collapse), but at the very least ‘facilitated the country’s 
most radical restructuring of its economy this century’ (Painter, 1994: 53–54, 
73).   
4.5.1 Stigmatised as criminals, cocaleros capture state power 
Today, Bolivia, where coca-chewing has been practised for centuries, leads 
the way in reversing the beliefs, prejudice and stigmatisation around coca. 
Since the dramatic election of a cocalero, Evo Morales, as president in 2005, 
Bolivia has worked to undo the ‘historical mistake’ of banning the coca leaf 
under the 1961 Single Convention. Immediately after assuming the 
presidency in 2006, Morales convened a Constituent Assembly to draft a new 
Constitution to change, among other things, the legal status of coca, causing 
concern in global drug agencies and the US. By September 2008, Bolivia had 
declared its open defiance when Morales expelled the US Ambassador from 
the Bolivian capital (Daily Telegraph, 12 September 2008). Two months later, 
he went further by expelling the US Drug Enforcement Administration.  
 
144 For more discussions on the differences between eradication in Colombia and Bolivia, see 
Mortensen and Gutierrez (2019).  
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In February 2009, following approval in a referendum, the new 
constitution came into force. It states that:  
The State shall protect native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, 
a renewable natural resource of Bolivia’s biodiversity, and as a factor 
of social unity. In its natural state coca is not a narcotic. Its revaluing, 
production, commercialization and industrialization shall be regulated 
by law. (Article 384, Constitution of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia)145  
Speaking before the CND in Vienna on 11 March 2009, Morales stunned 
his audience by chewing a bag of coca leaves at the podium. ‘This is a coca 
leaf’, he said. ‘This is not cocaine. This represents the culture of the 
indigenous people of the Andean region’ (Daily Telegraph, 12 March 2009). 
Bolivia then led a petition for two amendments to the 1961 UN Single 
Convention on Drugs: the removal of Article 49-2a which banned the coca 
leaf; and the removal of the coca leaf from the Treaty’s schedule of restricted 
products and substances. When countries led by the US objected, the petition 
collapsed in January 2011, well into Morales’ second term. In response, 
Bolivia officially withdrew from the Treaty in protest. It formally notified the 
UN Secretary-General of its withdrawal on 23 June 2011 — but then it also 
announced its application to re-accede to the Treaty on 1 January  2012, when 
the withdrawal would take effect. This was a legal manoeuvre, allowing 
Bolivia to re-accede officially ‘with reservations’, which means that it joins the 
treaty again, but notifies the other parties that it does not accept the 
classification of the coca leaf as an illicit drug. Under Section 1 of Article 49 
of the Treaty, a country may at the time of accession reserve the right to 
‘temporarily permit’ coca chewing in its territory for 25 years (INCSR 2012 
Vol. 1: 9, 16, 125–129). When the re-accession was approved a year later, 
Bolivia had won a technical means to buy time, ‘legalise’ coca cultivation 
temporarily, and then campaign for more changes within the UN system.146 
In other words, Bolivia won time to refine its policy of ‘yes to coca, no to 
cocaine’.  
 
145 From the English translation of Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution available at https://www.con-
stituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf , accessed 29 January 2019.  
146 Bolivia’s row with the UN, specifically with countries that opposed coca-leaf chewing de-
spite the Bolivian government’s opposition to cocaine, received widespread media coverage. 
See, for example, Jamie Doward (2013) in The Guardian.   
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4.5.2 ‘Yes to coca, no to cocaine’ 
The policy, officially called the ‘Cato Accord’, legalised the cultivation of small 
amounts of coca in specific zones or ‘catos’ to supply Bolivia’s legal market for 
coca with pre-set limits. It has been described as ‘a humane and effective 
approach to control coca cultivation’ that ‘encouraged the sindicatos or coca 
workers unions to self-police to ensure growers do not exceed this limit’ by 
identifying areas where over-production takes place, which are then subject 
to government-conducted eradication operations. In addition, it envisions the 
processing and export of coca-based products such as coca tea, coca shampoo 
and coca toothpaste (Grisaffi, 2015: 1; Ledebur and Youngers 2013). There 
is inevitable resistance from coca growers to such an approach, but it is 
‘overall deemed fair and well-managed, as shown by the relative absence of 
open rejection of the authority of the sindicatos’ (Mortensen and Gutierrez, 
2019: 66).  
As in Putumayo, many residents of Bolivia’s Chapare province are 
migrants displaced by upheavals and changing agrarian economies elsewhere 
(Chapter 6 provides further discussions on this). Chapare was not only where 
US-backed eradication campaigns were most forceful, it was also where the 
alternative coca control strategy was developed. The settler families of 
Chapare, emphasises Grisaffi, were not reliant on coca alone. They used 
manual labour in family-run farms to cultivate rice, bananas and citrus fruit. 
Others found work as labourers in coca-paste production. Perhaps because 
many of them had previously been exposed to social movements and the 
benefits of collective action as unionised workers in collapsed mining firms, 
it was from these settler-farms that the self-governing sindicatos emerged, 
which assumed the role of local governance, ‘responsible for assigning land, 
administering justice, taxing the coca trade and undertaking community 
projects such as building schools or roads’ (2015: 3).  
Grisaffi points out that coca growing is not profitable. Rather, ‘it 
complements subsistence farming and, in the absence of other income-
generating activities, is one of the few pursuits that provide them with access 
to cash’. In marginalised economies, cash is needed to pay for schooling, buy 
clothes, visit the doctor, or to purchase daily needs such as cooking oil or salt. 
To be eligible to operate a cato of coca, growers first have to obtain a land 
title and have their cato measured and officially registered. To bolster and 
improve internal controls, the European Union funded a biometric register 
of producers and their catos, imprinted on identity cards. Coca control then 
becomes a community responsibility, with the sindicato organising regular 
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inspections, and the community deciding on eradication measures should 
production breach the limits (ibid.: 3–5).  
There remain many problems and issues with the Cato policy, with some 
critics coming from the ranks of cocaleros themselves. Yet what cannot be 
denied is a significant outcome — the Cato policy has contributed to a sharp 
reduction in violence. Despite its previous history of violence and conflict, 
Bolivia today has no active armed insurgencies or Colombia-style criminal 
cartels. In a visit by Colombian peasant leaders to the Chapare in February 
2017, they were impressed that an eradication operation they had just 
witnessed did not lead to any outbreak of violence, and noted the deeply 
transformed relationships between the Bolivian military and the peasantry 
(Mortensen and Gutierrez, 2019: 66).  
4.5.3 Social movements, contentious politics and ‘rough peace’ 
Bolivia’s achievement is nothing less than remarkable, explains Ursula 
Durand-Ochoa (2012). The cocaleros were engaged in contentious politics; 
they had to defend an internationally outlawed commodity, and to make 
divisive claims that inhibited social movement unity. Externally, their claims 
and cultural identification with coca cast doubt on their legitimacy, thus 
limiting their chances of support from allies and sympathisers. Internally, they 
had to construct other political identities in addition to that of cocalero. They 
are campesinos and indigenous people too. They are poor communities 
whose very lives are at stake, and whose human rights have been consistently 
disregarded. They have a right to be heard in international policy-making that 
has so far deliberately excluded them. Thus, the cocaleros legitimised their 
struggles to their external audiences by raising issues wider than the coca, that 
they are willing to be part of a ‘plurinational state’, and that they represent the 
voice of the excluded. In the process, they turned the source of illegitimacy 
— the coca leaf — into a potent national symbol that signified opposition to 
the economic elites, the traditional political parties, and the United States 
(2012: 34, 196).  
The construction of such identities, Durand-Ochoa argues, is dependent 
upon political opportunities and threats that constantly shift. Thus, the 
cocaleros deliberately ‘accentuated, attenuated, redefined, and constructed 
identities in strategic calculations to promote unity and attract support’. They 
based their claims on a material grievance — coca eradication — that affected 
their livelihoods. But at the same time, they ‘employed symbolic discourses 
in their struggles as they sought to legitimise their initial grievances and 
incorporate new ones to sustain and broaden their appeal’. They made use of 
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political opportunities or created new ones, ‘by tapping into grievances, 
discourses and identities that resonate’ with various audiences. In other 
words, according to Durand-Ochoa, the cocaleros were successful because 
they employed both strategy-oriented approaches that led to visible gains, 
such as policy change, and identity-oriented approaches with less visible gains, 
such as the production or the appropriation of meaning. The cocaleros 
successfully challenged internationally dominant norms and law and put 
themselves on a collision course with the US. But instead of being politically 
isolated as a consequence, they began to rally other countries to start 
questioning the basic premises of the international drug control treaties (2012: 
196–197). Using the same strategies that the cocaleros used to broaden their 
appeal within the country, Bolivia under Morales championed wider issues of 
the excluded on the international stage. 
Stewart Prest has sought to explain what he terms Bolivia’s ‘rough peace’, 
or the avoidance of armed conflict in such a contentious political context. He 
argues that certain forms of locally embedded governance institutions — such 
as the sindicatos that assumed governance functions in the absence of the 
state — can play an important role in mitigating the likelihood of armed 
violence. ‘Inclusive communities equipped with governance institutions 
capable of resolving collective action problems’, he emphasises, ‘are, under a 
range of conditions, less likely to engage in armed conflict with other 
communities or the state’ (2015: ii).   
Thus, Durand-Ochoa’s and Prest’s conclusions are particularly useful for 
understanding what may be missing in the other three illicit-crop-producing 
countries studied here, which are affected by violence and conflict. Prest’s 
analysis may explain why and how some countries at risk of civil conflict, such 
as those with unconsolidated political regimes or limited state capacities, like 
Bolivia, ‘tend to persist indefinitely in a state of rough, yet durable peace, 
while others experience conflict’ (ibid.). 
The near elimination of violence, avoidance of criminal enterprise, and 
institution of self-governance all counter the framing of coca as a social evil. 
Drug control and development policies of other countries could benefit from 
a careful consideration of Bolivia’s experiences.  
4.5.4 Comparing Bolivia with other illicit-crop-producing countries 
As a case in this PhD study, therefore, Bolivia presents a necessary and 
important contrast with the other cases: it is major illicit crop producer but it 
has no active armed insurgencies, and as far as this research could determine, 
no politically active criminal organisations like those seen in Colombia. 
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Moreover, unlike Myanmar, Bolivia does not appear to need a state-
sponsored protection racket in order to turn coca into a source of stability.  
As already mentioned, one key similarity that Bolivia does share with 
Myanmar is the fact that its illicit crop and product effectively reversed a 
collapse of the national economy. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, 
Bolivia suffered a deep recession. The most obvious symptom was 
hyperinflation, the ‘twilight zone where banks no longer function, and bills 
are paid with foot-long bundles of paper money’ (New York Times, 8 April 
1985), while the value of earnings erode at a dramatic pace. ‘The largest peso 
note — a 100,000 peso bill — is worth only $2’ (ibid.). In early 1985, the 
inflation rate was estimated at 50,000%, but was estimated to fall later in the 
year to 16,000% (ibid.). And so effectively, what international economic 
sanctions did to cripple Myanmar’s economy after 1988, hyperinflation did to 
Bolivia in the early 1980s.    
Bolivian economist Roberto Laserna explains that the recession began 
with a crisis in the balance of payments, the result of Bolivia losing out on its 
external trade because of the plunging prices of its main exports, gas and 
minerals, and the tightening of conditions in the financial market. At its core, 
however, the recession was caused by serious problems of production that 
led to the virtual collapse of the formal economy (Laserna, 1995: 42–45). 
There were also ‘conjunctural “push” factors’, such as the widespread and 
prolonged drought of 1983–84 leading to a serious shortage of staples and 
the death of large numbers of livestock; the permanent and temporary 
migration of a workforce seeking stability; political scandals and instability; 
and overall discontent that led to a series of general strikes (Painter, 1994: 6).  
Deep and painful as it was, however, the recession coincided with a coca 
boom. As observed by James Painter, 
…the coca-cocaine economy clearly acted as a huge social safety net, 
absorbing labour from the collapsed mining and industrial sectors, and 
replacing large portions of dollars previously generated by minerals, gas 
and other exports. But coca and cocaine production also provided critical, 
and perhaps decisive, support for the success of the stabilization 
programme initiated by the government in 1985. (Painter, 1994: 54)  
Part of the evidence upon which Painter based this conclusion is a table, 
showing the spectacular rise of coca-cocaine in Bolivia’s economy from 1986 
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to 1990147. As Table 4.4 shows, starting from 1987, nearly half of Bolivia’s 
recorded exports were from the coca-cocaine economy. If opium was 
pumping half a billion dollars into Myanmar’s economy by 1997, coca and 
cocaine were doing the same for the much smaller Bolivian economy from 




Table 4.4: Coca-cocaine as a percentage of Bolivia’s exports, 1986 to 1990 
(Painter, 1994: 48) 
 




























































































     
 
The impact of the coca boom must not be measured in terms of aggregate 
income alone. A more important measure is how much of that income is 
retained inside the country and redistributed across the population. In 
Myanmar’s case, the income from opium exports could only be re-invested 
back into the local economy, as international sanctions had outlawed foreign 
 
147 Painter adapted this table from data supplied in Franks, 1991: 20.  
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banks and firms from transacting business with Myanmar. For Bolivia, 
Painter presents another table, based on two sources (USAID and Franks) 
that gives an indication of coca-cocaine incomes retained inside Bolivia in 








Table 4.5: Estimates of coca-cocaine incomes retained in Bolivia in 1990 
(Painter, 1994: 49) 
 
Official unemployment jumped from 5.8% in 1980 to more than 21% in 
1985, as at least 60,000 people lost their jobs in the manufacturing and mining 
sectors. These included the 27,000 miners who were laid off following a 
slump in the global price of tin — the backbone of Bolivia’s exports — from 
$12,000 to $5,000 a tonne. The government responded by closing 17 state 
mines (Painter, 1994: 7). Many of these laid-off workers, including those from 
the mining districts of Potosi and Oruro, migrated to the Chapare, the centre 
 USAID estimates Franks’ estimates 
Coca leaf income $35 million, of which 
$35 million stayed in 
country 
$64 million, of which 




$72–95 million, of 
which $37–59 million 
stayed in country 
$153 million, of which 
$71 million stayed in 
country 
Coca base income $193–291 million, of 
which $48–79 million 
stayed in country 
$364 million, of which 
$53 million stayed in 
country 
Cocaine income $291–380 million, of 
which $29–35 million 
stayed in country 
$330 million, of which 
$28 million stayed in 
country 
Total income 
staying in Bolivia 
$150–208 million $216 million  
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of the coca boom. Chapare is an area that falls largely within the Cochabamba 
Department, a political administrative unit of Bolivia. Painter acknowledges 
that the number of these laid-off workers who migrated permanently is not 
known. Laserna, however, made the coca boom and the migration to the 
Chapare the focus of his research. Laserna wanted to know:  
… how a sudden economic boom in a peripheral region and fuelled by 
an illegal international activity occurs, and what consequences this has 
for regional development. If the coca boom has generated a significant 
flow of financial resources, have these offered an opportunity for 
development? What possibilities did the small indigenous peasant 
producers of coca have to accumulate wealth? Has it been possible for 
the region to take advantage of the coca boom to improve the living 
conditions of the population and accelerate its development process? 
Laserna’s findings are important because of the inferences and clues they 
offer into the impact of illicit-crop-fuelled economic booms in the other 
countries in this study. Laserna examined Cochabamba’s place in Bolivia’s 
economy. Resting mostly on low-lying plains and flatlands adjacent to the 
Bolivian highlands in the west, Cochabamba became important ‘because of 
the development of agricultural haciendas which fed the mines in Potosi’. 
Hence, right from the beginning, Cochabamba was already incorporated into 
the internationalised Bolivian economy even though it was not export 
oriented prior to coca growing. As Laserna emphasises, ‘the economic cycles 
of silver, tin, rubber and petroleum, which have been the organising forces of 
the Bolivian economy, found in Cochabamba a basic source of essential 
inputs, i.e. food and labour’. Hence, he concludes, economic processes here 
were more stable than in other parts of the country (1995: 231–232).  
Migration into the region, along with the ability to reorient its economic 
focus to supply the mines in the highlands or the rubber plantations in the 
east, are probably the reasons why ‘there was neither the development of 
concentrations of capital nor a strong dominant class in Cochabamba’. 
Bolivian agrarian reform, which Laserna calls ‘one of the most radical and 
least violent on the continent’, was centred in Cochabamba, making small 
properties characteristic of the region. Cochabamba is a region of small 
landowners and merchants, making its regional economic structure flexible 
and versatile (ibid.: 232–235). 
An important insight provided by Laserna is that anti-drug campaigns 
made it impossible to turn the coca boom and its clandestine economic 
activities into development investments, and thereby attract legal capital into 
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the region. In Myanmar, in contrast, illegal drug profits were transformed into 
investments in the legal economy because its entrepreneurs were kept out of 
global financial flows by international sanctions and were ‘allowed’ by the 
authorities. This was not the case in Bolivia, where illegality and anti-drug 
policies spread uncertainty for turning drug profits into legal investments. To 
establish a strategy of minimum control over the drug economy, thereby 
turning it into a development asset, Laserna suggests three processes (ibid. 
241–245):  
• The opening of markets: expand the legal coca market, both through 
depenalising its use and consumption, and industrialising its deriva-
tives.  
• Decriminalisation: begin a process of gradual, partial and controlled 
decriminalisation of drug markets, steering a course between the 
extremes of unrestricted liberalisation on one hand and absolute 
prohibition on the other.  
• Human sustainable development: focus on the precariousness of the 
labour market and living conditions in the production zones, not just 
on the criminal organisations and their large profit margins.  
Laserna reiterates that the major obstacle to taking advantage of the 
enormous resource flows from clandestine economic activity and turning 
them into equitable development is uncertainty. At the family level, reducing 
uncertainty will stimulate the savings of campesinos, and permit the planning 
of investments to improve their living conditions, income security, and the 
use of resources. At the regional level, reducing uncertainty would allow for 
improved coordination of institutions and agencies to implement 
development policies, and avoid what happened in the Chapare where daily 
disputes between credit and infrastructure agencies, or between promoters of 
new crops and coca eradicators, turned the region into an arena for rivalries 
and inter-agency conflicts (ibid.: 245).  
Laserna’s proposals find particular resonance in Helmand, Shan State and 
Putumayo. At the core of the paradox of illicit economies is the principle that 
the social reproduction of resilience could be improved if uncertainty were 
reduced, especially under conditions of fragility.  
 
The case of Bolivia and the Chapare thus provide a useful contrast to this 
chapter’s development of a conceptual model of interdependency, as a means 
to better understand the political economy of illicit crop production. If coca 
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could be grown and managed in such way as in the Chapare — with 
considerably less violence, more democratic governance and the avoidance 
of control by criminal entrepreneurs, despite all its stated structural flaws and 
limitations — could the notion then of illicit drugs as evil be effectively 
challenged and dismantled? 
 
4.6 Conclusion: Interdependency as an approach for 
connecting drugs and development policy 
This chapter has demonstrated the fallacies of drugs and development policy 
orthodoxy. Many of the assumptions about fragility and vulnerability are at 
best incomplete assessments riddled with blind spots and oblivious to local 
agency. Assumptions about supposed links between fragility, violence and 
illegality are not always true. Illegal economies are shown to be capable of re-
inserting excluded and marginalised local economies back into national and 
global markets, thus enabling the penetration of capital and investments into 
displaced populations. Illicit drug crops can transform from being a source 
of violence to a source of stability, even a driver of economic growth. Non-
state institutions of local governance can potentially eliminate violence and, 
over the long term, pave the way for diversified local economies that 
ultimately eliminates dependence on illicit crops.  
To conclude, the cases in this chapter are not just cases of illicit crop- and 
drugs-producing territories, but are also spaces of change and contestation, 
where interdependencies are created or broken, and where the ‘resilience 
index’ — a single common metric that represents diverse outcomes or 
consequences (Ritter, 2009: 475) — has been reproduced in contexts that 
have similarities and differences. Policy development to eliminate the 
disconnect between drugs and development policies is long overdue, 
especially since there is no shortage of knowledge and evidence available to 
policy-makers for reconsidering current approaches. The analysis in this 
chapter provides some indications of possible areas for focus in new policy 
development in order to resolve the paradox of illicit economies, as 














Table 4.6: Summary: Challenging the assumptions of orthodoxy 
 
Case  Orthodoxy typically applied in 
understanding the case 






Fragile states are most vulnerable to il-
licit crop production and its harms. 
Vulnerability to illicit crops is not automatic in 
fragile states; focus should be on the agency/re-
silience of people.  
Peasants cultivating drug crops are pri-
marily rational economic actors. 
Peasants tend to prioritise stable subsistence 
over high return/high risk strategies; peasants 
run households, not firms. 
Denial of existence and impact of illicit 
drug economies. 
Engagement with illicit economies and actors to 
enable coping and survival in contexts of fragil-




Fragility, violence and illegality breed 
each other. Areas where illicit econo-
mies thrive are unruly, disorderly or 
less civilised. 
The more fundamental problems are marginali-
sation and exclusion. Illicit economies can serve 
excluded populations.  
The key problem to be solved in illicit-
crop-producing areas is illicit crop cul-
tivation.  
Farmers do not rely on illicit crop production 
alone. They adopt multi-layered strategies to 
build resilience. 
Illicit crop producers are simple receiv-
ers of economic and political signals, 
and barely have the power to influence 
the world in which they live.  
Opium and coca farmers create their own ver-
sion of social and political order, including lob-
bying for state structures needed for the admin-
istration of local economies. 
Illicit economies are distinct and sepa-
rate from the licit economy.  
Boundaries have become unclear. Illicit econo-
mies enable excluded territories and people to be 
inserted back into the market. 
Myanmar – 
Shan State 
Illicit crops and drugs production are 
sources of instability. Illicit actors and 
criminals create chaos and disorder.  
Illegality does not always breed violence. Under 
certain conditions, illicit crops can reduce vio-
lence and be a source of stability. 
Drug lords and criminals are illegiti-
mate actors who can only operate in 
the ‘shadows’. 
Drug lords and criminals can gain legitimacy. 
They can also become the legitimate democratic 
choice of voters.  




In conclusion, though illicit economies may enable coping and survival for 
excluded and marginalised communities, it is important to reiterate that there 
are costs involved that cannot be brushed aside. Behind the enterprises, com-
modity chains and social networks that make up illicit economies lies a form 
of capitalism that by nature is cruel, criminal, unregulated and exploitative. 
Communities surviving on the margins often have no choice but to live under 
its control, which may mean working under conditions of virtual slavery while 
criminal bosses reap most of the profits, or families being forced to give up 
their daughters as ‘opium brides’ to settle loans from drug traffickers. It is 
perhaps another paradox that, in overcoming some drivers of poverty, exclu-
sion and marginalisation, these communities expose themselves to a new set 
of risks and dangers. This makes the bridging of the divides between drugs 





Illicit drugs are evil. It is right to crimi-
nalise illicit drug crop producers.  
The concept of ‘illicit’ is a social construction. 
Coca chewing has never been illicit in Andean 
culture and history. Coca growers are not neces-
sarily criminals. 
State-sanctioned and aid-supported 
eradication campaigns are necessary to 
reduce the global supplies of plant-
based drugs.  
Social control mechanisms in place of market 





Criminal Entrepreneurs as 
Pioneers, Intermediaries and 




5.1 Introduction: El Plan Birmania 
In January 2001, a group of Colombian paramilitaries hatched a plan to create 
an alliance of drug traffickers, paramilitaries and politicians to re-establish a 
‘new Colombia’. This was after the private neighbourhood watch groups 
known as convivirs were declared unconstitutional and their licences to bear 
arms were revoked. But not all convivirs disbanded; some joined already 
existing paramilitary groups. Amidst the realignments, the plan was aimed at 
consolidating a right-wing coalition. However, the plan was nearly abandoned 
after it was rejected by Carlos Castaño Gil, the spokesman and de facto head 
of the national paramilitary network, AUC (Autodefensas Unidades de Colombia 
or United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) (Gutierrez Sanin, 2019: 83–87; 
see also UPI Español, 3 February 2007; Semana, 9 August 2007).  
The secret plan came to light only six years later in November 2006, after 
the examination of a USB memory stick handed over by the paramilitary 
commander Hernan Hernandez to Justice and Peace prosecutors. Hernandez 
(real name: Herbert Veloza Garcia), applied to demobilise under the terms of 
the July 2003 peace deal that President Alvaro Uribe concluded with the 
AUC. Paramilitaries whose applications to demobilise were approved were 
assured of jail terms of no longer than eight years and no extradition to the 
United States to face drugs-trafficking charges. In 2005, Congress approved 
the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975) to facilitate and legally mandate the 
demobilisation process (Beittel, 2015).  
The memory stick, which had belonged to Carlos (who was killed in April 
2004), not only contained letters about kidnappings and killings that had 
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occurred without his knowledge, but also pinpointed a police colonel, Danilo 
Gonzalez, as being responsible for the crimes (Semana, 9 August 2007; El 
Colombiano, 10 August 2008; ICTJ, 2013).  
But most explosive was Carlos’s allegation that Colonel Gonzalez, who 
was himself murdered in March 2004, was involved in a political project called 
El Plan Birmania (Spanish for ‘The Burma Plan’). The USB listed dozens of 
politicians who had signed up to the proposed right-wing coalition. In March 
2007, the Attorney-General called for 20 prominent politicians and other 
public officials to be questioned for the crime of conspiracy. Many were later 
arrested, including senators (UPI Español, 3 February 2007; Semana, 9 August 
2007; El Espectador, 17 May 2008; El Colombiano, 10 August 2008). Over the 
next few months, Colombia was embroiled in its most dramatic political 
scandal, called parapolitica (a contraction of ‘paramilitary’ and ‘politician’). It 
rocked President Alvaro Uribe’s government, not least because most of the 
politicians implicated were his political allies. On 16 May 2012, the Supreme 
Court convicted 37 members of Congress and five governors for their ties to 
the paramilitaries, while investigations continued on another 139 cases 
(Alsema, 2012).   
Two issues stand out in this chain of events. First, why did the architects 
of the secret plan call it ‘El Plan Birmania’? The most plausible explanation is 
that the Colombian paramilitaries were inspired by and wanted to replicate 
the way that local militias and armed groups in Burma were ‘allowed’ to make 
money from drugs, in return for their cooperation in counter-insurgency 
operations. In other words, they seem to have wanted the ‘state-sponsored 
racket’ that emerged in Burma replicated in Colombia. Second and more 
importantly, why did Carlos reject the plan? Carlos’s letters show that he was 
setting the stage to distance the AUC from narco-traffickers and indeed, at 
that time, he was locked in bitter public disputes with other paramilitary chiefs 
over their involvement in the illicit drug trade (UPI Español, 3 February 2007). 
Carlos, though he himself was involved in drug trafficking along with his 
brothers, had always wanted the AUC to be a political movement. Thus, he 
seems to have regarded Plan Birmania as a liability that would only increase 
distrust and heighten the image of opportunism of the AUC. In May 2001, 
five months later after the plan was first conceived, when the AUC had spread 
to 20 of Colombia’s 27 provinces and its presence was strongest where coca 
was grown, Carlos suddenly resigned from the paramilitary network, and 
issued a terse public statement: ‘Partners in the cause: we in the AUC are 
friends and are respectful of state institutions. This principle is inviolable. 
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Respect it. I hereby irrevocably resign my position that you have given me’ 
(UPI Español, 3 February 2007). 
This raises the question of whether Carlos’s rejection of Plan Birmania 
was due, on the one hand, to those permanent internal conflicts that reduced 
the paramilitaries to what Gutierrez Sanin and Vargas called a ‘patchy fabric 
woven by many different actors, whose local field of action necessarily put 
them at odds with each other at critical junctures’ (2017: 739); or, on the other 
hand, to his genuine opposition to the imminent expansion of criminal 
enterprise because what he sought, above all, was something more political?  
To answer this question and analyse potential links between criminals 
across borders, this chapter examines the careers and life stories148 of key 
criminal entrepreneurs across the four countries, which — when 
comparatively analysed — may reveal patterns and inferences which are 
relevant in answering this study’s central research question. The justification 
for the research approach adopted in this chapter is that probing deeper into 
messy politics through a comparative examination of careers and life stories 
and the unpacking the contexts from which they emerge — as revealed, for 
example, in the dynamics and contentions around Plan Birmania — will not 
only provide clues into the politico-economic roles of criminal entrepreneurs, 
but will also test the propositions on interdependency being developed by 
this study.  
To reiterate what was stated at the beginning of this study, the use of life 
stories as central units of analysis and sources of inferences derives from 
several scholarly outputs, including An Anarchy of Families (McCoy, 1994), as 
well as the literature on Historical Institutionalism, the approach to studying 
politics and social change elaborated by Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 1–3). 
Using criminal entrepreneurs as a unit of analysis can illuminate the 
‘branching processes’, particularly the points of departure from established 
patterns that lead to outcomes such as remarkable resilience to policies of 
prohibition and state control. 
Like other methods, there are of course limitations. Often, information 
about criminal actors is hidden or may remain incomplete, uneven, or 
piecemeal when verified. Hence, the stories presented here necessarily 
 
148 Ojermark makes the distinction that a life story is an account of a person’s story of his or 
her life, or a segment of it, as told to another; while life histories are the accounts of a life 
based on interviews and conversations (2007: 4). 
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privilege one set of information over others, are not exhaustive, and reflect 
the agenda of the researcher. The material gathered may not constitute 
grounds for making or disproving generalisations. Nevertheless, life stories, 
especially when used comparatively, can be useful sources of inferences in a 
process similar to Hospers’ explanation that when we see bear tracks in the 
mud, we can infer that a bear has been there, even if we didn’t see one (1990: 
72). Comparison may also, to a certain extent, resolve gaps caused by the 
incompleteness of information.   
A further note on the sources is necessary. For the Myanmar case, much 
of what is known about Lo Hsing Han’s life and career comes from two main 
sources: Bertil Lintner, a journalist who had published extensively on 
Myanmar since the late 1970s; and Alfred W. McCoy, who interviewed many 
of the relevant key actors in the opium trade during his fieldwork in Myanmar 
in the early 1970s and later visits. For the Afghanistan case, primary materials 
were consulted that yielded pieces of important information. These include 
the INCSRs, charge sheets filed in US courts in the prosecution of Lal Jan 
Ishaqzai and Bashir Noorzai, and the Scott Helmand Valley Archives 
compiled by the engineer Robert B. Scott, which includes letters he wrote in 
2000–2001 to US authorities. Other sources consulted include works by 
journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran; peace analyst Gretchen Peters; the PhD 
dissertation of Mark Beautement; and the PhD dissertation of ex-British 
Army officer Mike Martin. All these sources were in English.  
A main source for the Castaño brothers is the biography of Carlos Castaño 
Gil by Mauricio Aranguren Molina, sometimes referred to as an 
autobiography because Carlos speaks most of the time in the text. Aranguren 
appears to have been commissioned to accompany Carlos and conduct a 
series of interviews from May 2001 until just before the book’s publication in 
December 2001. Also consulted were Verdad Abierta149 and court case records 
and decisions; and various news reports, including those written by Jeremy 
McDermott. Most of these were in Spanish, and computer-translated into 
English. The main sources for Suarez are his biography written by his wife 
Ayda Levy (in Spanish); the memoirs of Michael Levine, a former agent of 
the US Drug Enforcement Administration; and news reports. To mitigate the 
 
149 Verdad Abierta (Open Truth) is a digital portal created and maintained by academics and 
investigative journalists for the reconstruction, preservation, and dissemination of infor-
mation about the Colombian armed conflict (see https://verdadabierta.com/quienes-so-
mos/). 
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obvious bias of these sources, the information has been carefully cross-
referenced with other sources and treated critically.  
The chapter proceeds with the comparative examination of these careers 
and life stories. In the conclusion, a set of inferences drawn from the 
comparisons is presented and elaborated. 
5.2 Myanmar: The ‘heroin king’ and ‘pillar of the 
economy’ from Kokang, 1963–2013 
Lo Hsing Han (or Luo Xinghan) is the quintessential pioneer, intermediary 
and arbitrageur. When he died of old age (79) on 6 July 2013, he had become 
a tycoon for whom key news organisations around the world — including the 
New York Times, Al-Jazeera, ABC News Australia and the Bangkok Post — 
published obituaries and mini-biographies. While Lo was acknowledged as a 
drug lord in these accounts, he was also hailed as an influential businessman 
who built from his drug profits a commercial empire in real estate; in jade, 
ruby and teak concessions; in port and container shipping; and in 
construction and maintenance of highways to the Chinese border. These 
enterprises, which make up the Asia World Company Ltd., played a key role 
in reviving Myanmar’s moribund economy battered by the isolation from 
foreign direct investments, development aid and hard foreign currency 
rendered by tough international sanctions.  
Underwriting Lo’s success was his ability to obtain long-term, stable 
protection for his illicit businesses. He played key roles that linked remote, 
subsistence producers of an illicit commodity to global markets. He had 
relationships of conflict and accommodation with other actors such as the 
Myanmar Army, Thai and Chinese authorities, and competitors in the trade, 
including the array of ethnic rebel armies straddled across the commodity 
chains he operated. Indeed, the labels ‘criminal’ or ‘gangster’ applied to Lo 
would be too simplistic. The Economist best captured his role in its obituary, 
by describing Lo as not simply a ‘heroin king’, but also ‘a pillar of the 
economy’ (27 July 2013).  
5.2.1 Weaponising opium for country-insurgency 
Lo was born in 1934 in the village of Ta Tsu Chin on Kokang’s border with 
China. Predominantly inhabited by ethnic Chinese, Kokang has never really 
been under full Burmese central government control. It was ceded to the 
British under the 1897 Beijing Convention, but the British and subsequent 
Myanmar governments could only exercise indirect rule. In the 1950s, the 
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territory found itself a refuge for Kuomintang (KMT) forces ousted from 
China by the victorious communists. The KMT found allies among Kokang’s 
local chieftains who spoke the same Chinese Mandarin dialect (FEER, 1990; 
Lintner, 2015).  
Lintner explains that Kokang was extremely poor because its ‘high 
mountains and a scarcity of water made rice cultivation almost impossible’; 
as a result, the region came to depend essentially on two cash crops — tea 
and opium — ‘which were sold or exchanged for food’ (Lintner, 2015). When 
war broke out in the 1950s, opium became Kokang’s only viable cash crop, 
considered best in the region because of its high morphine content. At that 
time, Lintner continues, Kokang’s de facto ruler was a woman, Olive Yang 
or Yang Jinxiu, ‘who had her own army of nearly 1,000 men’, with the teenage 
Lo being one of them. The Yangs were a family of Shan ethnic princes and 
businessmen who became part of Myanmar’s political elite. With the backing 
of the KMT, ‘she became the first warlord — or should one say, warlady — 
to send convoys of trucks loaded with opium down to the Thai border’ (ibid.; 
see also Lintner and Huong-Lintner, 2011). 
In 1962, the military seized power in Rangoon and sent troops to occupy 
Kokang. Eventually, Olive Yang was arrested, forcing her elder brother 
Jimmy — an MP for Kokang since 1950 and founder of the East Burma Bank 
— to retreat down to the Thai border where he joined the KMT, who had 
been driven out to Thailand in 1961 (McCoy, 2003: 423; Lintner, 2015). Lo, 
by then a higher-ranking commander, stayed behind with his militia. Shortly 
thereafter, he lost a large consignment of opium to the newly arrived 
Myanmar troops. Military intelligence then offered to return the opium, on 
condition that Lo and his men formed a home guard unit or Ka Kwe Ye 
(meaning ‘defence’ in Shan). This was the first key turning point in Lo’s 
career: he accepted the offer, and his KKY militia was given ‘the right to use 
all government-controlled roads and towns in Shan State for opium 
smuggling, in exchange for fighting anti-Rangoon rebel forces in the area’ 
(FEER, 1990: 22-23).  
The deal transformed Lo into one of the key drug traffickers in Shan State 
backed by the military. The Myanmar government, explains McCoy, had 
sound reasons for tolerating the opium traffic. The first reason was economic. 
Poorly executed reforms after the 1962 military takeover had crippled foreign 
trade and disrupted the consumer economy. Afraid of straining the patience 
of beleaguered consumers, the military tolerated the black markets that 
developed, wherein Shan smugglers carried opium down to Thailand, and on 
the way back, brought many of the consumer goods sold in Burma’s major 
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cities — transistor radios, motorbikes, watches, even toothpaste. Opium thus 
became Burma’s most valuable export commodity that stimulated trade and 
commerce. ‘Without it’, concludes McCoy, ‘the consumer economy would 
have collapsed’ (McCoy, 2003: 367–369).  
Another reason was political: the military government hoped to turn 
opium into a counter-insurgency weapon. By allowing local militias like Lo’s 
KKY to control most of the opium harvest, and then giving them use of 
government-controlled highways and towns as opium trading and refining 
bases, the various anti-Rangoon rebel armies — i.e. the KMT, the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB), and ethnic nationalist forces — would be deprived of 
funding, which the Army hoped could weaken these groups, if not lead to 
them giving up their struggles. Indeed, the opium trade, observes McCoy, led 
to rebel leaders deserting the cause for the more comfortable life of a 
government militia commander. But the policy was also double-edged: ‘while 
rebel leaders were won to the government side, just as many local militia 
became rebels and a force of their own’, further complicating the chaotic 
conditions in Shan State. Others, including the most well-known (Lo, Khun 
Sa, On Chan, Yang Sun), either switched sides repeatedly or became apolitical 
mercenaries fighting to defend their autonomy in order to safeguard their 
businesses (ibid.).   
As a KKY commander, Lo had other advantages. His elder brother, Lo 
Hsing-ko (Luo Xingguo), became a police chief inspector in Kokang, an 
added guarantee against local interference. A younger brother, Lo Hsing-
minh (Luo Xingming), was appointed by the military to maintain liaison with 
CPB forces operating north of Kengtung, a strategic area where the Burmese, 
Chinese, Lao and Thai borders meet, allowing the Lo brothers a position 
from which to coordinate the opium traffic (FEER, 1990; Lintner, 2015). 
Thus, from 1963 to 1973, Lo sent 10 to 20 tonnes of opium to the Thai 
border in caravans of 800 to 1,000 mules that stretched for up three miles, 
guarded by some 500 soldiers, and which usually took 26 days to complete ‘if 
it went smoothly’ (McCoy, 2003: 424).  
Lo was the ideal intermediary not only because of his access to 
government-controlled highways and towns, but also because he charged 
lower commission fees (20%) compared to rival traffickers in taking the 
opium for refining in Thailand. In a 1998 interview with the New York Times, 
Lo contends that it was not greed but benevolent concern for Kokang’s 
struggling poppy growers that drove him into the opium trade. ‘In the 
Kokang mountains’, he said, ‘people earned their living from poppy for over 
100 years’. Over that period, he continued, ‘poppy-growing and trading was 
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legal; it was the only income for the people’. In the interview, Lo waved aside 
questions about how much he earned, and instead emphasised: 
My whole life has been spent just helping the poor. I was working 
for the Kokang people and the poor people who were looking for 
a way to sell their product. I did so much for them. I felt it was 
honourable. The Kokang people needed the opium market. I was 
their sole agent, so the Kokang farmers got a reasonable price. (New 
York Times, 11 May 1998) 
Indeed, most growers of opium in the Kokang highlands are impoverished 
subsistence farmers from various ethnic minorities. As the Transnational 
Institute reports, the opium cash crop compensates for the lack of rice to feed 
the growers’ families. The crop is also used as savings that can be drawn on 
for emergencies, medicinal purposes, and traditional ceremonies and religious 
worship (Kramer et al., 2014: 13).  
In 1968, a reconsolidating CPB started an attempt to expand and build a 
rear base by successfully occupying Kokang, via an attack from the Chinese 
side of the border. Leading the force were Peng Jiasheng (Pheung Hya-shin) 
and his brother Peng Jiafu (Pheung Kya-fu), former comrades of Lo in Olive 
Yang’s army who, unlike the Yangs, sided with the CPB. The CPB’s arrival 
forced out various warlords and militias, including Lo and his men who 
retreated southwest to Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State, where 
he was allowed by the Army to set up a new base camp. The CPB occupation 
is said to have transformed Kokang: land left by the fleeing warlords was 
distributed to landless peasants, and law and order was restored. But the CPB 
could not eliminate Kokang’s opium production. Lintner (2015) offers two 
reasons for this: first, the CPB could not offer a viable alternative to opium 
cultivation because of the difficulty of finding cash crops suitable for 
Kokang’s terrain; second, some CPB commanders, like the Peng brothers, 
themselves became opium traffickers.   
In 1971, Lo and the Myanmar Army engaged the CPB in a 45-day battle 
for Kunlong bridge that led to a major defeat for the CPB, preventing their 
westward advance. The victory was credited to Lo’s knowledge of the local 
terrain, thus earning him greater protection for his opium caravans from a 
grateful Myanmar Army (ibid.).   
In 1973, however, the military regime appears to have changed its mind 
on the usefulness of the KKY militias. It is not clear whether the militias came 
to be viewed as potential liabilities because of their internal competition and 
squabbles; or if the paramilitary groups had simply lost value as a counter-
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insurgency device in an ever-more complex and continuing rearrangement of 
loyalties, alliances and business relationships in Myanmar’s border regions. A 
process of demobilisation was started, which Lo fiercely resisted. He went 
underground and switched sides by forming a temporary alliance with the 
main ethnic army in the area, the Shan State Army (SSA). It appeared that the 
SSA rebels, according to Lintner, ‘planned to suggest that the US government 
buy all Lo’s opium in schange for some recognition of their political 
demands’. But before the offer could be made, Lo was arrested by Thai 
authorities near the town of Mae Hong Son in northwest Thailand, and was 
quickly deported to Rangoon where he was tried and sentenced to death for 
‘high treason’ and ‘rebellion against the state’ — a reference to his alliance 
with the SSA. But the sentence was never carried out because ‘sending Lo to 
the gallows would destroy a useful tool’ (FEER, 1990: 22-23).  
Lo’s arrest may have been punishment from his military masters for 
refusing to disband, although there was also speculation that the planned 
approach to the US government alarmed officials who worried that Lo talking 
to the DEA may inadvertently expose the hidden powerful actors complicit 
in the opium trade. These ‘hidden actors’ were not just Myanmar government 
or Army officials on the take from the lucrative opium trade. McCoy points 
out there were not only Thai, Laotian or Vietnamese officials involved, but 
also and most importantly, the CIA. McCoy testified at the US Senate on 2 
Box 5.1: The processing of opium and the different types of heroin 
Lo was thought to have been manufacturing heroin by 1969. This was a significant step 
that allowed him not only to capture the lucrative value-added in transforming opium 
poppy into heroin, but also to establish economies of scale and reduce the burdens of 
transporting raw opium. Opium in its raw form is a gum-like secretion with a strong 
odour, that oozes from cuts on the pod of the opium poppy, which is collected by 
scraping it off the pod by hand; it is typically bundled into packs of 10 kg. It is converted 
into a morphine base for easier transport, in a process that uses boiling water, 
concentrated ammonia, and a two-step filtration. This morphine base is known as 
‘Heroin No. 1’, which is about 10% the volume of the original raw opium. Further 
processing transforms the morphine base into the heroin base or ‘Heroin No. 2’. By 
adding hydrochloric acid and additives like caffeine, the heroin base is transformed into 
something that resembles ‘brown sugar’ or ‘Heroin No. 3’. ‘Brown sugar’ is usually 
smoked as it is unsuitable for intravenous injection, hence it is further purified, filtered 
and refined, to produce a white powder that can be compressed into bricks, and is called 
‘Heroin No. 4’. Much of the Heroin No. 3 and No. 4 produced in the refineries along 
the Sino–Thai–Burmese border found its way to Vietnam, for consumption by US 
military personnel (Booth, 1996: 270–271).  
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June 1972 that American officials, i.e. the CIA, were implicated in the drug 
traffic in Southeast Asia. And so, while opium had clearly been turned into a 
counter-insurgency weapon, it also created risks that could damage those who 
profit from its proliferation.150   
5.2.2 Revival, re-emergence and the creation of order 
Lo spent nearly seven years in prison, but with the death sentence effectively 
commuted. By 1980, a stalemate had emerged in Myanmar’s multi-sided 
ethnic conflicts in which no side could either win or be defeated. Hence, a 
new government counter-insurgency strategy was started, and militia figures 
including Lo were released under a general amnesty. Their services were 
needed once again. On his release, Lo was given Kyats 2 million ($300,750) 
by the government to build a new base near Nampong in the Lashio area, 
where he set up another home guard unit under the government’s new Pyi 
Thu Sit (People’s Militia) programme that replaced the KKY. The agreement, 
however, remained the same:  fight the anti-Rangoon rebels and in return gain 
access to government-controlled roads for smuggling (FEER, 1990).  
McCoy argues that Myanmar’s generals were exploiting rifts within the 
Shan State Army and the CPB. By reviving Lo’s opium army and other Pyi 
Thu Sit militias, those rifts could be exacerbated, in addition to denying 
territory to the rebels due to militia presence. Indeed, nine years later, in 
March 1989, the divisions came to a head. Wa and Kokang rebels under the 
CPB, including forces led by the Peng brothers, mutinied and successfully 
drove the splintering leadership of the CPB into China. Lo, Olive Yang and 
Aung Gyi (a Sino–Myanmar ex-Army officer and a founder of the National 
League for Democracy) were sent to negotiate with the CPB mutineers. Lo 
visited Kokang on 20–21 March 1989, more than 20 years after being driven 
out by the CPB in 1968. He was received by the Pengs, his former enemies, 
with a dinner party. After subsequent meetings between Lo and the ex-CPB 
mutineers in Lashio, 17 new heroin refineries were established in the former 
 
150 For an example of such speculation, see http://www.eastbysoutheast.com/godfather-
golden-triangle-lo-hsing-han-obituary/, last accessed 11 Feb 2019. For one of McCoy’s 
testimonies to the US Senate, see https://archive.org/stream/CIA-
RDP75B00380R000100020022-9/CIA-RDP75B00380R000100020022-9_djvu.txt. McCoy’s 
testimony was very damaging to the CIA, because he provided evidence (published in his 
book Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia) at a time when US President Nixon had just called 
on Congress to provide support and funding for a global war on drugs (see McCoy, 2003: 9–
10).   
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CPB areas in Kokang and in the hills overlooking Mong Ko (FEER, 1990; 
Lintner, 2015; McCoy, 2003: 434–435).  
By late 1989, writes McCoy, Rangoon had broken ‘the welter of highland 
revolts with a strategy that combined economics, ethnicity and military 
pressure’. This time, the counter-insurgency strategy was improved with the 
addition of a new component: ceasefire agreements. The first 10-year 
ceasefire agreement between the SLORC and the United Wa State Army (one 
of the CPB splinters) was signed in May 1989. This was followed within the 
next few years by 15 other such pacts. Not only was the number of rebel 
armies fighting the military reduced, the pacts also created pressure on other 
rebel armies, like Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army, that have not yet signed up to 
the ceasefire agreements. Because Lo’s coalition was still too weak to confront 
the better-armed and better-positioned Khun Sa on the Thai border, they 
instead opened up ‘new overland trafficking routes across southern China to 
Hongkong that soon supplied half the colony’s heroin’ (McCoy, 2003: 434–
435, 438).  
If in the 1960s the approach was simply to lure small armed groups to 
become KKY militias in return for the opportunity to make opium profits, in 
1989, the larger rebel armies themselves were effectively enjoined, through 
the ceasefire agreements, to make profits themselves not only in opium but 
in other resource products too, including concessions for logging, jade 
mining, or plantation farming. This process has been popularly called ‘ceasefire 
capitalism’, or the ‘use of territory for political and economic ends as an 
effective post-war strategy’ (Woods, 2011: 751).  
The opium ceasefire strategy delivered quick results. Myanmar’s military 
began to exercise greater control over restive territories, particularly in the Wa 
and Kokang areas, where rebels became more preoccupied with making 
money from opium and other resource concessions, rather than running 
insurgencies against Yangon. Moreover, allowing Lo and those rebel groups 
that signed ceasefires the leeway to run their opium and other businesses also 
delivered a further benefit to Myanmar’s economically isolated economy: 
millions of dollars’ worth of drug profits were invested inside the country. 
With the country suffering from international sanctions and deprived of 
foreign direct investments, development aid, hard foreign currency, and even 
visas to travel to countries like the US, it was profits from ceasefire capitalism 
that filled the growing gaps. Opium alone started ‘pumping more than half-
a-billion dollars annually into the economy, an amount exceeding the 
government’s official tax revenues’ (Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009: 269). 
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Lo Hsing Han was at the centre of these dramatic changes, quietly plotting 
and preparing his next strategic move.  
However, it must be stressed that the ceasefire agreements did not result 
in broad political dialogues and settlements over how land and natural 
resources would be controlled, nor over how the profits therefrom would be 
taxed and shared. What happened instead, according to some scholars, was 
looting, land grabs and the non-disclosure of revenues by Army officials, 
ethnic armed groups and the paramilitaries. In many cases, contracts for 
infrastructure that passed through or built on certain territory were approved 
arbitrarily. The order that emerged, therefore, was a form of crony capitalism 
in which emergent elites, sometimes independently and sometimes in 
collaboration with one another, consolidated their control over territory and 
sections of the economy (Snyder and Duran Martinez, 2009; Woods, 2011, 
2018; Meehan, 2015). This was the context in which Lo’s Asia World 
emerged. Lo may be a ‘pillar of the economy’ as The Economist claimed; what 
it didn’t say was that he was a successful crony capitalist.    
5.2.3 Warlords as agents of capitalism 
In 1992, as hundreds of drug traffickers were executed in Yunnan and when 
Myanmar’s military was consolidating its control over its restive borderlands, 
Lo made what was perhaps the most strategic move in his career: he 
established the Asia World Company and became an important investor in 
the then internationally isolated licit economy of Myanmar. The firm 
expanded quickly and extensively, winning construction contracts from 
government, as well as Chinese-funded mega-projects, 151  thus effectively 
enabling the entry of licit, illicit and laundered capital into Myanmar’s 
borderlands (Meehan, 2015). Asia World’s spectacular growth was not 
deterred by its appearance in the US sanctions list. The bottom line is that 
Asia World had everything it needed in Myanmar.152  
Lo’s beginnings as a militia leader before the consolidation of military 
control in Kokang, and before China intensified its counter-narcotics 
 
151 It is not clear if China had arrived at any form of settlement with Lo. China also has no 
known counterpart to the US Foreign Kingpins Designation Act and Sanctions List that 
prohibits Chinese companies and individuals from doing licit business with identified narco-
traffickers.   
152 After the US government terminated its Burma Sanctions Program in October 2016 (see 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0569.aspx, last accessed 15 
February 2019) Asia World was taken off the list and has become a fully legalised and legiti-
mate multinational conglomerate that can do business with the US.  
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pressure, established his position to negotiate deals with other powerful 
actors. It is clear that his success at obtaining protection for his businesses, 
whether legal or illegal, lay in carefully balancing relationships with state 
authorities, whether Burmese, Thai, or Chinese. He turned himself into a 
resource that they needed, and was therefore able to extract concessions or 
opportunities. A drug lord just making a profit would simply be hunted down. 
But a drug lord serving a useful political and financial purpose could become 
an ally and receive protection. In the process, Lo had a huge impact on the 
commercialisation of the local economy in Myanmar’s opium-producing rural 
northeast. His illicit business created the conditions that enabled the diffusion 
of capital into Myanmar’s borderland economies, and hence — while often 
seen as a warlord and armed actor — he was also substantially an agent of 
capitalism who played a role in monetising the rural economy and enabled 
certain rural areas to be connected directly to outside markets over time.  
Ultimately, however, the order that emerged was a form of crony 
capitalism: a transformation with economic growth but little development, 
especially since inequalities in access to land and resources remained under 
the control of an emergent elite, and the profits generated generally bypassed 
public treasuries. Lo was no simple gangster or racketeer: he was strategically 
positioned to be of influence in both state and market. Lo Hsing Han 
established himself as the quintessential intermediary, pioneer and 
arbitrageur.  
5.3 Afghanistan: Movers of opium traffic negotiating 
protection, 1990s–2013 
‘The mafia, at its core, is an institution that exploits and thrives on 
the absence of trust by providing protection, largely in the form of 
enforcing contracts, settling disputes, and deterring competition’ 
(Gambetta, 2011: 2). 
Diego Gambetta’s research, credited for first lifting the veil off the 
clandestine economic activities of the mafia, is an exploration into why the 
south of Italy was persistently unable to develop socially and economically, 
yet did not slide any deeper into social dissolution. Gambetta’s answer was 
that the emergence of the mafia prevented this dissolution. He showed that 
the mafia’s violence is rational, serves a purpose, and has an organising 
principle which is to supply the specific commodity called protection 
(Gambetta, 1993). 
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The same questions could well apply to Afghanistan. It is unable to 
develop socially and economically yet demonstrates remarkable resilience that 
enables survival under conditions of extreme fragility, conflict and violence. 
Does Afghanistan, then, have an institution like the mafia that similarly 
provides protection, mediates access to resources, enforces contracts, settles 
disputes, and deters competition, thus preventing a slide into social 
dissolution, despite conflicts, violence and economic and social 
marginalisation?  
This section is an examination of the careers of two opium traffickers in 
Afghanistan and of how they negotiated protection within these contexts. 
Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai153 has been described by Afghan and Western officials 
as a leading opium and heroin trader from Helmand. Haji Bashir Noorzai154 
was a member of the mujahideen who fought the Soviets, and a tribal 
chieftain of the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan’s southern provinces, 
who originated from Maiwand District in Kandahar, the birthplace of the 
Taliban. Their careers provide clues not only into how protection is supplied 
to criminal entrepreneurs in Afghanistan’s opium-growing areas, but also into 
the context that structured the control of land as Helmand transformed into 
the world’s biggest producer of opium and heroin.  
5.3.1 Lal Jan Ishaqzai, the ‘dear old man’  
The person known as ‘Lal Jan Ishaqzai’ was a major Afghan drug smuggler, 
important enough to be designated, along with six other known drug lords 
from various countries, as a ‘Foreign Narcotics Kingpin’ by US President 
Barack Obama in a letter of 1 June 2011 to the US Congress.155 Lal Jan 
Ishaqzai is thus roughly on par with Lo Hsing Han. No other details were 
provided in Obama’s letter, except that Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai was born on 11 
 
153 The title ‘Haji’ is an Islamic honorific term referring to those who have already made the 
Haj or pilgrimage to Mecca. Ishaqzai refers to the tribe to which he belongs. The suffix ‘zai’ in 
the surname means ‘son of’, the equivalent of the prefix ‘bin’ in Arabic surnames, or the suf-
fix ‘son’ in many Scandinavian surnames.   
154 There are various spellings of this name, including ‘Bashar’ and ‘Nurzai’. In this study, I 
use the spelling used by US prosecutors: see 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/691.pdf, accessed 21 February 
2019.   
155 See Obama’s letter, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2011/06/01/letter-president-foreign-narcotics-kingpin-designation-act, accessed 19 
February 2019. 
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November 1950 in what is today the strife-torn Sangin District in Helmand, 
where his drug factories are thought to be located.156   
Sangin is a market town located on a narrow, flat, flood-plain area on the 
east bank of the Helmand River, just opposite the Y-junction where the 
Helmand and Musa Qala rivers meet (see Map 5.1). It is served by a good all-
weather road that goes to the Kajaki Dam about 40 km to the northeast. In 
the other direction lies the town of Gereshk which is located on the paved 
Kandahar–Herat highway and is the centre of many government services for 
regions north of the highway. According to Richard B. Scott (1980), Sangin 
gets abundant year-round water through traditional diversions and intakes 
from the river and from the Saraj canal. In the late 1940s, after the Second 
World War, Afghanistan’s then king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, started a 
project to massively improve existing canals (such as the Saraj waterway, built 
in 1910) and to transform the deserts of south-western Afghanistan into a 
fertile oasis. Drawing on Afghanistan’s $100 million gold and foreign 
exchange reserves earned from its principal export of pelts, the king hired the 
American construction company Morrison-Knudsen in 1946 to widen and 
improve the road from Kandahar to the Pakistani border. After receiving 
loans from the US Export-Import Bank and supported by US aid money, the 
company constructed the Arghandab dam, the Kajaki dam and the Boghra 
canal. Construction occurred in stages and was completed by 1970. The 
massive modernisation project, which came to be managed by the Helmand-
Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA), was at that time the world’s largest 
desert irrigation infrastructure (Chandrasekaran, 2012; Beautement, 2016).  
In the 1960s–1970s, according to Beautement, the US government 
became more directly involved with HAVA and designed the development 
of Helmand Valley as an economic buffer to shield Iran and Pakistan, its allies 
at the time, from Soviet influence. However, in order to achieve this, 
Afghanistan’s tribal rivalries needed to be tamed. While the British, decades 
earlier, had tackled the tribal wars ‘through the linear logic of boundary 
commissions’, the US ‘replotted tribal enmities along hydrological charts’. 
The resolution of conflicts became ‘a matter of apportioning cubic yards of 
water and kilowatt-hours of energy’ (Cullather, 2002, quoted in Beautement, 
2016: 112).  
 
 
156 Sourced from the US Specially Designated Nationals Sanctions List: https://sanc-
tionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/  





Thus, the security and effectiveness of infrastructure and water initiatives 
became synonymous with the social and political situation in Helmand. The 
great canal project brought jobs, new district centres, and the promise of 
thousands of hectares of irrigable land. New schools were set up, and net 
farm incomes per person rose fivefold from $126/year in 1963 to $1,280/year 
in 1973 (Beautement, 2016: 112). Yet a sticky problem that appears to have 
been deliberately left hanging was the land issue. Construction of the dams 
and the canals meant land requisitions, forced resettlement, redrawing of 
tribal boundaries, and the migration of communities from outside Helmand 
into newly reorganised towns. The formation of HAVA in 1952, for instance, 
involved the ‘removal of some 1,800 square miles of territory from local 
control’ (ibid.). This created intractable land disputes in a country where only 
Map 5.1 – Sangin District 
Sangin is shown in this Google satellite map at the Y-junction where the Musa Qala and 
Helmand Rivers meet. Also shown are Musa Qala, the Kajaki Dam, Gereshk, and Lashkar 
Gah, Helmand’s provincial capital. The green areas lining the Helmand and Arghandab 
Rivers are typically the irrigated agricultural areas in this desert region. The Herat–Kanda-
har Highway cuts across from East to West, crossing Gereshk. Map scale is not provided. 
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30% of private farmlands had been surveyed by 1978 (Wily, 2013: 20). 
Beautement (2016: 112) suggests that the resettlement programmes were an 
attempt to undermine tribal groups that had caused problems, and goes on 
to argue that similar patterns are being repeated today (ibid.).  
The canals certainly changed the traditional balance of power in Helmand: 
in addition to the khan (landowner), there also emerged the miraw (water 
manager), who sets out how much water each family can have from the canals 
and is the first person to arbitrate disputes (Martin, 2014: Appendix 2). 
Typically, the government maintains control of the water until it leaves the 
canals, after which it falls under the control of the indigenous systems of 
water distribution. Farmers pay a token fee to the miraw for the maintenance 
of the canals and are expected to provide labour in shovelling the silt during 
the annual scheduled shut-downs. In some areas, the khan is also the miraw, 
which can centralise power and influence, but this is not usually the case 
among the more fragmented Pashtun groups (Scott, 1980: 14).  
Wily (2003) points out that there is no clear regime for managing land 
rights, and by default, much of the management of land has fallen to the 
courts. However, given instability and the vulnerability of judges to coercion 
by warlords, land management and dispute resolution have mostly lost 
credibility. Most rural Afghans, continues Wily, regulate their land ownership 
relations through customary institutions, that are rife with practices that 
favour wealthier elites, men and dominant ethnic groups. As a result, deeply 
inequitable and unjust land ownership has become entrenched (Wily, 2003: 
3).  
Helmand also has a highly developed system of patronage for 
sharecroppers that has become the loose basis for political affiliation. 
According to Scott, sharecroppers in Helmand may come from any tribe or 
ethnic group; be a relative of the khan; be contracted for one or multiple 
seasons; or may work for a labour-short household. The khan is expected to 
look after the interests of those who work for him, be pious, pay for 
maintaining the prayer leader or mullah, and aid the poor and destitute. In 
many cases, a large household of over 40 persons gives a khan greater 
influence and security, as it provides a larger basis for him to rely on in times 
of trouble. Support for the khan, Scott continues, can be tribal, religious, 
based on economic dependence, kinship or any combination thereof. One of 
the conditions that makes Sangin distinctive in Helmand is that, unlike other 
districts which have a sizeable settler population, there were no settlers in 
Sangin until 1980 due to limited land resources (Scott, 1980: 6–7). 
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Over the years, Sangin became ‘the centre of opium poppy cultivation in 
this part of the country’ (Scott, 1980: 6); since 2000 it has been the largest 
opium market in various years (Chouvy, 2009: 61, 83). Scott (1980) explained 
that though Sangin had adequate water, it had very limited land resources. As 
such, the district had the smallest average farm size in Helmand but an above-
average household size of 10.1. This further compounded the economic 
pressures on the land to produce cash crops. It was perhaps because of this 
pressure that the district has more intensive agriculture, with opium poppy 
successfully double-cropped with the late planting of cotton. The cotton can 
be processed in the nearby cotton gins of Gereshk or Lashkar Gah (ibid.: 6–
7), while the opium crop can be processed inside Sangin’s network of hidden, 
makeshift drug labs.  
On top of its land problems, Sangin had tribal rivalries that turned it into 
one of Afghanistan’s most violence- and insurgency-affected districts. 
According to Mike Martin, a former British army officer and fluent Pashto 
speaker who did his PhD on the layers of conflict in Helmand, the tribal 
contests in Sangin could be traced to its strangely gerrymandered boundaries 
since 1964, which brought together an odd collection of the Ishaqzai and the 
Alikozai tribes, along with the Alizais and the Noorzais.157 As a result, none 
of the tribes became pre-eminent, leading to intense disputes over the years. 
One key dispute is over control of the district centre, which means not only 
control of the market where the local opium bulk trading occurs, but more 
importantly, control of the local police. The group that controls the police 
gains protection for its opium business at the expense of others, as the police 
can manipulate government eradication campaigns towards tribal enemies 
(Martin, 2016). 
In the middle of all this was Lal Jan Ishaqzai, one of the main khans in 
Sangin who owned a compound by the district bazaar, controlled the local 
market and levied taxes, until he was ousted in 2003. Sangin appears to have 
been better managed than neighbouring Musa Qala, which also has an opium 
bazaar for bulk trading. According to traders interviewed by Mansfield in 
1998, excessive taxes by the Akhundzada family (an Alizai family from 
northern Musa Qala), as well as extortion and the theft of opium by Nasim 
Akhundzada and his fighters, chased business away from Musa Qala and into 
Sangin, which soon became Helmand’s dominant opium bazaar (2019: 13).  
 
157 This dissertation was eventually published as the book An Intimate War: An Oral History 
of the Helmand Conflict, 1978–2012 (Martin, 2014).  
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Martin (2016) records that, when the Taliban arrived in 1994, they kicked 
out the feuding Ishaqzai and Alikozai warlords, but the Ishaqzai men soon 
began working for the Taliban. Subsequently, when the Taliban were 
themselves ousted in the US-led invasion of 2001, an Alikozai warlord, Dad 
Mohammad, was installed by the US-backed government of President Hamid 
Karzai. When two US soldiers were killed in 2003, Dad Mohammad managed 
to convince the Americans that the killers were Ishaqzai. US forces — 
oblivious to the tribal contests going on — allowed Mohammad to conduct 
a reign of terror against the Ishaqzais, which included stealing the drug stocks 
of the Ishaqzai and Chowkazai clans. US Special Forces took over a 
compound owned by Lal Jan and turned it into its firebase. The property was 
handed over to the British in 
2006, who renamed it FOB 
(Forward Operating Base) 
Jackson.158 Control reverted 
to US Marines in 2010, who 
renamed it FOB Sabit 
Qadam. The compound has 
now become an Afghan 
National Army base. Lal Jan 
Ishaqzai has been trying to 
get it back ever since (Seck, 
2014; Martin, 2016). 
This is where some 
confusion about the identity 
of Lal Jan Ishaqzai sets in. 
There appear to be two ‘Lal 
Jans’ — the Haji Lal Jan 
(Ishaqzai) identified in the 
US Sanctions List, and the 
Haji Lal Jan (Noorzai/ Darzai) identified by Mike Martin in his book. Asked 
to clarify this confusion, Martin said that ‘Lal Jan’ is not a formal name, but 
rather a moniker which translates into ‘dear old man’ in Pashto. The first Lal 
Jan (Ishaqzai) is the warlord and drug lord identified in the US Sanctions List. 
 
158 According to Patrick Hennessey, a British Grenadier Guard in Afghanistan, Lal Jan’s com-
pound was fraudulently sold by his main rival for $2,000. Hennessy spoke to MPs in the UK 
House of Commons in March 2016 calling on the government to end the war on drugs. See 
https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2016/03/11/the-day-police-told-parliament-
to-end-the-war-on-drugs, accessed May 2020.   
Box 5.2: Photo of what is believed to be Lal Jan Ishaqzai's 
house and compound in Sangin seized and since renamed 
successively FOB Jackson and FOB Sabit Qadam. Photo 
posted by a US soldier: 
http://blogs.militarytimes.com/battle-rattle/2014/05/, last 
accessed28  February 2016 
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The second Lal Jan (Noorzai/Darzai) is a powerful ex-Taliban commander 
from Nad-e-Ali — another irrigated and major opium-producing district — 
who was known for selling land in the desert to migrants who then engaged 
in growing opium (Martin, 2014: 122, 148). Martin believes that the owner of 
the compound that was renamed FOB Jackson and FOB Sabit Qadam is the 
drug smuggler whose actual name is ‘Fatah Mohammad’, who belongs to the 
Ishaqzai/Chowkazai clan, but who took the name ‘Lal Jan’.159 Thus, the US 
Sanctions list should also identify the individual they listed as ‘a.k.a. Fatah 
Mohammad’.160  
Martin confirms that, after being evicted from his Sangin compound in 
2003, Lal Jan Ishaqzai (or Fatah Mohammad) retreated to Quetta in Pakistan, 
where he began to divert his considerable resources to the scattered Taliban 
movement. For example, he paid the running costs of the Gailani Hospital, 
known for treating Taliban fighters injured in Helmand. This sponsorship 
‘enhanced his image in the eyes of the populace, even though he is doing it 
to interact with the Taliban, who are his clan and aid his opium business’ 
(Martin, 2014: 129).     
With his tribal enemies in alliance with US forces and the US-supported 
Karzai government, Lal Jan Ishaqzai eventually became more firmly 
embedded with the Taliban. Taliban protection enabled him to expand his 
opium business and he soon became one of, if not the main financier of the 
Taliban in Helmand, according to journalist Matthieu Aikins, quoting from 
military sources. Lal Jan also grew close to prominent families, especially 
those that exercised influence in Kabul. Because he was cut off from direct 
access to Kabul by the Alikozais, Lal Jan developed close relations instead 
with the powerful Ahmad Wali Karzai, President Karzai’s half-brother, who 
was the de facto local ruler of Kandahar as Chair of its Provincial Council. 
Thus, Lal Jan lived openly in Kandahar City under Wali Karzai’s protection, 
even after he was included in Obama’s kingpin list (Aikins, 2014). 
The Alikozai warlord Dad Mohammad preyed heavily on the Ishaqzais, 
with support from his American allies as well as Helmand’s governor, Sher 
Mohammad Akundhaza. In June 2006, the Ishaqzais struck back. Some 32 
members of Dad Mohammad’s family were ambushed and killed, after they 
came to collect the body of murdered ex-Sangin district governor Gul 
 
159 Personal correspondence with Mike Martin, March 2019.  
160 For the purposes of this study, the individual will be continued to be referred to as Lal Jan 
Ishaqzai, but this study understands him to be the same person known as Fatah Mohammad 
(Ishaqzai/Chowkazai), as explained by Martin. 
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Mohammad. The massacre has been described as a ‘drugs hit’, a Taliban 
reprisal, and an Ishaqzai–Alikozai dispute. Martin suggests that it was a 
combination of all three (Aikins, 2014: 152). 
The Ishaqzais made themselves felt elsewhere. Former Grenadier Guard 
Patrick Hennessy said that the high death toll during his tour of duty — 106 
British servicemen and about 100 Americans killed in Sangin alone — came 
from fighting with ‘members of the tribe of the guy who wants his house 
back’. Hennessy said they were ‘not being shot at too much’ when he first 
arrived, but things changed in 2009 and 2010 when coalition forces started 
targeting opium poppies. ‘When everybody’s livelihood started going up in 
smoke’, he continued, ‘they [locals] started planting IEDs [Improvised 
Explosive Devices]’.161  
Hence, despite having powerful enemies that included American and 
British forces, Lal Jan Ishaqzai was not marginalised at all, especially with Wali 
Karzai’s patronage. Wali was powerful not just because he was the president’s 
half-brother, but also because many regarded him as enjoying protection from 
the CIA, showing the extent of the complex relationships of conflict and 
accommodation among Afghanistan’s key players. Wali was first linked to 
drugs in 2004, after he intervened for the release of an ‘enormous cache’ of 
heroin found hidden beneath concrete blocks in Kandahar (New York Times, 
4 October 2008). He was subsequently reported as having been on the payroll 
of the CIA from 2001 to 2009 for providing a variety of services, such as 
supplying recruits to the local paramilitary group, called the Kandahar Strike 
Force, which was directed by the CIA and used for raids against suspected 
insurgents and terrorists. Wali was also a local go-between for the Americans 
when they wanted to talk to the Taliban. But most importantly, Wali was the 
Americans’ landlord in Kandahar, renting out a compound that became the 
base of the CIA and US Special Operations troops (New York Times, 27 
October 2009). To local people who knew the real owner of the compound, 
therefore, the base became symbolic of who the Americans were firmly 
connected with in the fluid politics of Afghanistan.   
However, Lal Jan Ishaqzai lost his protector when Wali was assassinated 
in July 2011. This emboldened prosecutors to painstakingly build a case 
against Lal Jan — gathering evidence and obtaining sworn testimonies. 
Finally, on 26 December 2012, Lal Jan’s home was raided by Afghan police 
 
161 See https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2016/03/11/the-day-police-told-par-
liament-to-end-the-war-on-drugs, last accessed 31 July 2019. 
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commandos, only to find that he had already escaped. However, Lal Jan 
telephoned Tooryalai Wesa, the governor of Kandahar, who in turn phoned 
President Karzai to ask what was happening and why Lal Jan Ishaqzai was 
being pursued. This series of phone calls shows how quickly a drug lord could 
access the very top of government. Unfortunately for Lal Jan, the phone call 
was tracked by the surveillance team, who pinpointed his location and 
arrested him. He gave himself up peacefully and was quickly flown to Kabul. 
In a matter of hours, the governor of Kandahar, along with a dozen elders, 
followed to lobby President Karzai to stop the prosecution (Aikins, 2014). 
According to Afghan journalist Tamim Hamid, 391 kg of heroin and 1,300 
kg of opium were seized during Lal Jan’s arrest. Also arrested were two of his 
nephews (Hamid, 2004).162 
Despite pressure from the elders and Kandahar’s governor, President 
Karzai authorised the prosecution to proceed. Karzai was scheduled to visit 
the White House in the following month, January 2013, and he needed to 
show some progress for the aid his government was receiving from the 
Americans. Subsequently, Lal Jan was taken to the Pul-e-Charkhi complex, a 
fortified area near Kabul airport, where the US-funded Criminal Justice Task 
Force is based. It was built to insulate its special prosecutors, judges and 
prison officials from political pressure and security threats. Within days, Lal 
Jan was tried, convicted and jailed for 20 years. Officials in Washington 
quickly praised this ‘rare success in the fight against the drug trade in 
Afghanistan’. Lal Jan’s successful prosecution justified the hundreds of 
millions of dollars that the US had spent in propping up Afghanistan’s 
criminal justice system.163 Predictably, during Karzai’s White House visit, Lal 
Jan’s case was flagged as one of the major accomplishments of the counter-
narcotics efforts (New York Times, 31 December 2014).  
Behind the scenes, however, Lal Jan and his allies were already setting in 
motion the mechanism for his release. On appeal from his lawyers, the 
Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 15 years. By April 2013, an order 
from the Presidential Palace, based on what appeared to be authorisation 
from the Supreme Court and the Interior Ministry, approved Lal Jan’s 
 
162 It was reported later that Haji Agha Mohammad, reputedly Lal Jan’s son, was arrested in 
2015 and sentenced to 10 years in prison. See https://www.pajh-
wok.com/en/2016/04/10/10-top-drug-smugglers-among-2906-arrested-2015 last accessed 
21 February 2019. 
163 See for example p.28 of a US Senate caucus https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=748464, 
accessed Feb 2019.  
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transfer from the high-security Pul-e-Charkhi prison in Kabul to Kandahar.164 
In June 2013, two lower-ranking judges in Kandahar ordered his release, 
based on provisions in Afghanistan’s old penal code that allow judges to be 
lenient for sentences of less than 15 years and taking account of good 
behaviour. As the news spread of Lal Jan’s release, President Karzai ordered 
his re-arrest. But it was too late: Lal Jan had already crossed to Quetta in 
Pakistan, where he remains at large. Corruption was blamed for his release, 
and as much as $14 million was said to have changed hands. Quoting an 
unnamed foreign official, one of the judges involved was said to have received 
$2 million in his bank account on the very day that Lal Jan was released. This 
judge has since fled the country (Aikins, 2014; Hamid, 2014; New York Times, 
31 December 2014).   
As Lal Jan’s case shows, protection is contingent and can quickly shift in 
a fluid and constantly changing context. Even if drug traffickers have deep 
pockets to pay bribes, this may not always be effective, especially when those 
providing protection have bigger battles to fight, or political posturing to 
maintain, for their own survival. President Karzai could have given in to 
pressure but went against it apparently because he needed to establish his 
counter-narcotics credentials in the eyes of donor governments, whose 
support his government urgently needed.  
5.3.2 Bashir Noorzai and the Quetta Alliance  
The case of another Afghan drug lord, Haji Bashir Noorzai, provides some 
contrast on the contingency of protection. He was of similar standing to Lo 
Hsing Han and Lal Jan Ishaqzai, having been included in the Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpins list submitted to Congress by US President George W. 
Bush in 1 June 2004.165 On 6 January 2005, US prosecutors brought charges 
against him at the Southern District Court of New York for conspiring from 
1990 to 2004 to violate the narcotics laws of the US. As the ‘head of an 
international heroin-trafficking organisation’, the prosecutors charged Bashir 
with controlling ‘opium fields in Afghanistan where poppies were grown and 
harvested to generate opium’, which was then brought to laboratories in 
 
164 There are various accounts of this release. The www.afghan-bios.info website states that 
it was a ‘mid-level judge’ who ordered his transfer from Kabul to Kandahar prison. My inter-
pretation, as given here, is based on Aikins (2014) and various reports in the New York Times.  
165 See https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/nyregion/09noorzai.html , last accessed 19 
February 2019.  
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Afghanistan and Pakistan for processing into heroin, and eventually exported 
to the United States (US District Court New York, 2005).   
Bashir Noorzai’s family, according to a Time report, owned large tracts of 
land in Maiwand, Kandahar, but was stripped of its ownership during the 
Soviet occupation (1979–1989). This prompted Bashir, then a teenager, to 
become a fighter with the mujahideen. When the Soviets were ousted, the 
Noorzai family recovered its land and started planting opium. The family 
supported the Taliban and was believed to be particularly close to Mullah 
Mohammad Omar, who also came from Maiwand. Bashir, renowned for his 
exploits as a mujahid, and by then an acknowledged tribal leader, apparently 
used his family’s links to become one of just four major traffickers given 
permission to grow and process opium poppies. Bashir is believed to have 
organised the shipping of heroin through Pakistan, and onwards to the 
United States. As early as 1993, Bashir was already regarded by the US DEA 
as a ‘wealthy heroin warlord and well-known drug trafficker’ (Powell, 2007). 
Bashir’s clout is reflected in a 1997 incident mentioned in the US charge 
sheet. When Taliban authorities seized a truckload of morphine base owned 
by Noorzai, the truck was reportedly returned shortly thereafter ‘with 
personal apologies from Mullah Mohammad Omar’. In 1997, Bashir is 
thought to have imported 57 kg of heroin into New York and to have plotted 
in 2000 to import 500 kg of heroin into the US and Europe. The charge sheet 
included an application for the forfeiture of all Bashir’s known properties and 
bank accounts in the US.  
A report by Gretchen Peters states that Bashir Noorzai was a former 
commander who fought under Yunis Khalis, one of the founders of the 
Hezb-e-Islami party that fought the Soviet occupation. Bashir was also 
Mullah Omar’s original sponsor while he (Bashir) was a key decision-maker 
of the ruling council of Hezb-e-Islami. According to Peters:  
The one-million-strong Noorzai tribe controls tens of thousands of of 
acres of rich poppy farmland, as well as the key road out of southern 
Afghanistan. Bashir’s late father, Haji Issa Noorzai, was a leading 
partner in the Quetta Alliance, a cartel identified by the DEA as a union 
of ‘three inter-related heroin and hashish smuggling groups’ that 
exported ‘multi-ton shipments of heroin and morphine base’. (Peters, 
2009: 10–11) 
The ‘Quetta Alliance’ was a label used by the DEA to refer to an informal 
alliance of three Pashto-speaking smuggling groups that cooperated with each 
other for mutual benefit, and whose ties have been reinforced through 
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marriage. They built their opium laboratories close to each other to enhance 
security; they bought and sold raw materials amongst each other, and on 
occasion have pooled resources to meet multi-tonne drug orders. The 
Alliance buys protection so that they receive advance notice of government 
raids, and as the DEA report claims, used their influence to quash Pakistani 
government plans to expand drugs enforcement capability. The Alliance has 
also suffered setbacks, such as killings of members by rival groups (the 
Pashtuns are a minority in Quetta) or arrests by law enforcers, but because of 
the scale and scope of their operations, they were able to absorb the blows. 
The report did not name the members of the Alliance. It concluded that:  
The Alliance operation is similar to a large manufacturing or service 
consortium. Each of the three groups brings individual strength to the 
Alliance. One has extensive political power; another has strong ties to 
Iranian trafficking groups; and the third has a strong presence on 
Pakistan’s Makran coast and on the Arabian Peninsula. (DEA, 1994)   
A key characteristic of Bashir Noorzai and other drug lords who smuggle 
heroin out of Afghanistan is that they also have profitable legal businesses. 
Some would say these firms and businesses are simply legal fronts for illegal 
activity, but then it could also be argued that they represent a portfolio of 
diversified business interests — a standard business school ‘best practice’. 
Juma Khan, another drug lord, for example, was one of Afghanistan’s largest 
importers of Toyota Land Cruisers and owned an electronics import-export 
firm in the United Arab Emirates. Bashir himself was Afghanistan’s leading 
tyre importer. Because no truck passes empty across the Afghan–Pakistan 
border, a US Treasury report labelled the border traffic as basically drugs 
coming out and consumer commodities going in, all enabled by the Afghan 
Transit Trade Agreement166 (cited in Peters, 2009: 26).  
The UNODC published two reports — The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A 
Threat Assessment (UNODC, 2011b) and Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate 
Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment (UNODC, 2012) — 
that found traffickers ‘misusing’ normal trade routes, dry ports and border 
 
166 The Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) was a 1965 Treaty that allowed landlocked 
Afghanistan to import products that are offloaded in Pakistani ports, mostly in Karachi, 
which are then transported by land to Afghanistan. Smugglers have used the ATTA to import 
goods that enter tax-free into Pakistan on the grounds that they are bound for Afghanistan, 
but which then never reach the border, or reach the border but are sent back, earning prof-
its for the illicit trade. The ATTA was reviewed and superseded by a 2010 Afghanistan–Paki-
stan Transit Trade Agreement (UNODC, 2012). 
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controls to smuggle opiates from Afghanistan to the global market. It 
identified four southern Afghan provinces as the centre of cultivation and 
location of heroin laboratories, and the source of trade routes, and classified 
them into those with low or no involvement of anti-government elements 
(AGE), and those supported or controlled by AGEs.  
Up to 150 tonnes of heroin are estimated to flow south through Pakistan, 
115 tonnes west through Iran, and 90 tonnes north through Central Asia 
(2009 figures). Much of the traffic through Pakistan flows via Balochistan 
Province, and its capital, Quetta. There is only one official border crossing, 
through the adjacent towns of Spin Boldak (Afghanistan) and Chaman 
(Pakistan), while the rest of the region is characterised by porous borderlands. 
The UNODC reports conclude that huge amounts of opiates are being 
trafficked through these borders with little resistance, and that there are many 
heroin labs in Helmand and Nimroz, where it is estimated that opium stocks 
are also being kept. The UNODC identifies the Afghan Taliban as one of the 
main beneficiaries of this trade through taxes they impose, estimated in 2009 
to range from $140 million to $170 million (UNODC, 2011b: 26–30). 
Matthew DuPee describes the Quetta Alliance as a network of Pashtun 
businessmen, smugglers and criminals who operated a ‘trucking mafia’ that 
expanded commercial linkages between Pakistan and Turkmenistan (passing 
through Afghanistan). He identifies Bashir Noorzai as part of this trucking 
mafia which came to support the Taliban, and refers to him as ‘a powerful 
tribal leader from Maiwand, and owner of the village mosque where Mullah 
Omar preached at in Sangersar Village’ (DuPee, 2010: 56). Maiwand, like 
Sangin, is a flat, agricultural area, irrigated by water from the Arghandab River, 
and through which the Herat–Kandahar highway passes. Hence, it is not only 
an important opium-growing area but also a market centre where opium can 
be bought on the roadsides.  
DuPee provides details of the relationship between Mullah Omar and 
Bashir. In the summer of 1994, as Afghanistan was mired in civil war after 
the removal of the Soviets, Mullah Omar is said to have approached Bashir 
to relate a vision in which the Prophet Muhammad told Omar about the need 
to bring peace to Afghanistan. Bashir thereafter donated $250,000, six pick-
up trucks, and an undisclosed quantity of arms and ammunition to Omar and 
what was then a budding militia composed of talibs (students). As the militia 
swelled in numbers, it eventually took over control of local government 
administration. From Maiwand, the militia spread and gained strength and 
became referred to as the ‘Taliban’, which was later to take control of Kabul 
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and most of Afghanistan. The relationship between Bashir and Omar 
remained strong through the 1990s (DuPee, 2010: 56–57).   
Apart from Mullah Omar, according to news reports compiled by History 
Commons, Bashir developed close ties as well with Al-Qaeda and with the 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). After 9/11, the Taliban was 
reported to have entrusted $20 million of its money to Bashir for safekeeping. 
Bashir later surrendered to US forces, and was held in custody at Kandahar 
airport, but was released before DEA agents could question him, apparently 
because he was an intelligence asset. He then moved to Pakistan, where he 
obtained a Pakistani passport provided by the ISI, which allowed him to travel 
to other countries. When in 2004 the Bush administration included his name 
in the Kingpin list, which effectively froze his assets, he sought negotiations 
with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. But a meeting in Dubai to 
finalise an agreement fell through when the FBI did not turn up (History 
Commons, undated).   
For reasons still unclear to US officials, Bashir agreed to visit New York 
in April 2005, apparently to volunteer the information he had on the Taliban 
and Mullah Omar to US counter-terrorism officials, in return for immunity 
from prosecution and being taken off the Kingpin list. Arriving on a 
commercial flight, he was met at the airport by US officials, who seem to have 
been at a loss about what to do with him. After being interviewed for 10 days 
in his room at the Embassy Suite Hotel in Lower Manhattan by anti-terrorism 
officials, however, another set of US officials, from the DEA, came to arrest 
him. He was double-crossed, Bashir argues, because despite the information 
he provided, the DEA needed to justify its own funding by showing it was 
cracking down, not tolerating drug lords (Powell, 2007).  
On 30 April 2009, Bashir was sentenced by US judge Denny Chin of the 
Federal District Court of Manhattan to life imprisonment. The judge argued 
that though Bashir had indeed cooperated with US authorities on the Taliban, 
the Afghan never admitted wrongdoing on the drug-related charges. His 
attempt to cut a protection deal with the Americans, lured, Bashir said, by 
two government contractors to use as leverage the information he could 
provide in the war on terror – fell apart (New York Times, May 2009). Unlike 
in previous cases when security considerations typically prevailed and drug 
lords were given protection for their security value, this time it was the war 
on drugs that was prioritised. Bashir’s case shows that cutting a deal is 
something of a gamble — one can win protection but may also lose the ‘bet’. 
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But unlike in a gamble, in real life the outcome is not determined by luck, but 
by the balance of interests167.  
5.3.3 Comparing opium kingpins 
‘Golden Triangle’ and ‘Golden Crescent’ are labels used to refer to the world’s 
major opium-growing and heroin-producing areas. From the early 1950s to 
1990, the Golden Triangle — the border region of southeast Asia comprising 
Myanmar, Thailand and Laos — produced most of the world’s illicit opium. 
In the Golden Crescent — the three western Asian countries of Iran, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan — opium production started to pick up in the early 
1970s. From 1991, however, production in Afghanistan snowballed so that 
by 2007, its opium crop amounted to 93 per cent of global output (Chouvy, 
2009: xii–xiii; 23). The rise of Afghanistan to top global opium producer is 
partly explained in this section. First, within Afghanistan’s south-western and 
largely desert region are agricultural lands irrigated from the Helmand River 
that make intensive agriculture, including the double-cropping of opium with 
cotton, possible. Second, key drug lords from that region were largely 
successful in negotiating protection for the illicit trade in the murky and 
complex politics of Afghanistan.  
If Lo Hsing Han was a central player in using the opium trade to revive 
the moribund economy of the Golden Triangle, Lal Jan Ishaqzai and Bashir 
Noorzai played similarly key roles in transforming parts of south-western 
Afghanistan, in just about two decades, to become the world’s principal 
producers of opium and heroin. All three were big enough players to be listed 
in the US Specially Designated Kingpins list.  
All three drug lords ran transport operations to bring opium and heroin 
across borders to the lucrative markets beyond. When he started, Lo ran 
caravans of 800–1,000 mules, that stretched for miles, to carry 10–20 tonnes 
of opium to the Thai border. Lal Jan Ishaqzai was in a strategic location: an 
opium-producing district with abundant water supply, which is also an 
important market town and opium bazaar connected by all-weather roads to 
nearby districts. It is also within easy reach of the Kandahar–Herat Highway, 
 
167 On 16 July 2019, however, it was reported that Bashir was freed from prison in Guan-
tanamo Bay, and handed over by US authorities to Taliban representatives in Qatar, appar-
ently to support peace negotiations between the US and the Taliban. See http://www.af-
ghanistantimes.af/senior-taliban-official-freed-from-guantanamo-bay/ last accessed 31 July 
2019. 
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a paved and well-maintained road through which much of the trade between 
Iran and Afghanistan passes. Bashir Noorzai’s clan controls much of the A75, 
the highway from Kandahar to Spin Boldak and the only paved road that 
connects southern Afghanistan to Pakistan. Bashir was also involved with the 
Quetta Alliance. Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, is the 
trade and communications centre between the two countries.   
Running transport operations for high-value contraband through conflict-
affected territory requires not only logistical cunning but also the ability to 
negotiate protection beyond territory that one controls. It is that protection, 
following Gambetta’s thesis, which prevents the slide into deeper social 
dissolution of marginalised areas that are unable to develop socially and 
economically. In the cases of both Myanmar and Afghanistan, that protection 
came directly and indirectly from a wide array of players — from local 
politicians and officials, the police and the military, private or non-state armed 
groups and, most importantly, US agencies. CIA involvement in the Golden 
Triangle is well-documented by McCoy. Though Lo’s case does not show 
direct engagement, CIA involvement certainly shaped the politics in the 
relationships between paramilitary drug traffickers like Lo and the Thai 
military. In Helmand, US troops provided protection to Lal Jan Ishaqzai’s 
tribal enemies, who were also drug traffickers. But Lal Jan was able to gain 
protection instead from Wali Karzai, the landlord of the CIA and Special 
Operations Forces, and supplier of a paramilitary militia used by the US for 
counter-insurgency operations in Kandahar. Bashir tried to strike a deal with 
the Americans but was apparently caught in the political tug-of-war between 
US anti-terrorism and anti-drug enforcement authorities.  
At some points in their careers, all three drug lords had shifting and 
contingent loyalties. Lo started in the private army of Olive Yang, became a 
counter-insurgent paramilitary leader, then switched sides to the Shan State 
Army when the military disbanded the paramilitary groups, only to find 
himself back on the military’s side after the 1980 amnesty. Lal Jan Ishaqzai 
was a Taliban ally who sought the protection of a local warlord (Wali Karzai) 
who was regarded by the local populace as a US ally. Bashir Noorzai joined 
the mujahideen against the Soviets, became a Taliban ally, and later tried to 
strike a deal by giving information on the Taliban to American counter-
terrorism officials. In other words, the three men arranged and rearranged 
themselves in relationships of conflict and accommodation with other actors. 
In these cases, the boundaries between licit and illicit, or between legal and 
illegal business is not very clear — in fact they overlap. Lo’s mule caravans 
went to the Thai border loaded with opium, but came back loaded with 
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consumer items, without which, according to McCoy, the consumer economy 
(at least in the 1960s) would have collapsed. Similar patterns are seen in 
Afghanistan. In 1986, an American assessment of narcotics trafficking 
commented that it was probably welcome because of the hard currency and 
Western consumer goods it delivered (INCSR 1986: 234). Bashir Noorzai was 
Afghanistan’s leading tyre importer, and while there is no direct evidence, it 
is likely that at least some of the lorries delivering goods to Afghanistan would 
smuggle opium or heroin on their way back to Quetta. Lal Jan has a base in 
Quetta to which he escaped, aided by the status he had acquired through 
paying the running costs of a hospital where injured Taliban fighters got 
medical attention.      
On 20 November 2017, US forces in Afghanistan started a new counter-
narcotics campaign called Operation Iron Tempest, a year-long bombing 
campaign that targeted Musa Qala, Sangin and other locations in Helmand 
and southern Afghanistan suspected of hosting heroin laboratories. The 
asymmetry in resources could not be any clearer. The US conducted over 200 
air strikes using F-22 stealth fighters and B-52 strategic bombers, precision 
bombs, and real-time satellite reconnaissance. The targets were no more than 
500 heroin ‘labs’ in non-descript mud huts often equipped with nothing more 
than a stove, barrels and precursor chemicals. These labs are so cheap they 
take less than three days to rebuild. Yet, by its own assessment, according to 
a Time report, the US admitted that its high-tech superiority barely dented the 
drugs trade. Opium and heroin production reached the highest levels ever 
recorded in 2018. In the last three months of the year, only two strikes took 
place, and the US quietly halted the operation. Iron Tempest became the 
latest high-priced counter-narcotics failure. As the report explained, the US 
has spent $8.9 billion in counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2001, 
‘yet the war-torn country has consistently produced about 85% of the world’s 
illicit opium supply’ (Hennigan, 2019).  
As the dust settled, the illicit drugs trade, with its peasant farmer proletariat 
and narco-bourgeois elite, simply carried on, proving its continuing resilience.  
 
5.4 Bolivia: Upper-class drug barons: 1970-1988 
‘The drugs industry,’ according to The Economist, ‘is simple and profitable. 
Its simplicity makes it easy to organise; its profitability makes it hard to stop’ 
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(14 August 2018)168. But profitability alone is insufficient in explaining its 
remarkable resilience. Without protection, profitability will not last. 
Profitability is not automatic in many contexts – it needs to be carefully 
constructed and maintained. A business that acts as a useful intermediator 
and keeps the right partners will continue to be needed. These are the beliefs 
and ideas of Roberto Suárez Gomez, Bolivia’s ‘King of Cocaine’ in the 1980s, 
as documented by his biographer, wife Ayda Levy (Levy: 2012).  
5.4.1 Family roots 
Roberto was a member of the elite who moved socially at the top of 
Bolivia’s high society. He was an heir of Casa Suárez, a firm founded by his 
great grandfather Pedro Federico Suárez Callaú (1837-1908), who moved 
from Santa Cruz to Bolivia’s northeast frontier in the 1850s and started the 
family’s exports of quinine (Levy, 2012: Chapter 1). In 1880, Pedro’s younger 
brother Nicolas (1851-1940) explored and mapped the river network further 
downstream and built barracks for rubber tappers on a strategic location that 
came to be known as Cachuela Esperanza, from where Casa Suárez 
established a monopoly on the transportation of rubber during its worldwide 
boom in the 1880s. In 1883, Casa Suárez expanded to London, where another 
brother, Francisco, registered the publicly-listed firm Suárez Hermanos Ltd 
(later renamed Suárez & Co. Ltd), and took charge of raising capital, 
purchasing property, and organising the delivery of cargo to and from 
Cachuela Esperanza. By 1890, the firm had become the world’s biggest 
rubber firm, supplying up to 70% of global demand. Operating in an isolated 
border area that could not be secured by the state, Casa Suárez won 
favourable concession agreements with a national government that effectively 
delegated many of its roles to the company. By the turn of the century, the 
firm owned or controlled up to 6.5 million hectares of tropical forests, 
grasslands and farms in Beni, Pando, and Santa Cruz, as well as in 
Cochabamba (Fifer, 1970; Lehman, 2018; and Levy, 2012)169.   
Casa Suárez functioned as a para-state in remote areas with a history of 
chronic economic and social restructuring (Lehman, 2018). Faced with 
constant labour shortages on account of its isolation, it weathered many crises 
over the years: (a) the 1899-1903 Acre border war with Brazil; (b) the 1920-
 
168 The Economist has covered the drugs industry extensively, arguing for legalisation, and 
coining the term ‘narconomics’ (Wainwright, 2016) 
169 A key source used is Nicolas Suárez Callaú’s family récords in https://www.myherit-
age.com/research/record-1-273338741-1-506270/nicolas-Suárez-Callaú-in-myheritage-fam-
ily-trees, managed by Benigno Suárez Castedo, updated on 8 April 2019.  
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1940 economic dislocation triggered by the fall of global rubber prices; (c) the 
1932-1935 Chaco border war with Paraguay; (d) the subsequent series of coup 
d’etats following the humiliation of defeat in the border wars; and (d) the rise 
of various political groups, including the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR), which came to power in 1952 and implemented sweeping agrarian 
reform policies, including reverting six million hectares of Suárez-controlled 
land back to government. Though reduced by these crises, the Casa Suárez 
empire weathered through because, as Lehman argues, amidst such 
uncertainties the firm learned to prioritise food production and living 
conditions, cancelled debts, and relied on alternatives such as cattle raising in 
order to avoid the depopulation of the region. In other words, Lehman 
continues, Casa Suárez developed the view that the rural workforce is in itself 
a resource and key asset to be preserved in order to survive harsh and 
uncertain borderland conditions (Fifer, 1970; Lehman, 2018). 
Cattle farming, therefore, encouraged settlement and the consolidation of 
rural towns. It also benefitted from still-existing Casa Suárez infrastructure, 
since live cattle, like rubber, were exported via the fleet of barges and port 
stations into Brazil. In 1939, Roberto spent a summer holiday with great 
granduncle Nicolas at Cachuela Esperanza, who at 88 remained active and 
strong and thus saved the young Roberto from drowning by pulling him from 
the swirling Beni river back into the boat (Levy, 2012: Chapter 2). Roberto 
would go on to expand the family’s cattle business. After his marriage to Ayda 
Levy in 1958, he inherited Hacienda San Vicente in Santa Ana del Yacuma, 
with 5000 heads of cattle, and started exporting cattle to Brazil, using steam-
boats rented from relatives in journeys that typically took 3 days downstream. 
With business growing, Roberto went on to purchase more haciendas for his 
cattle stocks like San Manuel from his brothers, El Chavius from the Mon-
tejos family, and El Carmen from the Castedos, among others. By the 1970s, 
the couple owned about 250,000 hectares of grazing land and 50,000 cattle 
heads (ibid., Chapter 7).  
5.4.2 Coca’s rise in eastern Bolivia 
Though the post-1952 agrarian reform became the final blow that led to 
the official dissolution of Suárez and Co. Ltd in London, the family seems to 
have secured some form of settlement with the government of Victor Paz 
Estenssoro. By 1962, Roberto was elected sub-prefect of Yacuma province 
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in Beni, while older brother Hugo was appointed Minister of State for Agri-
culture (Levy, 2012: Chapter 14)170. The Suárez family’s economic and polit-
ical presence in Beni, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba continued. They were 
seen by a national government based in the more densely-populated western 
highland regions not only as partners in forging stronger political and eco-
nomic links with the sparsely-populated eastern lowlands, they were also re-
garded as key actors for strengthening food security (Painter, 1994: 3). 
The reasons for Roberto’s entry into the drugs business remain unclear, 
but it appears to have started in the mid-1970s, enabled it seems by the ex-
pansion of coca farming into Cochabamba. Until the 1940s, up to 97% of 
coca fields were in the mountainous Yungas area (Painter, 1994: 3). By the 
1950s, however, the flat eastern lowlands of the Chapare in Cochabamba 
started growing coca. By 1967, Chapare had more hectares under coca culti-
vation than Yungas. A key reason for the shift, explains Painter, was that 
roads started to penetrate the low-lying areas of Cochabamba as part of gov-
ernment efforts to encourage settlement into eastern Bolivia, deemed neces-
sary to avoid a repeat of the loss of territory in the Acre and Chaco wars. 
When a paved highway funded by international aid was finished in the 1970s, 
which coincided with the rapid expansion of international demand for co-
caine, Chapare’s vast flat lands had become criss-crossed by a myriad of small 
paths and roads running off a main artery. This was unlike Yungas, where no 
airplane could land (Painter, 1994: 3-4; Laserna, 1995).   
Roberto’s extensive grazing lands and cattle business are essential to an 
understanding not only of the infrastructure upon which he built his drugs 
business, but also of the relationships of accommodation and patronage he 
established and maintained with coca farmers in the eastern lowlands. Rob-
erto was not simply an impersonal drug trafficker or gangster buying and sell-
ing coca in the conventional sense: he was also the patrón or godfather who 
had direct and indirect personal relationships with many of these farmers, 
some of whom were likely to be tenants allowed to grow crops, rather than 
just raise cattle, on the land.  
In the same way that cattle farming benefitted from the foundations built 
by rubber, Roberto’s drug business benefitted from his cattle infrastructure. 
Roberto trained as a pilot and modernised the cattle business by building air-
strips on his ranches and investing in what became Bolivia’s largest private 
fleet of small aircraft. With the aircraft, Roberto was able to transport meat, 
 
170  Note that I cite ‘chapters’ rather than ‘pages’ in Levy, 2012 because I used machine 
translations of each chapter into English, and hence do not have pages.  
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not just live cattle, to Bolivian and Brazilian cities, and gained considerable 
value added. The same fleet would later run the supply chains that brought 
coca base to Pablo Escobar and the Medellin cartel in Colombia, as well as 
cocaine to French partners in Marseille (Levy 2012: Chapter 12). In 1982, the 
Reagan administration estimated Roberto’s drugs turnover at $400 million a 
year (The Economist, August 2000).  
On 26 December 1982, Roberto hosted a party in San Vicente, which has 
a 2.2-km airstrip, ostensibly to celebrate eldest son Roby’s birthday, but which 
was also a meeting of families from Antioquia that banded together under 
MAS (Muerte a Secuestadores or Death to Kidnappers). MAS, formed for self-
protection after the kidnapping of Martha Nieves Ochoa by the left-wing M-
19 guerrillas, would later become the Medellin Cartel. For the party, airplanes 
were dispatched to Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro to pick up celebrity chefs; 
to Panama to collect boxes of whisky, champagne, and other spirits; and to 
Colombia to bring in Escobar and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha. When Escobar 
disembarked, a group of fourth-generation mariachis from Tecalitlán 
(Mexico) descended from a second plane playing ranchera music. As the party 
started, a prized Thoroughbred horse named Piropo arrived on a Super DC-3 
plane, a gift of the Ochoas to Roberto, who in return impressed the 
Colombians when he showed off his fully-grown pet jaguar named Kayan 
(Levy, 2012: Chapter 10). It was evident that these were no ordinary mobsters 
driving fancy cars.  
5.4.3 The geopolitics of Roberto’s cocaine business 
Important parts of Roberto’s biography are the stories Levy tells about the 
geopolitics of the cocaine business. Apparently, these accounts were pieced 
together not just from what she personally knew, but also from an 
unpublished 500-page ‘Coca-Cocaine Thesis’ in which Roberto provided 
details about his criminal exploits (Levy 2012: Chapter 18).  
Because the Cuban government played a decisive role in the liberation of 
Martha Nieves Ochoa from the M-19 kidnapping, Escobar accepted an 
invitation to visit Havana in January 1983 and brought Roberto along. In 
Havana, they were told about the Castro brothers’ strong interest in using 
drug trafficking as a weapon against US imperialism. A deal was therefore 
stuck, in which the cartel would pay $1-million a day for access to Cuban 
territorial waters and airspace. In return, the Cuban navy would not only allow 
cartel ships and planes smuggling cocaine to Florida to replenish, the drug 
traffickers will also be provided with intelligence drawn from Russian-
supplied radars on the precise location of American Coast Guard ships and 
aircraft (Levy 2012: Chapter 11).  
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The deal went smoothly for 16 months, enabling hundreds of tons of 
cocaine to be smuggled into the US, while Cuba earned a windfall. In June 
1984, however, it ended after Cuban intelligence found that Roberto and 
Escobar were also playing with the CIA and Lt. Col. Oliver North, in a deal 
brokered by Panama’s Manuel Antonio Noriega. Apparently, North and the 
CIA sought ways to circumvent the Boland amendments in the US Congress, 
which not only limited the amount but also set conditions on the aid that the 
US government could provide to the Contras fighting the Sandinistas, Cuba’s 
allies in Nicaragua. Roberto was to take charge of production; the CIA will 
organise delivery to US territory, via Limon Province in Costa Rica; and US-
based Medellin operatives will do distribution and sales. Each then takes a 
30% share of the profit, with the CIA share used exclusively for funding the 
Contras (Levy 2012: Chapter 12).  
In order not to mix things up, Roberto set up a new drug lab, called Villa 
Mosquito, in the most swampy and inhospitable part of Ballivian Province in 
Beni. The complex was built so that the laboratory, warehouses, houses, 
hangars and other outbuildings for electric generators and pumps would not 
be seen from the air; the only thing visible was a small house, a corral and a 
small herd of five hundred cattle. A catering company supplied fuel, food and 
other needs, including Brazilian prostitutes. The lab produced a thousand 
kilos of cocaine each day. Two Hercules C-130 aircraft owned by the CIA but 
registered under the US air company Southern Air Transport, which the 
Bolivians called Aerococa, departed each week from Villa Mosquito to 
transport seven tons of cocaine to Puerto Limon (ibid., Chapter 12).  
The angered Cubans urgently invited Roberto and Escobar for 
consultations in Havana. The plan was to arrest the pair in order to scuttle 
the operation. However, officials who negotiated the Cuban deal – General 
Arnaldo Ochoa and Colonel Antonio de la Guardia – warned the pair, 
allowing them to leave before the arresting party arrived. Both officials, 
bemedaled heroes of the Cuban Revolution, were later executed in Havana 
by firing squad (Levy, 2012: Chapter 11; Chapter 12; and New York Times, 14 
July 1989).   
5.4.4 Cocaine, Inc. 
Levy took pains to highlight that her husband was different from the crim-
inals and warlords with whom he partnered. He was the mild-mannered but 
cunning patrón, she emphasizes, who had ‘the touch for the common people’ 
and ‘helped the poor get out of their misery’. Levy lamented the betrayal by 
General Luis Garcia Meza, who  became president via a July 1980 coup that 
Roberto funded, only to cave in to US pressure by publishing a list of wanted 
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drug lords with Roberto and son Roby on top. The publication caused dam-
age, because Roberto’s known properties and assets were frozen, prompting 
Levy to start the tedious task of legally dissociating the family’s assets from 
those acquired through her husband’s illicit business. This also led to the sep-
aration of the couple, although they remained friends, states Levy, and were 
seen together in parties they hosted (Levy 2012: Chapter 5; Chapter 18). 
Roberto had a particular hatred for the US, citing how two American com-
panies, tobacco giant Philip Morris and firearms manufacturer Smith and 
Wesson, kill more people than cocaine (Levy, Chapter 5). More importantly, 
Roberto belittled the US-led ‘war on drugs’ because he believed that ‘no one 
can eliminate the largest business in the world’. The most that anti-drug op-
erations can achieve, he said, is to change the brokers or intermediaries who 
organise and profit from the business, pointing out that when special police 
and the DEA established bases in Bolivia’s coca-producing areas, coca leaf 
growing increased rather than diminished (Levy, 2012: Prologue).  
Roberto wanted to end the tendency to create a monopoly in the drugs 
trade, halt a slide to deadly competition, and smoothen relationships with 
government. He did this by setting up La Corporacion, which the Americans 
eventually called the ‘General Motors of Cocaine’. It functioned more like a 
loose partnership in an industry where entry is not difficult. Its incorporators, 
drawn from the Bolivian elite, essentially remained autonomous but pooled 
their resources together to reduce mutual costs, sold materials and services to 
each other, shared information, distributed orders, and coordinated where 
necessary (Levy, 2012: Chapter 7). 
Perhaps its most important innovation was to attach the illicit drugs trade 
to the infrastructure and business links of licit enterprise. For Roberto, it 
meant not just using the assets of his ranches, but also the family’s river in-
frastructure. Steam barges operating from ports on the Mamore River to 
Guayaramerin, for example, were used to transport bulk coca leaves for pro-
cessing. La Corporacion relied on already-existing business infrastructure – 
letters of credit, bank accounts, procurement lines, warehouses, insurance 
premia, legal and accounting firms, and so on. Roberto explicitly wanted to 
transform the ‘ant’ traffic in coca into a centrally-coordinated corporate en-
terprise. At its height when millions of dollars in cash arrived on planes from 
Colombia each day, the couple and their associates joked that ‘it was easier to 
drain the Mamore River than to end the flow of money’ (ibid., Chapter 7).  
As key investment, La Corporacion bought properties on the outskirts of 
the Madidi National Park near the Yata River to set up a network of labora-
tories for coca processing that its partners could use. A fleet of 30 Cessna 
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STOL206 (short take-off and landing) aircraft – typically with license num-
bers muddied to avoid identification and flown by pilots who paid bribes of 
$10,000 to obtain landing rights – were used to bring in the crude coca base 
from the Chapare. The processed cocaine paste sulfate was then transported 
to Colombia using longer-range turboprop DC-3 aircraft. The pilots (maru-
chos) typically earned $15,000 per flight. A key change Roberto introduced was 
to increase the sale price of cocaine base sulfate from $1800 per kilo to $9000 
per kilo (ibid., Chapter 7). 
5.4.5 Political connections 
Roberto had many political involvements and was even faulted by wife 
Ayda and brother Hugo for squandering money by playing politics. Accord-
ing to Painter171, Roberto was widely believed to have financed the 1978 cam-
paign of General Juan Pereda. Strong evidence also suggests that Roberto 
financed the brutal ‘Cocaine Coup’ of 1980 which put into power General 
Luis Garcia Meza, and ushered in what was perhaps the most violent period 
in contemporary Bolivia when the country saw extra-judicial killings, disap-
pearances, and torture, particularly of union leaders and left-wing figures op-
posing the coup (Painter 1994: 58-59). On assuming power, Garcia Meza 
quickly appointed Colonel Luis Arce Gomez as Interior Minister, whose first 
act was to authorise the release of key drug traffickers from jail (Levine, 1993). 
Arce is a cousin of Roberto (Levy 2012: Chapter 2).   
However, Roberto deplored the violence and ‘useless murders’. There 
were over 500 murders and disappearances, and thousands of tortures and 
imprisonment. Behind it was the mafia-like organisation Novios dela Muerte 
(Lovers of Death) led by the infamous Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie and 
Argentine military advisers. The Novios were a group of about 600 mercenar-
ies contracted by Arce to hunt down 140 small and mid-level drug traffickers, 
apparently to show to the US that on the contrary, Bolivia’s new rulers were 
also ‘tough’ against drugs. In reality, the Novios simply cleared the field of 
lower-level competitors (Levine, 1993: loc. 1156).  
Levy confirms the Novios also worked for Roberto, mainly to provide pro-
tection for the drug shipments to Colombia by ensuring that the Colombians 
paid first, before off-loading the cargoes. The Novios, she said, were known 
locally as the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles), on account of the images of those 
birds on the wings of Roberto’s planes. Levy, who has Jewish roots, listed 
 
171 Painter was the BBC’s correspondent at that time in Bolivia. 
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names of the most prominent Novios and called them ‘a diverse sample of the 
international extreme right’ (Levy, 2012: Chapter 6).  
Political connections to the CIA also came in handy for the drug traffick-
ers. In May 1980, La Corporacion was targeted by a joint US-Bolivia sting 
operation172, led by DEA special agent Michael Levine. The sting operation 
– in which an experimental 500 kilos of cocaine was picked up by plane and 
$9 million in cash paid inside the vault of a Bolivian bank – resulted in the 
arrest of two partners, Jose Roberto Gasser and Alfredo ‘Cutuchi’ Gutierrez, 
who were extradited to the US and indicted. However, Gasser was soon qui-
etly released from jail, and subsequently, the US Attorney’s Office in Miami 
dropped all charges. Gutierrez’s bail requirement was lowered from $1-mil-
lion to $10,000, which he quickly posted (Levine, 1993: loc. 683). Levine later 
found the reason for the release – Gasser and Gutierrez were assets of the 
CIA. The 1980s were also the period of La Guerra Sucia or the ‘dirty war’ 
against communism in Latin America, and the CIA was protecting its allies. 
To Levine’s dismay, the targets of the war on drugs were deemed by the CIA 
as the allies the US needed in its war against communism (ibid., loc. 1429).    
5.4.6 The end of the king 
Roberto broke off with the Medellin cartel in mid-1984. His declared rea-
son was that Medellin operators were undermining his business, but Levy says 
it was because Roberto deplored his partners’ violence and regretted enrich-
ing Escobar. The timing was significant for two reasons. First, in March that 
year, the Medellin cartel suffered a serious blow when the DEA and Colom-
bian police destroyed Tranquilandia, the processing complex with 19 labora-
tories and 8 airstrips that produced cocaine exports to the US. This left Rob-
erto with the only sizeable jungle laboratory facilities in Madidi, Yata, and 
Villa Mosquito. Second, the Cuban and CIA smuggling deals ended. But Rob-
erto by then, without the knowledge of Escobar, had already established ties 
with a jovial Colombian, Cesár Cano, who had good connections in the Ba-
hamas and knew the coasts and beaches of southern Florida. Over the next 
few months, business with Cano flourished, earning Roberto net profits of 
about $250 million. But the Antioqueños caught up with Cano: 12 hitmen 
killed him and his bodyguards in August 1985 on the doorsteps of his 
 
172 Because of the clandestine nature of the drugs trade, the best way to gather evidence for 
a successful prosecution is to catch the criminal actually committing the crime. Hence, law 
enforcers usually conduct a ‘sting operation’, a deception or a ruse, where they go under-
cover typically posing as buyers who purchase drugs using marked cash or traceable pay-
ments. 
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mother’s home in Bogota. Cano’s death unnerved Roberto, who promptly 
abandoned his illegal drugs business, and attempted to go legal by reviving 
his proposal to government of a new multinational corporation, modelled 
after Casa Suárez, capable of processing Bolivia’s excess coca leaf production 
into medicinal products for a mass market (Levy, 2012:  Chapter 13; Painter 
1994: 1). By that time however, Roberto was already too tainted to be con-
sidered seriously. 
In July 1988, at the end of Bolivia’s coca boom, Roberto was arrested in a 
raid in El Sujo, one of his ranches in Beni (Painter, 1994: 27-28). He was 
convicted to 15 years and put in a prison near La Paz that, according to Levy, 
was more like a paradise without freedom, rather than a purgatory. Roberto 
was however released in 1996 because his health deteriorated in the highland 
environment. Put under house arrest in the lowlands, he spent time working 
with a journalist and ghost writer to produce his memoirs, entitled Siempre Rey 
(Always King), which was turned down by publishers and filmmakers because 
it barely mentioned his criminal exploits. Levy later discovered that Roberto 
had also written a longer Tesis Coca-Cocaina that provided many of the details 
published in El Rey de la Cocaina in which Levy elaborated on Roberto’s crim-
inal background, but more in the mould of an upper-class Robin Hood (2012: 
Chapter 18 and Epilogue).   
Before he died in July 2000, Roberto attempted suicide by barricading 
himself in his room, brandishing a gun. But an ambulance arrived with doc-
tors that succeeded in convincing him to be brought to a private clinic, where 
he died five days later. Thousands of people, narrates Levy, attended his wake 
in Santa Cruz. He was buried in Cochabamba alongside eldest son Roby, who 
was killed in police custody in 1990 (ibid.) 
5.4.7 Comparing business models  
Two observations can be drawn from Suarez’s effective business model. First, 
it was his legitimate cattle and other businesses that provided the 
infrastructure for the illicit business. Suarez himself hinted that the export of 
cocaine to the US only becomes possible by embedding or hiding the 
contraband in the export of legitimate goods; he estimated that as much as 
60% of the value of all export traffic from Bolivia could be illicit. This is one 
reason, he argued, why the drugs trade could not be eliminated (Levy, 2012: 
loc. 68–76). This also strongly contradicts the assumption that criminal 
enterprise happens exclusively underground and can be separated from legal 
enterprise.  
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Second, successful criminal enterprise requires a good level of social 
embeddedness. Suarez sought legitimacy by engaging in ‘ostentatious 
philanthropy’, i.e. paying for church repairs, for paved streets in poor villages, 
or for soccer fields for street urchins. Like Colombia’s top drug lord Pablo 
Escobar, who was the biggest contributor to charitable projects of the 
Catholic church, Suarez became Bolivia’s major charitable donor (The 
Economist, 2000). Most importantly, he sought partnerships with the ‘right’ 
people, i.e. those who could provide protection. However, that protection 
appears to have been contingent on many factors. Suarez may have cut deals 
with the right people, but the lack of stability made it impossible for his 
partners in government, including the ‘Minister of Cocaine’, or the CIA, to 
give him the protection he needed over the longer term.  
Suarez’s life story sheds light on the edifice of illicit enterprise. While the 
kingpin strategy of countries like the US may eliminate the ‘big men’ with 
centralised operations, the illicit drug trade is much larger: it has vast 
production, processing and distribution networks that do not dissolve simply 
by eliminating those at the top. The kingpin strategy failed because it targeted 
only the top individuals and left the commodity chains and social networks 
of the local economies that enable drugs production largely intact. Over the 
long term, it appears that law enforcement was only able to restructure the 
trade, not eliminate it — just as Suarez had predicted.  
Important comparisons can be drawn in the careers of Suarez, Bashir 
Noorzai, and Lo Hsing Han. Suarez set up La Corporacion, which is roughly 
similar to Bashir’s Quetta Alliance, a network for mutual benefit that was 
bound together by social ties. It became critical for collective protection 
against risks and also minimised damaging competition. Suarez and Bashir 
were both from upper-class families. Lo on the other hand, was not from an 
upper-class family, and started his career as a militia leader who did the dirty 
jobs. Suarez’s licit cattle business provided the cover and infrastructure for 
the illegal trade. Lo took the opposite path: he started in the illegal trade and 
only when he had accumulated sufficient profits did he branch out into licit 
business. Suarez courted publicity and made ostentatious displays of 
charitable gift-giving. Lo was low-key, and believed he was already doing the 
poor a favour by selling their opium.  
There is also a contrast in the stigma attached to their illicit businesses. 
Opium was heavily stigmatised in the China–Myanmar border areas, largely 
due to successful eradication programmes, anti-opium mass movements, and 
public trials and executions in China. In contrast, in Bolivia, there is less 
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stigma attached to cocaine, and the UN-banned coca leaves are regarded as 
part of the national heritage.  
Control of transport resources was important in all cases. Lo started with 
mule caravans that went through mountain trails; later, he had access to 
government-controlled highways. Both Lal Jan and Bashir had easy access to 
highways, while the Noorzais controlled the only highway out of southern 
Afghanistan into Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Suarez, for his part, was 
able to use planes not only to transport coca base and paste but also to bring 
drug kingpins like Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha to lavish 
parties in his mansions.  
A further similarity are the shifting relationships they all face. Lo and 
Suarez had changing relationships of conflict and accommodation with the 
military. Suarez funded a military coup, if the accounts of Painter and Laserna 
are correct, yet ran into problems too with Garcia Meza when the dictator 
caved in to US pressure. Lo did not go as far as funding, but he did actively 
support a successful military coup as a combatant, and became its useful 
counter-insurgency tool.  
In July 1988, Suarez was arrested in a raid in El Sujo, one of his ranches 
in Beni; it was the first time that any major Bolivian trafficker had been cap-
tured (Painter, 1994: 27–28). He was sentenced to 15 years in jail. In the end, 
says the Economist, he was a broken and faded man who repented in prison 
and liked to be photographed in front of a picture of Jesus (The Economist, 
2000). His cattle herds dwindled to a few hundred. Yet he retained his flam-
boyance and took pride in the 18 children he fathered in the course of several 
marriages. He was released from prison in 1996 on account of good behav-
iour and deteriorating health and died in 2000. 
 
5.5 Colombia: Deciphering the Castaños, 1981 to 2007 
The Castaño-Gils173 were a brood of 12 siblings known as large ranchers in 
Antioquia and in adjacent Cordoba (Verdad Abierta, 2008a). In the early 1980s, 
 
173 The convention for names in Colombia is to have the father’s surname first (Castaño), fol-
lowed by the mother’s (Gil). The family’s surname, however, is commonly taken from the fa-
ther, ‘Castaño’.  
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three of the brothers — Fidel, Vicente and Carlos174 — shot to infamy as 
fearsome paramilitary leaders who used extreme levels of violence and coer-
cion to fight a growing leftist insurgency and, in the process, appear to have 
contributed significantly to the consolidation of a particular form of local 
economic order.  
5.5.1 The rise of the Castaño brothers 
In 1995 after the Medellin and Cali cartels had been eliminated following the 
sustained counter-narcotics kingpin campaign led by the United States, it 
became evident that Colombia’s scattered illicit drug business was not about 
to crumble: it had been quickly picked up by criminals and the ‘proletariat’ of 
the illicit trade who had the knowledge, skills and connections to carry on. As 
Crandall notes, the large, visible cartels were simply broken up into a much 
greater number of smaller, less visible drug producers, who turned into 
‘boutique’ traffickers specialising in certain parts of the overall business (2002: 
160). In the middle of this transformation were the Castaño brothers. Since 
Fidel, the eldest, had been killed in 1994, it fell upon Carlos and Vicente to 
consolidate their influence and power. They did more than just rebuild the 
illicit business: they gave it new allies and then built for it an important 
political platform — the paramilitary network the AUC — which prides itself 
on being a self-created ‘movement’ of its members, and not a tool made or 
instigated by the state (Aranguren, 2001: Chapter 5).175  
The eight boys and four girls of the Castaño-Gil family were raised in La 
Blanquita, an estate in Amalfi, a municipality 143 km northeast of Medellin. 
Amalfi lies adjacent to the sub-region known as Uraba, which covers northern 
portions of the provinces of Antioquia and Choco (and the entire land border 
with Panama) and western portions of Cordoba. Uraba retains its identity, 
not only because of its long history of racialised colonial violence as the site 
of Spain’s first colonial settlement, and a place where enslaved Africans were 
sent to mine for gold along the Atrato River (Ballve, 2020: 49), but also 
because it became a ‘drug-trafficking real estate’ sitting astride the key drug 
movement corridors from the centre of Colombia towards departure points 
on both the Pacific and Atlantic seaboards (McDermott, 2014).   
 
174 Fidel was born in 1950, Vicente in 1957, and Carlos in 1965 (McDermott, 2008; Verdad 
Abierta, 2008b, 2009).  
175 The AUC was supported by the military after its creation (see Grajales, 2011; Gutierrez 
Sanin, 2019). 
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Sometime in July 1979, 176  the family’s patriarch, Jesus Antonio, was 
kidnapped by the left-wing rebel group FARC. This came as a bitter blow for 
the family, since two brothers, Ramiro and Manuel, socialised with the 
guerrillas. Their father had also let the rebels camp on their El Hundidor farm. 
Three ransom notes were sent, and the first two were paid. The third ransom 
note for 50 million pesos (about $20,000) came on February 1980, but it 
appears the father already was dead by then. Apparently, Jesus rebelled in 
captivity, did not eat, and became ill. After a surprise skirmish, the guerrillas 
suspected a military rescue was afoot and became convinced that their 
hostage was valuable to the military, so he was shot. A peasant who saw the 
body before it was retrieved by the guerrillas confirmed to the brothers that 
their father was dead. His body was never recovered (Aranguren, 2001: 38–
40).  
‘Our revenge lasted two years’, Carlos told Aranguren. Fidel and Carlos 
gathered information and sought out those involved. The first to be found 
was Conrado Ramirez, seen as one of four who took the father from La 
Blanquita. Ramirez was arrested by the Army, but a magistrate thought to be 
sympathetic to the FARC said Fidel’s evidence was hearsay, and ordered 
Ramirez’s release. Three days later, as Ramirez emerged from the Fujiyama 
residences, Fidel shot him dead. It was the ‘first extra-judicial execution of 
the Autodefensas in the name of a genuine justice that does not yet exist in 
Colombia’, claimed Carlos (Aranguren, 2001: 44). In total, the Castaños killed 
seven FARC members linked to their father’s kidnapping.  
The story about the kidnapping is ‘where it all began’, said Carlos. Soon, 
the brothers set up the vigilante group, Los Tangueros, named after Fidel’s 
ranch, Las Tangas. Before long, the Tangueros were enjoying the backing of 
local ranchers, businessmen and the army who found them as a force that 
checked guerrilla activity (McDermott, 2008).177 The Tangueros, however, 
were more than just simple providers of protection, and the context in which 
they emerged offers clues as to the logic and purpose of their violence. A 
number of cases heard at the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
 
176 The date given in a profile on the Castaños by the Daily Telegraph is different (McDer-
mott, 2008).  
177 The Daily Telegraph journalist Jeremy McDermott tracked the AUC for 11 years and con-
ducted prison interviews with assassins and paramilitaries who worked for the brothers, in-
cluding Hebert Veloza Garcia, described as the right-hand man and chief assassin of Vicente 
Castaño. McDermott also interviewed Carlos in January 2002. 
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(CorteIDH)178 provide the details. The Court’s 178-page judgment on the 
Pueblo Bello massacre heard expert testimonies that the location of Fidel’s 
ranches, including Las Tangas, served as a strategic deterrent to guerrilla 
expansion. Not only were the ranches and their vigilantes situated in a cattle-
raising region where guerrillas collected war taxes from businessmen and 
livestock owners, they were also linked to the road networks that comprised 
the extremely profitable Eje Bananero (banana axis), the centre of which was 
the highway from Medellin to the port city of Turbo (CorteIDH, 2006: 46–
47).  
The development of the highway, the Court heard, changed the 
demographics of the region and consequently created rising social and 
political tensions. In the 1950s, forested areas were thinned out by logging 
operations that extended south, drawing in enormous revenues while opening 
land to more unplanned peasant settlements. But in the 1960s, the largely 
subsistence peasant agriculture that emerged was displaced by the arrival of 
Frutera Sevilla, the renamed United Fruit Company. 179  The company 
introduced a banana contract-growing scheme to Uraba landowners, most of 
whom were raising cattle. The transition was aided by generous loans 
provided by the Corporacion Financiera Colombiana de Desarrollo Industrial, which 
received US bank credits under the Alliance for Progress, a $20 billion US 
initiative to provide a ‘peaceful, democratic, capitalist alternative to the Cuban 
Revolution’. In the new scheme, Frutera Sevilla did not technically grow its 
bananas, but bought them from contract growers with an assured minimum 
price. The company then invested in road, canal- and drainage-building, 
deepened several streams leading to Rio Leon and the Gulf of Uraba, and 
acquired barges and tugs that carried the bananas to its ocean-going ships 
(CorteIDH, 2006: 25–47; New York Times, 10 January 1971; US Congressional 
Record, 30 April 1964). 
This period of ‘development’, however, created a chain of intended and 
unintended consequences. With land values increasing rapidly, predatory land 
prospectors and speculators targeted land occupied by the smallholder 
peasant population. Dispossessed and displaced, many survived by becoming 
 
178 CorteIDH is not to be confused with IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights). Both are authorities created by the American Convention on Human Rights adopted 
in November 1969. The principal role of IACHR is to monitor compliance with human rights 
standards, while CorteIDH is the body that adjudicates cases of human rights violations.  
179 The American company UFCO is infamous for its association with the Banana Wars and 
the creation of the term ‘banana republic’.  
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wage workers for the banana contract-growers, typically without the benefit 
of labour standards and protection. Meanwhile, landowners who did not 
grow bananas mostly established cattle ranches, which also served as a 
holding tool for claiming and controlling land while waiting to cash in on 
expected huge rises in land property values. The conversion of periphery 
areas to the north and east of the highway for cattle farming created further 
land conflicts and peasant displacements. Peasant attempts to hold onto land, 
including ‘land invasion’ initiatives, were violently repressed by state 
institutions and private security operations. Eventually, social and political 
forces emerged that confronted each other: two rebel military fronts, the 
FARC and the EPL (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion or Popular Liberation Army), 
gradually occupied nearby mountainous areas and supported the peasants, 
while the government authorised the Army to arm civilian forces that 
supported the cattle ranchers, banana growers and plantation owners. This 
became the central element of confrontation in the region (CorteIDH, 2006: 
24–26, 45–47). 
A 1988 report from DAS (Administrative Department of Security), quoted 
in the IACHR report on the Currulao massacre, provides the state’s 
description of this central confrontation:  
… the problem started when the EPL stepped up its campaign of 
kidnapping, murder, and extortion against the [contract-growing and 
cattle] farmers of the region, who formed self-defense groups to join 
forces with the army; this led to the polarization of positions and 
transformed the area into a war zone, generating a power vacuum that 
encouraged all manner of atrocities. (IACHR, 1994: 3–4)  
It was within this context that the Castaño brothers emerged. After their 
father’s death and given the rising tensions with the guerrillas, the brothers 
sought a new area where they could regroup. They wanted a strategic location 
near the banana plantations of Uraba, according to Carlos, in order to expand 
their growing paramilitary network and to ensure access to the sea and the 
border areas of Cordoba, Antioquia and Choco. They tried San Juan, on the 
coast, but abandoned the effort after the guerrillas killed ‘some of our boys’. 
Hence, they moved closer to Cordoba where they could better endure 
guerrilla retaliation, and where many ranches had been abandoned. Eventually 
they found the 2100-hectare estate Las Tangas, near Monteria the provincial 
capital, which Fidel purchased from a rancher in 1983.180 Las Tangas, says 
 
180 In case files against Fidel, the prosecutor charged that Fidel paid the first instalment on 
the property, but later kidnapped the son of the rancher and ‘recovered’ his payment. The 
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Carlos, was the first area that they ‘liberated’ from the guerrillas and it became 
a refuge and training ground for the paramilitaries (Aranguren, 2001: 70, 110).  
An expert witness in the cases against Fidel told the Court that the 
paramilitary forces they were building were paid for by drug profits 
(CorteIDH, 2006: 25–26). As the Castaños expanded their activities into the 
adjacent municipalities as far as the areas at the Gulf of Morrosquillo — 
expelling EPL guerrillas in the process — ranchers started returning, Carlos 
claims. ‘If it is a business for the guerrillas to impoverish the regions’, he 
continues, ‘Fidel considered it a thriving business to enrich those regions’. 
Fidel, claims Carlos, was essentially a capitalist (Aranguren, 2001: 113). As 
such, the Castaños and the Tangueros effectively contributed, whether 
intentionally or otherwise, to the transformation of the smallholder-led 
agrarian economy into a supply chain for capitalist, commercial agriculture on 
one hand, and illicit coca production, on the other. Violence and terror were 
their tools to destroy opposition.  
Between 1988 and 1990, the paramilitaries committed more than 20 
massacres, all linked to the social tensions arising from the agricultural 
commercialisation of the region. Carlos claims that not all of these were their 
doing: some were done by paramilitaries outside the Castaño network; and 
some took place even before they had established a presence in central Uraba 
(Aranguren, 2001: 109). Some examples of the atrocities listed in court 
records are:  
• Currulao (Turbo), 4 March 1998: 17 people, all active members of 
SINTAGRO (the Union of Agrarian Workers of Antioquia) 
murdered to intimidate voters into not voting for the Union 
Patriotica.181 
• Buenavista (Cordoba), 3 April 1988: 28 people executed as the 
Tangueros looked for an EPL leader involved in kidnapping. 
 
owners were later murdered. See:  https://verdadabierta.com/la-historia-detras-de-la-finca-
las-tangas/  
181 See https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/93eng/Colombia.10912.htm , accessed 15 Feb-
ruary 2020.  
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• Punta Coquitos (Turbo), 11 April 1988: 27 banana workers 
murdered, apparently by killers under contract from ACDEGAM 
(Association of Farmers and Cattlemen of Magdalena Medio).182   
• Canalete (Cordoba), 30 August 1988: 16 victims killed.  
• Pueblo Bello (Cordoba), December 1989: 43 peasants kidnapped, 
brought to Las Tangas, interrogated and tortured; 37 disappeared and 
only six bodies were ever found (CorteIDH, 2006: 26, 47–52).  
5.5.2 The mutation of the Castaños 
Fidel was the family’s main entrepreneur; he made money from mining and 
land speculation, trading in art, and drugs trafficking. He subsequently 
invested his profits in Las Tangas (Verdad Abierta, 2008a). His business 
network brought him into contact with Pablo Escobar. As the relationship 
expanded, Fidel was given charge of maintaining a supply chain in Bolivia for 
what was then the largest cocaine-processing network in the world. Carlos, 
meanwhile, rose to become a prolific sicario (assassin) of the Medellin cartel 
and the family’s chief enforcer. Vicente was deployed to Los Angeles for 
some time, where he handled the distribution end of the drug business 
(McDermott, 2008). 
When Escobar led the Medellin cartel into war with the Colombian state 
in 1989, Fidel was among the lieutenants who disagreed with this strategy, 
apparently because they did not want a deadly confrontation and wanted to 
make money from the drugs trade, not to use that money for a war that could 
potentially cripple that trade. In early 1992, when Escobar was in prison in 
La Catedral (under a negotiated surrender), he summoned Fidel, Fernando 
Galeano and Gerardo Moncada to a meeting. Fidel did not go: Galeano and 
Moncada ended up dead, believed killed by Escobar himself. It was then that 
Fidel set up PEPES (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar).  
Fidel’s rebellion was critical to the downfall of Escobar because, as 
McDermott explains, ‘Fidel set about proving he could be even more brutal 
than Escobar’. With support from Colombia’s security forces, and allegedly 
the DEA itself, Fidel typically set off two bombs for every bomb attributed 
to Escobar, targeting the Medellin chief’s properties. One car bomb narrowly 
missed killing Escobar’s children, partly deafening his daughter Manuela. 
Fidel also attacked Escobar’s accountants, lawyers and supporters, especially 
 
182 See https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/justicia/verdad/punta-coquitos-una-
masacre-en-altamar-articulo-857132, accessed 15 February 2020.  
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after Escobar escaped from prison in July 1992. Finally, a police sniper shot 
Escobar dead in December 1993 (McDermott, 2008; Los Angeles Times, 3 
December 1993).  
The Castaños thus mutated into criminal entrepreneurs who owned 
ranches and engaged in illicit drugs but at the same time operated as effective 
paramilitary vigilantes with a substantial following. By turning themselves into 
a credible force against leftist guerrillas, they were transformed from hunted 
gangsters to criminal entrepreneurs serving a useful political purpose. This 
gave them connections and a powerful ally which provided them with 
strategic protection — the military. Thus, they became players in their own 
right, or arbitrageurs on the margins of the state and market (Ahram and 
King, 2012).  
Their emergence as arbitrageurs is illustrated by one case in which 
businessmen eyeing palm oil plantations approached Vicente and his 
paramilitaries in the late 1990s to be partners in a project. Bernal-Bermudez 
writes that the businessmen found the Curbarado and Jiguamiando river 
basins in Choco to be ideal for palm oil plantations: they had the right climate 
and soil type, a supply of cheap land and labour, and were located near Pacific 
trading ports. Vicente’s role was to ensure that land and labour would remain 
available throughout the project. This was significant, explains Bernal-
Bermudez, because it was the first case of business taking the initiative to 
approach the paramilitaries for a partnership, instead of the other way around: 
typically, it was the paramilitaries who approached businesses offering them 
security in exchange for financial contributions (Bernal-Bermudez, 2017: 
228–229).   
On 6 January 1994, however, just a month after Escobar was killed, Fidel 
was himself shot dead in an accidental clash with EPL guerrillas,183 which 
according to Carlos, were already on the point of defeat. But Carlos kept 
Fidel’s death a secret, fearing demoralisation among their ranks. He even 
answered a questionnaire sent by a reporter in May 1994 pretending to be 
Fidel. Only after the publication of that ‘interview’ did the family realise Fidel 
was dead. A twist in this story is that when the identity of Fidel’s killer was 
discovered, the man was already fighting for Carlos against the FARC. He 
was identified as Commander Sarley (Francisco Morelo Peñata), who never 
knew the man he shot. Fidel, the founder of paramilitary autodefensas, died in 
 
183 Most news reports identify the group as FARC guerrillas, but Carlos said they were EPL 
(Aranguren, 2001: Chapter 1).  
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anonymity. Carlos forgave Sarley, who rose to become his second in 
command (Aranguren, 2001: Chapter 1).   
After burying Fidel, Carlos took the reins of Los Tangueros, and launched 
sustained attacks on FARC strongholds in Uraba. Carlos then established, 
together with Vicente, the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá or ACCU 
(Peasant Self-Defence Forces of Cordoba and Uraba), incorporating into 
their ranks former EPL members and FARC deserters. By terrifying the local 
population into denying FARC even a glass of water, ACCU expanded and 
by the end of 1996, ‘had done the impossible — it drove FARC rebels out of 
Uraba’ (McDermott, 2008). FARC’s defeat in Uraba had far-reaching 
implications, enabling processes of peasant displacement, land dispossession 
and land speculation without significant opposition.  
5.5.3 The multi-purpose franchise of a paramilitary brand 
The creation of the ACCU marked a turning point, notes Jacobo Grajales, 
because for the first time in Colombia’s long history of armed conflict, ‘a 
paramilitary group was endowed with the image of a politico-military 
organisation, with internal hierarchies, subdivisions and military ranks’. The 
ACCU defined itself as ‘a counter-subversive armed organisation’ and a ‘civil 
resistance movement’ that justified its armed mobilisation by the need to 
defend ‘national rights and interests’. Carlos then started pushing for closer 
coordination between the country’s paramilitary groups. In 1997, the national 
network Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or AUC (United Self-Defence Forces 
of Colombia) was established, with Carlos as its spokesman (Grajales, 2015: 
7). 
But the two brothers appear to have had different views on AUC’s 
purpose.184 While Carlos built the AUC into a politico-military force, Vicente 
used it as a network for drugs trafficking. Vicente started selling ‘franchises’ 
to drug traffickers and other armed groups by highlighting a key ‘benefit’: an 
AUC affiliation could change a drug trafficking organisation’s status from 
criminal to legitimate. Because a ‘franchise’ allowed the buyer the right to use 
 
184 These differences have been suggested in Verdad Abierta accounts but could not be con-
firmed or denied in Aranguren’s book which, strangely, has no mention of Vicente at all in its 
242 pages.  This in itself may be an indication of the brothers’ estrangement. However, what 
is clear is that Carlos agonised over his decision to take drug money to fund ‘the cause’. For 
example, in Aranguren, 2001: Chapter 14, he said he lost sleep over paying for 4,500 rifles 
from Central America with drug money but didn’t want to be ‘the idealistic commander who 
lost the war’. It is necessary to bring up this detail, not because it may be truthful, but be-
cause it is revealing of the public persona that Carlos desired.  
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the AUC name and logo, and get an official rank within the organisation, it 
potentially offered immunity from prosecution or extradition to the US. It 
turned common mobsters, following payment of a franchise fee, into armed 
political actors (Grajales, 2015).  
The franchise became a way not only to gain some form of legitimacy for 
criminals but also to provide cover and protection. Among those who 
purchased an AUC franchise were ‘the Twins’ (Los Mellizos), the brothers 
Miguel Angel and Victor Manuel Mejia Munera — two enterprising cocaine 
traffickers from Cali who were caught in a conflict between competing groups 
and sought the protection of the Castaños. In 2001, a police raid on one of 
their apartments in Bogota yielded $35 million in cash. By 2004, they had 
been named in the list of 12 most-wanted traffickers by the US. By 
establishing the paramilitary group Bloque Vencedores de Arauca and buying a 
franchise from the AUC, they effectively avoided extradition (Verdad Abierta, 
2008c).   
Thus, a type of actor emerged whose identity was vague and elusive, who 
could claim to be a political activist but at the same time was neither 
exclusively a paramilitary nor exclusively a narco-trafficker. Effectively, these 
figures continue the 17th century tradition identified by Gallant as bandits who 
became patriots, and vice versa, depending on their relationships with the 
state (Gallant 1999). Some franchisees called themselves ‘transitional armed 
group’, further blurring boundaries. Grajales (2015) makes the important 
point that, contrary to their common image as ‘outlaws’ operating outside the 
state and formal economy, these actors operated very much like politicians 
and businessmen who invest time and effort in building the legitimacy that 
enables survival and expansion. Among their various mechanisms, the most 
useful was the AUC franchise, which shaped the social construction of what 
constitutes illicit business and criminality in quite unexpected ways.  
5.5.4 The betrayal of the brothers 
In 2001 Carlos married Kenia Gomez Toro, a beauty queen from Cordoba 
who soon gave birth to a daughter, Rosa Maria. After his departure from the 
AUC, Carlos consolidated his assets and landholdings under his wife’s name 
and appeared to become absorbed in looking for a cure for their daughter 
who was born with cri du chat (cat’s cry) syndrome, a genetic condition in 
which the child often has a high-pitched cry like that of a cat. According to 
various accounts, Carlos regarded the illness of his daughter as punishment 
for his crimes (Las Dos Orillas, 2018; Verdad Abierta, 2009). 
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The political differences between Vicente and Carlos are highlighted in the 
circumstances that led to their deaths. By the end of 2002, Carlos was 
negotiating with the national government for the demobilisation of the 
paramilitary structures that he helped create, putting an increasing strain on 
his relationship with Vicente. AUC paramilitaries, many of them wanted for 
extradition to the US, worried about what Carlos might tell the Americans 
and hence wanted him silenced. On 16 April 2004, Carlos was reported killed. 
Vicente’s right-hand man, Jesus Ignacio Roldan, or Monoleche, later 
confessed to carrying out the assassination under orders from Vicente himself 
(McDermott, 2008).  
By November 2006, over 30,000 paramilitaries had demobilised. Because 
of considerable political pressure, Vicente himself applied to demobilise but 
in early 2007 went into hiding with Hernan Hernandez to organise a 
retaliation against the government. He canvassed support, asking AUC 
commanders to donate $250,000 each for a war chest, but only received two 
responses (Verdad Abierta 2008b). Hernandez himself was hesitant. On 11 
March 2007, four men arrived at one of Vicente’s estates, overpowered his 
guards and killed him. Many believed it was Hernandez himself who 
orchestrated the killing, but he denied it, triggering rumours that Vicente 
deliberately organised his own disappearance (Cambio, 2008; McDermott, 
2008). However, that he was indeed dead was proved by the scramble that 
ensued among various paramilitaries under Vicente’s influence to take 
possession of the Castaños’ houses and accumulated landholdings, including 
Las Tangas.  
Vicente was the last of the Castaños, with the other brothers having died 
at the hands of the FARC. With the Castaños gone, the AUC ceased to exist. 
Carlos wanted a political paramilitary that would be the antithesis of the 
FARC, with whom the AUC battled bitterly. Vicente, on the other hand, want 
to create the infrastructure for a decentralised capitalist enterprise in illicit 
drugs. Despite the differences in their intentions, the Castaños can be 
collectively credited for consolidating a particular form of local economic 
order in the territories they inhabited. 
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5.6 Conclusion: Deconstructing and classifying 
entrepreneurs of the illicit crops trade 
‘Criminal entrepreneurs’ are so called for two reasons: first, they are engaged 
in activities that are illegal; and second, their illegal activities are not simple 
criminal acts but are projects or undertakings that may require capital 
investments, infrastructure and logistics — hence an ‘enterprise’. Kidnapping, 
for example, is more than a simple criminal act because it may stretch on for 
months, even years, with the victim kept unharmed, sheltered, fed and 
constantly moved if necessary.   
Simple criminal acts like robbery or extortion can be perpetrated by a lone 
individual robber or bully; while pillaging or raiding may be done within 
minutes. But criminal enterprise is something else. First, protection plays an 
important part. As Blok elaborates, the specific conditions of outlawry force 
the criminal to rely very heavily on other people; if they lack protection, they 
remain like lone wolves that can be quickly hunted down (Blok, 1972: 497–
8). Second, a criminal enterprise may require labour or sub-contractors, which 
depend on connections and social networks. As I have argued elsewhere in 
the case of kidnapping, a criminal enterprise may even require ‘community 
participation’, for instance when hostages are kept in remote villages for 
months, and it becomes unclear whether the villagers are unwilling 
participants or criminal collaborators (Gutierrez, 2013: 125). And thirdly, 
criminal enterprise may be manipulated for various purposes, creating hidden 
beneficiaries. David Keen’s study on the ‘benefits of famine’ reveals how a 
network of government officials, merchants, transport owners and militia 
members politically profited from Sudan’s famine of the late 1980s (Keen, 
2008). Similarly, there are actors in the shadows who benefit from criminal 
enterprise.  
The Afghan trafficker at the beginning of this study, who collected 10-
year old Khalida as debt payment, is emblematic of the type of criminal 
entrepreneur examined here. This criminal entrepreneur is firmly located in a 
rural setting and in relationships of conflict and accommodation within an 
agrarian context. He is similar to Blok’s (1974) mafia, who are violent peasant 
entrepreneurs, but is different from Gambetta’s (1993 and 2011) mafia — the 
violent entrepreneurs focused especially on the industry of protection, of 
whom little is known about their further engagement with political and social 
contexts. Khalida’s trafficker is also different from Olson’s roving bandit 
involved in uncoordinated competitive theft or the stationary bandit who has 
successfully monopolised theft in his domain (1993: 568), because he is in the 
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business of trafficking a global commodity that passes through many borders. 
While roving and stationary bandits are useful for explaining why victims may 
cooperate with a ‘preferred’ predator, these concepts say little about 
globalised commodity chains.  
Thus, the social origins of the type of criminal entrepreneur in this study 
are also different from Volkov’s ‘violent entrepreneur’, a concept drawn 
mostly from urban reality which seeks to explain crime ‘as a result of the 
failure of different social institutions to ensure the proper social integration 
of individuals and groups’ (2002: 17). Rather, the concept of ‘criminal 
entrepreneur’ in this study seeks to explain crime as a result of relationships 
of interdependency — i.e. symbioses, quid pro quos and relationships of 
conflict and accommodation in changing rural borderlands.  
It is also important to point out that the logic of violence of this study’s 
entrepreneur is quite different from that of the drug cartels discussed by 
Lessing. Lessing differentiates between two types of cartel violence: fighting 
one another to conquer mutually prized territory and resources; and fighting 
states to constrain that state’s behaviour and influence policy outcomes (2015: 
1486).  In this chapter, although the violence described overlaps with 
Lessing’s categorisation, the focus has been on how such violence effectively 
contributes, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to the capitalist 
penetration of the countryside and the transformation of a smallholder-led 
agrarian economy.  
Different types of criminal entrepreneurs may be regarded as elites, 
defined simply as those ‘who have the organised capacity to make real political 
trouble’ (Burton and Higley, 2001: 182) in order to avoid the ‘conceptual and 
theoretical morass’ and multiplicity of definitions associated with the term 
(Zuckerman, 1977: 325–326). In addition, though having differences, these 
various types of criminal entrepreneurs can be collectively regarded as local 
actors propping up their preferred forms of local economic order. 
Rural elites in the illicit drug trade defy easy classification. The starting 
argument of this study is that they are not just predatory actors, nor 
exceptional criminals, as commonly depicted. Rather, they could also be seen 
from that historical viewpoint in bandit studies (Hobsbawm, 1959, 2000 
[1969]; Blok, 1972; and Gallant 1999) as the antithesis to social banditry (the 
expressions of local resistance to various forms of political and economic 
predation). Gallant’s description is useful to apply: these rural elites are 
predator-merchants who perform important but curiously unacknowledged 
roles ‘in the spread and global triumph of capitalism’. In examining 
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brigandage and piracy from the 1700–1800s, Gallant demonstrates how illegal 
networks of armed predators called ‘brigands’ and ‘buccaneers’ can transform 
into ‘patriots’ and ‘defenders of the state’ depending on their relationships 
with the state. Put simply, ‘bandits helped make states, and states made 
bandits’ (1999: 25–26). 
To probe into the argument that such criminal entrepreneurs are more 
than just criminals, bandits, or specialists in violence, and are in practice 
mediators between state and society and promoters of particular forms of 
local socio-economic order, this chapter evaluated and compared the criminal 
careers of drug lords in Myanmar, Afghanistan, Bolivia and Colombia. When 
assessed against and superimposed onto social and political contexts, the 
critical examination of these life stories provides useful insights into how 
certain conditions or variables — violence, political protection, peasant and 
labour displacement — are either necessary or sufficient to produce that central 
outcome of illicit drug crops in borderland economies.  
The main proposition that emerges is that criminal entrepreneurs survive 
and thrive because they establish interdependencies as pioneers for capital, 
intermediaries in commodity chains, and arbitrageurs especially in the dangerous 
places at the margins of state and market. 
As pioneers for capital, they can be informal but effective sources of credit, 
employment and investments in territories typically isolated from market 
networks, abandoned by the state, or governed differently. Gallant points out 
that bandits and pirates brought cash into typically marginalised areas, thus 
enabling those territories to be connected directly to outside markets over 
time (Gallant, 1999: 37–38). McSweeney et al. reiterate that, rather than being 
anathema to private investment in the rural sector, narco-entrepreneurs 
‘create the very conditions for such investments — not everywhere, but 
importantly in the very landscapes most likely to have been closed off to 
capital investment prior to the drug traffickers’ involvement’ (McSweeney et 
al., 2017: 16). They conclude that drug traffickers are the ‘narco-bourgeoisie’ 
who use the vast wealth they capture from an illicit commodity chain to act 
as neoliberal pioneers, spreading circuits of capital into new territories: 
communal, reserved and public lands (ibid.). 
As intermediaries in commodity chains, criminal entrepreneurs can be 
‘fixers’ who use cunning, innovation and violence to enable the flow of 
products, profit and people along these chains that run across borders. Using 
their various links, they can open access to government-controlled highways 
to enable the movement of products and contraband, or to facilitate transfers 
across a series of borders. They can also be the agents who link coca farms 
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to the legions of seasonal or migrating agricultural workers whose 
participation transforms coca production from household activity to 
commercialised industry. In Blok’s study, the mafia are the gatekeepers and 
powerbrokers that decide who become winners or losers in the contestations 
and competition in local economies (1974).  
Finally, as arbitrageurs, criminal entrepreneurs are what Ahram and King, 
quoting Braudel, described as ‘creatures of the borderlands, where states and 
empires had difficulty extending their own power’. They were: 
… uniquely gifted boundary-crossers, conducting both violent and non-
violent transactions across political, economic, and cultural dividing 
lines. Despite the popular image of warlords as sword-swinging 
barbarians ruling despotically from usurped thrones, the most successful 
ones turned out to have something that everyone else wanted: the ability 
to serve as middlemen across uncertain boundaries while, in the process, 
reaping some of the profits for themselves. (Ahram and King, 2012: 170) 
Gutierrez Sanin adds a key attribute of arbitrageurs, arguing in his 
comprehensive study of Colombian paramilitaries that they were enforcers of 
indirect rule, which primarily means ‘non-bureaucratically mediated territorial 
control and presence of the state’. It is a strategy of rule, especially in 
borderlands, ‘marked by a thin bureaucracy and thick system of partisan 
networks’ (2019: 15).  
Further inferences may be drawn and affirmed from these life stories. The 
set of cases show a variety of criminal entrepreneurs who created 
interdependencies that reset terms of modern-day political or booty 
capitalism; consolidated the transformation of supply chains for transnational 
agriculture; and made possible the business links, legal persons, bank 
accounts, transport assets, political connections and enterprise partnerships 
that transformed illicit crop cultivation and processing from backyard activity 
to commercialised industry.  
Lo Hsing Han’s rise from militia captain to business tycoon, along with 
the list of firms and tycoons who emerged from the Shan opium trade (see 
Table 4.C), fit patterns of an economic model well known in East Asia: 
cronyism, rebranded as ‘close government–business relations’. But in this 
case, the type of cronyism (where personal connections and political 
patronage determine who gets access to services, credit and other resources) 
appears different, because Lo’s post-1992 enterprises consolidated and grew 
despite international sanctions and apparent exclusion from global financial 
systems. This suggests that sanctions are only additional hurdles that do not 
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fully lock out sanctioned parties from the global circuits of capital and 
exchange.  
However, this also suggests that there may be different forms of insurance 
protection for illicit enterprises that change the ways in which its actors take 
risks, or the way that they manipulate those risks so that they become 
socialised, or borne by the state or others. As Chang points out, the issue of 
moral hazard is not some abnormality but has been an integral part of 
capitalism. Capitalism has developed on the basis of the moral hazard built 
into the institutions that socialise risk (Chang, 2000: 784–785). The growth 
and expansion of conglomerates capitalised by illicit drugs, like Lo’s Asia 
World, and how they link to the global industry of secrecy services and 
‘treasure islands’ outlined in Chapter 3, would be an important area for further 
research.   
Questions arise as to what drew Roberto Suarez, a rancher who already 
owned and controlled, by his wife’s account, about 250,000 hectares of 
grazing land, in which were found airstrips servicing a fleet of 30 Cessna 
STOL planes and other bigger aircraft, into the illicit drugs trade. He moved 
in Bolivian high society and was a typical example of the gente buena (good 
people) of blancos (whites) and mestizos — so why move into drugs 
production and trafficking? Levy provides the self-serving explanation that 
her husband had the ‘common touch’ and ‘wanted to help the poor get out 
of their misery’; Suarez’s biography suggests that he became a Bolivian Robin 
Hood after his entry into the drugs trade (Levy, 2012: Chapter 3). He was 
seen as a benefactor who bought the produce of poor peasants with no land 
tenure security, who were often extremely indebted, and had little access to 
credit, agricultural extension services, or insurance cover, and who lived in 
remote peripheral locations with poor infrastructure, where the state could 
not guarantee protection.   
Timing may be a factor. The creation of La Corporacion coincided with a 
‘coca boom’ when Bolivia’s overall economy was suffering from serious 
convulsions, and the global prices of its main exports were collapsing. Hence, 
coca growing became a safety net that absorbed workers displaced from the 
failing mining and gas industries (Painter, 1994; Laserna, 1995), and a growth 
industry that Suarez anticipated.  
This brings into focus the structural conditions that draw poor and 
marginalised peasants into illicit crop production. An oft-repeated caricature 
is that illicit crop growers are criminals and are therefore driven by greed185. 
 
185 The thesis of greed and grievance as drivers of conflict is discussed in Collier, et. al. 2006. 
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Yet all the cases in this chapter reveal different stories of coping and survival. 
In the high mountains of Kokang, the scarcity of water and the lack of 
infrastructure made opium a most viable cash crop (Lintner, 2015). In 
Afghanistan’s opium heartlands, there is no clear regime for managing land 
rights, and water rights to the canal systems are politically contested (Wily, 
2003). Coca growers in Uraba are those who have been displaced by 
commercial agriculture and its associated violence (Ballve, 2019). And 
migration to the coca-growing Chapare in Bolivia was triggered by an 
economic crisis (Laserna, 1995). Hence, it may be inferred that land tenure 
problems and overall economic insecurity are key factors stimulating illicit 
crop production, and the key actors of this chapter built their criminal 
enterprises in response to such structural conditions. This also answers 
McSweeney et al.’s questions of ‘why do narcos invest in rural land?’, ‘why 
there?’, and ‘why now?’ (2017).  
A second structural condition highlighted by the cases affirms Ballve’s 
point that ‘although often depicted as “ungovernable” or “stateless” spaces, 
narco-frontiers are wracked by extra-legal regimes of rule in which the state 
is simply one actor among others’ (2019: 211). Hence, as shown in this 
chapter, the criminal entrepreneurs become key providers of services such as 
transport, security and credit.    
None of the drug lords in this chapter could be classified as ‘social bandits’ 
as defined by Hobsbawm — i.e. those who resort to extortion, robbery and 
other forms of violence to simultaneously challenge the economic, social and 
political order and those who claim power, law and control of resources. 
While some of them tried to establish Robin Hood reputations or became 
generous donors to charitable causes, none of them challenged or attempted 
to reform the de facto distribution and control of land in their spheres of 
influence. Numerous judicial cases show the Castaños using violence and 
intimidation to expand their landholdings. Suarez was perhaps Bolivia’s 
biggest landowner. In the case of Lal Jan and Bashir, although this chapter 
was not able to get evidence of direct involvement, they thrived under 
conditions where land-grabbing has become central. The ethnic wars in 
Myanmar have been partly or wholly driven by land grievances. Because lack 
of access to land is the principal driver of illicit crop cultivation, continuing 
land dispossession will technically be in these drug lords’ economic interests. 
They may have provided some form of protection to subsistence farmers who 
supply the raw products, but the bottom line is that they can best be described 
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as politically neutral186 mercenaries fighting to be left alone to get on with 
business.   
The cases in this chapter may be taken as evidence that criminal enterprise 
is a force that — whether deliberately or inadvertently — prevents any 
organisational capacity among land-poor peasants from becoming a politically 
effective force for reform (Blok, 1972). The emergence of drug lords appears 
to prevent the articulation of peasant interests, and even to deflect concerted 
peasant action. This is most clearly seen in the case of the Castaños, who 
terrorised and displaced the peasant base of leftist guerrillas, thereby 
contributing to Colombia becoming the country with the highest number of 
internally displaced people after Syria.187 As Blok states, banditry can be a tool 
against social protest. Suarez wanted to be portrayed as a champion of the 
poor and the weak, but his businesses — both licit and illicit — arguably 
expanded the ranks of the poor and the weak. Lo and the Afghan drugs lords, 
because of their speedy entry into the ranks of the elite, directly impeded 
large-scale peasant mobilisation by showing a channel to move up the social 
hierarchy, thus weakening class solidarity. Blok’s other observations are 
confirmed by the cases. The more successful the criminal entrepreneur is, the 
greater the protection he enjoys. The more banditry becomes politically 
oriented — for instance, benefiting from government or agricultural 
investment policies — the more likely it is to become anti-peasant. Finally, 
while they may claim to be ‘patriots’ (Carlos Castaño), fight on the side of 
government (Lo Hsing Han), be modernisers of commerce (Roberto Suarez), 
or profess allegiance to movements like the Taliban (Lal Jan Ishaqzai and 
Bashir Noorzai), it is evident that the drug lords’ loyalty is not to the peasants 
(Blok, 1972: 494–496). 
Yet it also cannot be denied that these criminal entrepreneurs performed 
unacknowledged roles in the expansion of commerce and local economies. 
To enumerate: 
• Lo became, as he claims, the sole agent of impoverished Kokang 
farmers who needed to reach markets to sell their opium crop. He 
controlled the militia that protected opium caravans, and secured 
access to government-controlled highways through deals struck with 
local military commanders. The caravans brought opium to the 
border, and on their return, carried consumer items. As his profits 
 
186 Note that choosing to be ‘politically neutral’ means taking a political stance. 
187 UNHCR monitoring reveals that Colombia has 7.67 million internally displaced people, i.e. 
those who have been forced to flee their homes but have not sought safety in another coun-
try. See https://www.unhcr.org/colombia.html, last accessed 19 August 2019. 
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accumulated, Lo invested in setting up Asia World, a conglomerate 
that emerged and became profitable despite the economic sanctions 
and an international ban on banks and firms from transacting 
business with the company. In the words of The Economist, he was a 
‘pillar of the economy’ (2013). 
• Lal Jan Ishaqzai controlled the Sangin district market and developed 
it to become Helmand’s pre-eminent bulk opium bazaar, thus 
connecting the region’s opium growers to its buyers. Furthermore, by 
setting up drug labs in Sangin, he retained a larger percentage of the 
profits for local growers and primary traders.  
• Bashir Noorzai organised heroin transport routes from Afghanistan 
through Pakistan and onwards to the US and Europe that contributed 
to the rise of cash-starved and conflict-affected Afghanistan as the 
world’s principal opium producer. His family’s trucking business, as 
well his own business importing tyres, may have been the 
infrastructure for heroin exports.  
• If Bashir had trucks, Suarez had airstrips in his ranches and owned 
the largest private fleet of small aircraft in Bolivia that transported 
coca base and paste to Colombia. In the 1980s, these assets may have 
played a key role in enabling Bolivia to profit from the coca boom 
thus creating safety nets that absorbed labour displaced by the 
collapsed tin and oil and gas industries. In 1988, the year Suarez was 
arrested, coca-cocaine products accounted for over half of all 
Bolivian exports.  
Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasised that the forms of commerce and 
capitalism that these drug lords sustained were of the crony capitalist variety, 
in which markets are rigged in their favour and businesses remain anchored 
on corruption and political leverage, not on efficiency or productivity. The 
term narco-bourgeoisie indeed applies because the drug lords are a class of 
capitalists. They own or control territory (either as landlords or land-
grabbers), regulate access to resources, shape the division of labour while at 
the same time influencing the trajectories of state formation. Hence, to restate 
the conclusion, the cultivation of illicit crops, although providing a coping 
mechanism and a lifeline to impoverished subsistence farmers with 
decreasing land and limited livelihood options in marginalised borderlands, is 
at the same time the mechanism that transforms the narco-bourgeoisie into 
crony capitalists and creates the working class of the illicit enterprise.  
A number of further inferences can be drawn from the cases studied here: 
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• The common assumption that criminal enterprise is completely 
underground and can be clearly separated from legal enterprise is 
wrong. Criminal enterprise in Colombia, as exemplified in the 
Castaños’ case, enjoyed political protection. Lo Hsing Han’s opium 
shipments were given access to government-controlled highways. In 
Bolivia, Suarez’s illicit enterprises were attached to his legitimate 
businesses. In addition, Chapter 3 lists the role of countries and 
secrecy services in enabling illicit commerce across borders, using the 
licit international financial system.  
• The ‘kingpin approach’ of eliminating the big men of the drugs trade 
does not work in the long run. It fails because it can only target the 
top individuals, while leaving commodity chains and social networks 
of the local economies only momentarily disrupted, but largely intact. 
The atomisation of the illicit trade, or its dispersal, decentralisation 
and specialisation, can become an effective form of insurance against 
law enforcement. Over the long term, it appears that law enforcement 
could only reconfigure the trade, not eliminate it, as Suarez had 
predicted. 
• Protection is contingent on many factors, including regime stability; 
which US policy (drugs or counter-insurgency) would prevail; the 
social embeddedness of criminal actors; and relationships of conflict 
and accommodation between patron and client.  
• There are potential solutions, though most may still be works-in-
progress. Bolivia’s experiences, when contrasted against Colombia’s, 
offer clues and lessons on what may be needed in a transition from 
war to peace economies. As explained in Mortensen and Gutierrez, a 
key factor in mitigating violence and criminal activity seems to be ‘the 
usually overlooked intermediation role of strong local self-help, and 
typically non-state institutions in peasant communities that enables 
marginalised households to assert their interests in interactions with 
both state and market structures’ (2019: 63). In other words, social 
movements and their ‘political instruments’, like Bolivia’s sindicatos, 
can also act as intermediaries and arbitrageurs at the margins of state 
and market and can deliver substantially different outcomes. This 
preliminary assessment needs to be expanded and transformed into a 
wider research agenda.     
In conclusion, this chapter has presented case studies that provide a closer 
look into variations of narco-bourgeoisie participation in violent conflict and 
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criminal enterprise. The elaboration of their personal, family and career 
backgrounds, as well as the social and political contexts from which they 
emerged, provide clues not only to the puzzles of resilience in illicit crop 
economies, but also to the dilemmas and messy politics of criminal enterprise. 
These are more than just gangsters and racketeers: they are also important 










Conclusion: The Messy Politics 
and Governance Challenges of 
Illicit Crop Economies  
 
 
How do criminal entrepreneurs shape, and are in turn shaped by, the resilience 
of the illicit production of the crops opium and coca, and what are the 
implications of their enterprise on the governance over the livelihoods of poor 
rural households they affect? 
This was the question posed by this research. The quick answer is that 
criminal entrepreneurs shape the resilience of the illicit production of opium 
and coca, and consequently the governance of the livelihoods of these crops’ 
mostly impoverished growers, by assuming the following roles in the rural 
economies they inhabit:  
(a) pioneers of capital, or a narco-bourgeoisie, who create, whether 
deliberately or inadvertently, certain conditions for large-scale agrarian 
transformation;  
(b) intermediaries or brokers, who mediate between peasants on one hand, 
and the state and market on the other;  
(c) arbitrageurs, or implementers of indirect rule by the state, i.e.  ‘non-
bureaucratically mediated territorial control’. 
7.1 Steps to the conclusion  
In arriving at the above conclusion, a rather circuitous route has been taken. 
This is largely the result of the challenges of doing research on illicit drug crop 
enterprises, which have been routinely represented in policy debates with 
simplifying fictions and single story narratives; of which knowledge and 
information are incomplete, piecemeal, uneven or often hidden; and where 
ethical and practical issues for ethnography and the collection of data abound. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion – Messy Politics and Governance Challenges 
 
286 
The first key step taken was to recast the role of criminal entrepreneurs as 
a force for change, whether good or bad, or as a source of both order and 
disorder, especially in borderlands or the margins of state and markets. This 
step was consolidated with the adoption of Anton Blok’s framework on 
violent peasant entrepreneurs, thus firmly locating the criminal entrepreneurs 
in this study within agrarian settings. This is essential since mafia is often 
examined in its urban or at least non-rural contexts.  
The next step was to disprove or disestablish certain key assumptions of 
the senso commune, or the held-in-common conceptions, ‘popular science’, 
‘spontaneous philosophy’, or popular opinion (Gramsci, 1971) on illicit drug 
enterprise that have become normalised and, furthermore, legally, 
institutionally and ideologically embedded in a blocco storico or the global 
complex that rises out of the monitoring and reporting mechanisms of the 
UNODC and the ONDCP. This is often difficult because of the essentially 
contested nature of many of these conceptions. Hence, it was necessary to 
use the illustration of cocaleros who were historically regarded as criminals 
by the UN and the US, but who went on to win elections in Bolivia. Attitudes, 
behaviours and understanding of the crops now considered illicit were 
historicised to show that these are products of historical development and 
change. For this purpose, a periodisation of this history was introduced.  
Disestablishing conventional conceptions is a step similar to McCoy’s 
effort to shift the analysis of criminal syndicates and illicit commerce away 
from criminology, ‘where it is grounded in the specificity of law or survey 
research’, and towards the realm of politics and history ‘where it shares 
similarities with more amorphous concepts such as legitimacy or sovereignty’ 
(2019: 17). It is also in line with McSweeney et al.’s critique of orthodox 
development economics, where criminal activities ‘are typically understood to 
hinder forms of capital investment required to develop rural areas’, when the 
narco-bourgeoisie in reality ‘create the very conditions for it’ (2017: 15–16). 
A further step taken to test the senso commune was to check the internal 
validity of the official tracking and monitoring reports on illicit drug markets. 
This study found that official estimates of the size of illicit markets are not 
consistent with estimates on volume of production, while assumed average 
consumption and users’ expenditures on cocaine and heroin remain far too 
high to be realistic. These checks do not necessarily belittle or undermine the 
importance of the policies intended to tackle the harms and deaths being 
attributed to drug abuse, but they do raise the possibility that the political 
agenda of enforcing prohibition is shaping the data and the ‘popular science’, 
and not the other way around, as it should be. 
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Before getting to the main research operations, however, it became clear 
that an important disconnect exists between development policy and drug 
policy. This was therefore flagged, highlighting how the UNODC, the 
foremost drug policy agency, was not using data from the World Bank, a 
foremost development policy agency — and vice versa. This served to 
introduce the ‘paradox of illicit economies’, a discussion that provided a 
critical examination of further common assumptions while introducing 
elements from area-focused research that explained contexts in the four 
countries in which resilience against prohibition and resilience for survival 
emerged.  
Finally, the core research step was taken: a comparison of life stories of 
selected criminal entrepreneurs from the four countries. It is from this part 
of the study that most of the conclusions above have been drawn and 
developed. The research validated Blok’s framework that mafia are more than 
just outlaws or men of violence but are key local economic and political actors 
that shape outcomes of rural transformation.  
However, in anticipation of possible commentary that life stories may not 
be sufficient for making conclusions on the role of criminal entrepreneurs in 
rural transformation because ‘market forces’ may be equally or more decisive, 
a final step was taken, to analyse prices and the impact of price changes on 
illicit crop production and distribution. Though similar gaps and unevenness 
in the data were again encountered, this part of the study offers a non-
econometric examination that calls into question the analytical allure of 
prices.  
7.2 Expanding the conclusion    
This research was prompted by a realisation that there are other explanations 
— beyond development aid or protection from governments — for how 
poor and marginalised communities in difficult and dangerous areas survive 
violence, poverty and disasters. Somehow, these survivors find ways to make 
a living, no matter how precarious; they manage to negotiate some form of 
protection, no matter the violence they endure and trade-offs they make; and 
they secure assets needed for coping and subsistence, no matter how much 
has been taken away from them.  
But the riddle is that few policy-makers and development actors seem to 
be paying sustained and systematic attention to the peculiar conditions and 
challenges these survivors face, the trade-offs to which they surrender, and 
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the agency by which they build their resilience. Despite the commitment 
declared by governments and the United Nations to ‘Leave No One Behind’ 
(Agenda 2030, the Sustainable Development Goals), the survivors are actually 
being left behind for two key reasons. First, they live in, or are displaced into, 
areas that are far too dangerous for UN, development agency or NGO staff 
to visit or which can only be reached by state institutions when accompanied 
by military protection. Second, they are silently deprioritised because of 
stigmas that have been imposed, for instance that they are complicit in 
criminality, even terrorism, because they make money from the production 
of illicit crops or other similar illicit activities.  
The core approach used by this study was to analyse the role of criminal 
entrepreneurs in shaping that context, from which the following conclusions 
have been developed.  
7.2.1 Pioneers of capital 
Criminal entrepreneurs shape development and governance outcomes 
because they are pioneers of capital, or as explained by Richani (2012) and 
expanded by McSweeney et al. (2017), they are the narco-bourgeoisie who assume 
distinct roles in production relations in rural areas. Although bourgeoisie 
typically denotes town dwellers or a class of small property owners who 
displace old elites through profits of trade (Scruton, 1982: 43), the narco-
bourgeoisie in this study are firmly rooted in their rural contexts. They link 
displaced peasantries to market circuits, provide them with credit, sell their 
products, and are the force that enables the local rural economy to specialise 
in illicit crops. In other words, they are the principal enforcers of a model of 
local capitalist accumulation in a rural setting.  
Lo Hsing Han, though not necessarily a property owner when he started 
in his career, played a key role in linking a displaced peasantry to regional and 
international markets by transporting opium, the most viable crop that could 
be grown under conditions of conflict and instability. Lal Jan Ishaqzai, as the 
principal khan and landowner in Sangin until he was ousted by US troops and 
tribal enemies, was the gatekeeper managing access to land, water and the 
district bazaar. Bashir Noorzai and Roberto Suarez were archetypical landed 
elites who diversified their economic interests and, most importantly, 
controlled the transport necessary for moving illicit crops and products. The 
Castaños were not only the enforcers of violence, they were among the narco 
land grabbers (Ballve, 2012; Gutierrez Sanin, 2019) who collectively, 
aggressively and violently acquired between 4.4 million and 6 million hectares 
of land mostly dedicated to cattle ranching in Colombia (Richani, 2012: 60).  
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Certain patterns observed in this study on the narco-bourgeoisie’s role in 
transforming rural areas are affirmed in McSweeney et al.’s synoptic review 
(2017). For example, the Castaños’ acquisition of the 2,100-hectare Las 
Tangas estate, as well as the location of their other ranches, appear to have 
been designed to prevent territorial encroachment by FARC and the EPL; to 
control territory necessary for drugs processing and movement with minimal 
interruption; and to provide refuge and training sites for paramilitary 
expansion. Control of rural assets and access to rural communities provide 
opportunities for off-loading and laundering cash. The growth of 
‘boomtowns’ in Bajo Putumayo in Colombia, near the Ruili–Muse crossing 
on the China–Myanmar border, and in Spin Boldak on the Afghan–Pakistani 
border, affirm the prevalence of cash-based exchange and economic 
transactions that are rarely traceable. In sum, as McSweeney et al. point out, 
rural areas are not only spaces for moving drugs; they also provide accessible, 
multiple and integrated laundering opportunities in land, labour, livestock and 
processing facilities (2017: 12).   
A further pattern observed is the direct role of criminal entrepreneurs in 
the specialisation of local economies, and the consequent social 
reorganisation that follows. In the Amazonias, for example, peasants 
displaced from elsewhere by conflict and agricultural commercialisation were 
supplied with coca seeds to start the growing cycle, and with chemicals to 
process coca leaf into paste, by drug traffickers. But most importantly, the 
traffickers themselves bought the coca paste being produced by bartering it 
for food or clothing, at good prices (Ramirez, 2011). In the 1960s–1970s, 
Shan smugglers brought opium to the Thai border, and returned with 
consumer goods (McCoy, 2003) that effectively reconnected remote upland 
opium-growing communities to larger markets. In other words, the ‘services’ 
criminal entrepreneurs provided paved the way for the specialisation of such 
areas in illicit crop cultivation.  
A related role that emerges is the criminal entrepreneurs’ facilitation of a 
supply of hired hands or seasonal migrant workers who can be called upon 
during the labour-intensive harvesting weeks of the planting cycle, and in the 
case of coca, the processing of the leaves into paste. The macro picture is that 
peasant displacement creates the pool of recruits for this agricultural 
workforce. But drug traffickers themselves are often the recruiters who do 
the hiring, with the best example being Suarez’s operations in Bolivia. Vicente 
Castaño himself was asked to ensure land and labour supply for a palm oil 
project in Choco. 
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It bears repeating that specialisations are not the result of free exchange 
but are outcomes of practices exploiting a destitute peasantry. It is likely that 
there was little choice in the selection of crop grown. Seeds or credit may not 
be provided if the peasant household chooses to grow some other crop. In 
Uraba, it was seen that land speculation was a key reason for the subsequent 
violent confrontation between social and political forces in the region. As 
Richani emphasises, drug traffickers convert lands to pasture or export 
monoculture despite risks and low economic returns, because they are more 
interested in the expected returns of speculation (2012: 53).  
7.2.2 Intermediaries  
As seen in the preceding discussion, criminal entrepreneurs are more than 
just intermediaries and brokers, or middlemen in economic transactions. But 
it is important to retain this categorisation because it is as intermediaries that 
they display the remarkable ability to switch status — for example, from 
feared outlaw to a beloved patron; or from greedy exploiter to generous 
investor. Analysts like Cockayne and Pfister argue that criminal enterprise 
cannot anymore be reduced ‘to a simple, binary opposition between 
legitimate state organisations and illegitimate criminal organisations’. Such 
analysis, they point out, ‘is particularly problematic where a state exists in 
name only, is fragile, or engages in behaviour which calls its own legitimacy 
into question at the international or local level’. In many cases, it may even be 
hard to distinguish on the ground between what is legal and what is criminal 
because ‘government entities and criminal organisations come to resemble 
each other, providing similar services — especially protection — financed by 
similar rents and taxation arrangements’ (Cockayne and Pfister, 2008: 14). 
What emerges is a picture of illicit trade that is inextricably linked to 
legitimate commerce, best exemplified in this study by the operations of 
Suarez, in which his illicit enterprise is ‘piggy-backed’ on legal assets. As a 
result, there is a blurring of boundaries not only between state and criminal 
organisations, but also between legitimate and criminal business, the end 
result of which is criminal networks possessing an unprecedented degree of 
political and economic influence. In the middle, acting as intermediator, is the 
criminal entrepreneur.  
Simply put, organised crime and illicit economies are no longer completely 
underground as conventionally assumed; they quite often normalise or 
become the standard where they operate. Such normalisation is a typical result 
of their persistence and resilience. They occupy a unique location between 
what is legal and illegal, connecting the licit and illicit. Hence, they derive 
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benefits from being legal and illegal, licit and illicit, at the same time. It is from 
this ‘location’ that they begin to accumulate more formal legitimacy, for 
example as successful criminal entrepreneurs diversifying and investing into 
legitimate business. As reported by the UNODC, not all profits made from 
crime are re-invested back into the core criminal enterprise. 188  Once 
laundered, the money becomes indistinguishable from that earned through 
legitimate business.  
Mobility is a key attribute. The drug lords in this study were all well-
travelled, operating from different locations, and spatially nimble. In addition, 
they were also legally and financially mobile, in the sense that they had the 
legitimate fronts or mechanisms that are needed to open bank accounts, apply 
for permits and licences to bring legal (and illegal) goods across borders, 
acquire transport assets, rent warehouses and offices and, in the case of Lo, 
bid for and win government contracts and Chinese aid spending. This 
mobility is important and shows that criminal entrepreneurs are not holed up 
somewhere fearing arrest or avoiding capture but are effective mobile brokers 
who can carry on with business.  
7.2.3 Arbitrageurs  
A third role played by criminal entrepreneurs in shaping the resilience of illicit 
crop enterprise to prohibition, and the governance of the livelihoods of 
producers, is that of arbitrageurs who manage politics and order at the 
margins of state and market (Ahram and King, 2012). Arbitrageurs can also 
be thought of as those who take the place of state apparatuses in extending 
control to peripheral areas, or what Gutierrez Sanin describes as indirect rule 
— the primarily non-bureaucratically mediated territorial control and 
presence of the state, ‘through a thin bureaucracy and a thick system of 
partisan networks, which regulate the transactions between territories and 
central decision-making structures’ (2019: 15). This confirms Gallant’s point 
that ‘states made bandits and bandits helped make states’ (1999: 25), as well 
as Blok’s assertion that mafia should be viewed ‘as a vast system of personal 
relationships whose ramifying threads connect various levels of socio-cultural 
integration, rather than as an appendix-like criminal association to society’ 
(1969: 155).  
 
188 This was reported in the minutes of discussions at the UNODC meetings in April 2012. See 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/April/21-st-session-of-the-commission-
on-crime-prevention-and-criminal-justice-to-be-held-in-vienna.html?ref=fs1 accessed 28 
June 2019. 
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The cases covered in this study show that for typically subsistence growers 
of illicit crops, it is difficult to distinguish whether it is the state (which is 
typically behind the eradication of their crops) that is behaving like a criminal; 
or is it the criminals (who provide them with seeds and credit and often buy 
their product at their doorstep) who are behaving like the state?    
7.3 Further explanations for the resilience of illicit 
crop enterprise  
A question asked by this study is why even when armed with all the 
information generated by the INCSRs, US and global drug policies remain 
unable to break away from prohibition, even in light of its continuing failure. 
Why keep repeating a failed policy? This study has shown some answers on 
why prohibition fails. First, there exists a global ‘army’ of illicit crop 
producers, mostly poor and impoverished peasants who are ‘orphans of 
development’, that could not be wished away by prohibition. Second, drug 
policies attempt to ban illicit crops for which demand exists, and for which 
social structures and the divisions of labour have been reorganised; and which 
delivers profit and power for the capitalists, intermediaries and arbitrageurs 
operating between the producers and consumers in global commodity chains. 
Hence, bans only deliver temporary outcomes. In other words, prohibition, 
despite its aggressiveness and the instruments of coercion at its disposal, 
barely touches the institutions of capitalism — the various forms of 
accumulation, capital flows, the production of chemicals, the provision of 
cheaper transport and communication, and the movement of people — that 
are used to enable illicit enterprise. Is the reason for the repetition of failed 
policy then the continuing over-estimation by policy-makers of the power 
and capability of the state vis. the criminals without borders?  
This study began with a discussion of how two of the world’s largest 
economies, the United States and China, attempted to eliminate drugs 
kingpins, close down smuggling routes, and eradicate drug crop production 
in the late 1980s and the 1990s — and failed, dramatically. This failure, more 
than anything else, shows that the underlying, well-embedded labour and 
production networks of illicit crop enterprise could not be brought down by 
state action alone. The elimination of kingpins, the closing down of smuggling 
routes and financial networks, or the aerial spraying of illicit cropland at best 
bring only short-term disruption. Such campaigns, even when driven by the 
full force of the state, do not remove the commodity chain; the licit 
infrastructure upon which illicit activities can piggyback; the licit industries 
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that sustain illicit enterprise by providing what it needs; and the financial 
systems, whether formal or informal, that facilitate transactions. Wars on 
drugs can only reconfigure the business, as demonstrated by the material 
presented in this study.  
Chinese authorities themselves have coined a phrase to explain why illicit 
crop growing and processing in marginalised and excluded borderland 
economies display such extraordinary resilience: they call it the ‘ants-moving-
house’ method (Chin and Zhang, 2015), or the atomisation of illicit enterprise 
from large centralised ‘cartels’ to a much greater number of smaller and more 
flexible producers and traffickers, like ants that are dispersed when their 
anthill is ruined. As Roberto Suarez himself said, cartels like La Corporacion 
transform the ant traffic in coca base into a centrally coordinated corporate 
enterprise. Though such centralised organisations can be removed, this does 
not mean that the underlying ‘ant traffic’ can be automatically eliminated. The 
‘ants’ are the criminals-without-borders who, through informalisation via 
dispersal, decentralisation and differentiation — or the adaptive division of 
labour — make criminal enterprise resilient to prohibition.   
This dissertation has presented local contexts and life stories of a set of 
criminal entrepreneurs who engaged in what has become a strategic form of 
commerce that not only shapes particular forms of capital accumulation, but 
also structures the nature of state formation. The Castaños and their vigilantes 
were not just cattle ranchers and fearsome killers — they emerged in a context 
of rising social and political tensions as global capital penetrated the 
Colombian countryside. To reiterate, they effectively contributed, whether 
intentionally or otherwise, to the transformation of a smallholder-led agrarian 
economy into a supply chain for capitalist commercial agriculture on one 
hand, and illicit coca production, on the other. Lo Hsing Han was no simple 
warlord making money from opium, nor was he just an honourable 
middleman, as he claimed, who helped the poor people of Kokang find a way 
to sell their product. Lo not only contributed significantly to the consolidation 
of military control in Myanmar’s restive ethnic homelands. He had a huge 
impact too in the commercialisation and monetisation of borderland 
economies where opium became the ideal crop to grow, as he contributed to 
the creation of conditions for the diffusion of capital into these borderland 
areas.  
There are plenty of parallels between the Quetta Alliance on the Afghan–
Pakistani border and Bolivia’s La Corporacion. They were more than just the 
‘drug cartels’ that the DEA labelled them to be. They were also engaged in 
profitable legal enterprise that moved vehicles, tyres, rubber, or meat across 
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borders — legitimate business that made investments, paid for services and 
goods purchases, and hired workers. In many ways, they were mutual aid 
associations similar to the British East India Company, ‘bodies of merchants 
who came together to reduce risks and internecine competition’. To pigeon-
hole them into the sole status of criminals obscures the larger economic roles 
they played that ultimately explain the resilience of their illicit enterprise. All 
the criminal entrepreneurs examined in this study demonstrate, in one way or 
another, their role as agents of capitalism and state formation.  
The illicit enterprises examined in this study are resilient not just because 
of the innovation and cunning of their entrepreneurs but, more importantly, 
because they continue to be incubators for capitalism, enabling the generation 
of huge cash flows for wealth accumulation. While this wealth accumulation 
distributes relatively little to its peasant producers, what it generates is 
nevertheless sufficient for coping and survival in conditions of 
marginalisation and exclusion. The resilience also comes from a global system 
of intermediaries that enables the massive social reorganisations necessary for 
the reproduction of the illicit enterprise.  
The social reorganisations that have taken place deserve special focus, 
because they are not reversed by drug policy and prohibition. A few elements 
of these reorganisations have been discussed in the different chapters.  
• Land and territory in borderland regions that had little or no 
infrastructure and were typically excluded from circuits of commerce 
and exchange, were repurposed by the displaced and dispossessed 
peasants they absorbed. These peasants grew what was most viable 
under such conditions: crops like opium and coca whose products 
were easy to process, high value, low weight, and not easily spoilt. 
Most importantly, these were crops and products that will always 
have buyers — a critical consideration for subsistence producers.  
These crops and products are also often collected right at the farm 
gate, thus saving farmers the prohibitive costs and logistical problems 
of bringing their products to the markets or bazaars. 
• Poor peasants with few or no productive assets, surviving in 
infrastructure-poor and far-flung areas, and previously considered 
un-creditworthy, were able to access loans, for example to construct 
tube wells or purchase donkeys, if they planted opium and coca. The 
opium- or coca-funded assets were then used for other income-
generating activities. The impact of such loans can be significant. The 
Bolivian coca farmer Paulino Vasquez, who received windfalls from 
the coca boom, dreamt of buying his own land. The land-poor 
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sharecroppers in Helmand transformed deserts into agricultural land. 
Per capita bank deposits increased fivefold during a period of coca-
led growth in Putumayo. Opium transforms into a local currency 
used by poor households in Myanmar and Afghanistan, to be sold in 
possible future emergencies.  
• Over time, illicit crop economies bring in investments, and enable 
boomtowns to emerge, like those on the China–Myanmar border and 
Putumayo. They also change ways in which labour is appropriated, 
by tapping into streams of seasonal migrant workers or those 
displaced from elsewhere by conflict. In Bolivia in the 1980s, coca 
growing became a huge safety net that absorbed recently unemployed 
workers in the country’s collapsing gas and mining sectors.  
While these reorganisations strengthen the foundations of capitalism in 
marginalised and excluded borderlands, it must be reiterated that they are not 
benign changes — they are often coercive in nature. Key examples include 
the emergence of opium brides, when daughters are used to pay for loans in 
a system of cruel and unregulated capitalism; and the plight of migrant 
workers in coca-processing jungle labs who labour under slave conditions and 
are paid in coca paste, not cash.  
7.4 Theoretical and policy implications 
The cases presented in this dissertation on resilience (Chapter 4), careers 
(Chapter 5) and prices (Chapter 6), and particularly the depiction of the 
consumer, intermediary and producer markets in illicit drugs (Chapter 3) 
validate many of the theoretical constructs elaborated in Chapter 1. Across 
these narratives, the notion of interdependency has been the glue. 
Markets are not based on free exchange. Rather, the primary building 
blocks of a market, whether licit or illicit, are the social and economic 
relationships that emerge from interdependent actors, typically guided by the 
visible hand of power. The so-called ‘invisible hand’ of market exchange is 
actually a form of coordination that emerges from organic solidarity, the 
absence of which would cause the price system to collapse. Illicit enterprise 
disproves notions that profit maximisation can only be delivered via 
economic efficiencies. A new form of economics takes shape — one that 
moves away from prices and the invisible hand and converges instead on 
political entrepreneurship and the visible hand. 
The cases of the Castaños and Lo Hsing Han show how the reproduction 
of criminal entrepreneurs is in many ways a social consequence of the 
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disruptions created by agrarian change and capital accumulation: both were 
able to easily recruit young men of violence into the ranks of their paramilitary 
militias because there were ready pools of displaced labour with nowhere to 
go, who had been uprooted and displaced from the smallholder peasant 
economy. It is when the demand for the services of men of violence becomes 
recurrent — and can be met — that an enterprise in violence emerges.   
Illicit enterprise and actors also normalise. Lo Hsing Han successfully 
transitioned from militia leader to drug lord to a tycoon of licit business, 
described by no less than The Economist as a ‘pillar of the economy’. Carlos 
Castaño’s attempt to transform paramilitaries into a political movement, and 
the subsequent sale of AUC franchises by Vicente, normalised their presence 
and roles to a certain degree. Most importantly, Chapter 3 expounded at 
length on how illicit enterprise, like its licit counterparts, could expand with 
ease across borders, accumulate capital, create employment, make 
investments, and generate chains of economic activity. 
The question that remains therefore is how all these factors impact on 
governance over the livelihoods of poor subsistence peasants drawn to illicit 
crops to survive. This dissertation states that there is governance over 
livelihoods when subsistence producers are able to use their agency to 
negotiate the terms of development with state and/or market institutions on:  
• Restraining violence and enjoying protection of their property, assets 
and rights (or, at a minimum, avoiding criminalisation and 
stigmatisation); 
• Accessing the economic means to reproduce themselves (or avoid 
displacement and dispossession); and 
• Accessing justice, even in its non-formal and unorthodox 
configurations. 
The cases in this dissertation, particularly in Chapter 4 (resilience), show a 
duality. Criminal entrepreneurs can both practise and restrain violence as well 
as both threaten and protect rights. They can destroy or cut off access to the 
economic means for reproduction, while simultaneously becoming the source 
of investments and employment that can save moribund rural economies 
from collapsing. They can cause injustice in much the same way that they can 
provide privatised justice, which can often be more effective than the justice 
that the state provides. In other words, as Goodhand (2009) and De Danieli 
(2015) note, they can be a source of both order and disorder.  
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It is important to reiterate the conclusion of Chapter 4: that although illicit 
economies and their actors may enable excluded and marginalised 
communities to cope and survive, there are costs involved that cannot be 
brushed aside. Behind the enterprises, commodity chains and social networks 
that make up illicit economies lies a form of capitalism that is by nature cruel, 
criminal, unregulated and exploitative.  
How then may the governance challenges be addressed? Yashar (2018) 
points out that policy approaches adopted by countries for tackling violence 
related to drug trafficking and gangs are not normatively or politically ideal 
choices. Some countries respond with policy avoidance or equivocation, 
which contributes to a permissive environment for illicit actors. Others 
pursue punitive approaches, such as the aggressive, authoritarian mano dura or 
kingpin strategies. As has been shown in this study, such approaches 
historically deliver only short-term disruptions in illicit enterprises and may 
even, in certain cases, impede longer-term solutions. A third approach entails 
engaging in direct negotiations, leading to both formal and informal 
agreements. A fourth policy approach is a combination of rule-of-law 
accountability and social prevention and rehabilitation; this is the approach 
which, Yashar argues, holds democratic promise (2018: loc. 13463–13561).  
Some additional approaches may also be examined. First, it is worth 
considering whether Bolivia’s experience of ‘rough peace’ and sindicato 
governance may be replicated. Indeed, Bolivia provides an important contrast 
to Colombia: it is a main producer of coca and cocaine paste, yet it has no 
active insurgencies or criminal cartels in its illicit-crop-producing areas. A 
number of scholars have investigated why this should be. Ursula Durand-
Ochoa suggests that the construction of a cocalero-campesino identity among 
Bolivia’s displaced and dispossessed underclass played a role. Cocaleros — a 
mix of indigenous communities, peasants displaced by agricultural 
commercialisation, and unemployed workers from the collapsed mining and 
gas industries — constructed a wider and more inclusive political identity by 
raising issues beyond coca. They represented the voice of the excluded, and 
deliberately ‘accentuated, attenuated, and redefined’ that identity in strategic 
calculations to promote unity and attract support. In other words, they were 
able to build a social movement that was not only strong enough to defend 
itself against violence from rural elites but was also sophisticated enough to 
accumulate political power, to the extent that they were able to elect one of 
their own, Evo Morales, as President of Bolivia in historic elections in 
December 2005 (Durand-Ochoa, 2012: 196).  
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Stewart Prest, who did fieldwork in the coca-producing Chapare, coined 
the term ‘rough peace’ to describe Bolivia’s avoidance of armed conflict in a 
contentious political context. He argues that certain forms of locally 
embedded non-state governance institutions — such as the sindicatos or the 
coca workers unions that assumed governance functions — can play an 
important role in resolving collective action problems, and hence mitigate the 
likelihood of armed violence (Prest, 2015). As such, how can the usually 
overlooked ‘intermediation role of strong local, self-help, and typically non-
state institutions in peasant communities’ be better enabled so marginalised 
households can assert their interests vis. the state and market forces 
(Mortensen and Gutierrez, 2019: 63)?   
Second, attention ought to be focused too on how protection enjoyed by 
criminal entrepreneurs may be better identified, managed and progressively 
reduced. The mafia may be providers of protection, but they also need 
protection in order to survive and thrive in the long run, a situation best 
captured by the notion of interdependence. The Castaños, despite their 
demonstrated capacity for viciousness, still needed allies locally and 
nationally. They were sustained by their links to local ranchers, businessmen 
and banana contract growers, groups like ACDEGAM, and most 
importantly, the military. Suarez himself theorised about protection: it was his 
belief that profitability would not last without protection, and that it was 
necessary to keep the right partners and allies to continue in the illicit trade. 
Lal Jan Ishaqzai lived openly in Kandahar under the protection of Wali Karzai 
until the president’s half-brother was assassinated. How could such 
arrangements be better addressed?  
Finally, it is necessary to cast a critical eye on the role of the US, which has 
used its vast powers to compel producer countries to criminalise and pursue 
a hard-line approach to illicit drugs. This needs to be re-evaluated. The US 
government sits on a wealth of data with which to rethink this long-standing 
approach that continually fails to deliver on its promises. What also clearly 
emerges is the inconsistency of US policy, with protection being extended to 
their allies in the war against communism, even if those allies were the targets 
of its war on drugs. 
In sum, the single stories, simplifying fictions, and the senso comune of 
conventional policy understanding need to be replaced by a readiness to 
tackle the messy politics and governance challenges of criminals-without-
borders and their enterprise.  
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The following annexes provide the datasets and tables from which the graphs 
and charts in Chapters 3 and 6 of this study were drawn.  
Figure 3.6 data and sources 




8 Annexes: Data Notes and Tables  
Year Afgh Myan 
Notes and Sources (list of source docu-
ments) 
1985 15000 71000 INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 (Myanmar); 
66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1986 14250 80785 INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 (Myanmar); 
66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia); WDR 1999: 23 and 42.  
1987 20125 84161 INCSR 1989:15; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; and INCSR 
2002: ii-22 (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bolivia, Colombia); 
WDR 1999: pages 23 (Afghanistan and Myanmar); 42 
(Bolivia and Colombia) 
1988 25571 107771 INCSR 1989: 15; INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1998 Cultiva-
tion; WDR 1999: 23; WDR 2001: 60; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bo-
livia and Colombia) 
1989 24519 144394 INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; INCSR 
1991:21; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001:60; WDR 
2002: 47; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23  
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1990 23219 149215 INCSR 1991: 21; INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultiva-
tion; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 
Part 1: 23 
1991 31594 158889 INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 
and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; 
INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1992 30656 153970 INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 
and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; 
INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1993 35038 156338 INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 
and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; 
INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1994 47976 150292 INCSR 1995: 26; INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 
and 42; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 
Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29 
1995 47084 154070 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 
2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1996 48658 163044 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 
2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1997 49853 155150 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 
2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1998 53910 130267 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 
2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1999 73243 89500 INCSR 1999: 21; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 
Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
2000 74551 108700 WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 
2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138 





2001 4646 105000 WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 
138 
2002 52425 79700 INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 
and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2003 70500 54665 NCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 
and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2004 156233 41467 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2005 106040 37120 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 2010, 
VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2006 169560 21200 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 2010, 
VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2007 196600 26360 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 2010, 
VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2008 157000 26100 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 2010, 
VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2009 107350 25017 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 2010, 
VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2010 121000 41800 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 62 
and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2011 123000 40050 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 62 
and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2012 167000 51000 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 62 
and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2013 203500 54400 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 62 
and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2014 217500 54800 WDR 2019b: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2015 192000 55500 WDR 2019b: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2016 204000 44800 WDR 2019b: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2017 328500 41000 WDR 2019b: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2018 263000 37300 WDR 2019b: 62 and 67 
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Figure 3.7 data and sources 
Area (hectares) in coca cultivation, Colombia, 1985–2018, as estimated in 
















 1985 15500 
 
1986 14000 24240 
1987 25450 22500 
1988 31743 34000 
1989 42523 42400 
1990 40400 40100 
1991 37662 37500 
1992 37237 37100 
1993 39799 39700 
1994 45501 44700 
1995 50900 50900 
1996 67200 67200 
1997 79491 79414 
1998 101800 101800 
1999 122500 152584 
2000 136200 160286 
2001 164200 144801 
2002 144450 102000 
2003 113838 86000 
2004 114050 80000 
2005 144000 86000 
2006 157100 78000 
2007 167000 99000 
2008 119000 81000 
2009 116000 70500 
2010 87143 60333 
2011 83000 64000 




2012 78000 48000 
2013 80500 48000 
2014 112000 69000 
2015 159000 96000 
2016 188000 146000 
2017 209000 171000 
2018 208000 169000 
 
 
INCSR sources: INCSR 1986: 91; INCSR 
1989: 15; INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1991: 
21; INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998: pdf; 
INCSR 1999: 76; INCSR 2000: 63; INCSR 
2001: 99; INCSR 2002 II-2; INCSR 2004 
Table; INCSR 2007: 29;  INCSR 2008: 
129; INCSR 2009; INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 
23; INCSR 2011, VOL. 1: 201; INCSR 
2012, VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 2013, VOL. 1: 
103; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 
2015, VOL. 1: 29; INCSR 2016, VOL. 1: 
30; INCSR 2018, VOL. 1: 26; INCSR 2019, 
VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 2020, VOL. 1: 23 
 
WDR sources: WDR 1999: 41; WDR 2000: 
160; WDR 2001: 67; WDR 2001: 67b; 
WDR 2002: 55; WDR 2003: 23; WDR 
2004, VOL. 1: 95; WDR2005: 207; WDR 
2006 VOL. 1: 81; WDR 2007: 64; WDR 
2010: 161; WDR 2012: 35; WDR 2015 An-





Figure 3.8 data and sources 
Area (hectares) in coca cultivation, Bolivia, 1985–2018, as estimated in INCSR 
and WDR. However, Painter’s data on area under cultivation from 1963–1990 
have also been included in the table, to provide continuity and contrast to the 
INCSR and WDR data. Note that Painter’s data have not been discussed at all 
in the text of Chapter 3.  If Painter’s data are included in Figure 3.8, the graph 






Year INCSR WDR Painter 
1963   3000 
1964   3100 
1965   3197 
1966   3189 
1967   3980 
1968   2600 
1969   2600 
1970   4450 
1971   5340 
1972   6140 
1973   7160 
1974   7900 
1975   11285 
1976   12000 
1977   12300 
1978   18860 
1979   18860 
1980   22788 
1981   27704 
1982   31459 
1983   35475 
1984 30254  39750 
1985 34250  44286 
1986 30254 25800 49082 
1987 41050 29300 60710 
1988 49259 42900 57890 
1989 53104 48900 55450 
1990 52500 48800 47644  
Year INCSR WDR Painter 
1991 50184 46400  
1992 46207 43825  
1993 47500 45700  
1994 48232 46767  
1995 48600 47400  
1996 48100 46900  
1997 45800 44820  
1998 38000 37000  
1999 21800 21800  
2000 17100 14600  
2001 19900 19900  
2002 23840 23700  
2003 24250 23600  
2004 24600 27700  
2005 25786 25400  
2006 24571 27500  
2007 27143 28900  
2008 28857 30500  
2009 30714 30900  
2010 29917 31000  
2011 26143 27200  
2012 25000 25300  
2013 27000 23000  
2014 35000 20400  
2015 36500 20200  
2016 37500 23100  
2017 31000 24500  
2018 32900 23100  
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INCSR sources: INCSR 1986: 91; INCSR 1989: 15; INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1991: 21; INCSR 
1995: 26; INCSR 1998: pdf; INCSR 1999: 76; INCSR 2000: 63; INCSR 2001: 99; 
INCSR 2002 II-2; INCSR 2004 Table; INCSR 2007: 29; INCSR 2008: 129; INCSR 
2009; INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; INCSR 2011, VOL. 1, VOL. 1: 201; INCSR 2012, 
VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 2013, VOL. 1: 103; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 2015, VOL. 
1: 29; INCSR 2016, VOL. 1: 30; INCSR 2018, VOL. 1: 26; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 25; 
INCSR 2020, VOL. 1: 23 
WDR Sources: WDR 1999: 41; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 67; WDR 2002: 55; WDR 
2003: 23; WDR 2004, VOL. 1: 95; WDR 2005 VOL 2: 207; WDR 2006 VOL. 1: 81; 
WDR 2007: 64; WDR 2010: 161; WDR 2012: 35; WDR 2015 Annex: iii; WDR 2018 




Figure 3.9a and 3.9b data and sources 
Comparison of area under cultivation (a) in Bolivia and Colombia (INCSR 
sources only) Figure 3.9a; and (b) in Bolivia and Colombia (WDR sources 











   
1985 34250 15500 
  
1986 30254 14000 25800 24240 
1987 41050 25450 29300 22500 
1988 49259 31743 42900 34000 
1989 53104 42523 48900 42400 
1990 52500 40400 48800 40100 
1991 50184 37662 46400 37500 
1992 46207 37237 43825 37100 
1993 47500 39799 45700 39700 
1994 48232 45501 46767 44700 
1995 48600 50900 47400 50900 
1996 48100 67200 46900 67200 
1997 45800 79491 44820 79414 
1998 38000 101800 37000 101800 
1999 21800 122500 21800 152584 
2000 17100 136200 14600 160286 
2001 19900 164200 19900 144801 
2002 23840 144450 23700 102000 
2003 24250 113838 23600 86000 
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2004 24600 114050 27700 80000 
2005 25786 144000 25400 86000 
2006 24571 157100 27500 78000 
2007 27143 167000 28900 99000 
2008 28857 119000 30500 81000 
2009 30714 116000 30900 70500 
2010 29917 87143 31000 60333 
2011 26143 83000 27200 64000 
2012 25000 78000 25300 48000 
2013 27000 80500 23000 48000 
2014 35000 112000 20400 69000 
2015 36500 159000 20200 96000 
2016 37500 188000 23100 146000 
2017 31000 209000 24500 171000 




INCSR sources: INCSR 1986: 91; INCSR 1989: 15; INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1991: 21;  
INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998: pdf; INCSR 1999: 76; INCSR 2000: 63; INCSR 
2001: 99; INCSR 2002 II-2; INCSR 2004 Table; INCSR 2007: 29;  INCSR 2008: 
129; INCSR 2009; INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; INCSR 2011, VOL. 1: 201; INCSR 
2012, VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 2013, VOL. 1: 103; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 
2015, VOL. 1: 29; INCSR 2016, VOL. 1: 30; INCSR 2018, VOL. 1: 26; INCSR 2019, 
VOL. 1: 25; INCSR 2020, VOL. 1:23  
WDR Sources: WDR 1999: 41; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 67; WDR 2002: 55; WDR 
2003: 23; WDR 2004, VOL. 1: 95; WDR 2005 VOL 2: 207; WDR 2006 VOL. 1: 81; 
WDR 2007: 64; WDR 2010: 161; WDR 2012: 35;  WDR 2015 Annex: iii; WDR 
2018 Booklet 2: 52;  UNODC July 2017b: 1-3; UNODC August 2019a:13; 
UNODC August 2019b: 12  




Figure 3.10 data and source 
Comparison of changes in area under cultivation and coca leaf production in 




Cultivation hectares Production tonnes 
Year Bolivia Colombia Peru Bolivia Colombia Peru 
1986 25800 24240 150400 71311 18422 150400 
1987 29300 22500 167000 80985 17100 167000 
1988 36900 34000 190000 101992 25480 190000 
1989 40900 42400 200000 113048 32224 200000 
1990 38300 40100 210000 105861 42257 210000 
1991 35900 37500 161300 99228 45172 242000 
1992 33500 37100 120000 92594 44930 240000 
1993 35200 39700 129000 97293 45422 223900 
1994 36100 44700 108800 99780 71958 162000 
1995 36600 50900 106500 101162 80706 159800 
1996 36100 67200 75000 99780 108910 131000 
1997 36000 79436 72262 99504 129481 130200 
1998 28000 101800 51000 77392 165934 95600 
 
 
Source: WDR 1999: 42 
 
 









Figure 3.11 data and sources 
Estimated production of dried opium (tonnes) in Afghanistan and Myanmar (all 
sources are the same as in Figure 3.6)  
 
 
Afghanistan Myanmar  Sources 
1983 488 550 INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 
(Myanmar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1984 160 637 INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 
(Myanmar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1985 417 490 INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 
(Myanmar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1986 405 817 INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 
(Myanmar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia); 
WDR 1999: 23 and 42.  
1987 621 931 INCSR 1989:15; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; and 
INCSR 2002: ii-22 (Afghanistan, Myanmar, 
Bolivia, Colombia); WDR 1999: pages 23 
(Afghanistan and Myanmar); 42 (Bolivia and 
Colombia) 
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1988 799 1221 INCSR 1989: 15; INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 
1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23; WDR 
2001: 60; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23 (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bo-
livia and Colombia) 
1989 808 2122 INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; 
INCSR 1991:21; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 
2001:60; WDR 2002: 47; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23  
1990 826 2017 INCSR 1991: 21; INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 
1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; 
WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 
1: 23 
1991 1078 2104 INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; 
WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 
67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-
22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1992 1139 2048 INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; 
WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 
67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-
22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1993 1302 2281 INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; 
WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 
67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-
22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1994 2046 1831 INCSR 1995: 26; INCRS 1998 Cultivation; 
WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2000: 160; 
WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 
1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29 
1995 1853 1964 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 
42; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; 
WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1996 2110 2116 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 
42; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; 
WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 




and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1997 2426 1982 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 
42; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; 
WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1998 2360 1502 INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 
42; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; 
WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
1999 3675 982 INCSR 1999: 21; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 
2001: 60; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 
2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; 
INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
2000 3439 1086 WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 
55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 
1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 
138 
2001 130 981 WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
2002 2339 729 INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; 
WDR 2010: 137 and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2003 3233 647 NCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 
2010: 137 and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2004 4450 357 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; 
WDR 2014: vi 
2005 4325 353 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; 
INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; 
INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2006 5758 281 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; 
INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; 
INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2007 7800 384 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; 
INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; 
INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
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2008 6100 382 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; 
INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; 
INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2009 5133 308 INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; 
INCSR 2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; 
INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25 
2010 3400 555 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 
2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 
and 25 
2011 5100 530 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 
2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 
and 25 
2012 4000 690 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 
2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 
and 25 
2013 5500 833 WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 
2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 
and 25 
2014 6350 785 WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 
23 and 25 
2015 3700 647 WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 
23 and 25 
2016 5300 834 WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 
23 and 25 
2017 9070 550 WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 
23 and 25 








Figure 3.12 and 3.13 data and sources 
Two different stories on coca production in Colombia 
 
 
Comparison of production estimates in Bolivia 






Bolivia Colombia Sources 
1983 32500 11,215  INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 (Myan-
mar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1984 41377 11,080  INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 (Myan-
mar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1985 43150 11,867  INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 (Myan-
mar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia)  
1986 50119 11,806  INCSR 1986: pages 234 (Afghanistan); 179 (Myan-
mar); 66 (Bolivia) and 91 (Colombia); WDR 1999: 
23 and 42.  
1987 66481 18,688  INCSR 1989:15; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; and 
INCSR 2002: ii-22 (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bolivia, 
Colombia); WDR 1999: pages 23 (Afghanistan and 
Myanmar); 42 (Bolivia and Colombia) 
1988 75127 25,267  INCSR 1989: 15; INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1998 Cul-
tivation; WDR 1999: 23; WDR 2001: 60; INCSR 
2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 (Afghani-
stan, Myanmar, Bolivia and Colombia) 
1989 78309 33,484  INCSR 1990: 19; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; INCSR 
1991:21; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001:60; 




WDR 2002: 47; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 
Part 1: 23  
1990 79033 36,495  INCSR 1991: 21; INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cul-
tivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 
and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23 
1991 77966 35,130  INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; WDR 
1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23 
1992 81837 34,701  INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; WDR 
1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23 
1993 86012 36,238  INCSR 1995: 26; INCSR 1998 Cultivation; WDR 
1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23 
1994 90920 48,925  INCSR 1995: 26; INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 
1999: 23 and 42; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 
and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; 
and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29 
1995 86796 137,140  INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; 
WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 
and 138 
1996 77842 180,980  INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; 
WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 
and 138 
1997 73367 209,902  INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; 
WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 
and 138 
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1998 55621 266,144  INCRS 1998 Cultivation; WDR 1999: 23 and 42; 
WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 
2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 
2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 
and 138 
1999 22800 362,066  INCSR 1999: 21; WDR 2000: 160; WDR 2001: 60; 
WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and 
INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 
2010: 137 and 138 
2000 20100 395,360  WDR 2001: 60 and 67; WDR 2002: 47 and 55; 
INCSR 2002: ii-22; and INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; 
INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138 
2001 22560 308,925  WDR 2002: 47 and 55; INCSR 2002: ii-22; and 
INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 
2010: 137 and 138 
2002 24867 185,009  INCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 
2010: 137 and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2003 26003 150,775  NCSR 2004 Part 1: 23; INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 
137 and 138; WDR 2014: vi 
2004 20400 136,154  INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; WDR 
2014: vi 
2005 32880 152,272  INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 
2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 
1: 25 
2006 35480 153,315  INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 
2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 
1: 25 
2007 37450 148,000  INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 
2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 
1: 25 
2008 39700 100,950  INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 
2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 
1: 25 
2009 38600 165,100  INCSR 2007: 29; WDR 2010: 137 and 138; INCSR 
2010, VOL. 1: 23; WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 
1: 25 
2010 37450 165,333  WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 
62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 




2011 36500 137,800  WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 
62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2012 31450 150,050  WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 
62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2013 24300 208,200  WDR 2014: vi; INCSR 2014, VOL. 1: 25; WDR 2019: 
62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 25 
2014 33100 308,500  WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 
25 
2015 32500 454,000  WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 
25 
2016 38000 606,100  WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 
25 
2017 39850 930,900  WDR 2019: 62 and 67; INCSR 2019, VOL. 1: 23 and 
25 
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Figure 6.6 data and sources 
Comparison of farm-gate prices ($/kg) of dried opium in Myanmar as presented 
in different UN reports 1986 to 2001 
 
 









1986 103 220   
1987 126 249   
1988 143 260   
1989 146 243   
1990 267 249 242  
1991 123 170 165 185 
1992 92 120 116 130 
1993 100 123 119 134 


























1994 153 178 173 194 
1995 252 277 269 302 
1996 206 214 208 233 
1997  279 124 139 
1998   64 196 
1999   128 213 
2000   142 261 
2001    222 









Coca Base Coca Base Coca Base 
















1990 658 638 
 
1991 662 642 721 
1992 612 594 666 
1993 883 857 962 
1994 1432 1389 1560 




1995 609 591 664 
1996 831 807 906 
1997 1127 779 874 
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Figure 6.9 data and sources 














































Sources: WDR 1996 Statistical Analy-
sis: 36; WDR 1999: 77; WDR 2001: 
73; WDR 2002: 62; UNODC 2003; 
WDR 2003: 174; WDR 2004, VOL. 1: 
74; WDR 2005 VOL 2: 15; WDR 
2007: 201; UN Drug Statistics 2008: 
30; WDR 2009: 193; WDR 2014: vi; 




Figure 6.10 data and sources 






1986 2.97 WDR 1999: 81 
1987 2.87 WDR 1999: 81 
1988 1.38 WDR 1999: 81 
1989 1.31 WDR 1999: 81 
1990 0.99 WDR 1999: 81; WDR 2001: 73; and WDR 
2004, Vol.2: 49 
1991 1.20 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 Vol. 2: 
243 
1992 1.07 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 
1993 1.39 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 




1994 1.22 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 
1995 1.52 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 
1996 1.20 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 
1997 1.56 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 
1998 1.55 WDR 1999: p. 81; WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 
62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 
243 
1999 3.18 WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 62; WDR 2003: 
202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 243 
2000 5.71 WDR 2001: 73; WDR 2002: 62; WDR 2003: 
202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 243 
2001 5.58 WDR 2002: 62; WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 
2004 VOL 1: 243 
2002 5.60 WDR 2003: 202 and WDR 2004 VOL 1: 243 
2003 5.40 WDR 2004 VOL 1: 243 
2004 4.95 WDR 2005 VOL 2 Vol 2: 225 
2005 4.30 WDR 2006 Vol 2: 253 
2006 3.55 WDR 2007: 201; WDR 2008:233 
2007 4.10 WDR 2008:233; WDR 2009: 194 
2008 5.40 WDR 2009: 194; WDR 2010: 259 
2009 4.90 WDR 2011: 244; UNODC September 2011: 4 
2010 6.35 UNODC September 2011: 4; UNODC Septem-
ber 2012: 5 
2011 7.80 UNODC September 2012: 5 
2012 7.40 UNODC June 2014a: 1 














2013 7.80 UNODC June 2014a: 1 
2014 8.30 UNODC July 2016: 14 
2015 9.40 UNODC July 2016: 14:  UNODC July 2017a: 14 
2016 8.10 UNODC July 2017a: 14; UNODC August 2019 
2017 9.40 UNODC August 2019 
2018 12.50 UNODC August 2019: vi 




Figure 6.11 data and sources 
Bolivia’s coca leaf prices compared to production levels 
 
 
Year Tonnes Sources 
1986 71311 WDR, 1999: 41 
1987 80985 WDR, 1999: 41 
1988 90741 WDR, 1999: 41; WDR 2001: 67;  
1989 89883 




WDR, 1999: 41; WDR 2001: 67; WDR, 
2002: 55; WDR 2004: 95 
1991 80654 
WDR, 1999: 41; WDR 2001: 67; WDR, 
2002: 55; WDR 2004: 95 
1992 81837 
WDR, 1999: 41: WDR 2001: 67; WDR, 
2002: 55; WDR 2004: 95 
1993 86012 
WDR, 1999: 41: WDR 2001: 67; WDR, 
2002: 55; WDR 2004: 95 
1994 90909 
WDR, 1999: 41: WDR 2001: 67; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 2004: 
95 




WDR, 1999: 41: WDR 2001: 67; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 2004: 
95 
1996 77568 
WDR, 1999: 41; WDR 2001: 67; WDR 
2000: 160; WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 2004: 
95 
1997 73040 
WDR, 1999: 41: WDR 2001: 67; WDR 
2000: 160: WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 2004: 
95 
1998 55349 
WDR, 1999: 41: WDR 2001: 67; WDR 
2000: 160: WDR, 2002: 55 WDR 2004: 
95  
1999 22800 
WDR 2000: 160; WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 
2004: 95 
2000 13400 
WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 2004: 95; WDR 
2005 VOL 2: 207 
2001 20200 
WDR, 2002: 55; WDR 2004: 95; WDR 
2005 VOL 2: 207 
2002 19800 WDR 2004: 95; WDR 2005 VOL 2: 207 
2003 23800 WDR 2004: 95; WDR 2005 VOL 2: 207 
2004 34750 
WDR 2005 VOL 2: 207; WDR 2006 VOL. 
1: 81; DR 2007: 64 
2005 28740 
WDR 2006: 81; DR 2007: 64; WDR 2010: 
161 
2006 33200 
WDR 2006 VOL. 1: 81; DR 2007: 64; 
WDR 2010: 161 
2007 36400 WDR 2010: 161; WDR 2012: 35 
2008 39400 WDR 2010: 161; WDR 2012: 35 
2009 40133 WDR 2010: 161; WDR 2012: 35 
2010 40900 WDR 2012: 35; WDR 2015 Annex: iii 
2011 33500 WDR 2015 Annex: iii 
2012 30400 WDR 2015 Annex: iii 
2013 24300 WDR 2015 Annex: iii 
2014 33100 UNODC July 2016: 14 




2015 32500 UNODC July 2016: 14 
2016 36750 UNODC July 2017a 
2017 39850 
UNODC July 2017a; UNODC August 
2019: vi 
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